The NYS FAQ on the New Firearm laws

If they appeal does the law stay in effect? Not my lane.
 
Well, this is Legal, and in the weeds is generally presumed.

From the analysis, B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits, 1. Good Moral Character:
Simply stated, instead of moving toward becoming a shall-issue jurisdiction, New York State has further entrenched itself as a shall-not-issue jurisdiction. And, by doing so, it has further reduced a first-class constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense (which,
during the 19 th and 18th centuries in America, generally came with an assumption that law-abiding responsible citizens were not a danger to themselves or others unless there was specific ground for a contrary finding) into a mere request
Ouch. That's stating it rather strongly. And, to my thinking, appropriately.

From 2. List of Four Character References (footnote removed for clarity):
The Court begins its analysis of this provision by acknowledging the apparent dearth of historical analogues requiring a responsible, law-abiding citizen to provide character references in order to be permitted to carry a gun. However, just as lacking, it appears, are historical
analogues requiring a responsible, law-abiding citizen to even apply to be able to carry a gun.
The Court imagines that historically this application requirement was not common only because the need to restrict gun possession in a geographical area rarely existed. In any event, in those instances where the need did exist (for whatever reason), it is difficult to imagine the absence of
an accompanying need to verify the statements made in the application (through one or more character references). Indeed, in each of these three historical analogues cited above in note 22 of this Decision, a reference requirement accompanied the application requirement. For these
reasons, the Court lets this provision stand.
So, it appears the Judge is saying, well, it's thin sauce, more water than oatmeal, but, you did include a packet of dehydrated notes, if only the one.

Which leads us to 3. List of Family and Cohabitants (emphasis added):
Far more invasive and onerous than a demand for a list of character references, however, appears to be a demand for the “names and contact information for the applicant's current spouse, or domestic partner, any other adults residing in the applicant's home, including any adult
children of the applicant, and whether or not there are minors residing, full time or part time, in the applicant's home” (as set forth in Section 1 of the CCIA). Indeed, none of the three historical analogues cited above in note 22 of this Decision contain such a demand. Moreover, the Court
finds that no such circumstances exist under which this provision would be valid
(other than a circumstance in which the provision was not enforced, which of course is no circumstance at all).
As a result, the Court orders its enforcement temporarily restrained.
Now, that could be read that as the requirement for cohabitant and familial references has no basis, then the Character Reference requiermwnt is on equally poor ground.

4. List Social Media Accounts for Past Three Years (emphasis added; footnotes removed)
Based on the briefing so far in this action (and the briefing in Antonyuk I), the Court finds that an insufficient number of historical analogues exists requiring a list of social media accounts for the past three years, for purposes of Section 1 of the CCIA. For example, Defendants have
adduced no historical analogues requiring persons to disclose the pseudonyms they have used while publishing political pamphlets or newspaper articles (which might be considered to be akin to requiring the disclosure of all one’s social-media accounts). Moreover, the Court finds that
no such circumstances exist under which this provision would be valid (other than a circumstance in which the provision was not enforced).
As a result, the Court orders its enforcement temporarily restrained.
The counter-argument that there cannot be historical analogues for "social media" due to their limited historicity is a real one. Like as not, though, the declaration of need is just one more tied to "provide references" requirements enjoined above.

5. “Such Other Information Required by the Licensing Officer” (emphasis added):
Although the Court can find no historical analogues supporting this requirement (other than perhaps the three historical analogues cited above in note 22 of this Decision), and although this requirement certainly appears to exacerbate the open-ended discretion referenced above in
Part III.B.1. of this Decision, the Court can imagine a set of circumstances in which it is constitutionally valid (other than non-enforcement): for example, if the licensing officer were to require only very minor follow-up information from an applicant (such as identifying information). As a result, the Court will let this provision stand for now, although it is willing to revisit the issue during the briefing and hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
I have seen some grumbling about this item. However, this appears to be couched very carefully. That the "open-ended discretion" noted above was on extremely shaky ground, and potentially a deliberate repudiation of Bruen. Note, too, how the notion is also limited, as in "only those required things not submitted"--rather than the presumed--in other locations--"anything we can dream up that was not submitted." That latter cynicism may be mete in our modern times, but is not generally the stuff of legal discourse.

