Federal court upholds Cook County ‘assault weapon’ ban

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Aim1

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From the article:

"Judge Manish S. Shah, a 2014 appointment to the federal bench by President Obama, held there was fundamentally no difference between the contested Cook County regulations and one adopted in 2013 by the Chicago suburb of Highland Park, the latter of which was upheld by the U.S. 7th Circuit with further challenge subsequently turned away by the Supreme Court."



https://guns.com/2018/08/08/cook-county-gun-ban/


Federal court upholds Cook County ‘assault weapon’ ban

8/08/18| by Chris Eger

A legal challenge to gun restrictions in the second-most populous county in the nation was beaten back in a federal court last week.

Two area gun owners, Troy Edhlund and Matthew Wilson, filed suit against Cook County, Illinois officials over the vagueness and constitutionality of the county’s local ban on some semi-auto firearms and magazines.
 
This really needs to go up the ladder to SCOTUS. Chicago's handgun ban is unconstitutional, but yet an AWB is fine? I might be missing some minutiae, but it really doesn't make sense.
 
Judicial activism and it is way to common.

Refusing to strike down a law is the opposite of "judicial activism." That doesn't mean the decision is right (I think it is not), but judges being "active" has a specific meaning - and it doesn't mean "decision I disagree with." It's the opposite of "judicial restraint," which generally means letting the legislature set policy.

This goes back a long way - to the turn of the 19th-to-20th century, when active judges were striking down some of the early economic regulations, such as laws against child labor or minimum wage laws. Other judges, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued for greater judicial restraint.

Just to be clear: I think that the law in question should be found unconstitutional. I think it's an infringement of the individual 2nd amendment right, and one that would fail an intermediate level of scrutiny, or even a rational basis test if that test were applied in a serious fashion (as it was in the context of gay marriage prohibitions). It would take an active decision by a court to strike down the law, but it would be consistent with the text and purpose of the constitution. So it would be the right thing to do.
 
Refusing to strike down a law is the opposite of "judicial activism." That doesn't mean the decision is right (I think it is not), but judges being "active" has a specific meaning - and it doesn't mean "decision I disagree with." It's the opposite of "judicial restraint," which generally means letting the legislature set policy.

This goes back a long way - to the turn of the 19th-to-20th century, when active judges were striking down some of the early economic regulations, such as laws against child labor or minimum wage laws. Other judges, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued for greater judicial restraint.

Just to be clear: I think that the law in question should be found unconstitutional. I think it's an infringement of the individual 2nd amendment right, and one that would fail an intermediate level of scrutiny, or even a rational basis test if that test were applied in a serious fashion (as it was in the context of gay marriage prohibitions). It would take an active decision by a court to strike down the law, but it would be consistent with the text and purpose of the constitution. So it would be the right thing to do.
I consider judicial activism to be a ruling based on the personal political views of the judge rather than the constitution. Perhaps that isn't the proper definition.
 
A lot of people use it that way, but that's not really correct, IMO. Judicial restraint-versus-activism is the dimension of how willing a judge is to issue some ruling overriding another branch. As I mentioned above, the original judicial activists were economic conservatives.

For lawyers and judges, it's important to be able to distinguish that propensity/reluctance from, say, ideological bent.
 
Of course everyone thinks their preferred view is the right one. For people, such as lawyers, who have to make professional judgments based on predicting how particular judges will rule, you just have to deal with those judges and their tendencies - whether you personally agree with them or not.
 
States rights to restrict based on public safety.

Every federal decision that I know of coming from the lower courts have held this line. Nothing new here.

What has to happen for anything to change is the SC has to change it in some landmark decision dismantling states rights. I honestly don't think it will happen in my lifetime.

We are looking at an AR ban here this year. I'm not selling my M1 carbine for that reason. Most of those idiots writing those AR restrictions have no clue what they are.
 
Aim1 wrote:
Federal court upholds Cook County ‘assault weapon’ ban

Please provide a link to the decision from the court's website and post this to the Legal section so that the lawyers can comment on it's actual significance.
 
