A technical question about the history of the AK-47 in relation to the SKS...

Status
Not open for further replies.

Theohazard

Member
Joined
Feb 24, 2014
Messages
1,849
Location
Western PA
I’m reading The Gun by C. J. Chivers, a book about the history of automatic weaponry in war, and focusing specifically on the historical impact of the AK-47. It’s an excellent book, but (understandably) it doesn’t go into very many technical details; it’s obviously written for a general audience that might not know anything about firearms.

Right now I’m at the part about the AK-47’s development. The author explains why the Soviets were looking for a new rifle, and how the SKS was lacking a full-auto ability and only had a 10-round fixed magazine. But so far, the author hasn’t explained why a completely new rifle was needed: Why couldn’t they just modify the SKS to be select-fire and have a detachable magazine?

Basically, my question is a technical one: What was it about the SKS’ design that required a completely new rifle instead of modifying the existing design? I suppose the author might address that question later, but I doubt it considering the general non-technical nature of the book.
 
My guess is the AK is much cheaper to make.
Especially the folded sheet metal receiver ones.

The milled receiver on the SKS couldn't easily be manufactured by unskilled present labor in 3rd. world countrys either.

Germany pioneered stamped sheet metal assault rifles in WWII.
The Russians where quick to pick up on how much cheaper they could be made then forged and milled rifles.

rc
 
From my rembembry, (;)) the SKS and AK-47 were developed separately but almost simultaneously. (SKS 1944-45, AK 1946-47) The SKS was designed to be what it was, and the AK was designed to be something slightly different. So it wasn't a matter of having one old design they maybe could modify. They had two contemporary designs to choose from, and pretty much chose to make both.

As far as ease of manufacture, remember that the first AKs WERE stamped, and that was found to be too hard to get right for the Soviet factories and factory workers of the time. The milled-receiver AK-47 was actually easier to construct to the needed tolerances, and was introduced as a stop-gap measure to get reliable rifles in production until the stamped version was perfected in 1959 with the AKM.
 
The SKS appears to have been intended as a stopgap to get the Red Army up to parity with the Western powers. The design is conventional, and entirely derivative from pre-war designs: the locking system from the Saive precursor to the M49, also the Czech designs from the 1930's. The trigger group is lifted from the Garand. Adopting the SKS allowed them to get the 7.62x39 cartridge into use, and probably convince the Old Guard leadership that an intermediate cartridge could replace the 7.62x54 on a modern battlefield.
The AK was much more an original design, and took more time to get debugged, and again would have been a tougher sell to the military leadership. If it hadn't been for the special circumstances of the Vietnam War, the conventional M14 would have been the US issue for many more years, because there would have been no perceived reason to replace it.
 
Sam1911 said:
the SKS and AK-47 were developed separately but almost simultaneously. (SKS 1944-45, AK 1946-47) The SKS was designed to be what it was, and the AK was designed to be something slightly different. So it wasn't a matter of having one old design they maybe could modify. They had two contemporary designs to choose from, and pretty much chose to make both.
The book makes it sound like the SKS was already developed by the time the Soviet push for a new rifle came about. It refers to the SKS as a "serviceable but not quite satisfactory carbine" and follows it up with:

"It was light, simple, and inches shorter than most infantry rifles of the time, which made it easier to handle in thickets, in urban combat, in armored vehicles, or on parachute duty. But it fired only one round for every pull of the trigger, and was fitted with a fixed ten-round magazine. The Red Army's Main Artillery Department was interested in an individual soldier's weapon with more firepower. For more firepower, something else was needed."

The Soviets mobilized a huge effort to design a new rifle, and I'm just wondering what made the SKS un-adaptable to a select-fire design?

(I'm pretty sure my quote of the book falls under the "fair use" doctrine and isn't a copyright violation, but if I'm wrong I apologize in advance.)
 
