[geekWithA.45]

http://www.msnbc.com/news/870468.asp

[Boats]

It is just my opinion, but ABSOLUTELY NO ONE from the California judicial system should ever be elevated to a court position outside of the People's Demokratik Republik of Kali.

[BenW]

Being a liflelong resident of CA, I can empathize with Boats' statement. But man, if she were pro RKBA what a boost that would be for our side. As much as I hate the whole PC thing, can you imagine liberals trying to spin a black woman as unfit for the position? I'd like to grab a bag of popcorn and watch that movie!

[44Brent]

Justice Brown Dissents Against Ruling Banning Gun Shows


Counties and cities can ban gun shows, court rules
DAVID KRAVETS
Associated Press
SAN FRANCISCO ---- Counties and cities in California may ban gun shows on their fairgrounds and other government properties, the state Supreme Court ruled Monday.

The 6-1 decision in two cases backs local regulations banning weapons at flea markets in Los Angeles and Alameda counties. The two ordinances were passed there in 1999 among concerns that gun shows tarred the image of the counties and promoted violence.

The decision, if it stands, is expected to set off an avalanche of similar ordinances across the state. In briefs filed to the court, representatives from at least 20 cities and counties urged the justices to grant them such powers.

California's justices have never ruled on whether statewide regulation of gun sales leaves room for stronger local regulations. Until Monday, the high court has left those decisions for the lower courts to decide.

A state appeals court overturned San Francisco's 1982 ban on handgun possession, saying cities and counties cannot write such laws. But in 1998, another appeals court upheld West Hollywood's ban on cheap handguns known as Saturday Night Specials, saying a city could outlaw a gun that was legal in other parts of the state.

But on Monday, the justices entered the politically charged debate, ruling in two cases that local governments are free to outlaw gun shows that commonly occur on county fairgrounds.

"Alameda County has the authority to prohibit the operation of gun shows held on its property," Justice Carlos R. Moreno wrote in his first majority opinion since taking office in October.

In sharp dissent, Justice Janice Rogers Brown said such an initiative by a local government "exceeds its regulatory authority."

The gun industry argued to the seven justices that local governments are powerless to regulate the industry because the Legislature has authorized gun shows on public property. The industry said the local laws were pre-empted by state rules.

The two cases reached the high court after a federal appeals court, unsure of how to interpret California law, asked California's justices to intervene.

Monday's rulings do not reach into whether local governments can ban gun sales on private property. The cases only involve whether the bans can occur on public government-owned property.

The high court's ruling, however, does not end litigation in the dispute.

The justices' conclusion was forwarded to a federal appeals court hearing the two cases. Monday's decision informs the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on how to apply state law, but federal First Amendment questions remain in the litigation brought by the gun industry.

Still unresolved in the pending litigation is whether barring gun shows violates First Amendment protections of speech. Five years ago, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit overturned Santa Clara County's gun-show ban, ruling that gun sales were protected commercial speech.

The gun industry predicts the appeals court will rule the same way in the pending two cases. Industry representatives said blocking weapons shows would create a slippery slope to outlawing other types of trade shows.

"Suppose a county enacted an ordinance saying people who like to engage in the hobby of collecting Indian artifacts can no longer hold shows at the county fairground"? asked Donald E. J. Kilmer Jr., a gun industry attorney. "How do you think that would sit?"

He said the gun industry's biggest worry is that one California local government after the next would ban them. He added that no other state allows their local governments to ban gun shows on their property.

Cameron Baker, an attorney for the city and county of San Francisco, said local governments can now justify banning gun shows because of today's violent climate. "What is the justification for having to possess or sell a firearm on county property?" he asked.

San Francisco, in court briefs on behalf of nearly two dozen local governments, urged the court to give them the power to block the gun shows because "gun violence is an epidemic ravaging communities throughout California."

The National Association of Arms Shows, the Second Amendment Foundation and others urged the court to rule otherwise.

"Aside from educational opportunity, gun shows also are a political forum for views evaluating, and often criticizing, the effectiveness of gun control laws," the groups wrote. "Regardless of whether these criticisms are correct, criticism of gun control laws is core political speech."

