...And in general conviction for a crime doesn't necessarily require that it be proven that the defendant intended to violate the law. It is usually sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant intentional performed the acts which constitute the elements of the offense, whether or not he understood that doing those things was a violation of law. So if, for example, an offense were defined as having on one's dominion and control the components which could be readily assembled into a Title II weapon, it's possible that one could be convicted of the crime if he knowingly and intentionally had those items in his possession, whether or not he knew that doing so was illegal.
Indeed, the central point of this thread is the question of what sort of intent, or evidence of intent, is necessary for a conviction for the possession of an unregistered short-barreled rifle based on possession of components which could be assembled into a short-barreled rifle....
Which defers to US v. Thompson/center ruling, in that having (distributing, as it were) all the parts for a legal title I pistol and title I rifle on the same receiver does not constitute manufacturing an SBR, even though one
could be assembled with those sets of parts.
What do you mean "defers"? How does my statement delegate to or submit to
Thompson/Center?
Thompson/Center is a case that might have a bearing on the question, but it doesn't by any means settle the question. The Eleventh Circuit didn't consider
Thompson/Center at all in
Owens and found it distinguishable in
Kent.
....By virtue of the fact that a person is capable of violating laws anywhere, anyplace, at any time, in the absence of evidence that they did violate or intended to violate the law, it has to be presumed that they did not/wouldn't....
Is that supposed to mean something? One will have criminal liability for committing acts which are the elements of the crime. The question is when and under what circumstance is possession of parts which could be assembled into a short-barreled rifle an element of the crime of possession of an unregistered Title II weapon. That question has not been definitively answered.
Thompson/Center described circumstances in which such possession is not. But in
Kent (and
United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.1977) and
United States v. Zeidman, 444 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir.1971), cited in Kent), such possession was an element of the crime.
...The intent component is demonstrable in court for constructive possession resulting in possession of an unregistered SBR if the parts cannot have been assembled into a legal title I firearm....
Do you have any legal authority to support that?
...We have long told people not to have a shorty upper around if they have a title I rifle or lower but no pistol/SBR/other firearm or lower onto which the short upper can be installed....
How nice for you, but the fact that you've been telling folks that doesn't mean it's correct.
...Kent had an upper, complete and ready for use, with no title I pistol or other firearm lower onto which it could be assembled legally....
The Eleventh Circuit did mention that, but the court mentioned as part of a laundry list of factors which lead to the court's conclusion. It was not the only factor, nor did the court say anything which might suggest that it was dispositive. As far as we can tell from the opinion the result would not necessarily have changed had that not been the case.
...That case also made a point of the fact that the upper was readily installed and used in a matter of seconds, more than mere spare parts like a loose barrel....
Which was still just one of a laundry list of factors.
...Which would be of concern for the OP, except he has told us that he has a receiver which is ostensibly configurable as a pistol or other firearm with a sub-16" barrel....
Nothing we've seen provides definitive guidance that it should not still be a concern for the OP.
...The Owen case affirms that even though he had the parts for a legal title I configuration, having actually configured it as a title II SBR makes possession of the parts for a legal title I configuration irrelevant. That was part of my statement: "short of evidence to the contrary"
Hogwash. Having parts for a Title II weapon was irrelevant in
Owens because
Owens actually possessed a fully assembled short-barreled rifle (
U.S. v. Owens, 103 F.3d 953 (11th Cir., 1997), at 955):
...the jury found that appellant Owens assembled the weapon with the seven-inch barrel, and as assembled it was clearly an unregistered rifle "having a barrel ... of less than 16 inches in length." 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(a)(3). Thus, Owens possessed the weapon assembled with the seven-inch barrel. Because the statute, as applied to Owens, clearly was not vague, we need not consider whether the effect of the statute is uncertain with respect to other litigants. U.S. v. Owens, 103 F.3d 953 (11th Cir., 1997)....
Your opinions have been poorly supported, and paying attention to your opinions could get someone into a lot of trouble. Further posts which in my estimation lack adequate supporting authority will be deleted.[/QUOTE]
