[Iain]

This came up in another thread, and so to separate those issues (those of the atomic bomb and appeasement) I thought I would start this thread. It appears that it is a huge issue, some trace the ''feminisation'' of British culture to this point while others argue that it was fundamentally wrong. I have a lot more respect for the second position than the first.

This is the conclusion of a 6,000 word essay I am presently writing about the policies of the 1930's towards Hitler. Read and respond in the same manner as it is written. That kind of saves on the whole personal abuse thing.

--------------

Hindsight has judged Chamberlain guilty of the appeasement of the worst regime in history. Chamberlain’s actions after Munich, and during that meeting, have confirmed his guilt in the eyes of many. From that meeting in 1938 he made mistakes in compounded them with a mixture of optimism - of peace and defeatism.

Chamberlain is most often judged on the way his actions look to us now. Certainly Eden never forgot the way appeasement came to look after 1930, possibly a major cause of his hasty actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Chamberlain was considering peace and not placing the country on a full war footing right up until the power of his administration was broken by Kingsley Wood and others in May 1940. In the light of more complete knowledge of the scope and scale of the ‘achievements’ of the Nazi regime, and the failure of Chamberlain to properly respond to the outbreak of war, Chamberlain’s policy prior to Munich began to look like that of a coward, a fool or a weakling.

Had Chamberlains actions been successful, had a war between Britain and Germany been avoided, then Chamberlain would be remembered with Gandhi as one of the most successful advocates of peace in human history. This ignores the realities of Hitlerian Germany, realities that made Chamberlain unlikely to succeed. He was even open to an application for peace from Germany after the outbreak of war. By now he was decided; “He [Hitler] must either die, or go to St. Helena” (Gilbert and Gott. 1963. pp. 346). There is a marked lack of reality to modern eyes in this hope, and increasingly Chamberlain was becoming distant from political and public opinion by this point, and it led to his downfall. By 1939 Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that:

We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi government. As long as that government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. (UE. pp.247)

Prior to 1939 however, Chamberlain was very much in line with public opinion. There was much, and still is much, criticism of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the later Locarno Pact. This treaty led to a demilitarised Rhineland, and Germany split by a Polish area of land that gave Poland access to the sea and control of Danzig. There were strict limitations on German military power and the German economy was arguably stifled by the reparation repayments demanded. By the 1930’s many members of the British public and press felt that the Treaty of Versailles had gone too far and blamed the French for this. Too often critics of appeasement have blamed Chamberlain for conceding to German in 1936 and after, and simultaneously blamed Britain and France for the harsh terms of Versailles. Some might agree that Chamberlain’s actions over the Rhineland and German rearmament were carried out in the light of the widely held belief that Versailles was too draconian.

Chamberlain is damned in the popular memory for his failure to stand up to the tyrant that Hitler was. The Nazi anti-Semitic policies and their repercussions, such as Kristallnacht, were known. Anti-Semitism was not exclusive to Germany at this time. In fact some attribute the fall of Hore-Belisha as Minister of War in 1940 to the fact that he was Jewish. Wedgwood had to tell the Commons on January the 16th “The Prime Minister denies that the Secretary of State was dismissed because he was a Jew. He cannot deny that the prejudice against him was because he was a Jew.” (ibid. pp. 348). Hitler was not the first, nor the last, tyrant to be given free reign by many in the international community. Britain was not the first, nor the last country to fail to fulfil the spirit of its obligations and treaties to another country like it did to Czechoslovakia. Churchill was nearly a lone voice when he said of T. E. Lawrence: “In Colonel Lawrence we have lost one of the greatest beings of our time…I hoped to see him quit his retirement and take a commanding part in the dangers now facing this country.” Churchill was out of government and out on a limb during most of the 1930s. His actions over India and his parliamentary habits had not endeared him to many. He nearly lost the support of his constituency in 1938 when he “assailed the ‘Prince of Peace’, as Chamberlain temporarily appeared to most local Conservatives”. (Jenkins. 2001. pp.530) Gilbert and Gott wrote in the first page of the ‘Acknowledgements’ of their classic “The Appeasers” written in 1963:

We have been inspired by the example of Englishmen who refused to be bullied by Nazi bombast…who determined to stand up to that bully…and who urged England not to compromise with evil…We owe a special debt to these men, who by their example, convinced us of the need to tell this sad story of British weakness, not haltingly, but forthrightly. For it is also a story of British strength in the end; of the defeat of appeasement; of the triumph of honour.

However Keith Robbins writes “Appeasement was not a ‘success’ long enough to allow contemporaries to praise its merits in any depth…there were some [contemporary] historians who believed that government policy was broadly on the right lines” (Robbins. 1988. pp1) Herein is the difficulty that faces those who wish to establish the merits of appeasement. The judgement made by many is made in the light of events that occurred after 1939-40, those events being the defeat of the allies that led to Dunkirk, the Holocaust, the triumphant allied victory that led to the end of the Nazi regime and others. It is easy to see pure evil in action when watching the Nuremberg speeches on television now. At the time however it was not so obvious.

The actions of the British Government over the Rhineland, the Anschluss and even Czechoslovakia were thought by some to actually increase the likelihood of peace in Europe. Now those events are seen as evidence of Hitler’s belligerence, at the time they were seen as a shift in the balance of European power, and not necessarily an unwelcome one. Apart from germanophobes such as Vansittart, many saw Germany as Britain’s natural European ally and blamed France for its pitiful state. The aggressiveness of its government, and some of that government’s internal policies, were not welcome, but were seen as a sort of “youthful exuberance” that would calm down as the regime matured.

Failure to prepare is another charge often laid it Chamberlain’s door. Britain was not on a full war footing by 1940, but to attribute that entirely to Chamberlain is not entirely accurate. Kingsley Wood consisted asked for more money in his role as Secretary of State for Air, Simon told him that ‘such spending might lead to inflation, “a rise in prices, in wages, in interest rates” and involve “some real injury to our financial strength.”’

Allowing Germany its claims over the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland and colonies without war was thought a way to redress wrongs, restore Germany, to avoid the break up of the British Empire, but most importantly: to avoid another European war. It is easy to see how this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Nazis, Hitler and their ambitions. Who understands that regime even now?

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Any proof reading posts are also welcome, I have cut and paste this straight from Word.

[Iain]

No-one?

[Old Fuff]

Socialists of that period, in both Britain and France tended to see the world through rose-colored glasses, and the Communists that were aware of the alliance between the USSR and Germany supported Hitler’s ambitions so long as they were not directed toward the “Mother State.”

