Vermont Supreme Court upholds historic gun control law - High capacity magazines

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9th Circuit in California did the opposite

CA is requesting an En Blanc in the 9th so we haven't won here yet.
If we lose that California Rifle and Pistol is prepared to take it to SCOTUS if they will take it.
If we win then it is a question of if the State will take it to SCOTUS. Other states would probably prefer that they don't.
If it does go to SCOTUS and we win (years down the road of course)that might put a crimp of some of the current White House plans.
 
A ban on magazines with more than 10 rounds is likely to be passed by Congress and signed by Biden. With AR mags at less than 15 bucks apiece right now, seems crazy not to stock up.

I remember during the Clinton assault weapon ban, normal capacity Glock magazines went for about $100 each.
It's going to take him actually coming out and announcing that he has an immediate plan to do so, then they will disappear overnight. Most people only wait until the 11th hour... listening to folks who know better complain is going to be a lil hard to take when for the last decade you could buy 10-12 packs for less than $100.
 
Perhaps the magazine ban is a "foot in the door" measure. Start small. Get a favorable ruling that will set a "precedent" to work with...in other words create a legal situation that intentionally leads to a "law of intended consequences."

Is anyone still so naive that they think magazines is the real issue? . They are after control of your firearms. Joe said so publicly and is on record....the second amendment is "not for individuals." Do the "intellectual math"!
 
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Every time he stood and spoke on the issue when he was breaking the bad news to us we kept hearing "and I'm a strong supporter of the 2nd amendment, I have a safe full of guns and have hunted all my life....."
 
Every time he stood and spoke on the issue when he was breaking the bad news to us we kept hearing "and I'm a strong supporter of the 2nd amendment, I have a safe full of guns and have hunted all my life....."

Sadly most of the politicians with an R next to their name don't have the backbone to withstand the media attacks when some incident happens.

So they think they have to do "something" to make the bad press go away
 
The 9th Circuit already ruled the first California magazine ban illegal.
https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-n...gun-politics-11a1e49886a3143f2db3fbf5b10c5069

Yes, but a stay is still in place until the court either denies the states request of a En Blanc rehearing or it is reheard and decided in our favor.
So while we did win in the 9th at the moment it makes no difference. The 9th will either rehear it or not, until then the sale of >10 round mags (in CA at least) is still prohibited.
 
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I have heard the phrase "more important than the outcome of a particular decision, is that a decision be made in a timely manner". I sort of agree with that. Of course I may eat my foot one day, I sort of just wish they'd "hand down" "their" decision already. Rip off the bandaid so to speak so we can get on with life. The proposals in and of themselves are an infringement, whether they come to pass or not. Like a form of harassment.

It would be a major relief if there was a cut and dry grandfathering of all arms purchased legally during a time period where such arms were legal, irrespective of any future bans. Is there any case law or precedent or whatever you'd call it to pursue such a thing?
 
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If the 9th Circuit struck down the California law, the probability of SCOTUS upholding their decision is pretty good. For the 9th to do that is a very big deal. They are anything but conservative.
 
SCOTUS is not inevitable, as that court may and usually does deny cert.
Be careful what you wish for, as a case with bad facts can do more harm than good, even though some members view the Constitution differently than others. The Vermont case, according to one account I have read, involved a white supremacist likely caught in the act of some unsavory activities, so may not be the best poster child for the cause.
 
It’s so sad and frustrating that we “need” some court to tell what what we can “have”, even though it’s so plainly spelled out in our Constitution. If this same discussion were being had over whether the Supreme Court says cars with more than 4 cylinders were “allowed”, it would be dismissed as idiotic.
 
A reminder is apparently in order that political discussions are frowned upon here at THR.
 
it may be "political" and against the rules

What is against the rules in non 2A politics. What violates the rule everyone agreed to when they signed up was getting outside of that agreement. The problem is that people want to rant and expand their gripe more broadly than the scope of THR.
 
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Forgot to insert quote asking how they figured out the magazine was illegal...