States rights to restrict based on public safety.

Every federal decision that I know of coming from the lower courts have held this line. Nothing new here.

What has to happen for anything to change is the SC has to change it in some landmark decision dismantling states rights. I honestly don't think it will happen in my lifetime.

We are looking at an AR ban here this year. I'm not selling my M1 carbine for that reason. Most of those idiots writing those AR restrictions have no clue what they are.

10th Amendment jurisprudence has more or less eroded "states rights" in the past 100 years. Congress, as long as there is some connection to interstate commerce, can and has overridden all sorts of state laws, FOPA of 1986 for example, overrides even NY state's and city laws if you are transporting a firearm in accordance with its provisions through NY. Congress can also act under its powers regarding national security--e.g. the army and navy clauses, regulate militias, and so forth or to protect against discrimination. A state or local authority could be held liable for firing someone on the basis of legal firearm ownership for example. NY state's and other states' interference into banking and other issues could also be curbed by Congress. And of course, state laws have been repeatedly overridden by the Courts on issues of the rights of the accused or abortion. States' rights are not dead exactly but federal courts tend to side with the federal government rather than the states on most issues.

Guns are not one of those primarily because they are disfavored rights of the legal establishment and elites. It also appears that a concentrated attack on the First Amendment is underway regarding speech and free exercise of religion that may turn these into rights disfavored by legal establishment.

Thus, a federal court will rule that a state's restrictive laws on gun ownership of law abiding citizens are perfectly permissible but that same court will overturn a law and compel a state to release people who are dangerous criminals despite the effect on public safety.

ATLDave is correct in part but incorrect in part regarding judicial activism. In general, you have to take the sum total of the judge's actions in a variety of cases to determine whether they favor judicial restraint versus activism--not one decision. The concept as used by legal scholars really refers to a judge's general temperament and tendencies rather than one particular decision. Restraint also has a whole additional grouping of attributes, for example restrictive sense of standing, avoiding constitutional questions if possible, mootness, jurisdiction, and so on. It really only makes sense to apply the descriptor to a judge's general behavior than one particular decision.

Where it gets difficult is that a judge who ignores a higher law that prohibits an action, such as the Constitution, for deferring to the popular legislation of the moment is really shirking their duty as stated in Marbury. Otherwise, there is no principled argument for judicial review if it is the sort where the judge ratifies the policies that they like as constitutional but strikes down those that they dislike.

The sad thing is that many of the states that currently have oppressive gun laws often have quite favorable state constitutions to the right to bear arms. State judiciaries have often gutted these which is not a matter of restraint but activism in affirming the extension of state power where it is prohibited by the state's higher law.
 
ATLDave is correct in part but incorrect in part regarding judicial activism. In general, you have to take the sum total of the judge's actions in a variety of cases to determine whether they favor judicial restraint versus activism--not one decision. The concept as used by legal scholars really refers to a judge's general temperament and tendencies rather than one particular decision. Restraint also has a whole additional grouping of attributes, for example restrictive sense of standing, avoiding constitutional questions if possible, mootness, jurisdiction, and so on. It really only makes sense to apply the descriptor to a judge's general behavior than one particular decision.

Where it gets difficult is that a judge who ignores a higher law that prohibits an action, such as the Constitution, for deferring to the popular legislation of the moment is really shirking their duty as stated in Marbury. Otherwise, there is no principled argument for judicial review if it is the sort where the judge ratifies the policies that they like as constitutional but strikes down those that they dislike.

You are correct that a judge's overall level of judicial restraint is best assessed by looking at the totality of his or her jurisprudence, and an approach of deciding on the narrowest ground possible is often an aspect of restraint. Still, a judge can exercise restraint in one case but not in another. Not all judges are perfectly consistent - in fact, few are. And judicial scholars have often written of a particular jurist's restraint in one case or another. I disagree completely that one cannot characterize a single decision as exercising restraint or a more active approach.