Last edited:
Edarnold said:
The SKS appears to have been intended as a stopgap to get the Red Army up to parity with the Western powers. The design is conventional, and entirely derivative from pre-war designs: the locking system from the Saive precursor to the M49, also the Czech designs from the 1930's. The trigger group is lifted from the Garand. Adopting the SKS allowed them to get the 7.62x39 cartridge into use, and probably convince the Old Guard leadership that an intermediate cartridge could replace the 7.62x54 on a modern battlefield.
The AK was much more an original design, and took more time to get debugged, and again would have been a tougher sell to the military leadership. If it hadn't been for the special circumstances of the Vietnam War, the conventional M14 would have been the US issue for many more years, because there would have been no perceived reason to replace it.
That's a pretty good explanation. Was the SKS design also just not able to handle sustained full-auto fire? Because otherwise you'd think they would've at least given it a select-fire capability if it was. I really don't know much about its design, to be honest.
 
The book makes it sound like the SKS was already developed by the time the Soviet push for a new rifle came about. It refers to the SKS as a "serviceable but not quite satisfactory carbine" ...
Right. (I read Chivver's book several years ago and also caught an interview with him about it on NPR. Neat guy!)

But it was very nearly perfectly contemporary. Yes, it had been developed in the year prior and fielded, but there was this other rifle in the works and once the Avotmat Kalashnikova was functional, there really wasn't any great need to go back and reinvent the SKS. They had a rifle for their main battle troops, and something that was perfectly fine for the reserves and home guard types and for export to their allies/puppets. Kind of a first tier and second tier thing. Very little of the production capacity or product lines of the Soviet mil-industrial complex was ever abandoned, stopped, or even thrown away. They were still making bolt action Mosin-Nagants up into the mid 1960s! Rifle works ok? Make millions! This rifle works good too? Make millions of it, too! That old rifle still works? Keep on making millions if it as well!

Later in the book Chivvers talks about the production mindset of the Soviets as pertains to weapons, and gets into how they just kept the lines going all the time, no matter what. Make em, ship em to allies, make and ship rifle PLANT to allies and have THEM make more and more. To the extent that one of the puppet states did an inventory of their stockpiles after the fall of the wall, and determined that they had about TEN Soviet rifles for every man in their army.

Great is the enemy of good enough, and the SKS was plenty of a good enough thing.
 
Thanks Sam. Yeah it's a fascinating book and the author seems like a really interesting guy. And he's a Pulitzer Prize winning Marine, which is pretty much an oxymoron!

I wish I had more time to focus on reading this book right now, but the short-attention-span nature of a laptop and THR are a lot easier to focus on while I'm trying to keep my 8-month-old from hurting herself.
 
If you really need something to do while watching the young'uns:

http://www.thehighroad.org/showthread.php?t=548933

Follow the link and you can listen to the whole interview, including this...

Host: "When you say you find them ... how do you notice them?"
Chivers: "Well, you're going to laugh at me, so go ahead. If you know what you're looking for in the various Kalashnikovs, you become almost like a birdwatcher who can at a glance into the bushes tell you that there's three or four different kinds of warblers there..."

His segue into explaining to the host how to ID old Soviet milled guns.
 
That's a pretty good explanation. Was the SKS design also just not able to handle sustained full-auto fire? Because otherwise you'd think they would've at least given it a select-fire capability if it was. I really don't know much about its design, to be honest.

Actually, it seems like the bolt and carrier design of the SKS may actually be more adaptable to full auto then the AK design. The tilting bolt of the SKS contains more mass relative to the bolt carrier than the rotating bolt of the AK, and the disconnector on the SKS will hold the hammer until the bolt is in battery. The carrier of the AK seems to bounce back off the front trunnion which is why you sometimes have rate reducers on full auto AKs.

I see the AK as a much simpler gun to produce, even if you have a milled receiver. The SKS stock requires a stock to be roughly inlet to hold the TG to the upper, the AK holds both the TG and hammer group in the receiver with a piece of spring wire. Replacement of the bolt in an AK means just finding one with the proper clearance between trunnion lugs and barrel, on the SKS the bolt is a large and finely machined piece that fits into a fixed size receiver (although presumably the SKS could be modified to take a variable sized locking shoulder ala the Saive designed FAL).

