First, one needs to look at the ALCLAD and later studies, nicely laid
out in the Hall[1] and Hitchman[2] reports of the 1950s. Based on data
collected from WWII (and later Korea). It was determined that
regardless of theatre of operations virtually all rifle fire occurred at
less than 500 meters (yards). Probability of a hit at of ranges 300
meters (yards) or more dropped to 'negligible'. 80% of all effective
rifle _and LMG_ fire occurred at 200 meters (yards) or less. Major
factors cited were terrain, camouflage and exposure target.
Regardless of how much training we give personnel, these factors will
not be changed!
Secondly is the very real situation of reduced accuracy in combat.
Personnel under the very real stress of combat are not able to maintain
the levels of marksmanship shown in a training environment. This was
amply demostrated during the US Army's ACR project of the 1980s where
'expert' rifleman were placed under situations meant to simulate actual
combat conditions. Marksmanship scores dropped to very low levels, and
most personnel were unable to engage targets past 100 meters effectively.
Combat accuracy has nothing to do with ability on the range.
Further, aimed fire has very little impact. Again, the Hitchman report
is illustrative:
"...in combat, hits from bullets are incurred by the body at
random...the same as for fragment missiles which...are not...Exposure
was the chief factor...aimed or directed fire does not influence the
manner in which hits are sustained...[Despite] evidence of prodigious
rifle fire ammunition expenditure per hit,...the comparison of hits from
bullets with those of fragments shows that the rifle bullet is not
actually better directed toward vulnerable parts of the body."
One of the most controversial conclusions of this report was that
accurate, aimed rifle fire was for the most part an idea that only
existed in the minds of ordnance officers back in the pentagon and the
various arsenals.
[1] "An Effectiveness Study of the Infantry Rifle", BRL Memorandum
Report #593, Donald R. Hall, March 1952.
[2] "Operation Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon", ORO Technical
Memorandum T-160, Norman Hitchman, June 1952.