Consequently, then as now the solution to disputes were to be sought through diplomacy rather then armed force. In England armed force was largely a joke because the Socialist governments throughout the 20’s and 30’s cut military spending at all levels so they could support ever-larger welfare programs in an era of economic depression. Consequently Chamberlain perused appeasement because he didn’t have any other realistic options. Would he done otherwise if the necessary military assets had been available? I doubt it. He was after all, a Socialist.

[CZ52GUY]

While I don't have the time to provide a detailed critique, I would differ with you based on your premise...that being, if Hitler could have been contained, than all would have been well, and Chamberlain would have been thought of in a far different light.

Hitler then, as I believe Saddam was up until March 19th 2003, was a threat. History proves it, in both instances.

Chamberlain deserves to be judged on the results of his actions, as do all of us, not what might have been.

We have no reason to believe that a containment policy would have prevented the holocaust.

The good people of Czechoslavakia and Austria did not choose that tyrant, Chamberlain had no standing to make that choice for them.

Comparisons with Ghandi who fought for liberations of oppressed people are hardly credible with one who sought to doom millions to live under the thumb of Hitler indefinitely, for his own convenience.

Bottom line, evil can never be legitimately appeased because the bargaining position is clearly weighted toward the aggressor. Evil must always be confronted because the alternative is to depend on the good graces of one that is not good.

Your essay is thoughtful and well written with arguments that are morally and logically flawed...because it appears you seek to apologize for Chamberlain's negligence in a similar manner as he tried to convince the world of the merits of leaving millions to the tender mercies of a tyrant whose character (albeit the extent thereof was not quantified) was already known.

Regards,

CZ52'

[Mike Irwin]

Chill, St Johns...

I'm still digesting.

[Iain]

Fuff - Chamberlain was not a socialist, he was a Conservative with a very large capital 'C'. Armament policy in the 20's and 30's was based on the '10 Year Rule', that being that there was to be no major war in the next ten years. Something of an assumption. It must also be borne in mind that military technology was moving at a very fast rate at this time, Italy had the most up to date air force in 1937 it was out of date by 1939.

CZ - you seem to have made a large assumption. That being that I am out to defend Chamberlain. Defend him perhaps from his most unfair of critics by being a milder and I think more accurate critic.

I have clearly identified flaws within Chamberlains logic and the rest of the dissertation will/has outlined these further. I did not suggest that containment was a viable policy or that it would have prevented the Holocaust. The atmosphere of Gandhi was prevalent at the time, there is no doubt that Gandhis movement was in the minds of many.

Britain was not an international policeman at the time, its power was on the wane. Many Americans do not want to get involved where they are not threatened today, many Britons did not then or now.

I personally think that a lot of assumptions are made about the policies of Chamberlain, yes Chamberlain knew about the expansionist passages in Mein Kampf and the Hitlerian concept of living space (liebsraum), the implications could hardly be known. In fact the say that Hitler was ''evil'' in the 1930's is to clearly use a value judgement based on the facts as they were after the war. Hitler was a popular leader with many Germans and Chamberlain was popular with Germans when he avoided war.

To rearm in the 1930's was widely perceived as unnecessary and possibly provoking. The British government fulfilled, to the point of the seizure of Prague and their failure to act then, the exact terms of their treaty with Czechoslovakia. Many were far more concerned with British peace and security than they were with events in the east of Europe.

An alliance with the Soviets was out of the question. Many were more opposed to the 'Reds' than they were to Hitler. Churchill was originally one of them. Rearmament of Germany had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly preceeded Chamberlains government. Of the allowed 100,000 troops the Germans had 40,000 NCO's in case of a sudden conscription drive. The German government conspired with arms manufacturers such as Junkers and Heinkel to keep evidence of banned weapons manufacture from the arms inspection committee.

Appeasement had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly most trace it back to 1933, prior to Chamberlain. The National Government of Baldwin certainly sought to appease German grievances over reparations (some estimated that under the original terms of Versaille Germany would have finished reparations in 1982) and colonies. Versaille had neutered a world power, many elsewhere sought to undo the damage done to Germany as a way to placate its youthful radical leaders.

I often make the same value judgements as Robbins says 'no historian writes in a vacuum', yet the whole point is to try to understand the complexities of a policy that was not in reality a single policy but a series of policies based on economic, military and world power balance factors.

Morally and logically flawed?

[Destructo6]

That's a lot of ifs.

I believe I would have been on the side of Anthony Eden, who resigned from Chamberlain's government over appeasement, and oppossed it. I would certainly roundly comdem giving away things that belonged to others, namely Austria and Czechoslavakia.

[Iain]

Eden was an early appeaser who changed his mind later on. Some argue that at the point that Eden switched sides was the easiest point to do so and that to maintain a 'appeasement' position was far harder. What I would have done? No idea - had I been able to see the realities of the Nazi regime then obviously I would have attacked them. To state that Hitler was an aggressive expansionist as late as the Anschluss was playing around with a whole lot of 'ifs'.

Austria - the Anschluss was not all that unpopular in Austria. Robbins writes ''Reports suggested that, on the whole, German troops had been well received...It was not possible to come to the aid of state that did not seem that anxious to survive.'' (pp.79)

Czechoslovakia - strange case, not a stable nation in fact a new creation. The original takeover of the Sudetenland was not vastly unpopular in the international community, after all the people that Hitler wanted control over were ethnically German, and many of them violently supported the Nazi party. Rioting was making the region unstable, Benes was under pressure both internal and external. Britain honoured its obligation to protect the Czechoslovakian state (up until prague was seized), it never promised to protect Czechoslovakian borders. Political games? Certainly - which government does not play them. The sentiment was ''We do not want to get involved in the fate of a country that does not concern us.'' A certain degree of isolationism was not unique to the US at this time. Another European land war was high on the list of 'to avoid'.

[CZ52GUY]

CZ - you seem to have made a large assumption. That being that I am out to defend Chamberlain. Defend him perhaps from his most unfair of critics by being a milder and I think more accurate critic.

I am not assuming, I am reading your essay and providing my thoughts on the assessment of Chamberlain you provide, as a reader thereof. There was not an intent to impugn your motives, rather to assess the content of the essay and provide a brief critique of the substance of the message I read.

Britain was not an international policeman at the time, its power was on the wane. Many Americans do not want to get involved where they are not threatened today, many Britons did not then or now.

It was Chamberlain who inserted himself as one with standing to negotiate with Hitler. I did not allocate a claim of British responsibility for the Czech's and Austrians...it was Chamberlain who assumed that role without the consent of those whom Hitler had taken hostage.

I personally think that a lot of assumptions are made about the policies of Chamberlain, yes Chamberlain knew about the expansionist passages in Mein Kampf and the Hitlerian concept of living space (liebsraum), the implications could hardly be known. In fact the say that Hitler was ''evil'' in the 1930's is to clearly use a value judgement based on the facts as they were after the war. Hitler was a popular leader with many Germans and Chamberlain was popular with Germans when he avoided war.