Sometimes I wonder about just how much he designers had to do with the acceptance of the guns. Simonov was a very experienced and educated designer, and by WW2 had been working in the Tula arsenal design group for over a decade. Kalashnikov was young enough to be a son to Simonov, and was drafted into the army in WW2 as a young man. He served on a tank crew, was injured and spent many months in a hospital recovering.

Given the circumstances, I would think that the young veteran with a demonstrated natural talent may have been favored over the middle aged guy who was working in an arsenal before the Tsar was overthrown.
 
Sometimes I wonder about just how much he designers had to do with the acceptance of the guns. Simonov was a very experienced and educated designer, and by WW2 had been working in the Tula arsenal design group for over a decade. Kalashnikov was young enough to be a son to Simonov, and was drafted into the army in WW2 as a young man. He served on a tank crew, was injured and spent many months in a hospital recovering.

Given the circumstances, I would think that the young veteran with a demonstrated natural talent may have been favored over the middle aged guy who was working in an arsenal before the Tsar was overthrown.

Muddying the waters is the slightly more that implied suggestion that Kalashnikov's history and role in the actual design of the rifle that bears his name is probably closer to a state sponsored parable than a factual account of events. Chivvers discusses that in some depth. Not only was gun design not probably the sole output of one man's mind and skill, but the story crafted around him was a wonderfully encouraging tale of a young simple good Soviet citizen finding ways to turn his natural talents to the service of his country -- when actual records of his family and background and detail about the engineering development team that produced the Avtomat Kalashnikov seem to be disappeared. Truth is not inherently good, and the story of history is only valuable because of how it serves the state's interests.
 
OK, let me take this from my area of professional expertise, which is the subject of Soviet aircraft. One of the topics I teach to my students (All DOD work) is about the engineering developmental path of Soviet era military technology, partucularly aerospace material. This information comes from that study.

It was very very common for the Soviet military to have multiple competing systems under development at the same time by competing OKB's (Experimental Design Bureaus). Each OKB would design a product and prototypes, and then submit them for testing. Adoption was followed by assignment to a variety of GAZ's`(military industrial manufacturing concerns) who actually did the manufacturing. By keeping competing designs coming, they had a way to hedge their bets on what would work and what wouldn't. VERY often a basic development from existing technology was designed at the same time as a "backup" for another design that was groundbreaking in some way in order to have a backup plan, or to give the end result goal plan time to mature fully. My bet is that the SKS and AK relationship was exactly of that nature.

Often the Soviets accepted a design that was technically deficient compared to it's direct competition, if the design still met basic needs and was easier/cheaper to build. The MiG-15 is an example of this. The competing design, the Lavochkin LA-15 (FANTAIL to NATO code readers) was by all reports a design that was a better performer for the mission for which both were designed. It's flaw was more complex construction and higher costs. The PVO got the MiG-15 and the Lavochkin was forgotten.


So within this paradigm of design and manufacture, it's not surprising that both the SKS and the AK were contemporaries. What's surprising to me is that there aren't yet more designs floating around.


Willie

.
 
FWIW all the gun smith tinkerer types I know say the SKS is very hard to make into a full auto rifle. Something about the way things work makes it almost totally unfit for that role. But the Chinese were said to have mucked around making a full auto SKS at one time. That's what I hear anyway. Obviously it didn't catch on. The reason why is that the AK came along so soon after the SKS that it was knocked out of the water as far as the Soviets were concerned. They gave all their SKS making hardware to the Chinese along with the techs who did the work.

I also look at what the Russians were copying when they made those weapons. First you had the M1 with the same 10 round capacity and also fed by stripper clips. But there were other rifles coming along in the war like the M1 Carbine that was shorter, lighter and used a smaller caliber round but still had a smaller capacity mag in the 15 round detachable. I think most M1 Carbines came with the smaller mag (rather than the 30 round mag). Keep in mind that the 7.62 x 39 round was very similar in ballistics to the .30 cal. US rifles. But later in the war the Germans unleashed the Sturmgewehr and that changed the rules of rifle making again. Suddenly it was obvious that a high capacity, fast firing assault rifle (the Sturmgewehr actually translates to assault rifle) could be very effective. So the Russians set to work copying that design using the round they had already developed (the 7.62 x 39).

