Repost from another thread due to pertinence to this thread discussion -
https://www.thehighroad.org/index.p...g-in-u-s-v-rahimi.931587/page-2#post-12928826
We won't know whether Rahimi undid Bruen
Maybe this will help.
I went over the Rahimi ruling and searched for "Bruen" and majority opinion cited extensively from Bruen as to how the
Supreme Court "explained", "clarified" and "directed courts" Heller's ruling regarding "text and history" to examine “historical tradition of firearm regulation” because
"some courts have misunderstood the methodology" and reaffirmed Heller that
"reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence at the founding. Rather, it 'extends, prima facie, to ALL instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence.'”
Rahimi ruling further reaffirmed burden of providing historical evidence shifting to the states/government and stated, "
Government must show that the restriction 'is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation' ...
Government ...
bears the burden to 'justify its regulation'"
I am not a lawyer but to this layperson, Rahimi ruling did not undo Bruen and as justice Jackson stated, reaffirmed Bruen as "binding law" of the land -
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
In Bruen, we explained that when a firearm regulation is challenged under the Second Amendment, the Government must show that the restriction “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (Page 4)
In light of Bruen, the panel ... ordered additional briefing ... Surveying the evidence that the Government had identified, the panel concluded that Section 922(g)(8) does not fit within our tradition of firearm regulation ... We granted certiorari.
Derived from English practice and codified in the Second Amendment, the right secures for Americans a means of self-defense. Bruen (Page 5)
In Heller, our inquiry into the scope of the right began with “constitutional text and history.” Bruen
In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation” to help delineate the contours of the right. We explained that if a challenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment. We also clarified that when the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to “justify its regulation.”
... some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases ... As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach of the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence at the founding. Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to ALL instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in existence.” ... Holding otherwise would be as mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to muskets and sabers.
As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition. A court must ascertain whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.” (Page 7)
This Court reviewed the history of American gun laws extensively in Heller and Bruen. (Page 9)
Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public generally. (Page 14)
Our analysis of the surety laws in Bruen also does not help Rahimi.
In Bruen, we explained that the surety laws were not a proper historical analogue for New York’s gun licensing regime. (Page 15)
While we also noted ... to emphasize just how severely the State treated the rights of its citizens. But as we have explained, our Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation distinguishes citizens who have been found to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others from those who have not. The conclusion that focused regulations like the surety laws are not a historical analogue for a broad prohibitory regime like New York’s does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate analogue for a narrow one.
As we said in Bruen, a “historical twin” is not required. (Page 16)
In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “responsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right ... In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, this Court did not “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment.” ... we conclude only this: An individual ... may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. (Page 17)