The "sin" of Austria and Czechoslovakia were sufficient to recognize that this individual was no friend of liberty. It is not Chamberlain's lack of an immediate "Bush-like" response that convicts Chamberlain...it's his assertion of "peace in our time" and arrogant sentencing of the Austrians and Czechs to life under Hitler that does. He became an advocate for sustaining Hitler's early crimes, which history shows emboldened him rather than appeasing him...which is consistent with attempts to appease aggressive behavior, it's a flawed strategy based on its effectivity (or lack thereof), the morality temporarily set aside.


To rearm in the 1930's was widely perceived as unnecessary and possibly provoking. The British government fulfilled, to the point of the seizure of Prague and their failure to act then, the exact terms of their treaty with Czechoslovakia. Many were far more concerned with British peace and security than they were with events in the east of Europe.

Again, allowing an aggressor to intimidate based on fear of being seen as "provoking their wrath" is intentionally following the path of the victim. One seeks to arm themselves or become proficient in martial combat not to provoke, but to prepare for unwanted conflict. That Britain allowed themselves to become unprepared is fairly allocated to those who were in power at the time. Their job description involved "risk management", for which history indicts them. Again, it is always fair to judge individuals (this poster included) based on their performance compared with the responsibilities they are allocated.

An alliance with the Soviets was out of the question. Many were more opposed to the 'Reds' than they were to Hitler. Churchill was originally one of them. Rearmament of Germany had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly preceeded Chamberlains government. Of the allowed 100,000 troops the Germans had 40,000 NCO's in case of a sudden conscription drive. The German government conspired with arms manufacturers such as Junkers and Heinkel to keep evidence of banned weapons manufacture from the arms inspection committee.

I believe that is why an alliance with the United States proved beneficial, and the eventual alliance with the Soviets a "necessary evil". This does not acquit Chamberlain of the sins for which history has convicted him.

Appeasement had begun as early as the 1920's and certainly most trace it back to 1933, prior to Chamberlain. The National Government of Baldwin certainly sought to appease German grievances over reparations (some estimated that under the original terms of Versaille Germany would have finished reparations in 1982) and colonies. Versaille had neutered a world power, many elsewhere sought to undo the damage done to Germany as a way to placate its youthful radical leaders.

The post of Prime Minister carried with it responsibilities that the historical context you provide does not free Mr. Chamberlain from. The post is one of head of state, which requires leadership.

I often make the same value judgements as Robbins says 'no historian writes in a vacuum', yet the whole point is to try to understand the complexities of a policy that was not in reality a single policy but a series of policies based on economic, military and world power balance factors.

The "contextual" elements you describe are useful in describing the factors which could have provided weight to arguments Chamberlain would have considered, the damning evidence is that a crime was committed by Hitler against two sovereign nations. Chamberlain's response was to insist to Hitler that he stop the carnage there. That is not justice, and therefore where no justice is served, the threat remains...which is true within our society to this day at other levels.

Morally and logically flawed?

Logically = Appeasement never works, so there is no logical defense of one who employs a strategy that consistently fails.

Morally = The crime of violating the sovereignty of Czech's/Slovaks and Austrians was committed by Hitler...Chamberlain helped "legitimize it"...there is no historical context that can be applied to abdicate the historical responsibility that Chamberlain correctly assumes. He didn't commit Hitler's crimes...but he certainly was an important enabler.

Regards,

CZ52'

[Iain]

CZ I don't disagree with some of that, although I feel it is unfair to damn a man based on what we know now.

With regards to Austria and Czechoslovakia - posted stuff about that while you were posting your last post I think.

[Iain]

Another section:

(this is rough still)
The mood in Britain at this time is often discussed; examples are given, like that of the debate of the Oxford Union on the 9th of February 1931. That famous debating society passed a motion, 275 votes to 133, stating that ‘This House declines to fight for King or country.’ The significance of the motion has long been debated itself, was it a clear motion, was the pacifism of the students part of the rebelliousness of youth, particularly youth raised amid the First World War. Historians have sought the exact definition of the pacifist tendencies in Britain at the time.

Some divide the public into two sections, those of pacifists and pacificists (Robbins, 1988, pp.25). The former described as persons following an ‘act of faith’, the latter being principled and pragmatic. It does seem that a pacifist outlook was part of Britain’s character at this time. No war movements had been started, such luminaries as Bertrand Russell and George Lansbury were very highly involved in these movements. The Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 had discussed the ‘outlawry of war’ and the 1930 Lambeth Conference concluded that war as a settlement of international dispute was against Christ’s teachings. Gilbert and Gott identify the year 1933 as the ‘beginning of appeasement’ and the examples cited above do not contradict this necessarily. There were appeasers who did not appeal to this notion of the avoidance of war at all costs, but also recognised that war was loathsome. Pacifists were not necessarily appeasers, rather than ‘craven or covert sympathisers with Fascism’ (ibid, pp. 26) they took the principle of the avoidance of war to be their guiding one and other policies or practicalities are almost irrelevant to this principle.

George Lansbury was one of these. As Labour leader from 1931 to 1935 he often voiced his opinion on foreign policy described as a policy that ‘advocated unconditional non-violence’ (Parker, 1993. pp.309) The National Government was in place throughout these years and despite the previous trend that some had thought would lead to a total domination of the polls following universal suffrage, the Labour Party was increasingly looking ineffectual as opposition to the government. Lansbury was savaged by the trade union leader Ernest Bevin, for ‘taking your conscience around from body to body’ (ibid. pp.310). Lansbury was a passionate advocate of the League of Nations, in the same year that he resigned as leader of the Labour Party the League Union (a private pro-League organisation) held what is essentially the largest private referendum ever held in Britain. Of those that responded 11 million supported remaining in the League of Nations, 10 million of those supported economic and non-military measures against an aggressor nation. Of that 10 million, 6 and three-quarter million were prepared to take military actions.

Another example of the public mood is the bye-election in Fulham in 1934 in which a Labour candidate took the seat from a Government candidate on a large swing. At the time many identified the cause as being due to the Labour candidate’s outspoken pacifism, now the cause is identified elsewhere.

The realistic prospect of establishing a public mood is slight though; events throughout the 1930’s were responsible for the changing of many a mind. Some, having seen the horrors of the First World War were strongly opposed to violence and yet the realities of the world political stage can make war seem inevitable and necessary.

