It Has Started
- Thread starter rhedley
- Start date
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Waitone
Member
Maybe the artist should have included a constellation of tort terrorists surrounding the black hole watching what happened to the vote.
Kerry as tasked some asinine number of attorneys to "monitor" election around the US.
Kerry as tasked some asinine number of attorneys to "monitor" election around the US.
Is it pro- or anti- e-voting?
To me, it's neither. It's just a preview of what's to come. We [FLA] has an over population of *Blue Dog Democrats*. They still believe the *Hanging Chad* ploy should have worked, and Gore *won the election*.
You do know that there were a lot of *over votes* in West Palm Beach, that where someone votes for both of the canidates on one Ballot. The did this to kill Bush votes, this was most likely someone in the Precinct management .
This time, there will be something wrong with the software. And they will
disenfranchised ,,again
To me, it's neither. It's just a preview of what's to come. We [FLA] has an over population of *Blue Dog Democrats*. They still believe the *Hanging Chad* ploy should have worked, and Gore *won the election*.
You do know that there were a lot of *over votes* in West Palm Beach, that where someone votes for both of the canidates on one Ballot. The did this to kill Bush votes, this was most likely someone in the Precinct management .
This time, there will be something wrong with the software. And they will
disenfranchised ,,again
Don't worry about any hanging chad or erratic "e vote", because the way things are going this is not going to be nearly as close a race as last time around. Unless Bush wakes up and radically changes his tactics, he's going to lose soundly. I'm sorry to say that I don't expect much out of him in the next 3 months, and expect to see him go down.
Jim March
Member
You want scary?
A lot of these Florida counties are on Diebold gear, either touchscreen or more commonly, optical scan.
Either way, the vote is tallied on "GEMS". Let me show you a summary on GEMS I wrote for somebody else recently:
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In any Diebold Elections System installation, optical scan OR touchscreen, there's a central vote-tally program called GEMS (Global Election Management Software) installed on one large PC at the county's elections HQ.
GEMS takes in data "from the field" in a variety of forms: memory cards come from either optical scan or touchscreen terminals, and modems can be used to transmit "early results" for the media on election night.
The security of the GEMS program is unspeakably bad. Despite Diebold's price tag of $44k for this "advanced application", it's just a simple "front end application" written in Microsoft Access, a database which any compu-geek will tell you has severely substandard security.
The result? The votes and other data within the GEMS data file can be edited by the real MS-Access program, with no password required even though there's a "GEMS password". "GEMS passwords" themselves can be edited, as can the votes, the AUDIT TRAIL (without leaving an audit trail entry when doing so!), and anything else in there. If MS-Access isn't handy, it can still be done by hand with a text editor if you know where to look, or by a malicious script uploaded at any time, directly or remotely.
It gets worse. Vote-counting is basically an accounting function, or something very close to it. GEMS contains two sets of books. The data on votes is literally kept in two places ("tables") internally.
By default, these data tables match. So people working away in GEMS itself doing honest election functions see nothing wrong and no evidence that there's "two sets of books" in there.
So let's say you're a crook, either a rogue within the county elections staff or the Diebold onsite tech. Or Diebold corporate dialing into one of those modems...or any of the above leaving a nasty little script laying around somewhere inside the GEMS machine or uploaded via a memory card.
You first "decouple" the two sets of books by changing all the "0" entries to "-1" in the "dirty field" table (that's what it's actually called). Now you can edit the vote table that supplies the county-wide numbers while leaving the table that supplies the per-precinct numbers alone.
Why would you do this?
Well an honest county election official who "smells a rat" will spot-check some precincts and compare them to the GEMS numbers. This is what happens in the 1% manual recount mandated by Calif law anyways. But what you don't know is that GEMS is spitting out per-precinct data that's honest, when the county total is DIShonest. You don't KNOW there's two sets of books in there.
There's two ways to stopgap this:
1) Load MS-Access and look at the tables directly, making sure "sum candidate counter" and "candidate counter" match AND that the flags in "dirty field" haven't been set. BUT that means you, the election official, have MS-Access loaded on there and it's NOT an approved voting application and it's a known "hack tool" that YOU can use to edit the bejeesus out of things.