Nothing certain, but strong speculation is that the magazines are plastic and have a production date stamp. It’s very common even if it’s not very well known. They generally look kinda like a clock and the hands point to the month and a year will be noted. So if the ban went into place on Feb 1 of 2020 and the magazine is stamped with the clock mark indicating March of 2020 then its a dead giveaway. I will keep an eye open for a Marlin that can be used as an example. I know I have some at home but I’m not sure about work. It’s generally for stuff with warranty or expiration dates.
 
It’s so sad and frustrating that we “need” some court to tell what what we can “have”, even though it’s so plainly spelled out in our Constitution. ....

What our Constitution means and how it applies has been a matter for dispute almost as soon as the ink was dry. Hylton v. United States in 1796 appears to be the first major litigation involving a question of the interpretation and application of the Constitution. Then came Marbury v. Madison decided in 1803; and McCulloch v. Maryland was decided 10 years later, in 1813.

In the real world the Founding Fathers assigned the role of deciding what the Constitution means and how it applies to the federal courts (Article III, Sections 1 and 2):
Section 1.

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish....​

Section 2.

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,...​

The exercise of judicial power and the deciding of cases arising under the Constitution necessarily involves interpreting and applying the Constitution to the circumstances of the matter in controversy in order to decide the dispute. Many of the Founding Fathers were lawyers and well understood what the exercise of judicial power meant and entailed.

Thus if there is disagreement about whether a statute enacted by Congress applies to decide a controversy or the application of the statute is barred by the Constitution, the matter is one within the province of the federal courts to decide. As the Supreme Court ruled back in 1803 (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), 1 Cranch at 177 -- 178):
...It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply....

It's well settled law that under certain circumstance and to some extent a constitutionally protected right may be regulated. What those circumstance might be and the nature and extent of permissible regulation will be worked out by the courts. To do so, a court will consider, among other things, the nature of the right, the nature of the regulation, and the governmental purpose intended to be served.

For the purposes of illustration, let's consider the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, assembly and religion against laws that abridge those rights we know there has been a history of certain regulation of speech, assembly and religion. A few examples are:

  • Laws prohibiting such things as false advertising, fraud or misrepresentation, as well as laws requiring certain disclosures in connection with various transactions, would absolutely survive a challenge to their validity on Constitutional grounds even though such laws do impinge on the freedom of speech.

  • If you are offering securities or certain other types of investments to the public, your written solicitation materials will have to first be approved prior to use by one or more regulatory agencies. If you are selling medicines in interstate commerce, your labeling will have to be approved in advance by the FDA, and you will have to have demonstrated, through hard, scientific data, that any claims or representations made are true. These are also laws that abridge freedom of speech, and yet they are regularly enforced.

  • Laws respecting the time, place and manner of speech or assembly have also survived Constitutional challenges. Thus a municipality may require that organizers obtain a permit in order to hold an assembly or a parade and may prohibit such activities during, for example, the very early morning hours. See, for example:

    • Hill v Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), in which the Court, in upholding a Colorado law restricting protesting, educational or counseling activities within 100 feet of the entrance to a health facility, noted:
      ...We are likewise persuaded that the statute is "narrowly tailored" to serve those interests and that it leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. As we have emphasized on more than one occasion, when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement...

      • Cf. McCullen v. Coakley (U. S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1168, 2014)


      • In McCullen the Court struck down a new Massachusetts "buffer zone" law. As noted in the opinion the Court had previously sustained a different sort of buffer zone law in Colorado, and nothing in McCullen casts any doubt on the continued validity of the Colorado law (McCullen, slip opinion at 2):
        ….The statute [the prior Massachusetts law] was modeled on a similar Colorado law that this Court had upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703 (2000). Relying on Hill, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the Massachusetts statute against a First Amendment challenge. McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F. 3d 45 (2004) (McGuire II), cert. denied, 544 U. S. 974 (2005); McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F. 3d 36 (2001) (McGuire I).

        By 2007, some Massachusetts legislators and law enforcement officials had come to regard the 2000 statute as inadequate.....


    • Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir., 2006) in which the court upheld a Santa Monica ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies. In fact in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs the court specifically acknowledges that the ordinance may burden the protected right, noting, at pg 1038:
      ...A narrowly-tailored permitting regulation need not be the least restrictive means of furthering a locality's asserted interests. The regulation may not, however, burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve a scheme's important goals. See United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir.1999). "[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied `so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985))...

  • In the leading case on prior restraint (Near v. State of Minnesota Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)) the Court in striking down a Minnesota statute allowing for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory news analyzed in considerable detail and depth the scope and extent of the infringement of the freedom of press, the interests served and the availability of other and narrower remedies. And the Court then reached the conclusion that the statute went too far to be a permissible regulation.

    But nonetheless the Court also noted that certain interests, under certain circumstances would justify even prior restraint (Near, 283 U. S. 657, at 715 - 716):
    ...The objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. 'When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its error that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. Ed. 470. No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.6 On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 139, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874.' Schenck v. United States, supra. These limitations are not applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect private rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity...

  • In the past, laws prohibiting polygamy have been upheld against challenges that they violate the right to free exercise of religion (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890)).

So in fact the reality is that rights protected by the Constitution may nonetheless be subject to some limited regulation. The foregoing discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that the courts do permit limited regulation of a constitutionally protected right. There are numerous examples of laws sustained by the courts which abridge freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. And First Amendment jurisprudence also offers some clues as to how such regulations will be evaluated by the courts.

We can not expect, nor will we see, perfect correspondence between the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment and the regulation of rights protected by the Second Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is quite mature at this point, but Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the wake of Heller, is in its infancy. However, we can expect some regulation of Second Amendment rights to be upheld by the courts.
 
What our Constitution means and how it applies has been a matter for dispute almost as soon as the ink was dry. Hylton v. United States in 1796 appears to be the first major litigation involving a question of the interpretation and application of the Constitution. Then came Marbury v. Madison decided in 1803; and McCulloch v. Maryland was decided 10 years later, in 1813.

In the real world the Founding Fathers assigned the role of deciding what the Constitution means and how it applies to the federal courts (Article III, Sections 1 and 2):

The exercise of judicial power and the deciding of cases arising under the Constitution necessarily involves interpreting and applying the Constitution to the circumstances of the matter in controversy in order to decide the dispute. Many of the Founding Fathers were lawyers and well understood what the exercise of judicial power meant and entailed.

Thus if there is disagreement about whether a statute enacted by Congress applies to decide a controversy or the application of the statute is barred by the Constitution, the matter is one within the province of the federal courts to decide. As the Supreme Court ruled back in 1803 (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), 1 Cranch at 177 -- 178):

It's well settled law that under certain circumstance and to some extent a constitutionally protected right may be regulated. What those circumstance might be and the nature and extent of permissible regulation will be worked out by the courts. To do so, a court will consider, among other things, the nature of the right, the nature of the regulation, and the governmental purpose intended to be served.

For the purposes of illustration, let's consider the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, assembly and religion against laws that abridge those rights we know there has been a history of certain regulation of speech, assembly and religion. A few examples are:

  • Laws prohibiting such things as false advertising, fraud or misrepresentation, as well as laws requiring certain disclosures in connection with various transactions, would absolutely survive a challenge to their validity on Constitutional grounds even though such laws do impinge on the freedom of speech.

  • If you are offering securities or certain other types of investments to the public, your written solicitation materials will have to first be approved prior to use by one or more regulatory agencies. If you are selling medicines in interstate commerce, your labeling will have to be approved in advance by the FDA, and you will have to have demonstrated, through hard, scientific data, that any claims or representations made are true. These are also laws that abridge freedom of speech, and yet they are regularly enforced.