IMO it was all about the Russians copying the trends of the war and trying to keep up or get ahead because they had been in a fight for their lives. After the end of the war they weren't convinced that there wouldn't be another war between the US and them pretty quickly and they wanted to have the best infantry rifle they could produce. That rifle became the AK-47. It was a good design as evidenced by the fact that so many still use it. I think the US saw the effectiveness of that rifle and the SKS (to a lesser degree) in Korea and they played catch up inventing the AR series before Vietnam got going. Real jumps in effectiveness have been very rare since then. Designs were perfected but jumping from semi-auto to full auto in a carbine was a huge jump. We haven't seen that kind of huge jump in quite a while IMO. Some things threaten to make that jump now but they are still in the works.
 
Point
M1 Garand = 8 round enblock clips, not 10.
And not stripper clips.

The enblock clip stayed in the Garand until it was empty.
Then it was empty, and ejected with the last round fired from it.

rc
 
Willie Sutton said:
It was very very common for the Soviet military to have multiple competing systems under development at the same time by competing OKB's (Experimental Design Bureaus). Each OKB would design a product and prototypes, and then submit them for testing. Adoption was followed by assignment to a variety of GAZ's`(military industrial manufacturing concerns) who actually did the manufacturing. By keeping competing designs coming, they had a way to hedge their bets on what would work and what wouldn't. VERY often a basic development from existing technology was designed at the same time as a "backup" for another design that was groundbreaking in some way in order to have a backup plan, or to give the end result goal plan time to mature fully. My bet is that the SKS and AK relationship was exactly of that nature.
Thanks Willie, that's probably the best explanation so far. The book does explain the Soviet system of multiple competing design teams.
 
To sum it up in few words, Soviet small arms program for intermediate cartridge included a whole spectrum of infantry arms, such as:
- bolt action carbine for rear echelon troops (dropped from development in around 1945 or 46)
- general issue semi-auto carbine (several designs were developed concurrently, Simonov SKS turned out to be the winner
- select-fire automatic carbine (avtomat), which initially was considered to be a more effective replacement for a submachine guns. Again, many designs were developed concurrently, starting from Sudaev AS-44; AK became the winner, eventually
- squad automatic weapon / light machine gun; this trial was won by Degtyarov RPD

Original concept was that SKS should be the main issue weapon for Soviet infantry, and AK / AKS to be used to more specialized roles; however, after several years of practical use it was found that AK could fill the role of the standard issue infantry rifle and eventually replace less effective SKS
 
IIRC, the SKS design was a scaled down version of a Soviet anti-tank rifle. Prototypes were field tested by some units in battles leading up to the fall of Berlin. The StG 44 hadn't really made an impact on them yet, and the PPSh-41 was heavily used in taking Berlin.
 
IIRC, the SKS design was a scaled down version of a Soviet anti-tank rifle
No, it wasn't
SKS was a scaled-down version of the experimental 7.62x54R Simonov semi-auto rifle, developed in 1940-41 in competition with Tokarev SVT-40
PTRS anti-tank rifle was based on the same design, but scaled up and adapted to en-block clip rather than stripper clip loading.
 
"Muddying the waters is the slightly more that implied suggestion that Kalashnikov's history and role in the actual design of the rifle that bears his name is probably closer to a state sponsored parable than a factual account of events."


Maybe... Maybe Not. Again, let me use my professional area of expertise in the subject of Soviet Aerospace design to lead a lesson.

In the Soviet system, the OKB (Experimental Design Bureau) was a very small engineering design bureau named after the chief designer. The design was formalized there, with prototypes built either internally or by contractors. After the design was handed over to the state, the state did acceptance trials and those designs selected for production were assigned to the variety of state-owned GAZ's for production. This is a complete contrast to the "design and build" business model of western firms. That's why there was no "Kalishnikov Factory" and similarly no "MiG Factory". There was an absolute separation between OKB and GAZ.