[Gray Peterson]

To inject some firearms related logic into this:

The Minnesota CCRN (thank you guys, I'm seriously considering getting a non-resident permit from MN, but could you please work on getting Minnesota to recognize Utah or Florida so I can go there without going there to get a permit first?), figured out back in 2001 and 2002 that their attempts at appeasing some members of the law enforcement lobby were fruitless.

In that the lobbies had claimed they would support it if they made certain concessions, it was figured out quickly that they would never support it, no matter how many concessions were made, so CCRN pressed on, saying "We made deals, you broke them, no more deals". Eventually, a GOP House was elected, a GOP governor (Tim Pawlenty), and a pro-carry but still democratic majority senate. The Senate leaders played games, so the House amended the DNR bill with PTC reform on it. Senate debated 8 and a half hours, and it was finally voted on, 37-30, in favor.

Clearly the Churchill method of doing things in MN worked.

[CZ52GUY]

Was Chamberlain Prime Minister? Yes

Is he accountable for what his actions or lack thereof resulted in? Yes

...it goes with the suit...similarly, we will judge heads of state of our government based on the net impact of their actions or lack thereof, not whether "it seemed like a good idea at the time"...

We need to raise the bar for those who take on the role of head of state. To so easily give them a pass is to fail to acknowledge the awesome responsibility they are given.

What we can try to do is learn from their mistakes and support policies consistent with what works, and what is right.

I think that too often we are tempted to identify with historical figures based on our own circumstances...and are too often tempted to set the bar far too low (both for them and our own standards of exellence that we set for ourselves).

You and I are not heads of state, Chamberlain was...in the end, he helped Hitler become what he became. He couldn't run and hide from that and we can't rightly attempt to re-write the end of the play to be more favorable to his circumstances.

Did Chamberlain intend to provide Hitler with legitimacy and embolden further aggression? I doubt it, but he made touch choices and his legacy must be judged based on the results, not the intent.

Regards,

CZ52'

[CZ52GUY]

I think your thorough communication of historical context is interesting but in the end you pile on all the "excuses" which can be made for pursuing a failed policy.

If your intent is to make a case for all the "causal factors" that went into shaping Chamberlain's decision, you've done a very good job of bringing them together.

In the end, to paraphrase a contemporary politician of Chamberlain's, the buck stops with Chamberlain...he was head of state...he must shoulder the historical responsibility for the actions he took.

No amount of historical context or environmental conditions can shield us from the results of our actions. A congressmen hit a motorcyclist recently and I'm sure charges will be filed. He will find an advocate who will seek to provide a defense for him...in the end, a life was ended...not out of pre-meditation, but out of negligence, carelessness, and as the result of a previous unlawful act (running a stop sign if the reports are correct).

The criminal involved has had a "distinguished career", but his legacy will unfortunately be that he killed someone because of carelessness or incompetence behind the wheel. He will never be able to run and hide from that, because the impact of his crime was severe, and permanent. There can be no remedy, no restitution, and no excuse.

60 years from now someone will seek to look at his full record...and show how many people ran stop signs and how motorcycles were difficult to see...and so on and so on and so on...but in the end a crime will still have been committed, the victim will still be dead, his loved ones will have had to carry on without him...and no amount of rationalization will change that.

The same is true for Chamberlain.

Regards,

CZ52'

[hops]

It is easy for us to condem the leaders of Europe, with 20-20 hindsight.

We all forget about the looming Communist threat. Had Germany gone communist in 1919 as did Russia, the world would be would different today. Remember, from 1927 or so until when Hitler became Reichskanzler in 1933, the Communist militias battled the NAZI militias in the open streets of Germany. The German gun control laws of 1928 tried to curtail the violence.

By the mid 1930's there was remorse among Britain and Frence for the injustice of Versailles. A strong Germany was needed then, just as a strong Germany was needed after 1950. What was wanted was a Germany whose interests were aligned with that of France and England. Well, big dogs seem to have a mind of their own. The U.S, seems to prove this a lot since the collapse of the Soviet Super Power.

Russia was the bigger threat, with its exportation of the communist ideals. That Stalin had 14 million Soviet troops on his borders in the summer of 1941 does ponder the question what his plans really were.

The Austrian Anschluss was a mutual Austrian - German wish, since 1918.

The German move and occupation of the CZ republic was interesting. There Germans were so nice to the CZ's that Britain had to send in a three man Hit team to assasinate Hydrich, because the CZ's were working well with the Germans.

Hitler's biggest mistake was not understanding England's, effective, policy regarding Europe, in effect since the 1500's. Make sure that no single European power wins on the Continent. Spain in the 1500/1600's, France and Holland in the 1600-1800's and Germany in the 1900's.

Had Hitler understood this, he might have gotten a peace after Poland. Especially after Soviet aggression against the Baltic states and Finland. He still insited as his peace terms that all lost German lands and Colonies be returned in the fall of 1939. That was just not going to happen.

With Versailles, the seeds were planted for a future war. In fact, one can say that America's lack of forcing France and England to adopt all of Wilson's 14 points in 1919, helped plant the seed. Germany aggreed to an armestice on Wilsons 14 points, where were very generous terms when compared to Versailles.

By 1945 the lesson had been learned. Unconditional surrender was worse then Versailles, yet America's involvement in rebuidling Europe was the best thing for Europe.

Chamberlain was playing against a stacked deck, dealt to him by Loyd George and Clemmenceau 20 years before.

[CZ52GUY]

I would dispute that the Austrians and Czechs wanted what Hitler imposed upon them...and I think it can be reasonably debated as to whether there was majority consent to the within these nations for absorption into the 3rd Reich. I don't recall the referendum where they chose to become part of Germany...

With Versailles, the seeds were planted for a future war. In fact, one can say that America's lack of forcing France and England to adopt all of Wilson's 14 points in 1919, helped plant the seed. Germany aggreed to an armestice on Wilsons 14 points, where were very generous terms when compared to Versailles.

While one can say just about anything, to suggest the America of 1919 could force terms on France and England is ridiculous, and if you're attempting to blame the US for WWII, you are completely out in left field...way left, going, going, gone...

Was Chamberlain part of the problem or part of the solution?

I'd argue that Chamberlain was part of the problem. By the time Churchill showed up, the deck was stacked significantly higher against him than was against Chamberlain.

Chamberlain's appeasement failed, Churchill's resolve and defiance succeeded. History appropriately recognizes both men for their performance.

St John's essay provides excellent historical context to the circumstances that existed at the time. It doesn't absolve Chamberlain from the results of his actions (or lack thereof)...your arguments do not either.

Yes, it is easier to judge results after the fact...but that is the metric that is applied to world leaders...comes with the job.