  • Laws respecting the time, place and manner of speech or assembly have also survived Constitutional challenges. Thus a municipality may require that organizers obtain a permit in order to hold an assembly or a parade and may prohibit such activities during, for example, the very early morning hours. See, for example:
    • Hill v Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), in which the Court, in upholding a Colorado law restricting protesting, educational or counseling activities within 100 feet of the entrance to a health facility, noted:
      • Cf. McCullen v. Coakley (U. S. Supreme Court, No. 12–1168, 2014)


      • In McCullen the Court struck down a new Massachusetts "buffer zone" law. As noted in the opinion the Court had previously sustained a different sort of buffer zone law in Colorado, and nothing in McCullen casts any doubt on the continued validity of the Colorado law (McCullen, slip opinion at 2):


    • Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir., 2006) in which the court upheld a Santa Monica ordinance requiring a permit for public assemblies. In fact in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs the court specifically acknowledges that the ordinance may burden the protected right, noting, at pg 1038:

  • In the leading case on prior restraint (Near v. State of Minnesota Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)) the Court in striking down a Minnesota statute allowing for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory news analyzed in considerable detail and depth the scope and extent of the infringement of the freedom of press, the interests served and the availability of other and narrower remedies. And the Court then reached the conclusion that the statute went too far to be a permissible regulation.

    But nonetheless the Court also noted that certain interests, under certain circumstances would justify even prior restraint (Near, 283 U. S. 657, at 715 - 716):

  • In the past, laws prohibiting polygamy have been upheld against challenges that they violate the right to free exercise of religion (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890)).

So in fact the reality is that rights protected by the Constitution may nonetheless be subject to some limited regulation. The foregoing discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that the courts do permit limited regulation of a constitutionally protected right. There are numerous examples of laws sustained by the courts which abridge freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. And First Amendment jurisprudence also offers some clues as to how such regulations will be evaluated by the courts.

We can not expect, nor will we see, perfect correspondence between the regulation of rights protected by the First Amendment and the regulation of rights protected by the Second Amendment. First Amendment jurisprudence is quite mature at this point, but Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the wake of Heller, is in its infancy. However, we can expect some regulation of Second Amendment rights to be upheld by the courts.
Thank you for this fascinating dissertation! :)
 
True. Mental Illiteracy has been a problem for liberals since the beginning of liberals.

So you claim to know the one, true meaning of the Constitution; and anyone who disagrees with your interpretation is wrong? In other words, you favor tyranny, as long as it's your brand of tyranny.

On the other hand, in the words of two of our Founding Fathers:

  • Madison in Federalist 39:
    ...the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated....

  • Hamilton in Federalist 78:
    ...The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing....

In our system the people, all citizens, do have a say.

  • The Founding Fathers well understood how people do disagree and how politics works. They were active, mostly successfully, in the commercial and political world of the time. Almost all were very well educated. They were generally politically savvy. Many were members at various times of their home colonial assemblies or were otherwise active in local government or administration. They were solidly grounded in the real world and knew how to make things work in the real world. That is why they were able to bring our nation into being.

  • But we live in a pluralistic, political society, and not everyone thinks as you do. People have varying beliefs, values, needs, wants and fears. People have differing views on the proper role of government. So while you and those who share your views may use the tools the Constitution, our laws and our system give you to promote your vision of how things should be, others may and will be using those same tools to promote their visions.

  • The Constitution, our laws, and our system give you resources and remedies. You can associate with others who think as you do and exercise what political power that association gives you to influence legislation. You have the opportunity to try to join with enough other people to enable you to elect legislators and other public officials who you think will be more attuned to your interests. And others who believe differently have the same opportunities.

  • So if you want things to be different, by all means, get politically active and try to marshal sufficient political power to change things. But of course that doesn't guarantee that you will get your way. People who think that things should be different from the way you think things should be also have a say. If you don't believe that they do, you believe in tyranny -- as long as it's your tyranny.

The reality is that our Constitution has served as a governing document of this republic for over 200 years. We've survived a panoply of travails, including civil war, economic ups and downs, an assortment of lousy elected officials, and some really lousy laws (like Prohibition) -- and yet we endure. From The Wall Street Journal, "The Culture That Sustains America’s Constitution", 2 July 2018:
Since 1789 the average life span of national constitutions world-wide has been 19 years,according to scholars at the University of Chicago. Meanwhile, “We the People of the United States” are now well into the third century under our Constitution. We’ve lived under the same written charter longer than any people on earth. We’ve had regular federal elections every two years, uninterrupted even by the Civil War....
 
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