By Wikipedias definition: OKB = "Опытное конструкторское бюро" - Opytnoye Konstruktorskoye Buro translated to Experimental Design Bureau. During the Soviet era, OKBs were closed institutions working on design and prototyping of advanced technology, usually for military applications.

Note that they are only *design and prototyping* institutions, not production factories. This is a very important distinction to make. Interestingly enough the Russian word "конструкторское" transliterated as "Konstruktorskoye" and with the cognate in English of "Constructor" means "The construction place" in the context of "making something new from ideas" as opposed to the one who builds in series production. it has the connotation of a place of original imagination. "Konstruktor" means more or less "inventor". "Skoye" means more or less "place.


In any event:

OKB's were set up very rapidly when a "Chief Designer" (after which the OKB would be named) was identified as having potential to design a system that the state was interested in. An OKB could range in size from perhaps four people to perhaps 500. All were run "from top to bottom" by the Chief Designer around whom the OKB had been assembled. At times two shared the role and name, MiG being an example (Mikoyan and Guerevich, leading the the correctly spelled "MiG" as opposed to "Mig"). Even the largest of the OKB's were small, and the Chief Designer was expected to be, well... the CHIEF designer. Otherwise competition from his subordinates would result in THEM being cherry picked out and given their own design team and OKB name.

In MiG, for example, Mikoyan himself had hand on his french curve and pencil and Guerevich had slide rule and aerodynamic tables in hand for all designs up to and including MiG-23. They LITERALLY designed the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21, and MiG-23. They were assisted by draftsmen, specialized systems engineers (pneumatics, hydraulics, electrics, powerplant, etc), but the actual design of the vehicle was not very well distributed as a "collective" effort, but truly was more of an individual "cult of ability" design.

Aerospace OKB's you might have heard of include MiG (Mikoyan & Gurevich), Sukhoi, Tupolov, Beriev, Lavochkin, Mil, Sikorsky (before he emigrated to the USA), etc. Engine designers for these had their own OKB's: Kuznetsov, Klimov, Tumanski, etc. Same with many many many other military design OKB's spread across the spectrum of industries.

In firearms, we see the names Kalishnikov, Simonov, Mosin & Nagant, etc., etc. Each of these was similarly a small engineering team led by one Chief. This was Soviet policy long before WW-II, and the system of naming "Objekts" after the chief designer was long established. Naturally when "Objekt 611" or whatever became world famous, credits and praises and fame was heaped on the Chief Designer, who stood out in front as the face of the OKB that was named for HIM. Equally, if an OKB failed, the Chief Designer was often sent to the GULAG (another acronym). At times very talented designers rotated between fame, the GULAG, and then back into a new OKB as a valued designer based on the whims of Stalin. The Soviets had no problem tossing an engineer into prison to contemplate his failure and then to ressurect him when his expertise was again needed.

Here's an example, using Tupolev, who went on to design the TU-144 Supersonic transport as well as many other influential swept wing jet designs postwar. Taken from a book review of his biography:

On the evening of 21 October 1937, four agents of the NKVD (the KGB’s precursor) entered the offices of Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev and arrested him. Tupolev, the principal figure in the early development of Soviet aviation and a leading aircraft designer, was led away to immediate imprisonment. With this reprise of a scene played thousands of times during the Stalin era began one of the most bizarre (and telling) episodes of Soviet history. For Tupolev found himself not in the cells of Lefortovo or Butyrka prisons but locked away with hundreds of other aviation specialists and ordered to carry on his aircraft-design work. Like most of the NKVD’s deeds, the tale of the prison workshops remained unknown and may never have seen the light of day if not for Leonid Kerber and his book Stalin’s Aviation Gulag. This fascinating story is all the more compelling since it is based on Kerber’s own imprisonment with Tupolev and on the long professional and personal relationship that followed. Stalin’s Aviation Gulag relates how Kerber, Tupolev, and hundreds of other aviation specialists were arrested and forced to work in three NKVD-run prison workshops (sharaga in Russian). Tupolev and his design team were imprisoned, along with the Petlyakov and Myasischev design teams, in the buildings Tupolev had worked in prior to his arrest—later to become the Tupolev Design Bureau. There the men lived and worked, isolated from their families and allowed outside only in the “monkey cage”—a rooftop enclosure of steel bars. Once, when the aircraft of a sharaga design team flew over Red Square in a May Day parade, the jailed designers were permitted to view the fruits of their labor from the monkey cage. Kerber paints the entire grim picture with similar vignettes: sharaga colleagues who disappear in the night, summonses to NKVD headquarters for interrogation on design projects, and books inscribed with the names of known purge victims appearing in the prison library. Tupolev, Kerber, and most of their design team somehow survived and even managed to design and fly a plane, the TU-2 bomber, under these horrendous conditions. Then, in 1943, they were released as abruptly as they had been arrested.


So much for the Soviet way of dealing with folks that didn't meet immediate expectations.


Without a real grasp of this dynamic, I am not sure that anyone can really understand that the very fact that there was an OKB named after Kalishnikov REALLY means that he was the boss and that he did the heavy lifting as leader of the team. if someone else had been at all influential, we would know his name. The Soviets only very rarely ignored the opportunity to provide a new "Hero" for public consumption, and as was seen with MiG being named after two equally influential "Partners", had Kalishnikov had anyone else in his OKB worthy of special recognition, we would know that name. The only exceptions were for programs of extreme secrecy (rocketry and nuclear physics) where the designers were anonomous and often restricted to living in industrial cities that concentrated that area of expertise into secure zones for the sake of state security. Korolev would be an xample fo this (Chief Designer of the Soviet Space Program). In fact Korolev was simply called "The Chief Designer" for his pubic name, as Soviet citizens knew exactly what that term meant: The head of an OKB.

Note also that the general way to running an OKB was to shine as a star in someone elses, and to be recognized for it, and to be promoted. You were not promoted WITHIN your existing OKB, you were given your own. Rarely was someone identified "from scratch" as having the potential to step right up to the position. For this to occur, the man was generally outstanding. Rapid rise into the position was generally earned by merit. "Merit" did include loyalty to state as well as technical ability, and past history of being a soldier, from a proper family, etc., etc., did influence things. But at the end of the day you needed talent too... and lack of same was not rewarded.

The following is a pure guess, based on my knowlage of the complexities of design of aerospace vehicles and the staffing of the OKB's for them: My *educated professional guess* is that during the original design phase of the AK-47 the total staffing of the team would have been on the order of perhaps 25 men including the Chief Designer, a couple of Assistant Designers, several draftsmen, and a handful of tool and diemakers, plus helpers and assistants. He would have been able to draw upon experts from other industries (steel, machine tool, etc.,) to incorporate their input into the production engineering questions that form an integral part of every design.


Willie

.
 
Last edited:
FWIW all the gun smith tinkerer types I know say the SKS is very hard to make into a full auto rifle. Something about the way things work makes it almost totally unfit for that role


I'll just say that is absolutely false. Give me 5 minutes with one.
 
I am not sure that anyone can really understand that the very fact that there was an OKB named after Kalishnikov REALLY means that he was the boss and that he did the heavy lifting as leader of the team.
Kalashnikov didn't had his own design bureau untill well into production of AK.
At first, he worked with skeleton team of very few men at small arms proving ground in Shurovo; later he finalized his AK-47 design at Kovrov machine building plant.
Once Ak was approved for production, Kalashnikov vwas sent to Izhevsk, where at the existing factory (then Izhevsk mecahnical plant, now Izhmash) he eventually built his own design team, which was part of the factory's own design bureau.
 
^^ Understood. Very good points.

The final point being that he was chosen out and given his own team based on performance and not on the Soviets needing a "Hero" for publicity reasons.