Regards,

CZ52'

[Destructo6]

It doesn't matter if some of the residents of the Sudatenland, parts of Czechoslavakia or any other country wanted to join Germany. That was a matter that should have been decided between the two countries and voluntarily by all parties affected. It was not something that should have been decided by a third party, Chamberlain.
had I been able to see the realities of the Nazi regime then obviously I would have attacked them.
It's all in Mein Kampf. Lock, stock, and barrel (to keep it firearms related).

[Mike Irwin]

I find myself to be in a peculiarly bad position at the moment.

It seems that my :cuss:ing ex wife has most, if not all, of my books on this period in English history, including my copies of Gilbert & Gott (which was not complimentary of Chamberlain's policy of appeasment), Fuchser's book (the title escapes me) and, worst of all, Charmley's book "Chamberlain and Lost Peace," which is probably still the poster child for "appeasement really worked, but no one is smart enough to relize it" crowd that has sprung up in the past 25 years.

David Dutton's recent book hasn't made it into my collection yet, either, but from all account's it is an intersting examination not of Chamberlain's failings, but the process by which Chamberlain is now blamed for leading Britain to war.

It looks like the ex also got copies of books that are UNFRIGGINGBELIEVABLY DIFFICULT to find in this country, including my British first edition of Violet Asquith's "Churchill as I Knew Him."

Pardon me while I hyperventilate for awhile and figure out just how I'm going to reassemble my reference library so I can positive respond to your thesis summary.

There's little doubt, though, that Charmley figures prominently in your basic premise.

[Mike Irwin]

Now that I have that little rant out of the way...


St. John,

First and foremost, I find there to be a serious conceptual flaw in your equating Chamberlain and Ghandi as "peacemakers."

That appellation, or at least attempted peacemaker, can be given to Chamberlain, despite his failures, but I do not believe that it can, or should, be given to Ghandi.

Ghandi was first and foremost a revolutionary. He may have been a pacifist, but he was not a peacemaker.

Fundamentally, Chamberlain pursued policies that attempted to preserve peace at all cost.

Ghandi, on the other hand, advocated policies of passive non-resistance. He knew, and in fact counted on, the fact that such a program would serve a two-fold purpose:

First, it would (and did) make British administration of India exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

Second, (and Ghandi counted on this) it would allow the Indian population to seize the moral highground on the world stage and would help sway world opinion against Britain.

Gen. Dyer incompetently played right into that tactic when he ordered his troops to open fire on unarmed and peaceful demonstrators at Amritsar.

Ghandi was a proponent of violence, as long as it was directed against his cause, not outward from his cause.

[HBK]

Chamberlain was a moron. He said he guaranteed "peace in our time." What a crock. History proved him wrong. Just my opinion, it could be wrong.

[Iain]

I tell you what - I'll delete the Gandhi reference, it was not an equation of Chamberlain to Gandhi more a indication of the spirit of the times as Robbins says:

"A British government might have been in a position, up to a point, to determine how Britain should behave, but it could not control the lobs dropped into its court by Hitler, Mussolini, Gandhi or Roosevelt, to mention but four names.''

I'm confused as to why you seem to think that I am excusing Chamberlain. My criticisms of Chamberlain are not harsh granted but I do say things like 'there is a marked lack of reality' and 'this is to misunderstand the nature of the Hitlerian regime.'

My research has been based on Gilbert and Gott's 'The Appeasers', Roy Jenkins' 'Churchill' (very good btw) RAC Parkers' 'Chamberlain', Keith Robbins' 'Appeasement', Uncovered Editions original papers 'Dealing with Adolf Hitler: War 1939'. Charmley does not enter in to it.

Chamberlain was not about peace at all costs, after all he declared war in the end over Poland, not over Britain. And the idea that the British were left undefended in 1939 is also unfair:

"The efficiency of the airforce and navy in 1940 refutes the denunciation of Chamberlain as irresponsibly reckless."

From Parker.

[Khornet]

for what purpose are you writing this? For school, or publication, or just for the love of it?

My impression of the 'nub' of this piece, the overall take-home message, is that one must judge a man's decision in terms of what was known at the time, what data he had to work with, and what a reasonable man would have done with it. And that things weren't as clear-cut at the time as we see them now, knowing more fully what Hitler really was. And that we must keep in mind that the overall mood of the British at the time was essential to the emergence of appeasement. That, exhausted by the first war, England and indeed much of Europe -AND the USA- just didn't have it in them to confront Hitler when it was most easily done.

In all these I think you are right.

However, not all men failed to see. Churchill, Eden, and others knew what had to be done. So what was the difference? Character. Chamberlain was foremost a politician, and his appraoch to any situation was to seek a way through without upsetting the applecart--to preserve the political situation. Churchill, although a politician in the sense that it was his career, was not a politician first and foremost, but a man of convictions who expressed them through politics. So when he was confronted with Hitler, the question became "Is this man evil?" Once that question was answered, the rest was obvious: confront him now, and damn the cost, damn the upsetting of the political balance, or we'll have a worse mess later.

Naturally, Churchill's approach was condemned as crude and simple-minded, and he was treated as the unmannered buffoon at the polite party who insisted on blurting out that the hostess had bad breath. Much as a recent American leader has been damned for a simple-minded cowboy, come to think of it.

Finally, I would remark that although few of us can claim that we would have been as prescient and courageous as Churchill, ever since then we have had the lesson of what appeasement brings. So those who practice it now are worse than Chamberlain: the Cold War appeasers of the Soviets, for example.

[CZ52GUY]

"A British government might have been in a position, up to a point, to determine how Britain should behave, but it could not control the lobs dropped into its court by Hitler, Mussolini, Gandhi or Roosevelt, to mention but four names.''

The British government and its leadership was 100% responsible for determining its behavior. Was then, still is. No it could not control the lobs thrown at it, but they certainly could control their response to the lobs.

"The efficiency of the airforce and navy in 1940 refutes the denunciation of Chamberlain as irresponsibly reckless."

The defeat of the British and French resulting in the heroic evacuation at Dunkirk refutes Parker's assessment of Chamberlain's "military readiness" score...as does the impact of the Blitz on London whose citizens I'm sure felt so very well protected by the Chamberlain defense team's risk mitigation plans when they failed to neutralize the German threat on the mainland of Europe.

"Peace in our time" turned into bombs-in-my-flat in London.

Again, Chamberlain's policies are subject to the scrutiny of 20-20 hindsight because that was in his job description.

Regards,

CZ52'

[Iain]

Khornet - I agree I think Churchill was a man of principle, but also a politician, Chamberlain was a politician who had some principles. His determination to stick to his principles as late as his resignation in May 1940 was his downfall. He believed in the principle of European peace to British advantage.

It's a dissertation for a degree. It is nowhere near publication standard. :)

I am going to look into what decided Churchill, I kind of seem to think though that it was a huge gamble on his part, and one that paid off rather well. Eden took the same gamble as Prime Minister in 1956 and it backfired.

