....You say a trust is not included in the definition of a "person". And then you post a reference that appears to say it is....
No, I did not say that a trust was not included in the definition of "person." I said a trust is not, in law or in fact, a legal entity. And that is correct. A trust can not own property. A trust can not sue or be sued in its own name. A trust does not do business in its own name. A trust is, under the law, merely a construct or device through which a person owns assets or property for the benefit of another.
The definition of the word "person" under the Internal Revenue Code (26 USC 7701(a)(1)) includes a trust (and a partnership, association, and estate):
...where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof...
That doesn't change the legal nature of a trust. That simply means whenever a tax statute uses the word "person", the rule or provision of the statute also applies to a trust (and a partnership, association, and estate), except:
...where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof...
The qualified (by the exception noted) inclusion of a trust within the definition of "person" does not, and can not, change the essential legal character of the trust concept. A trust doesn't become an entity or actual person because of that inclusion. It's merely a way of conveniently saying that when a tax provision applies to a person, except:
...where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof...
the tax provision also applies to a trust (and a partnership, association, and estate)
....Say Joe Blow has a machine gun, which is registered to the Joe Blow Trust. Joe is the trustee. If you were to ask ATF who "owns" the gun, what would they say? Joe, or the Trust?
They'd say "Joe as trustee of the XXX Trust." More importantly, so would a court.
That is illustrated by this comment by the Third Circuit looking, in a different context, at the use of a trust as a device for the beneficial ownership of NFA weapons (
Watson v. Lynch (Third Circuit, No. 15-2859, 2016), slip op. at 9):
...a trust is not an entity distinct from its trustees, nor is it capable of legal action on its own behalf. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 3 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003)). Indeed, Watson himself does not dispute that he is the “individual human being” seeking to possess a gun on behalf of the Trust. He argues, however, that because trusts are not “persons” under the statute, he may act on behalf of the Trust in his capacity as a trustee without triggering the prohibition on natural persons transferring or possessing a machine gun. Appellant’s Br. 55-56. But nothing in the Gun Control Act supports such a reading. Irrespective of whether Watson is a trustee, he is also a natural person and therefore prohibited from performing any of the acts forbidden of natural persons under the Gun Control Act. His inability to comply with the Gun Control Act, in turn, prevents ATF from granting his application under the National Firearms Act. See 26 U.S.C. § 5822; 27 C.F.R. § 479.65. ....
And as the Third Circuit noted in
Watson (slip op., at 6):
....Watson claimed to be exempt from the prohibition on possessing machine guns because he had applied on behalf of a trust, which he argued was not a “person” covered by the Gun Control Act. ATF explained that although a trust is not a “person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold property. Therefore, ATF considers the individual acting on behalf of the trust to be the proposed maker and possessor of the machine gun.....
To clarify: While the Internal Revenue Code includes a trust (and a partnership, association, and estate) in the definition of "person", the Gun Control Act (at 18 USC 921(a)(1)) does not.