because from a technology and manufacturing standpoint, the US certainly had the capability to mass-produce the AK-47
There is a major flaw in this premise.
First off, die stamping as a machining process really did not mature until about 1950-55. The Soviets were milling '47s until the AKM came out (1959).
In 1933, the War Department was not even entirely set on the Garand as a solution.
And what would have been the impact if the designer/manufacturer had an analysis showing that most hits by small arms during WWI were not at 600 yards? Or 500, or 400, or 300 or even 200? The data existed. All it needed was to be gathered/crunched/presented/sold.
Again, flawed premise--you do not make major changes in wartime production unless there is a huge advantage. The Italians tried changing from 6.5 carcano to 7.5 in the middle of a war--this did not work out well at all.
The Japanese also tried changing from their 6.5 to the 7.7 in the middle of a war, this fared even worse.
The US War Production Board was a huge, cumbersome beast with a turning radius measurable in astronomical units. But, it was relentless. It's rigidity and procedure turned out millions of identical parts, all utterly interchangeable to the point that they did not need to be serialized to a given arm.
The US M1/2 37mm gun was largely pointless in 1940, and by all sensible arguments ought to have been replaced with the British 57mm 6 pounder. Other than it would not have fit in the various turrets and mounts the 37 did. (This is why the US kept using a satisfactory 75mm gun that fit well in Sherman turrets--it worked, and was workable.) That M1/2 37mm was being fielded well into 1945, where it was only good against trucks or similar soft-skin vehicles. The Gun you have is better than the superior one on the drawing board.
The M1 Carbine was used in WW2. On the battlefield, how was it that much different than the AK?
The Carbine was originally intended to be a PDW, the complete replacement for all handguns in TOE. It was hugely successful in this role, too.
The Naming of it suggested that it was meant as a shorter version of the main battle rifle is part of the reason it became a Company/Platoon leader arm, and then being used as s Squad leader's arm.
The War Department had some very specific methodology in mind. They were more than well aware that artillery & MGs produce far more casualties than rifles (around 25x for arty, 10x for MGs). Therefore, the ammo ought suit the MG first. MGs were expected to range out to 2800-3200 yards--this in no possible way describes 5.56nato.
It was desired to have MGs and rifles use the same ammo, despite the ammo being set up differently (belts versus clips) when boxed and crated.
That dis-commonality is what doomed the 7x53, despite the Pederson round being a better rifle round. American excellence in logistics negated the issues of clips an belts getting forward to troops. But, no one could expect that in 1935.
In addition, while we had the Garand in 1936, they were not as forward-deployed as people might imagine. There were very few in the Philippines for example, almost none at Pearl. The Marines did not commit to the Grand until 1942. So, the war in the Pacific would not have changed so very much. And logistics and strategy would win that war (the Marines were still using the 1917 Browning in 1945.