Alameda County outlawed gun possession on county property in 1999 in response to a shooting at the fairgrounds in Pleasanton the year before.

Los Angeles County issued its ban the same year at the fairgrounds in Pomona. At the time, county lawmakers said that gun violence "has ravaged the lives of individuals."

There are 2,500 licensed firearms dealers in California. The same 10-day waiting period for persons to purchase weapons at a California gun store applies to weapons purchased at the state's gun shows. Only licensed firearm dealers can sell weapons in the state. Convicted felons are banned from buying them.

The cases are Great Western Shows v. Los Angeles County, S091547 and Nordyke v. King, S091549.


4/23/02

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/839189/posts

[Blackhawk]

She sure would be an interesting choice!

[Russ]

I'm sure if she is nominated that bloated swine Teddy Kennedy or Patrick (if I only had a brain) Leahy or Little Chucky Schumer will find out what her 2A poistion is.

[Gary H]

The Democrats would not be able to oppose her. Her stand with regards to the gun shows is encouraging. I think that this would fit right in with Bush's efforts to attract black voters. An effort that has seen few results.

[Frohickey]

California SC Justice Janice Rogers Brown.

-Lone dissenting opinion in the Nordyke vs King (Alameda County gun possession in county property ban, effectively banning gun shows in Alameda County)
-Lone dissenting opinion in the Great Western vs LA County (LA County gun sales in county property ban, effectively banning gun shows in LA County, specifically, the city of Pomona)
-Part of the concurring opinion in the Merrill vs Navegar (Merrill sued Navegar, the Tek-9 gun manufacturer for negligence because a criminal used a Tek-9 to kill people in a San Francisco building)
:scrutiny: -Part of the concurring opinion in the Kasler vs Lockyer (Assault Weapon ban via features), but you have to read her concurring opinion

