In thirty states, the license can be demanded without probable cause. A traffic offense is not a requirement for a vehicle stop. In California, law enforcement believe they can and they will perform a "Terry stop" on anyone in or out of a vehicle if they have "reasonable suspicion." This is less than "probable cause." Furthermore, in United States vs. Long (1983) it is construed that a "Terry stop" was sufficient to also search a vehicle. Vehicle searches are exempt from 4th Amendment warrant requirements (Caroll vs. United States), and furthermore exempt from probable cause under a Terry stop. I know some will argue the 4th doesn't require a warrant. My point is that Terry stops don't require probable cause either.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada established that even a pedestrian must identify himself to law enforcement upon demand.
"But engaging in activities requiring a license without a license will, itself, be an offense."
I think that makes my point.
Raising multiple legal questions requires a somewhat lengthy answer. So for others, feel free to skip.
I) Hiibel actually had an apparent driver of a vehicle that was outside the vehicle when the police arrived, he was not a pedestrian in the common meaning of the term. The situation was that the police received a report alleging that the driver of a truck matching the truck by the defendant was assaulting a female. From the Scotus case facts:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-5554.ZO.html
"The sheriff’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.
The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had “any identification on [him],” which we understand as a request to produce a driver’s license or some other form of written identification."
II) Regarding Terry stops, what the court is referring to is a very old common law rule developed from an ancient statute of Parliament, 13 Edward I, c. 4, that far predates the Constitution itself.
You can find reference to it in Blackstone's Commentaries referring to watchmen and their powers in Book 4, p. 289. "2. Arrests by
officers, without warrant, may be executed, 1. By a justice of the peace; who may himself apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, by word only, any person committing a felony or breach of the peace in his presence. 2. The sheriff, and 3. The coroner, may apprehend any felon within the county without warrant. 4. The constable, of whose office we formerly spoke, hath great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He may, without warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace, and carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to ensue, he may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon; and for that purpose is authorized (as upon a justice's warrant) to break open doors, and even to kill the felon if he cannot otherwise be taken; and, if he or his assistants be killed in attempting such arrest, it is murder in all concerned. 5.
Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I. c. 4. to keep watch and ward in all towns from sunsetting to sunrising, or such as are mere assistants to the constable,
may virtute officii (powers of the office) arrest all offenders, and particularly night-walkers, and commit them to custody till the morning." Notice that there is a general power to arrest and hold even without probable cause in this statute.
In general, the common law did not give one the power to be anonymous in public and constables, sheriffs, and watchmen could require people identify themselves and to state their business generally. By this means, criminals escaping justice could be caught and those with ill intent would be dissuaded from proceeding with evil plans because they were identified. Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England indicates that the general wearing of disguises in order to prevent identification was suspect as a honest person has nothing to fear from being identified (found in his Institutes, Vol. 4, p.75 where he is talking about Night Hunting (poaching) which is a general presumption of other common law practices derived from the few formal statutes at the time. You see a bit of this in Shakespeare's play, Much Ado about Nothing.
This same English common law was adopted in the early colonial era in the U.S. which allowed constables and watchmen to determine both identity and purpose for people to be about in public. You find this repeatedly buried in colonial law reports and history. Society at the time simply did not have the surplus to support much in the way of law enforcement so individual citizens were drafted into law enforcement roles to supplement the few law enforcement officials that were employed by the communities.
Here are current statutes regarding stop and identify statutes.
https://infogalactic.com/info/Stop_and_identify_statutes
and from Police Chief's Magazine,
http://academyresources.net/wp-cont...hief-Magazine-Failure-to-Identify-Article.pdf
III) Regarding automobile searches, Carroll simply clarifies that motor vehicles are different than someone's home due to public safety and the ability to flee jurisdictions rapidly to conceal criminal activities. It is simply the latest in a long line of precedents that allowed officers of the law to inspect cargoes, etc.
For the most part, Carroll was simply adding motor vehicles to existing law governing ships and their quarters, railroads, wagons, and so forth regarding stops for inspections, customs, taxes, and the like which did not require warrants. The old standard of trespass required an actual trespass on one's property which is a complicated matter when dealing with public roadways but cases and statutory law clearly at the time distinguished vehicles from individuals walking. It is a distortion to say that Carroll abrogates the 4th Amendment but simply that motor vehicles are different. What governs currently gets complicated given the Katz analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy standard but basically locked containers or spaces like a trunk might very well require a warrant or probable cause if there is no officer safety issue involved. Anything in plain view or in open fields does not require a warrant as the very sight of it indicates probable cause and vehicles are included in that during a stop.
IV)
Michigan v. Long (1983), the major point of the case is not search and seizure but rather judicial federalism. State supreme courts do not have the ability to extend U.S. Supreme Court precedents to offer more protections without the U.S. Supreme Court's say so. In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court is supreme over what its precedents mean so a state wishing to extend protections must use its own constitutions and precedents and not rely on precedents from the U.S. Supreme Court.
V) To sum up, reading the Constitution itself is similar to powerpoint bullet points of a lengthy lecture--it the start of the conversation not the whole of it. Precedents, custom, and understanding of the general meaning (either in the great principles of today's society if you are not an originalist or the original text meaning/intent of the Framers if you are an originalist) are needed if you want to go beyond a cursory understanding of it.