2) Tell GEMS to print per-precinct totals one by one, then add them up on a hand-calculator and make sure they match the GEMS countywide total.
And then either way, you STILL don't know what other crooked garbage Diebold has up their sleeve (as in, we haven't even talked about the *terminal* software!!!) so the REAL cure is to take a 12ga shotgun to every Diebold terminal plus the GEMS box and then sue Diebold for fraud WHILE jailing them for election law violations!
-------------
Now imagine Democratically-controlled county election staffers having access to this piece of junk.
If it's not clear yet: it is NOT possible to trust the electronic vote results in any Diebold county. In an Optical Scan county, you CAN go back and count paper, but nobody will do that if it's rigged as a "blowout".
A lot of these Florida counties are on Diebold gear, either touchscreen or more commonly, optical scan.
Either way, the vote is tallied on "GEMS". Let me show you a summary on GEMS I wrote for somebody else recently:
-------------
In any Diebold Elections System installation, optical scan OR touchscreen, there's a central vote-tally program called GEMS (Global Election Management Software) installed on one large PC at the county's elections HQ.
GEMS takes in data "from the field" in a variety of forms: memory cards come from either optical scan or touchscreen terminals, and modems can be used to transmit "early results" for the media on election night.
The security of the GEMS program is unspeakably bad. Despite Diebold's price tag of $44k for this "advanced application", it's just a simple "front end application" written in Microsoft Access, a database which any compu-geek will tell you has severely substandard security.
The result? The votes and other data within the GEMS data file can be edited by the real MS-Access program, with no password required even though there's a "GEMS password". "GEMS passwords" themselves can be edited, as can the votes, the AUDIT TRAIL (without leaving an audit trail entry when doing so!), and anything else in there. If MS-Access isn't handy, it can still be done by hand with a text editor if you know where to look, or by a malicious script uploaded at any time, directly or remotely.
It gets worse. Vote-counting is basically an accounting function, or something very close to it. GEMS contains two sets of books. The data on votes is literally kept in two places ("tables") internally.
By default, these data tables match. So people working away in GEMS itself doing honest election functions see nothing wrong and no evidence that there's "two sets of books" in there.
So let's say you're a crook, either a rogue within the county elections staff or the Diebold onsite tech. Or Diebold corporate dialing into one of those modems...or any of the above leaving a nasty little script laying around somewhere inside the GEMS machine or uploaded via a memory card.
You first "decouple" the two sets of books by changing all the "0" entries to "-1" in the "dirty field" table (that's what it's actually called). Now you can edit the vote table that supplies the county-wide numbers while leaving the table that supplies the per-precinct numbers alone.
Why would you do this?
Well an honest county election official who "smells a rat" will spot-check some precincts and compare them to the GEMS numbers. This is what happens in the 1% manual recount mandated by Calif law anyways. But what you don't know is that GEMS is spitting out per-precinct data that's honest, when the county total is DIShonest. You don't KNOW there's two sets of books in there.
There's two ways to stopgap this:
1) Load MS-Access and look at the tables directly, making sure "sum candidate counter" and "candidate counter" match AND that the flags in "dirty field" haven't been set. BUT that means you, the election official, have MS-Access loaded on there and it's NOT an approved voting application and it's a known "hack tool" that YOU can use to edit the bejeesus out of things.
2) Tell GEMS to print per-precinct totals one by one, then add them up on a hand-calculator and make sure they match the GEMS countywide total.
And then either way, you STILL don't know what other crooked garbage Diebold has up their sleeve (as in, we haven't even talked about the *terminal* software!!!) so the REAL cure is to take a 12ga shotgun to every Diebold terminal plus the GEMS box and then sue Diebold for fraud WHILE jailing them for election law violations!
-------------
Now imagine Democratically-controlled county election staffers having access to this piece of junk.
If it's not clear yet: it is NOT possible to trust the electronic vote results in any Diebold county. In an Optical Scan county, you CAN go back and count paper, but nobody will do that if it's rigged as a "blowout".
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