Cliff-note summary: She is pro-2A!!! :D
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J.
I
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court. I am writing separately
because, although the rejection of the equal protection claim is compelled by the majority opinion in Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628 (Warden), I would independently reach the same conclusion under the unique circumstances of this case.
In Warden, a majority of this court abandoned our longstanding commitment to "serious and genuine judicial inquiry" into equal protection claims in favor of the highly deferential rational basis formulation articulated by the United States Supreme Court. (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th 628, 661 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.), quoting Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711, quoting Dorrough v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2d 1007, 1011.) Under the standard adopted by the Warden majority, "In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are "plausible reasons" for [the classification] "our inquiry is at an end." ( FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 313, italics added, quoting U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz (1980) 449 U.S. 166, 179; see, e.g., Central State University v. Amer. Assoc. of University Professors (1999) 526 U.S. 124; Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 35 Cal.2d 121, 130-132.) (Warden, at p. 644.)
The dichotomy between the United States Supreme Court's laissez-faire treatment of social and economic rights and its hypervigilance with respect to an expanding array of judicially proclaimed fundamental rights is highly suspect, incoherent, and constitutionally invalid. "[T]he outcome in every case turns on how the court chooses to characterize the classification. Suspect classifications, such as those based on race or that impact rights the court deems 'fundamental,' warrant strict (read 'fatal') scrutiny; other classifications warrant rational basis (read 'anything goes') review. (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307, 313-316.) As Justice Mosk so aptly put it, '[t]he vice of the binary theory ... is that it applies either a standard that is virtually always met (the rational relationship test) or one that is almost never satisfied (the strict scrutiny test). [Citation.] Once the test is selected, the result of its application is foreordained ...' (Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 796 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)" (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 661-662 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Just so, the result here was foreordained once we assumed "the AWCA does not burden a fundamental right under either the federal or state Constitutions, [and therefore,] the rational basis test applies. (See Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 522, 531-533; Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman (D.N.J. 1999) 44 F.Supp.2d 666, 685; California Rifle [& Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City of West Hollywood (1998)] 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1329; Suter v. City of Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1133; In re Evans (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1270.)" (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)
This case, however, illustrates the illusory nature of the distinction between "fundamental rights" and "areas of social and economic policy." Curiously, in the current dialectic, the right to keep and bear arms - a right expressly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights - is deemed less fundamental than implicit protections the court purports to find in the penumbras of other express provisions. (See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health (1990) 497 U.S. 261, 278-279; Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 384-387; Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) 431 U.S. 494, 499-500.) But surely, the right to preserve one's life is at least as fundamental as the right to preserve one's privacy.
The founding generation certainly viewed bearing arms as an individual right based upon both English common law and natural law, a right logically linked to the natural right of self-defense. Blackstone described self-defense as the "primary law of nature," which could not be taken away by the law of society. (2 Jones's Blackstone (1976) p. 4.) "[T]he peaceable part of mankind will be continually overrun by the vile and the abandoned, while they neglect the means of self defense... . The supposed quietude of the good man allures the ruffian; ... (but) arms like laws discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world... . Horrid mischief would ensue were (the good) deprived of the use of [weapons] ... the weak will become a prey to the strong." (1 Paine, The Writings of Thomas Paine (Conway edit. 1894) p. 56.) Extant political writings of the period repeatedly expressed a dual concern: facilitating the natural right of self-defense and assuring an armed citizenry capable of repelling foreign invaders and quelling tyrannical leaders.
After the Civil War a series of enactments, culminating with the Fourteenth Amendment, acknowledged the correlation between self-defense, citizenship, and freedom. Section 14 of the Freedman's Bureau Act, which the 39th Congress passed over the President's veto, provided: "That in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, ... the right to ... have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district without respect to race or color or previous condition of slavery... ." (Freedman's Bureau Act (July 16, 1866) 14 Stat. 176, italics added; see Halbrook, Second Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia (1995) 5 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 105, 141-150 (Second Class Citizenship).)
Halbrook concludes the Freedman's Bureau Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment leave no doubt that 'the constitutional right to bear arms' is included among the 'laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security,' and property, and that 'the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights' is to be protected" (Second Class Citizenship, supra, 5 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. at p. 150) under the Fourteenth Amendment, which would confer citizenship on all persons born in the United States and imbue them with every right of citizenship, including the right to keep and bear arms. ( Ibid.) In more recent times, Congress has continued to recognize that the right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Second and the Fourteenth Amendments. (Pub.L. No. 99-308 (May 19, 1986) 100 Stat. 449.)
The judiciary, too, has consistently acknowledged the interplay between express provisions and implicit protections. In Poe v. Ullman (1960) 367 U.S. 497, the seminal case in the Supreme Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence, Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects privacy. He claimed the due process clause covered, but was not exclusively limited to, "the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the constitution," including "freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures." (Id. at p. 549 (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).) The court continues to cite Justice Harlan's enumeration as part of the full scope of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement. (Planned Parenthood Southeastern PA v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. 833, 848-849; Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 169 (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.); Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 499 (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.).)
II
We got it right two decades ago: "The constitutional bedrock upon which all equal protection analysis rests is composed of the insistence upon a rational relationship between selected legislative ends and the means chosen to further or achieve them." (Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 786.) The reasoning on which we relied has even greater force now. "The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation." ( Id. at pp. 786-787, quoting Railway Express v. New York (1949) 336 U.S. 106, 112-113 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection (1972) 86 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8.) It is true, of course, that even a searching equal protection analysis will not preclude all underinclusive classifications. Rational basis with bite merely requires that when a legislature addresses an area of concern "in less than comprehensive fashion by 'striking the evil where it is felt most,' [citation] its decision as to where to 'strike' must have a rational basis in light of the legislative objectives." (Hays v. Wood, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 791, quoting Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 132.) The anomaly here, of course, is that those complaining of unequal treatment - gun owners and dealers - are not a powerless minority, but rather one of the most focused and wellfinanced interest groups in modern American politics.