From 6. Eighteen Hours of Firearm Training:
The Court has been persuaded by Defendants that historically Americans’ familiarity with firearms was far more common than it is today; and it is has not yet been persuaded by Plaintiffs that the CCIA’s firearm-training requirements are so onerous as to fall within the scope of what the Supreme Court in Bruen called “exorbitant.” NYSRPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2138, n.9 said, because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry.”) (emphasis added). As a result, the Court lets that provision stand for now.
This item, too has had some on edge. This, from my understanding, is due to the difference between the requirements that did issue before and the new requirement for training.
That becomes meat to be debated in the future arguing of the case. And, the different nature of the training will likely be broached at that point.

From 7. In-Person Meeting
Unlike an application without character references, the Court can easily imagine an application without an in-person meeting. Indeed, in only one of the three historical analogues cited above in note 22 of this Decision was a reference requirement accompanied by an in-person-meeting requirement. Moreover, that analogue was a city statute, the general reliance on which the Supreme Court has expressed disapproval. See NYSRPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2154 (“[T]he bare existence of these localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of an otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry.”). Moreover, the Court finds that no such circumstances exist under which this provision would be valid (other than a circumstance in which the provision was not enforced).
As a result, the Court orders this provision’s enforcement temporarily restrained.
Pretty clear, here.

8. Prohibition in “Sensitive Areas" gets deep into the weeds of each of the areas so declared. The Court also makes specific instructions on a per each basis. Which seems to chafe at some NY firearm owners, who, presumably, expected a more blanket expungement of the limitation, more in keeping with Thomas' written decision in Bruen. Such are verisimilitudes of legal code.

This seems to settle most of the issue (emphasis added):
Setting aside the lack of historical analogues supporting these particular provisions, in the Court’s view, the common thread tying them together is the fact that they all regard locations where (1) people typically congregate or visit and (2) law-enforcement or other security professionals are--presumably--readily available. This is precisely the definition of “sensitive locations” that the Supreme Court in NYSRPA
considered and rejected:
In [Respondents’] view, ‘sensitive places’ where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens include all ‘places where people
typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.’ . . . It is true that people
sometimes congregate in ‘sensitive places,’ and it is likewise true that law enforcement professionals are usually presumptively available in those
locations. But expanding the category of ‘sensitive places’ simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement
defines the category of ‘sensitive places’ far too broadly. Respondents’ argument would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment and
would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense. NSYRPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2133-34.​
Although historical analogues certainly exist prohibiting carrying firearms in specific places, no historical analogues have been provided prohibiting carrying firearms virtually everywhere, as the CCIA does.
As a result, the Court orders the enforcement of these remaining provisions temporarily restrained.

This is rather sharp, from C. Strong Showing of Irreparable Harm (original edited for clarity, emphasis added):
Plaintiffs have made a strong showing that they will likely experience irreparable harm if the Temporary Restraining Order is not issued for the reasons stated in their motion papers and declarations, and the reasons stated in the Court’s Decision and Order in Antonyuk I, 2022 WL
3999791, at *36.
Granted, due to the comparative lengths of time involved, a stronger likelihood exists that Defendants would be charged with violating the CCIA during the period between the Court’s Decision on Plaintiffs’ motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the final disposition of this action than during the period of the Court’s Decision on Plaintiffs’ motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a decision on their motion for a Preliminary Injunction. However, a presumption of irreparable harm ordinarily arises from a strong showing of a constitutional deprivation “even when the violation persists for ‘minimal periods’ of time.” A.H. v. French, 985 F.3d 165, 176,
This means (among other things) that the presumption arises regardless of when during the litigation that deprivation occurs (i.e., before a decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction or before the final disposition of an action). Here, the Court has found that Plaintiffs have made such a strong showing of a constitutional injury for the reasons stated above in Part III.B. of this Decision.

