USSC rules on bizarre case

Status
Not open for further replies.

taliv

Moderator
Staff member
Joined
Oct 23, 2004
Messages
28,765
http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2015/us-deadlyforce.pdf

in a nutshell, officers serve an arrest warrant for misdemeanor, and the full-value knucklehead decides to flee, resulting in 18 minute 100+ mph chase through texas, during which time, he called twice to tell the officers to back off or they would be shot.

in the meantime, a half-value knucklehead with a badge (reportedly 'underperforming' by one news source and told to be more 'proactive') decided the more proactive course of action, despite instructions to wait for spike strips, was to fire 6 rounds from his bushamster into the car to 'stop the vehicle' though 4 of the rounds went into the full-value knucklehead and none of the rounds went into the hood or engine or radiator. it did, nevertheless, stop the vehicle in short order.

so the court ruling on whether or not the half-value knucklehead had immunity, after relatives of the full value knucklehead sued for excessive force, was in favor of the trooper.


among the many other bizarre twists in this case, Scalia argues separately that using a rifle to stop a car is not 'deadly force' just because it was in fact deadly. rather, because he intended to shoot out the engine.

sotomayor dissented, apparently unimpressed by the trooper farva's unwillingness to wait another half second for the car to travel 30 more yards to the spike strips

so... i guess, texas probably needs to add a training module on "leading moving targets" to their curriculae
 
While I might agree that that the officer could have waited a few seconds, I can see that force of the nature taken by the officer was not so far out of line that a civil suit should be in order...
 
While I believe the officer used questionable judgement and seems to have violated departmental policy, I don't think he went so far over the line as to nullify his immunity.

while I think Scalia's reasoning is as far out there as Sotomayors', I think the court got this one right
 
CA just had a similar scenario.

Full knuckle head - high speed chase (not his 1st high speed pursuit plus had a long rap sheet) and on the wrong side of the road. Sheriff helicopter shot him.


Sheriff dept does have training on that scenario but rarely implements the tactic.


Parents did sue saying they didn't have to kill him to get him to stop and pointed to his past high speed chases that the police used spike strips etc to get him to stop.

But I'm not sure the outcome. I think it was dismissed.
 
You can run but you can't hide.

As Ron White once said, "I didn't know how many of them it would take [ to throw me out ] but I knew how many they were going to use.
 
9mm i agree

would be interesting if scalia's view became law though. e.g. if you intended to fire a 'warning shot' and accidentally killed someone, it would still be considered non-lethal



btw, the tater salad bit is hilarious!
 
Most aren't aware that "sovereign immunity" was probably the basis for that ruling, despite the court's remarks... Here in Florida our supreme court ruled in such a manner some years ago that cities (and their officers) no longer could claim immunity in cases where it could be shown that negligence could be shown on the part of the officer during a high speed chase (this was after a pursuit that ended up killing two young sisters that were innocent occupants of a vehicle hit by the offender)...

The immediate result of that ruling (over 25 years ago now...) was that every Department in the state quickly re-worked their chase policies to only allow pursuits in felony situations (and most required officers in pursuits to notify their supervisors and specifically cite the reasons for the chase...). Supervisors were required to call off any chase that didn't meet the new standard. That ruling and the change it brought about here was dramatic. In my personal opinion it was a blessing for every young cop (young'uns are always willing to risk their own lives in a pursuit.... no matter how trivial the reason for it..).

As far as deadly force goes, I can't think of any agency in my area that allows use of a firearm in a chase unless they're clearly justified in killing the operator (and it better be really clear cut or that officer will find him or herself getting prosecuted...). The incident in Louisiana recently is a pretty clear case of what shouldn't be done and can never be justified....

As usual, I'm not a lawyer (just an old retired cop) so I'll wait for better explanations to follow from others...
 
While the Supreme Court ruling is mundane and boring as well as reflecting how stupid a few judges are, I found Taliv's assessment of what happened absolutely hysterical.

Ron
 
Is it even plausible for a 223 to enter from the angle of approach and disable an engine faster than spikes (i.e. lock it up)?

TCB
 
The court made the proper ruling. This is a policy and training issue, not a legal issue. While spike strips are generally safer then shooting to try to disable a vehicle or kill the driver, there is still the possibility of a fatal crash if a tire disintegrates and doesn't just deflate like it's supposed to. It has happened.

Scalia and Sotomeyor both made stupid statements. But then they are Supreme Court Justices, why would we expect more? In reality, anytime you attempt to forcibly stop a vehicle going 85 mph you are effectively using deadly force. Stop sticks are safer then shooting the tires, the radiator, engine block or driver, but they aren't 100% safe. In the end I think the court made the right call, even if Judge Scalia didn't understand why it was the right call.
 
Is it even plausible for a 223 to enter from the angle of approach and disable an engine faster than spikes (i.e. lock it up)?

TCB

Nope, not outside of some weird "golden bullet" scenario where it destroys the distributor or something.

A burst from an M249 SAW to the radiator and engine area could be expected to stop a vehicle...eventually. 7.62 and up is where you can more likely expect penetration of the block into the cylinders etc. I'm no mechanic though...

I agree the court got it right but not for the right reason.
 
barn... there's more than a few existing threads on stopping a car by "shooting the engine"... Most conceded that it's a bad idea / highly ineffective (unless you're using something 50cal or larger....).