CZ - I reached some of the same conclusions as you when looking in to the use of the atomic bomb in 1945. I was roundly criticised for judging Truman on hindsight and probably fairly. Can we stay off the A-bomb but add this - who is to say my initial criticisms of Truman and your criticisms of Chamberlain based on hinsight might have something to do with our nationalities? ;)

Chamberlain had placed significant civil defense preparations, the Expeditionary Force was a failure, but the Navy and the Air Force did quite well. We would not have been able to evacuate Dunkirk without significant naval power.

My initial thoughts about Chamberlain were that he was dead wrong and morally wrong to boot. Gilbert and Gott wrote their famous text in 1963, Gilbert then wrote another in 1966, his tone had changed. Most historians tone changed after the release of official papers in the 1980's.

[Iain]

Just a quick vaguely related question - is my writing ok? Does it have a bit of style or is it like reading a pizza menu? Sentences makes sense and train of thought apparent?

I seriously regret doing a History degree, think I may be should have done an English Literature degree. Of course, neither makes me more employable than the other. :)

[CZ52GUY]

CZ - I reached some of the same conclusions as you when looking in to the use of the atomic bomb in 1945. I was roundly criticised for judging Truman on hindsight and probably fairly. Can we stay off the A-bomb but add this - who is to say my initial criticisms of Truman and your criticisms of Chamberlain based on hinsight might have something to do with our nationalities?

I would judge both men based on the results of their actions, not based on my country of origin.

I would not concede that Truman's use of the A-Bomb can be reasonably compared with Chamberlain's lack of preparedness.

The Atomic Bomb was used in lieu of a full scale invasion of the Japanese homeland. Any reasonable analysis of the loss of life to be experienced by both sides in those circumstances would show the A-Bomb killed fewer individuals. I read Hiroshima and was appauled by the suffering of those who were at or near ground zero. I also have had the privilige of having first hand discussions with vet's who served in the Pacific theater.

I do not concede your point.

The result of Chamberlain's policy was a Europe under Hitler's thumb for nearly 6 years.

The result of Truman's decision was a swift end to the protracted conflict in the Pacific which in the end, saved more lives than it cost.

I think that your posted draft suffers from relying too much on the opinions of others. A reasonable person can review the circumstances of the time, and judge based on merit whether the policies of Chamberlain were effective or not. Quoting the flawed conclusions of others does not a persuasive argument make when those conclusions do not pass the "common sense" test.

The threat was Germany, the approach was appeasement, the result was tyranny in Europe and carnage in England from German bombs. The alternative was defiance, the result was liberation from tyranny, and freedom from the fear of the German bombs.

Compare the alternatives and the results, and you have a solid argument. Continued attempts to provide excuses for incompetent preparedness and failed foreign policy does not change the outcome OR the appropriate conclusions to be drawn.

Regards,

CZ52'

[CZ52GUY]

Just a quick vaguely related question - is my writing ok? Does it have a bit of style or is it like reading a pizza menu? Sentences makes sense and train of thought apparent?

The sections I've consumed are easy to follow and the perspective presented easy to identify. It certainly exceeds the "Reader's Digest 10th grade standard" but is not overly intellectual so that an individual with a reasonable degree of education (e.g. High School diploma) could not consume.

It's your conclusions that are the problem :neener:

CZ52'

[Iain]

Not overly intellectual or not overtly intellectual? ;)

Appreciate your input.

[CZ52GUY]

Well, there are no $50 or 50# words...no gratuitous use of Latin phrases...so I would say both apply.

I think the reality is that if you are writing this for academic consumption that you will succeed in the initial endeavor by slanting your observations to the political bias of your professor. The question is, does that form of "appeasement" square with who you are as a person?

In the end, you need to be true to YOUR evaluation of the circumstances of the time and YOU need to be able to articulate a position that can reasonably be defended. Set the bar high for yourself, because when you do, no teacher or forum poster can cause you to doubt the validity of your conclusions or the application of logic and values that were causal to your reaching those conclusions.

The assignment will be over in a relatively brief period of time, the habits you make now and the standards YOU set for YOURSELF are foundational for how you live out the remainder of your days.

Choose wisely...

Good luck!

CZ52'

[Khornet]

we are flattered that you ask our opinion.

In general, the style is clear and readable. You do need to be careful to use semicolons in the proper places, e.g.:

Pacifists were not necessarily appeasers, rather than thae the craven..

a semicolon after appeasers will be more clear. I'll try to make time to read thoroughly; I zipped through rapidly as I'm pressed for time.

And an aside- I've always fantasized about quitting Medicine and going back to study history or English lit.

[Khornet]

have you read "Burying Ceasar" ? Nice study of the relations of Churchill and Chamberlain in the last years before the war.

[Byron Quick]

St. Johns,

Czechoslovakia was indeed facing internal and external problems of grave difficulty. But examine their military and industrial strength. Their surrender before the Nazis was more due to lack of moral courage by their government rather than a lack of the means to fight. If Chamberlain had been willing to say that under no circumstances would he condone German annexation of Czechoslovakia...things could have been much different.

I feel that Chamberlain was so fearful of another WWI that he actually was largely responsible for causing it to happen.

So many folk with vast experience and keen intelligence forget that it takes mutual goodwill to achieve peace but only unilateral aggression to achieve war. It boggles my mind that anyone could look at Nazi Germany and believe that peace was possible. But then look at all the folks in the US who believed the same thing. For that matter, look at the people who thought we could come to a meeting of the minds with the Soviets.

[Iain]

I don't disagree with a lot of that Byron. Chamberlain would have had a very difficult time selling the necessity of war to the British public in 1938, and the French may well not have supported the British at that point (although they didn't turn out to be of vast use when they did support us - did I say that out loud?)

As for looking at Nazi Germany and believing peace was possible. It is very clear to us now, and some have appeared to history almost prophetic with their predictions about the Nazi's. Cynically I sometimes wonder if Churchill was playing a huge gamble - if there was a war then glory for him. If not then no big loss. In 1933 he made a speech to the Anti-Socialist League praising the 'clear eyed German youth ready to die for their fatherland'. Virulent anti-communism clouded many an eye at this point, some wished the Nazi's and the Soviets to go at each other and save the rest of us the hassle.

Despite all that I have said, one cannot escape the feeling that the period 1933-9 builds inevitably to war. Although nothing is inevitable...

[Destructo6]

What are you using for primary sources? What you list seem to be secondary sources only.

[Iain]

Funny thing is that I don't have to use primary sources, which is nice. However I am using one, the Uncovered Editions is a collection of papers from the archive of the Stationery Office in London. Mostly telegrams and speeches. About 300 pages of telegrams and speeches which is tough going.