As to the rest, I think you are close to conflating correctness of decision with activism/restraint. Again, many lay people have tried to mush the two together into a single concept, which basically boils down to this: the person has a view of what the constitution means, requires, and/or permits, and any judge who rules in a manner inconsistent with that view is an "activist." There are people on the left who do precisely the same thing and use precisely the same wording. But restraint is not, in and of itself, either left or right. It is an orthogonal axis. There are leftist judicial activists and left-leaning practitioners of judicial restraint. And right-leaning judges of both types, too. All 4 quadrants have a fair number of judges in them.

I'd also note that the most thorough-going/extreme view of judicial restraint would call Marbury the original activist decision. There is no explicit grant of authority in the Constitution for the Supreme Court to sit as an arbiter of whether Congress - a co-equal branch of government - has violated the constitution. It is there by logical implication, ruled the Marbury court, and everyone has been largely agreeing ever since. However, when I was in law school, it was fashionable for a certain segment of the right-leaning scholars and students, chafing under what was the still-recent memory of the Warren court, to call that into question. Newt Gingrich posited that Congress could, and perhaps should, take away the jurisdictional authority for the Supreme Court to even hear such challenges. But around the same time, the Court started striking down some positive enactments that the left had favored, and the value of having an institution to call balls-and-strikes on the conformity of statutes to the constitution became apparent to the right pretty quickly!

To circle back to the actual topic of this thread: The case was decided in a way that comported with the narrow precedent from within the judge's circuit, but against the reasoning of the relevant Supreme Court precedent and against its interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision. This wasn't an "activist" decision, just a lazy and/or wrong-headed one. Now, if the same judge were to strike down, say, a "stand your ground" law on some substantive constitutional ground, or a state-level law preempting local ordinances, that probably would be fairly characterized as "activist."
 
We are looking at an AR ban here this year. I'm not selling my M1 carbine for that reason. Most of those idiots writing those AR restrictions have no clue what they are.

Do not make the mistake of underestimating your enemy. Your M1 carbine may not be safe. The leaders do know the differences in guns and write laws that are broad enough to include other types of guns other than the evil AR's they are banning.

Remember their REAL objective is banning ownership of ALL firearms.
 
I disagree with you about the general usage of restraint in legal scholarship--it makes little sense to call a decision one of restraint when a large proportion of judicial decision making is hidden essentially. It was essentially developed as a "realist" critique of the Lochner Court's actions and continued by those on the right during and after the Warren Court. It is also not really current in the research to use two axis of types of judges. At the Supreme Court level, the legal model has consistently failed to predict Supreme Court decisionmaking and instead, the behavioral model has more or less become the de facto accepted explanation of judicial decision making. Even at the lower appellate courts and district courts, the behavioral model demonstrates substantial predictive power versus the legal model of judicial behavior. Large databases of judicial decisionmaking and the rational choice models have allowed a much more complex model of behavior to be explained instead of the older concepts. As a result, most current research in judicial decisionmaking trends toward indicating on how judges use their discretion to shape outcomes. I suggest reading Murphy on his Strategies of Judicial Behavior or later research by Lee Epstein, Spaeth and Segal, etc.

Nor is it correct to limit the idea of judicial restraint to simply following precedent. There are a whole host of behaviors associated with judicial restraint including the various factors of jurisdiction and justiciability of claims that also fit with the explanation of "restraint".

It is problematic to assign decisions at the trial court level as representing activism or restraint because of the limits implied by review from a higher court which is more properly termed constraints. Occasionally, a trial court or appellate judge will actually put into writing that they disagree with precedent but are following it anyway. More often due to the press of business, unwillingness to put their true feelings into opinions, etc. are silent on the matter and simply opine that the precedent is settled and the judge is compelled to follow it.

Restraint when applied to member of SCOTUS makes practical sense as an analytic factor in decision making because the Supreme Court can modify precedent or reinterpret constitutional provisions and members are not really constrained in the short run by other actors such as Congress or the President. In a lower court setting, or even appellate setting, the concept of constrained decision making makes more sense because constraints imposed by higher courts through appellate review, workload, a judge's ambitions, etc. are more applicable than restraint. In cases of first impression is where we see district court judges being able to more fully exercise discretion and generally these cases might be more indicative of a judge's temperament.