The fact that the original design holds his name even though it was not his own OKB indicates to trained observers that even though the original team did not hold his name, that he was defacto the "chief designer" and was so recognized.

The real truth is that he probably was just as good as his publicity says he was.


In Soviet times, nomenclatures of items had extreme significance. To have an individual recognized in the naming scheme indicated a lot, including loyalty, as the naming was permanent. To have your name on the item meant (A): You invented it, and (B) There was no liklihood that you would be later found to be "disloyal" and erased from history.


Note the nomenclatures. These men were both good at what they did, and very well trusted.

Transliterated for those not conversant in Cyrillic.

SKS: Samozaryadnyj Karabin sistemy Simonova

AK: Avtomat Kalashnikova

DShK: Degtyaryova-Shpagina Krupnokaliberny

RPK: Ruchnoy Pulemyot Kalashnikova

PPSh-41: Pistolet-Pulemyot Shpagina

PM: Pistolet Makarova.

SVD: Snayperskaya Vintovka sistem'y Dragunova

RPD: Ruchnoy Pulemyot Degtyaryova


Note the "a" at the end of each name. This is a posessive. It iterally means "owned by" or "of him". It's literally "Kalishnivov's Rifle" or "Makarov's Pistol" or "Simonov's Carbine". It indicates real ownership and authorship of the design. It's truly an honorific.


Small language note: Unfortunately, Cyrillic isolates many non-Russian speakers from the fact that technical Russian has many borrow-words from English. Transliteration into the roman alphabet is sometimes helpful to show this: Karibin, Avtomat, Snayper, Pistolet, System'y, etc., which is why I use transliterated Russian in my lectures. Fun example: масло = maslo. Is it Butter or Mazola? Or is it Oil for your Автомат Калашникова?? ;) Truly? It's all three.



"Kalashnikov vwas sent to Izhevsk, where at the existing factory (then Izhevsk mecahnical plant, now Izhmash)"

Then you know where my motorcycle was built... ;)


Smile,

Вилли Саттон


.
 
Last edited:
When the Chinese Type 67/68 rifles began showing up in VN the US troops often thought them to be select fire SKS rifles. How similar to the SKS was the Type 67/68?

Could I get some cites on the use of the SKS or AK 47/AKM during the Korean War? I have never seen anything on that and the closest I have come to suspecting it was because of my Dad. In the spring of 1954 in Korea nearly a year after the cease fire he saw and heard an odd rifle being tested either in or adjacent to his Ord. Unit. Dad was vehicle Maintenance, but the shops for everything were appearently close. Years ago when I showed him a photo of an AK (before they were generally available in the US) he thought it might be what he saw. Note the "war" was over almost a year at this point but there were still "incedents" that might have lead to the capture of a new rifle.

I have spoken to Korean war vets that saw and or handled K98 style Mausers, FN 49, and Japanese Arisakis in the hands of North Korean or PRC troops (Besides Mosins, PPSh, and such)but never spoken to one that saw an SKS or AK.

-kBob
 
The 67 is a machine gun.

How similar to the SKS was the Type 67/68?

The 68? (Which is really a 63...)

Having handled one at "The Petting Zoo" (those who have been there know what this is), it's externally similar in layout but is an AK down deep. Rotating bolt versus tilting bolt. You could say it's an AK in the skin of a SKS. Hand it to someone trained on the SKS and it handles the same.


"Could I get some cites on the use of the SKS or AK 47/AKM during the Korean War?"

Likely not. The Sovs didn't provide much actual material assistance at that technical level (their privision of MiG's was another story completely), and the timeframe predated Chinese local manufacture of either (which would have been the supply pipeline) according to what I have read. Certainly it's possible that Soviet "Observers" brought a few for trials. Bear in mind that there were Russian pilots engaged in combat in MiGs against us, to do developmental test flying and tactics development that would have been useful back home. Did a few AK's and SKS's get sent too? My bet is "yes" but that they would have been carefully controlled and not ever seen in general use. A FOIA request sent to Aberdeen would be the research spot where I would start were I really interested in learning more.


Willie

.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top