[GinSlinger]

I agree that more primary sources are needed. My last substantial history paper before my (nearly ended) four year hiatus was a statistical history of Comal county TX for the years 1840-1880. Diaries and meeting minutes helped explain why Comal (a German settlement) voted for seccession, and why the county did so well during the war (while other counties around them faultered) and during reconstruction. (While the traditional histories did not explain those things.)

Anyway, not to hijack the thread with my work, but I find primary sources very useful espicially with the number of sources that are now "turning up". I would really like to see any transcripts from the face-to-face meetings of Chamberlain and Hitler. Or, failing that, to see the respective diary entries. Did Hitler's Anglophilic tendencies have anything to do with Chamberlain's responces to Hilter aggression? Hitler was well known as a persuasive speaker. Was the wool pulled of Chamberlain's eyes?

I have some other questions, but as I am only an undergraduate, they are perphaps better addressed if I could read the entile text. Perhaps the file could be zipped and e-mailed to me? I have aided a friend in his thesis preperation, it is not easy, and defending it can seem like fending off hostiles. Best of luck to you.

GinSlinger

[Thumper]

why the county (Comal) did so well during the war

Heck, I could've saved you a lot of research. Why? Aesthetics of the surrounding countryside and copious amounts of "river time."

If they'da had Shiner Bock, there might not have even been a war.

[Iain]

I'm only an undergraduate too, part of the aim of the work that I am doing is a literature review, focussing on Gilbert and Gott's 'The Appeasers'.

The book of primary sources I am using are sources from within the British government, telegrams and speeches. I am also using Mihail Sebastian's diary for some quotes demonstrating fears on the continent and hopes for an early peace because 'I think that Hitler pushed his blackmail to the limit and that, if Britain resists, he will back down a split second later.' (Sebastian)

History is but one third of my degree and this is less than a 12th.

[Destructo6]

Funny thing is that I don't have to use primary sources, which is nice.
Wow. I did my proseminar paper (~20 page research paper) in the Spring Quarter and we were required to use at least 5 primary sources plus a similar number of secondary sources and journal articles. Luckily, the Ottoman Turks/Nationalist Turks were pretty good about saving things. Sometimes hard to find it in English, though.

[Byron Quick]

Although nothing is inevitable...

Depends. Say you want peace, love, goodwill towards all, and the examination of life which makes life worth living. Say I live down the street and want nothing better in life than to beat your brains out with a club.

We will inevitably have conflict unless you stay in your home until I find a different cause in life or you move. Of course, a bus or some such could run me over. But your earnest desire for peace will have absolutely no bearing on the outcome unless that desire is so great that you run away and stay away...and I can't find you.

[CZ52GUY]

Within your hypothetical, you fail to acknowledge the possibility that the pacifist will achieve a sense of pragmatism and that the primal instinct of self-preservation will kick in. It could be, that the pacifist ends up confronting the aggressor and defeating him...

The certainty of an invevitable outcome is never completely certain. It is fair to play the percentages, and to provide after-incident scoring based on the actual results...in this case Chamberlain's foreign policy.

As we look at Chamberlain, I think St John correctly points out that he was not a "fundamentalist appeaser", just a very committed one. He eventually pursued a military response approach, albeit an ineffective one, largely based on a lack of preparation to effectively put forward and execute.

Best wishes,

CZ52'

[Iain]

Yes, I certainly would not agree that Chamberlain was a ''fundamentalist appeaser'' (nice btw - may have to throw that in with your permission) he was the man who declared war in the end.

[CZ52GUY]

...the most sincere form of flattery :D

By all means.

Best wishes,

CZ52'

[grampster]

Thumper: Some of my favorite time after reading the intelectual maunderings of our fine bretheren on THR is doing what you said, Michigan style, on a pontoon on the lake with a cooler of Labatts. Headin' there now.

To my THR Bretheren: I really love reading and digesting information put forward as it is on this thread. Thank you for the brain food.

:D

[Byron Quick]

Within your hypothetical, you fail to acknowledge the possibility that the pacifist will achieve a sense of pragmatism and that the primal instinct of self-preservation will kick in. It could be, that the pacifist ends up confronting the aggressor and defeating him...

I failed to acknowledge that for a very good reason. The pacifist's goals are peace and the avoidance of conflict. If he confronts his aggressor and defeats him...he doesn't achieve his goals. However, the reason for that example was not to illustrate the full range of options available...it was to illustrate the inevitability of conflict if you have only one agent desiring conflict versus peace requiring at least two agents acting in concert.

Oh,yeah, the moderator thingy. Doesn't matter as long as we're all civil.

We can wax eloguently about how stupid and inane each others' ideas and statements are. We just can't say the same about each other:D

[Mike Irwin]

"Just a quick vaguely related question - is my writing ok? Does it have a bit of style or is it like reading a pizza menu? Sentences makes sense and train of thought apparent?"

As a person who makes his living as a writer/editor, and also as someone who has more than just a little history under my belt (BA, work towards my Masters), I'd say your presentation has the dry analytical style beloved of academic historians the world over.

What are you currently working towards?

[Iain]

BA Mike. It is not my general tone, reading Jenkins and Parker (especially Parker) has the unfortunate effect of rubbing of on my writing style temporarily. Actually when my degree ranges across anthropology, history and sociology the ability to adapt and change tone very quickly is quite useful.

So to all - apologies if the tone of all my posts are drier than the Atacama at the moment, it is temporary.

[Mike Irwin]

"drier than the Atacama at the moment.."

Don't make me go Anasazi on your butt...

Congratulations, you're pursuing virtually the same track that I pursued.

[fallingblock]

"Actually when my degree ranges across anthropology, history and sociology the ability to adapt and change tone very quickly is quite useful."
************************************************************

It does indeed! And you have commendable skill at managing the change.

For what it's worth, I'd like to recant my misdirected usage of
"post modern" in the 'Enola Gay' thread.

That's a formidable & volatile academic challenge you've taken on:D

"dry analytical style" will get you through with most academic historians, as Mike says.

But it's your work....fire it up and leave yourself recognisable within it.;)

[HBK]

I think your writing style is exteremely solid.

[CZ52GUY]

I failed to acknowledge that for a very good reason. The pacifist's goals are peace and the avoidance of conflict. If he confronts his aggressor and defeats him...he doesn't achieve his goals. However, the reason for that example was not to illustrate the full range of options available...it was to illustrate the inevitability of conflict if you have only one agent desiring conflict versus peace requiring at least two agents acting in concert.

I think the "tangential point" I was trying to make, is that we are often too willing to apply a label to an individual, demographic, or even policy that becomes more rigid than the reality of the world we live in.