Moreover, this presumption has not been rebutted. Four of the six Plaintiffs have alleged and sworn a concrete intention to violate the law in the immediate future. ... They have also alleged and sworn most if not all of the Defendants’ expressed willingness (to varying degrees) to enforce the challenged provisions of the CCIA. ... Finally, a fifth Plaintiff has alleged and sworn that applying for such a license in Onondaga County would be futile in the future (including the period of time before the Court decides Plaintiffs’ motion for a Preliminary Injunction). ... Defendants have not controverted these factual assertions.

Under the circumstances, the fact that Plaintiffs may stand an even greater chance of being arrested (or having an application ignored) later (during the period of time between a hearing on their motion for a Preliminary Injunction and the final disposition of this action) than now (during the period of time between now and when their motion for a Temporary Restraining Order) in no way diminishes the fact that they stand a sufficient chance of being arrested or having their application ignored now.
I had wondered just when and how those comments so eagerly made by political types in NYS would "come home to roost."

So, I found it a good read, a glimmer of hope in a darkened world, that State actors cannot simply say "Not in My State!" and go against SCOTUS so blatantly and obviously.
 
Shall issue is supposed to use objective criteria to determine if a person is qualified to be issued a concealed carry license. What is more subjective than character references? Also for the character references they must come from the county you live in and must know you for a year. So, if you recently moved into a county from another state or even within the state, you may well be denied your constitutional rights for at least a year. The reasoning on the constitutional validity for character references seem to contradict what the judge is ruling on other subjective criteria.
 
Shall issue is supposed to use objective criteria to determine if a person is qualified to be issued a concealed carry license. What is more subjective than character references? Also for the character references they must come from the county you live in and must know you for a year. So, if you recently moved into a county from another state or even within the state, you may well be denied your constitutional rights for at least a year. The reasoning on the constitutional validity for character references seem to contradict what the judge is ruling on other subjective criteria.

Yup... there are still a lot of issues with the ruling and I'm still afraid of what might happen when it very likely gets appealed and the 2nd District hears the case. Then, we in NY might have to wait for another lawsuit to make its way through the courts. And in the meantime, the state continues to deny our rights and waste our tax money over this.
 
And lucky me, my permit expires very soon right in the middle of this mess. The Supreme Court acted quickly to vacate the massachusetts law on needing a permit to purchase or possess, so if the Appeals Court hasnt gotten the message yet from Bruen and the number of vacates the Supreme Court has issued, they will pretty quickly.
 
And lucky me, my permit expires very soon right in the middle of this mess. The Supreme Court acted quickly to vacate the massachusetts law on needing a permit to purchase or possess, so if the Appeals Court hasnt gotten the message yet from Bruen and the number of vacates the Supreme Court has issued, they will pretty quickly.
That is where NY law is very lacking. A simple rule or procedure that allows for possession and purchase other than concealed carry would eliminate so much controversy. Not everyone wishes to carry concealed, defense of residence and shooting sports has not been addressed by any of this. You still need a 18 month permit process to buy a handgun for home defense or target shooting/hunting. This is where the original challenge was lacking.
 
The following is a bit of really good news that may deserve its own thread:

https://www.reuters.com/legal/federal-judge-suspends-many-new-yorks-new-gun-restrictions-2022-11-07/

NEW YORK, Nov 7 (Reuters) - A federal judge in New York temporarily suspended many parts of the state's new gun restrictions on Monday to allow members of a gun-owners' rights group to continue their lawsuit challenging the new law as unconstitutional.

Judge Glenn Suddaby of the U.S. District Court in Syracuse agreed to issue the order at the request of six New York residents who are members of Gun Owners of America, which competes with the National Rifle Association in political influence.

