Please clarify "possesion" in the home, if one is a prohibited person

Rule3 said:

This question is about a situation of Husband and Wife in Florida....

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1. There is some federal authority to suggest that a prohibited person may lawfully have legal title to guns he can't physically possess.
   
   
   • In U.S. v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76 (C.A.9 (Or.), 1996), the 9th Circuit set aside a conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun, because the conviction was based solely on evidence of ownership, but under circumstances in which the defendant could not possibly have had access to or possession of the guns. Casterline was in prison at the time, and the guns were in the sheriff's department evidence locker. As the Ninth Circuit wrote in Casterline, at 79 (emphasis added):

     ...The felon-in-possession statute is prophylactic, intended "to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1963 1968, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977). Ownership without physical access to, or dominion and control over, the firearm does not constitute possession. If the felon owns a firearm, but does not actually possess or have dominion and control over it, then he does not possess the firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ....

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   • There is also some federal authority to suggest that upon becoming a prohibited person one's rights to control disposition of the firearms he must dispose of might be subject to some constraints. See Henderson v. United States (Supreme Court, No. 13–1487, 2015) in which Henderson became a prohibited person and sought to direct the transfer of his guns. In finding in favor of Henderson, the Court said (Henderson, slip op at 7 -- 8, emphasis added):

     ...a court facing a motion like Henderson’s may approve the transfer of guns consistently with §922(g) if, but only if, that disposition prevents the felon from later exercising control over those weapons, so that he could either use them or tell someone else how to do so. One way to ensure that result, as the Government notes, is to order that the guns be turned over to a firearms dealer, himself independent of the felon’s control, for subsequent sale on the open market. See, e.g., United States v. Zaleski, 686 F. 3d 90, 92–94 (CA2 2012). Indeed, we can see no reason, absent exceptional circumstances, to disapprove a felon’s motion for such a sale, whether or not he has picked the vendor. That option, however, is not the only one available under §922(g). A court may also grant a felon’s request to transfer his guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them, so long as the recipient will not allow the felon to exert any influence over their use. In considering such a motion, the court may properly seek certain assurances: for example, it may ask the proposed transferee to promise to keep the guns away from the felon, and to acknowledge that allowing him to use them would aid and abet a §922(g) violation. See id., at 94; United States v. Miller, 588 F. 3d 418, 420 (CA7 2009). Even such a pledge, of course, might fail to provide an adequate safeguard, and a court should then disapprove the transfer. See, e.g., State v. Fadness, 363 Mont. 322, 341–342, 268 P. 3d 17, 30 (2012) (upholding a trial court’s finding that the assurances given by a felon’s parents were not credible). But when a court is satisfied that a felon will not retain control over his guns, §922(g) does not apply, and the court has equitable power to accommodate the felon’s request….

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2. On the other hand, "possession" is very broad:
   
   
   • U.S. v. Booth, 111 F.3d 1 (C.A.1 (Mass.), 1997, at 1):

     ...The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual possession and constructive possession.... Even when a person does not actually possess an object, he may be in constructive possession of it. Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time of exercising dominion and control over an object or over the area in which the object is located. The law recognizes no distinction between actual and constructive possession, either form of possession is sufficient. Possession of an object may be established by either direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary to prove ownership of the object,...

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   • See U.S. v. Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d 549 (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1991) in which Barron-Rivera's conviction for being an alien in possession of a firearm was affirmed without him even having had to touch a gun. Barron-Rivera's claimed reversible error in that the government failed to prove the necessary intent.
     
     The court of appeal noted, at 551:

     ...Barron-Rivera argued that the gun was in his wife's residence at the time he re-entered the United States and moved back into that residence. Accepting that contention, the district court, nonetheless, found that Barron-Rivera's possession of the firearm was voluntary because he permitted the firearm to remain in the house after he acquired knowledge of its presence....

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     In affirming the conviction, the court of appeal found, at 551 -- 552:

     ...In other words, by continuing to reside in the apartment in which the gun was located, he voluntarily and knowingly possessed the gun...

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   • See, also, United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (3rd Cir., 2012), in which the gun a prohibited person was charged with illegally possessing was not secured against the prohibited person's access, supporting both the prohibited person's conviction for unlawful possession of a gun and the indictment of his cohabitant. From the opinion (at pg. 593, emphasis added):

     ...on June 6, 2008, a valid search warrant (the “search warrant”) was executed on the couple‟s Clarion County home. Agents seized an SKS, Interordnance M59/66 rifle (“SKS rifle”) from an upstairs bedroom.
     
     Although Huet is legally permitted to possess a firearm, Hall was convicted in 1999 of possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and is therefore prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm. After being informed of the raid, Huet allegedly told investigators that the guns in the house belonged to her and that it was not illegal for her to purchase weapons. Despite Huet‟s assertions that she alone possessed the SKS rifle, the Government sought and obtained an indictment charging Hall with illegal possession of the weapon, and Huet with aiding and abetting Hall‟s possession....

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     So the gun Hall, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawfully possessing, belonged to his cohabitant, Huet. It appears to have been undisputed that Huet could lawfully possess firearms. Nonetheless, she was indicted for aiding and abetting Hall's unlawful possession of gun because Huet's gun wasn't secured against access by Hall.