Politics is the art of the possible under pressure. "Everything that emerges from the legislative forum is tainted by its journey through the lobby. And the demand for perfection must inevitably compromise with the hard facts of political life." (Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws (1949) 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 350.) The pledge of equality before the law becomes meaningless if courts routinely validate legislative acquiescence to the strongest pressure group; but democratic processes are undermined if courts exhibit zero tolerance for any deviation from the great principle of equal protection. And the toughest and most delicate of questions is how to apply the principles of equal protection in a case like this one which defies - or perhaps redefines - the paradigm. The answer does not depend on "a mechanical application of convenient formulae," but rather requires a "complex and creative act of judgment." ( Id. at pp. 350-351.) In this narrow intersection, rational basis analysis and heightened scrutiny may look the same.
Plaintiffs complain that the ban is irrationally underinclusive. Admittedly, the Legislature's findings and declarations seem internally inconsistent. While declaring that it banned the semiautomatic firearms listed in Penal Code section 12276 because each weapon "has such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings," the Legislature goes on to declare that it does not intend "to place restrictions on the use of those weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities." (Pen. Code, § 12275.5.) Conspicuous by its absence is any finding that the listed weapons differ from those not listed with respect to the salient characteristic, namely, their "rate of fire and capacity for firepower." ( Ibid.)
On the other hand, plaintiff's claim that the ban is irrational because it will have no effect on violent crime proves too much. The insistence upon a rational relationship between selected legislative ends and the means chosen to further them cannot be so exacting. To declare murder a crime will not prevent murder. Prohibiting the possession of weapons by convicted felons will not stop criminals from obtaining guns. Assessing ever greater penalties has not eliminated the scourge of drug abuse. Means scrutiny assumes the law will have some effect and compares that effect with the means the Legislature has chosen.
Were courts to overturn every legislative action that is likely to be ineffective, few laws would survive. As in other spheres of human endeavor, legislative action is often fated to be more symbolic than real, and the understandable human desire to do something to address the crisis of the moment, not to mention the political necessity of being seen to be doing something, may be the real object of many legislative exercises. (See Kobayashi & Olson, In re 101 California Street: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of "Assault Weapons" (1997) 8 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 41, 43.) And, to be fair, the most severe problems confronting us - like the current plague of violence - are quite beyond the capacity of government to cure. As Solzhenitsyn observed half a century ago, "the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either - but right through every human heart - and through all human hearts." (Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (1992) p. 615.)
Constitutional provisions divide into two categories: the "historically defined hard core of procedural provisions," including the Bill of Rights, the mechanics of institutional arrangements, political processes, and power allocations (Bickel, The Morality of Consent (1975) p. 29) and the "constitutional generalities" which must make it possible for future battles to be fought and for the Constitution "to transcend and endure beyond the fiercest political differences." (Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) p. 105.) While the courts must enforce both, the necessary openendedness of concepts like equal protection means judicial review has important practical limits in a democracy. Where legislative compromise is still possible under conditions which are likely to fairly reconcile competing interests, courts may decline to intervene. The court's duty to restrain the tyranny of the majority must be measured against its obligation to act prudentially and with deference to the political process. Under our regime, a court must oppose arbitrary injustice even when acts of oppression have been duly enacted, and may vouchsafe no answer though contending political forces - momentarily in equipoise - teeter on the edge of tyranny.
Here, the underinclusiveness of the statute is not an attempt to exploit a despised minority. Instead, the Legislature sought to satisfy its need to do something about gun violence without awakening the political enmity of a large and effective constituency. Gun owners may be, as amici curiae argue, "a class of people subjected ... to vicious stereotypes," but in the political realm a vicious stereotype is a constitutional disadvantage only when it results in impotence.
III
The issue before us may be among the most troubling and intractable of the last 30 years. Predictably, as cultural disintegration accelerates, the level of lethal violence escalates. Even cynics, quick to accuse elected officials of political posturing and empty symbolism, are stunned by the steadily mounting body count. Like the poet, we are forced to "put [our] eyes on a diet" because our "tears are gaining too much weight." (Kaufman, Golden Sardine (1967) "Heavy Water Blues," p. 60.) It is impossible not to grieve for the thousands of young men cut down in their prime; impossible not to mourn toddlers slaughtered in the midst of innocent play; impossible to ignore the grim reality of school children whose final moments echo with screams of terror and the sudden slap of bullets. And worse even than the slaughter of innocents is the death of innocence. All too often, the killers are children, too.
Some antigun advocates candidly admit they welcome '[shooting] incidents' and hope 'more heinous ones with more tragic or important victims' will help move public opinion beyond support for narrow controls to the desired goal of complete disarmament. (Kates, Gun Control: Separating Reality From Symbolism (1994) 20 J. Contemp. L. 353, 358, quoting Ross, Book Review (1992) 98 Am. J. Soc. 661.) Amitai Etzioni, as spokesman for the Communitarian Network, dismisses the gun control measures that have been enacted and those currently under discussion as but 'vanilla-pale' measures. (Kopel et al., Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibitions (1997) 56 Md. L. Rev. 438, 450, quoting Etzioni et al., The Case for Domestic Disarmament (1992) The Communitarian Network <http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop_disarm.html (June 5, 2000).) In Professor Etzioni's view, the only effective measure to end gun violence is domestic disarmament. (Ibid.) He has elsewhere argued that the right of the people to keep and bear arms (if any such right exists) is outweighed by the right of the public to be safe. (Kopel et al., at p. 445, quoting The Communitarian Network, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities reprinted in Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective (Etzioni edit. 1995) 11, 19.)
I suspect the freedmen of the Reconstruction Era would vehemently disagree. So would the Armenians facing the Ottoman Turks in 1915, the embattled Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943, and the victims of Pol Pot's killing fields.
The media keep the horrific visions of gun violence ever before our eyes. These acts of individual madness are undeniably tragic and totally unacceptable in a civilized society. But there are other horrific visions - the victims of which number in the millions - perpetrated by governments against unarmed populations.
CONCLUSION
The framers could have had no conception of the massive scale on which government-sanctioned murder would be committed in the twentieth century, but they had a keen appreciation of the peril of being defenseless. That wariness is reflected in the Constitution. Perhaps they would agree with Thomas Paine's practical observation in his article Thoughts on Defensive War (Paine, Thoughts on Defensive War (July 1775) Pennsylvania Magazine <http://www.scican.net/~jsnider/thotsdefwar.html > (as of June 13, 2000)): "I am thus far a Quaker, that I would gladly agree with all the world to lay aside the use of arms, and settle matters by negotiation: but unless the whole will, the matter ends, and I take up my musket and thank heaven ... ."
BROWN, J.