In his order, he said New York officials could not compel people applying for a gun license to disclose a list of everyone they live with or the handles of their social media accounts, major provisions of the Concealed Carry Improvement Act which took effect on Sept. 1.
He also sharply pared back New York's new list of "sensitive places" where it is a new felony crime to possess a gun even with a license, writing that the state could not ban guns in theaters, bars, parks, airports and other public places."
 
Without a complete and total understanding of the current rules, it's extremely risky to use your CCW permit in NYS right now.

You can commit an armed robbery at a pharmacy in NYS and, as long as you didn't shoot anyone, be processed and immediately released with a court date. But if you violate the new carry law, it's a felony and you go to jail. That's the kind of "justice" we have in New York, brought to us by the very corrupt politicians who run things.
 
It looks like New York may have really hurt itself in passing the CCIA. The ruling talks about striking down requiring character references. Character references have been a part of acquiring a handgun license in New York State for decades.

As I read the Judge's opinion, he upheld the provision of requiring four character references when he wrote on page 106 of the preliminary injunction (emphasis added):

Based on a comparison of the burdensomeness of the CCIA’s “four character references” requirement (i.e., burden versus justification) to the burdensomeness of the relevant historical analogues (again, burden versus justification), the Court finds the burdensomeness of the “four character references” requirement is reasonably proportionate to the burdensomeness of the relevant historical analogues. As a result, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied with regard to this regulation.
 
Our latest fear is that the order will be vacated by the 2nd Circuit until the trial. Then the trial, even if positive, an appeal holds the order, then to Scotus. So years down the line for any carry.

Despite those praising Bruen, it still may be a pragmatic disaster for NYS carry.

Some folks are mad about the class and expense. However, I'm seeing around here classes at $425. That's not out of line with regular two day hand gun classes, so that will be a hard argument. Unless, you claim that a significant part of the population can't afford that and perhaps it is racially discriminatory. However, Scotus pro gun folks probably don't care about that. I see the class surviving up and through Scotus. Just my guess.

It remains to be seen if Bruen was a win for NYS despite applications elsewhere.

I also opine that Scotus turning the 4 cases back to screw around with their historical rules was a stupid waste of time. They should have been taken and decided rather than adding years to a decision and attempts to plumb history by antis to support the AWB and mag bans. Oregon just passed one and that should have been shut down as an option years ago.
 
I also opine that Scotus turning the 4 cases back to screw around with their historical rules was a stupid waste of time. They should have been taken and decided rather than adding years to a decision and attempts to plumb history by antis to support the AWB and mag bans. Oregon just passed one and that should have been shut down as an option years ago.

With the SCOTUS now outlining a one step "history and tradition" standard, these cases almost had to be remanded for further review in light of Bruen because SCOTUS doesn't try cases (with of course exceptions for narrowly defined Original Jurisdiction cases,) they make judgements based on the established record, and most of these cases did not have established records regarding the "history and tradition" of the individual law under review because they were decided by the two step process and the courts simply assumed that the underlying behavior was constitutional protected, and proceeded to rule on the "means-ends" second step of the two step process where the law against the behavior was found constitutional. Since SCOTUS eliminated the second step, the courts now need to go back and fully investigate the first "historical" step in detail.

One of the cases I'm following is Duncan v. Becerra, and that case was remanded by SCOTUS back to the 9th Circuit, who remanded it back to the Benitez court for further consideration in light of Bruen. If you go to the link I provided, you can see all of the filings by the Plaintiff and Defendant in the case.

The Attorney General is arguing for extensive historical record examination by various historical scholars in an attempt to find an analogy to the California magazine capacity restriction law.

Last Friday the Law Firm representing the Plaintiffs posted all of the 11/10/22 filings from the Attorney General's office, including statements by 8 historians outlining possible analog laws and practices that could be used by the Defendants to uphold the California magazine capacity limit law.

None of this historical record would have come out had SCOTUS simply overturned the 9th Circuit and upheld Judge Benítez's original ruling in the case. Whether this record changes Judge Benítez's mind with regards to the Constitutionality of the California law is to be seen.
 
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