Regarding the decision by the judge regarding Cook County in the case above, for example, summary dismissal actions can indicate a judge's decision that the law is settled and no factual assertions by the plaintiffs could be made that overcome that. There is no discussion about the standard of review, a choice of treating Miller and Heller as equally applicable, the cursory treatment of Ezell, etc. The judge is making a choice not to allow a case to go to trial and allow facts to be established in court. The judge is making a choice in what precedents should apply while dismissing others. Thus, these actions could be considered activism. There is a reason why summary dismissals along with jury instructions are the most likely decisions to be overturned at the appellate level in that they exhibit purely judicial discretion at the trial court level in interpreting the decision. However, it may also indicate a trial judge's feelings that the "law is settled" and that a trial would be a "waste of time" indicating the constraint of time and appellate review. The neat two axis typology of judges breaks down when applied to real cases and analyzing these. There is a reason that multi-factor analyses has supplanted this sort of analysis and instead focuses on judge's general tendencies, understanding the factors that allow or discourage judicial initiative aka activism, and so forth.

The whole question of a "correct decision" is a canard from Blackstone's emphasis on "right reasoning" that will produce the optimal decision by a judge. Justice Holmes writes of the common law that it can be summed up by "experience' of a particular time and place which gives the idea that law is malleable and should fit the times via judicial discretion. Even in ancient times, the problem of gloss and precedent has always plagued the legal community. In part, the idea of a "higher law" was to impose constraints on kings who in turn argued that they had a divine right to rule. Similarly, precedents established by other preceding kings were argued as restraining a decision by the current king.

The whole tactic of the legal community from time immemorial has been essentially if the precedent is against you, you argue that the facts in the current case are different than in the precedent. If the precedent favors you, you argue in favor of stare decisis. Occasionally, an argument will be made that the old precedent is wrong because of a higher moral principle or law exists that compels a complete junking of the precedent which fails far more than it succeeds.

None of these positions really indicates whether the current court's application of the law to the facts in the current case is "correct". Only appellate review will sort that out as far as "correctness" within the confines of the judiciary. Ultimately, however, it will be the people themselves that will determine such questions.
 
boom boom, thanks for the erudite and thoughtful response! I will admit I am some years (now a couple of decades) removed from the scholarship. I will look for the suggested studies, as they certainly sound interesting. I could continue to quibble here and there with various points in your response, but trying to match the quality of your post would require a lot of time,and I might still come up well short. I will concede the match to you, sir.
 
Sorry about the long post but you might find the following interesting.

The Segal-Spaeth database of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and judicial votes on merit is available for public download as the sampled Songer-Haire dataset for the U.S. Courts of Appeals that more or less replicates that research for the appellate court level. These were funded by the NSF. It is much more difficult to track district court opinions which I did as an research project in the past on a specific topic. A few folks have done in-depth research such as Karp and Lyle on district court decisionmaking but these are rather dated.

In my own research, generally, I found that district court judges could and did engage in creative decisionmaking if they wished to follow their policy preferences but constraints dictated the majority of their decisions (particularly statutory requirements in my case). Haven't went back to that line of research since a major Supreme Court decision basically obliterated the utility of extending that particular line of research. Lawrence Baum's Puzzle of Judicial Behavior is an excellent summation of the varying models used to study judicial behavior but not sure if he has updated it recently. Walter Murphy's Elements of Judicial Strategy is a good gateway to Lee Epstein's later works with a variety of authors on game theoretic models of judicial behavior.