Only a guessing here but I imagine it's the best excuse the officer could come up with after shooting into an occupied vehicle and killing the occupant.

In 22 years I heard some real whoppers from my own guys -trying to explain their actions after the fact, sometimes something minor, occasionally not so minor.... (heck I might have done something similar myself once or twice - no- my sergeant didn't buy it, either....
 
The immediate result of that ruling (over 25 years ago now...) was that every Department in the state quickly re-worked their chase policies to only allow pursuits in felony situations (and most required officers in pursuits to notify their supervisors and specifically cite the reasons for the chase...). Supervisors were required to call off any chase that didn't meet the new standard.

How is Attempting to Elude treated in Florida? In WA, its a felony. So as soon as they try to run, have they crossed the felony threshold and now you can shoot to stop them?
 
I just read a story about a week or two ago about some city marshalls is Louisiana (can't remember the town) that shot at a man fleeing in a vehicle and wound up killing his 4 year old child. Both of those officers have been charged with murder IIRC. I wonder if this decision will impact that case as they can argue they were only trying to stop the vehicle and not kill anyone.
 
How is Attempting to Elude treated in Florida? In WA, its a felony. So as soon as they try to run, have they crossed the felony threshold and now you can shoot to stop them?

You can't shoot someone just because they are a fleeing felon. See Garner v Tennessee.
 
Yes you can...just not legally.

And I was under the impression that simple murder charges were state offenses, not directly under federal law. Is this kicked up a notch simply because the shooter was an officer acting in his duty role?
 
All that arising from a misdemeanor warrant serving? Better to let the offender get away and catch up to him at a later date under more favorable circumstances.
 
does it make a difference that he called- twice- and threatened to shoot the pursuing police?

Yes it made a difference. The court ruled that there was sufficient threat that Garner didn't apply.


In this case, Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away
from encountering an officer at Cemetery Road. The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that Mullenix acted unreasonably in these circumstances “beyond debate.”

The general principle that deadly force requires a sufficient threat hardly settles this matter. See Pasco v. Knoblauch , 566 F. 3d 572, 580 (CA5 2009) (“t would be unreasonable to expect a police officer to make the numerous legal conclusions necessary to apply Garner to a high-speed car chase . . .”

Far from clarifying the issue, excessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted. In Brosseau
itself, the Court held that an officer did not violate clearly established law when she shot a fleeing suspect out of fear that he endangered
“other officers on foot who [she] believed were in the immediate area,” “the occupied vehicles in [his] path,” and “any other citizens who might be in the area.” 543 U. S., at 197 (first alteration in original; internal quotation
marks omitted; emphasis added). The threat Leija posed was at least as immediate as that presented by a suspect who had just begun to drive off and was headed only in the general direction of officers and bystanders.
Id. , at 196– 197.
By the time Mullenix fired, Leija had led police on a 25-mile chase at extremely high speeds, was reportedly intoxicated, had twice threatened to shoot officers, and was racing towards an officer’s location.


The issue was not that the officer violated Leija's 4th Amendment rights by shooting, but that by shooting when he did, by not waiting to see if the stop sticks had worked, he should lose his qualified immunity and be personally liable for damages in a civil suit. The court ruled:

See, e.g., Thompson v. Mercer , 762 F. 3d 433, 440 (CA5
2014); Brief for National Association of Police Organizations et al. as
Amici Curiae
15–16. Nor are spike strips always successful in ending the chase. See,
e.g., Cordova v. Aragon , 569 F. 3d 1183, 1186 (CA10 2009); Brief for
National Association of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 16 (citing examples). The dissent can cite no case from this Court denying qualified immunity because officers entitled to terminate a high-speed chase selected
one dangerous alternative over another. Even so, the dissent argues, there was no governmental interest that justified acting before Leija’s car hit the
spikes. Mullenix explained, however, that he feared Leija might attempt to shoot at or run over the officers manning the spike strips. Mullenix also feared that even if Leija hit the spike strips, he might still be able to continue driving in the direction of other officers. The dissent ignores these
interests by suggesting that there was no “possible marginal gain in shooting at the car over using the spike strips already in place.”
Post,at 4 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In fact, Mullenix hoped his actions would stop the car in a manner that avoided the risks to other officers and
other drivers that relying on spike strips would entail. The dissent disputes the merits of the options available to Mullenix, post, at 3–4, but others with more experience analyze the issues differently. See, e.g., Brief for National
Association of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 15–16.
Ultimately, whatever can be said of the wisdom of Mullenix’s choice, this Court’s precedents do not place the conclusion that he acted unreasonably in these circumstances “beyond debate.”
al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at 741.
More fundamentally, the dissent repeats the Fifth Circuit’s error. It defines the qualified immunity inquiry at a high level of generality—whet
her any governmental interest justified choosing one tactic over another—and then fails to consider that question in “the specific context of
the case.”
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S., at 198 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As in Anderson, the conclusion that Mullenix’s reasons were insufficient to justify his actions simply does not “follow immediately” from the general proposition that force must be justified. 483 U. S., at 641
 
IMO, there are times when deadly force is a good idea to stop a high speed car chase. Letting it continue puts the public in further danger. The fact that this guy already threatened to shoot at police already put this well beyond just a misdemeanor arrest.

If he had past high speed car chases, I have to wonder about the tactics used to make the arrest.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top