[Jim March]

Speaking as a California gun rights activist, I think she's a brilliant choice.

I've looked over her gun-issue rulings and the only one I'd take issue with is that according to her vote (not a full position statement, mind you), there's no right to arms in the Calif Constitution (even though there's a "right to life" bit at the beginning). Not good, BUT let's realize that it would be a little bit of a stretch and since her fellow justices wouldn't buy it, all it would do would be to label her as a "genuine radical".

As is, her vote wasn't anything like a "swing vote" and it positions her well enough as a "moderate" on the issue to get past the Senate.

Works for me...absolute ideological purity is over-rated, compared to a practical "just win, baby!" approach.

[Boats]

Well I revise my opinion, let's get her to DC already!

[Sprout]

Sounds like a winner :)

[PrudentGT]

I saw bits and pieces of the confirmation hearing on television the other day -- for a minute I thought I was watching Schumer and Feinstein engaged in a lynching. I figured anyone these guys were slamming so hard must be that rare gem, a civil servant mindful of the limits of their authority, so I looked up this thread.

My eyes were getting tired somewhere in her concurring opinion posted here, but *OMG* she spells out that the 2nd is encorporated in the 14th!.

BTW, she was a little evasive in the conf. hearing but one can hardly blame her...

[Mark Tyson]

Holy cow! She supports the 2nd Amendment as an individual right, a barrier to genocide and tyranny, and acknowledges its incorporation inthe 14 amendment.

"Where have you been all my life?"

[Langenator]

Forget the DC Court....Justice O'Connor, the retirement home is calling...