The predominant critique of Marbury comes from two sources--the first is the dissent in Eakin v. Raub by Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Andrew Jackson's veto message on the rechartering of the Bank of the U.S. provides another similar critique. A more recent critique is the more interesting arguments presented by Van Alstyne at Duke, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/544/

Regarding the intent of the Framers, it is clear that they meant for the U.S. Supreme Court to rein in states and prevent encroachment on federal power. It is less clear that they intended to grant the power of constitutional amendment to the Court otherwise Article V is redundant. They specifically rejected the idea of a Council of Revision but justices on the Supreme Court clearly believed that the judicial power included declaring laws unconstitutional even before Marshall (see Hylton v. U.S. 3 U.S. 171 (1796)).

Van Alstyne's argument is that Marshall basically ignored all current norms of judicial behavior such as allowing informal participation by the administration as a party, being a witness to the facts involved in the case from his position of secretary of state when a recusal was warranted, failing to force the administration and Senate to turn over key documents. However, his greatest critique is of the opinion itself. Marshall, according to Van Alstyne, distorted the wording of the key section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 at issue in the case and the words of the Constitution in order to prevent the case from being filed elsewhere. His inconsistency later provoked a fellow Justice in dissent in a later case to argue that Marshall more or less violated his own precedent in Marbury on judicial review. Van Alstyne contends that Marshall's order of the opinion also indicated a political decision as the key finding is that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case brought by Marbury. This meant that the first two sections were obiter dicta as extraneous reasoning not necessary to decide the legal question of jurisdiction.

Similar contortions were used in Taney's Dred Scott decision to a disastrous effect. For that reason, Raoul Berger and some others such as Alexander Bickel tred lightly on the morals of judicial review and more or less argued that it was a necessary evil rather than an unalloyed good.
 
:) I feel like the primary care physician who started talking about cancer with an accountant at a cocktail party... and a Mayo Clinic research head walked up. You've obviously got a very deep and immediate command of this subject matter, while I only have my now-fading recollections from law school (I've been in private practice since the end of the last century) on a lot of this stuff. I was very interested in these topics as a student and younger lawyer, but that's a long time gone now. Thanks again for dropping the knowledge!
 
:) I feel like the primary care physician who started talking about cancer with an accountant at a cocktail party... and a Mayo Clinic research head walked up. You've obviously got a very deep and immediate command of this subject matter, while I only have my now-fading recollections from law school (I've been in private practice since the end of the last century) on a lot of this stuff. I was very interested in these topics as a student and younger lawyer, but that's a long time gone now. Thanks again for dropping the knowledge!

Thanks and kudos to you keeping people straight on most of the threads dealing with legal issues. I seldom weigh in on those because it is too much like work. :(

Right now I am working off and on on a article/perhaps book/ project on state constitutions and so I don't do much judicial behavior research anymore. My cites are not quite the cutting edge that they were 8-10 years ago or so when I had to keep up with it. I do keep up with most public law topics though but would be lost in large tracts of private law such as contracts, land, torts, etc. Although I have read parts of Jefferson's tract on the history of English land law--it is fascinating stuff and gives insight into Jefferson's mindset and his legal education at William and Mary.
 
I mostly do esoteric health care and technology stuff. Interesting and challenging, but very far removed from judicial/legal philosophy as such.
 
I consider judicial activism to be a ruling based on the personal political views of the judge rather than the constitution. Perhaps that isn't the proper definition.
Until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, this and similar decisions are consistent with the Constitution.

Indeed, the ruling is in accordance with other appellate courts, reflecting current Second Amendment jurisprudence; there is no evidence that either the district court judge or review panel based their decisions on ‘personal political views.’

As a fact of law, AWBs do not violate the Second Amendment.

Again, this may change should the Supreme Court ever agree on hearing an AWB case.
 
Until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, this and similar decisions are consistent with the Constitution.

Indeed, the ruling is in accordance with other appellate courts, reflecting current Second Amendment jurisprudence; there is no evidence that either the district court judge or review panel based their decisions on ‘personal political views.’

As a fact of law, AWBs do not violate the Second Amendment.

Again, this may change should the Supreme Court ever agree on hearing an AWB case.

So the constitution says what a judge or judges decide it says until a higher court decides it says something else?
In addition, we the people do not have the right to question or criticize the decisions of the courts?
 
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