While a pacifist's goals may include peace and the avoidance of conflict, the pacifist is also a human being capable of unpredictable behavior. His/her views not withstanding, he/she has thousands of years of primitive instincts toward self-preservation to overcome to stand fast to those "loftier convictions".

Bottom line, the bully vs. the pacifist makes the bully a 1-5 favorite without question, but the outcome isn't a lock...which is something all bullys should consider.

In the circumstances of Chamberlain, while we are quick to point out the flaws that history has correctly allocated to him, I think the bully Hitler also miscalculated. "Peace in our time" did not prevent Chamberlain from taking the first steps which the rest of the free world at the time made stick over time.

If Chamberlain pursued failed policies, certainly Hitler did as well. He promised his people an empire which lasted but a VERY SHORT time. His country ended up in ruins, and he ended up dead in a bunker.

Bully vs. Pacifist or Appeaser...in this case score one against the Bully, because the Appeaser's instincts for self-preservation did kick in eventually, which started the process toward the ultimate downfall of the Bully.


Best Regards,

CZ52'

[agricola]

CZ52GUY,

Some good points, which are all to often ignored.

Briefly, even in 1938 the UK's armed forces were nowhere near ready (Spitfire and Hurricane at the late prototype stage, no tanks capable of matching the Pzkfw III, 5 CHL stations, few troops, obsolete RN), even compared with what he went to war with in 1939. As St.Johns noted, there was no public support for a policy of brinkmanship that risked war (Chamberlain was lauded for his stand) and the French probably would not have acted in concert with the UK (they of course didnt act in 1939 aside from to declare war and did not (with a few exceptions) fight when they got invaded). Chamberlain at least started the rearmament process and made sure that survival was probable - in that respect he did far more than Daladier (or Hitler for that matter). Noone here has stated what would have happened if Hitler had gone ahead and invaded the Czechs anyway regardless of the French and UK opposition - remember the Phoney War anyone?

Also, be wary of overstating Churchill's popularity - remember that he was held in such high esteem by the British public that they ran him from office in the 1945 General Election with a speed not seen again until John Major's humiliation in 1997.

[Byron Quick]

Noone here has stated what would have happened if Hitler had gone ahead and invaded the Czechs anyway regardless of the French and UK opposition - remember the Phoney War anyone?

I believe that I touched on this in a prior post. The idea that Britain was in a better position after losing the Czecks with their army and their ordnance factories to the Germans is, quite frankly, laughable.

The Czechs had the military and industrial capability to put up one hell of a fight. What they needed were allies...even if those allies could lend only moral support and the solemn promise of coming to their aid eventually. The perception that they were totally abandoned by the West is what sapped their will to fight. Their perception was completely and precisely accurate. It was congruent with reality at all points.

So what would have happened would have been a major attrition of German military resources even acknowledging that the Czechs would have been defeated. They would have had a better run than France.

Did Hitler miscalculate? He kept on until he was in a death match with the British Empire. And couldn't realize it was a death match. The fact that the British Empire had many times the manpower and industrial capacity of Germany seems to have escaped him also. He bet he could either conclude an advantageous peace with Britain or conquer it before it could bring its full capabilities to bear. Even without the USA and the USSR, I believe he would have lost that bet.

But he wasn't satisfied with fighting overmatched on one front. So he came up with his brainchild: let's invade the Soviet Union. Now this came frightenly close to succeeding and would have if he had been able to leave his generals alone and had kept the SS out of Ukraine.

Then the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and he decided to declare war on the US.

So he wound up fighting three nations. Each outmatched Germany in manpower, resources, and industrial capacity.

That might count as minor missteps.

[Iain]

In surrendering the Sudetenland Czechoslovakia was deprived of 55% of its coalfields. Also parts of the old Czech-German border were thought by many to provide a natural military defense nearly on a par with the Maginot Line.

Germany won the land war up until 1941 or so for a good reason - Hitler had decided that 'conventional economic wisdom is not correct', he plowed masses of money in munitions, money that was not being spent in Britain or elsewhere for fear of collapsing the economy again.

Germany was geared for 'blitzkrieg' without realising it, in fact the invasion of France was the first deliberate blitzkrieg. The marches on the Rhineland (an invasion force of about 2,000 I believe), Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been unconscious 'blitzkriegs'. I doubt that the Czechs would have done much better than the French, when Hitler's troops marched into Prague they did so with little resistance, this was due to the threat of mass air raids on Prague if there was resistance. Events at Guernika and elsewhere showed the new threat from the air for what it was.

Hitler made some fairly major miscalculations. He admired the British for their 'nordic'ness, and even vaguely projected in his megalomanical brain that perhaps one day Britain would help in the invasion of the US. This was to miscalculate one power in its twilight but still with some fight left, and a newly emergent power in one go.

In 1933 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the British Cabinet that Britain was less ready to intervene militarily on the content at that time than she had been in 1914. The decision was made not to expand the BEF, but spend money on the air force, the navy and the army a poor third. This, along with geography, gave Britain a strong defensive posture, but it was to take a while before she could adopt an offensive one and expect to succeed.

[HarryB]

"The efficiency of the airforce and navy in 1940 refutes the denunciation of Chamberlain as irresponsibly reckless."

Coming in late on this thread...

Wouldn't Hitler's poor decision to stop bombing military targets and initiate civilian bombing make this point moot? The change in strategy is what allowed the RAF to catch its breath and survive.

[agricola]

HarryB,

yep, but that sort of ignores the point that the system provided for by Chamberlain firstly defended the UK for longer than Goering intended, and second was able to bomb Berlin (whether or not it was a mistake is somewhat confusing). Hitler didnt decide to change targets, he was forced to because of his statements made previously.

[Destructo6]

Germany won the land war up until 1941 or so for a good reason - Hitler had decided that 'conventional economic wisdom is not correct', he plowed masses of money in munitions, money that was not being spent in Britain or elsewhere for fear of collapsing the economy again.
That's not true according to what I've read. Germany didn't mobilize her economy until after she was losing on the Eastern Front. Chapter 1 of Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich lists numbers, types, etc of available German armor and what they faced, which were often outnumber and even outclassed in capability. German use of armor made the whole difference.

[agricola]

destructo6,

in that last post youre entirely correct - after France Hitler actually cut back his tank production, and the Matilda II (albeit undergunned) and Char 1bis were much better tanks than the German mainstays Pzkfw III and IV (the IV being at that stage of the war armed with a low-velocity gun), but almost all German tanks had radio, and they were led by a well trained group of officers who knew what massed armour could do and how to do it.

[Khornet]

My hat is off to you all. We need you teaching in the colleges and high schools.