My project for this evening...letters to my Senators (not that it will do much good, but hey...). If anyone has already written their Senators, I'd love to see what you sent. And I'll post what I send.

[BenW]

for a minute I thought I was watching Schumer and Feinstein engaged in a lynching.
Which, now that this thread has been resurrected, shows that you never want to use Ben to predict the outcome of anything or to pick your lottery numbers. I said back in FEB I couldn't see how the liberals could spin her as unfit. Boy was I wrong.

[Langenator]

Don't feel bad Ben-if President Bush nominated Jesus himself for the Court, they'd find a way to spin him as unfit.

"Mr. Christ, you claim to be the Son of God. I fear that will lead you to be biased in Church-State cases."

[Sergeant Bob]

Schumer and Feinstein and their ilk are not the only ones to blame here.
What about the spineless Repugnicrat congress and President Bush who refuse to really fight for these nominees?
Since most of them don't seem to give a crap about the Constitution, I guess it's just be too much trouble to fight for someone who does.
Then they just blame the mean old Democrats.

[Drjones]

It is just my opinion, but ABSOLUTELY NO ONE from the California judicial system should ever be elevated to a court position outside of the People's Demokratik Republik of Kali.

You obviously know NOTHING about her. That woman should be president and we should have clones of her in the house, senate, Supreme Court, etc.

Read this:
http://www.thehighroad.org/showthread.php?s=&threadid=46069


That woman is amazing.

[Drjones]

The dangers of being a one-issue voter are sickening...

Not only is she pro-2A (now you can rest easy) but she is anti-government.

I mean as in the same exact way that the Founding Fathers were extremely distrustful of a very powerful, centralized and distantly located government.

Here's a quote from her on the topic: "Where government moves in, community retreats, civil society disintegrates and our ability to control our own destiny atrophies."

No offense, but most people here should at least try to find out something about her before you damn her as an anti.

I live in CA. Does that mean I'm a commie and you'd never vote for me too? :rolleyes:

I'm just to the left of Pat Buchanan, thankyouverymuch. :)

[BenW]

No offense, but most people here should at least try to find out something about her before you damn her as an anti.
Uhm, everyone on this thread so far has posted in favor of her. :)

[Drjones]

Uhm, everyone on this thread so far has posted in favor of her.



It is just my opinion, but ABSOLUTELY NO ONE from the California judicial system should ever be elevated to a court position outside of the People's Demokratik Republik of Kali.

[BenW]

That was his post on 10FEB. His post on 11FEB was:

Well I revise my opinion, let's get her to DC already!

[Drjones]

That was his post on 10FEB. His post on 11FEB was:

OOps!!! My apolgies then.

I still think the knee-jerk anti-CA sentiment was a little out of line though... :rolleyes:

[Moparmike]

Not only is she pro-2A (now you can rest easy) but she is anti-government.

I mean as in the same exact way that the Founding Fathers were extremely distrustful of a very powerful, centralized and distantly located government.

Here's a quote from her on the topic: "Where government moves in, community retreats, civil society disintegrates and our ability to control our own destiny atrophies." Wait wait wait....Let me get this straight. We are installing a libertarian:) from Kalifornistan:eek: who has publicly stated her opinions into a judicial post:what: in DC:what: :what:

Has the world come to its senses?:what: :scrutiny: :scrutiny: My world of fearing the lack of common sense in the government is crashing down!! (Nope, just a brick falling. My bad.)

[Standing Wolf]

This is when the genteel white gloves Republican majority in the Senate hides under the bed, right?

[Frohickey]

Which, now that this thread has been resurrected, shows that you never want to use Ben to predict the outcome of anything or to pick your lottery numbers. I said back in FEB I couldn't see how the liberals could spin her as unfit. Boy was I wrong.

Nah. You are actually correct. You see, to understand liberals, you need to start thinking like one... strike that... feeeeel like one. Liberals do not think. All they have are feelings, and feelings, unlike facts, can change depending on how you got out of bed that morning, or if you didn't get to take a swim in your automobile (Ted Kennedy).