Treason at the New York Times

Let me restate .. If the adminstration (no matter what it is) asks them not to bring a story, what right does the NYT have to do so? Whether the story was reported prior or not is not the issue, and I doubt if the detail of the story was revealed in the past.

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WT said:

The editor and reporter of The New York Times were interviewed on TV last night. They claim they talked to over 20 'informants' about this issue.

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WT said:

I doubt the editor and reporter swore an oath to protect US secrets like these 'informants' did. Yet these 'informants' were so concerned about what the government was doing that they are willing to risk 25+ years in prison for revealing secrets..

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WT said:

That aside, has the government successfully prosecuted ANY employee for revealing secrets to the news media? I don't remember any...

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WT said:

I think the Times did a valuable service to US citizens. ...

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Prosecution is difficult but not impossible. It most recently jailed New York Times reporter Judith Miller for contempt of court but prosecution is difficult since the little worm journalists cry "freedom of press" or some such as their shield for treason...

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Senor Rivera's on-air map episode in Iraq was more of a technical misunderstanding by him of the broadcast rules for embedded journalists and yes he did pay a price.

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Surely you are wise enough to spot the difference between this Geraldo issue during initial Iraq invasion (which also happened to several other embedded journalists with Army units) and the NYT giving away state secrets!

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GTSteve03 said:

But I know which one you're OK with.

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The New York Times is not the law and not above the law.

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I think the Times did a valuable service to US citizens.

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Given its importance in the financial community, SWIFT takes its role in the global fight against money laundering and other illegal activities extremely seriously:

1. Responsibilities - It is SWIFT policy that its services should not be used to facilitate illegal activities. Users are urged to take all reasonable steps to prevent any misuse of the SWIFT system.

2. Cooperation - SWIFT has a history of cooperating in good faith with authorities such as central banks, treasury departments, law enforcement agencies and appropriate international organisations, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF*), in their efforts to combat abuse of the financial system for illegal activities.

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GTSteve03 said:

So, how exactly is all of this secret

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For Immediate Release

contact: (703) 905-3770

March 10, 2006

FinCEN seeks industry input on feasibility of collection of cross-border wire transfer data

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network today announced it is issuing a survey to banking and financial services industry trade groups seeking information about the feasibility and impact of implementing a cross-border wire transfer reporting requirement under the Bank Secrecy Act. The survey, which is required by the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004, is part of an ongoing study into the feasibility of imposing a requirement that financial institutions report to FinCEN records that they currently maintain concerning international wire transfers. The American Bankers Association, the Institute of International Bankers, the Credit Union National Association, the Independent Community Bankers of America and representatives of major money wire services are assisting in this effort by distributing this survey to their membership.

“If we can identify data in cross-border wire transfer records that helps protect economic and national security and find a workable way to efficiently collect that data – all while protecting and preserving its integrity - it will enormously strengthen our efforts,” said Robert W. Werner, FinCEN’s Director. “At the same time, we need to ensure that we do not impose regulatory requirements on the industry without the promise of real anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding benefits. This survey seeks to help us understand that regulatory impact and we encourage recipients to respond.”

On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed into law S. 2845, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Act). Section 6302 of the Act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to study the feasibility of “requiring such financial institutions as the Secretary determines to be appropriate to report to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network certain cross-border electronic transmittals of funds, if the Secretary determines that reporting of such transmittals is reasonably necessary to conduct the efforts of the Secretary against money laundering and terrorist financing.” The Act requires the Secretary to issue these regulations by December of 2007.

Prior to any such regulations taking effect, the Act requires that the Secretary certify that the technical capability to receive, store, analyze, and disseminate the information is in place. The Act also requires that, in preparation for implementing the regulation and data collection system, the Treasury must study and report to Congress the feasibility of implementing such regulations.

The survey will support other efforts to complete the feasibility study. Canada, Australia and many other countries already have systems in place to collect this information. FinCEN is closely collaborating with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), the global leader in this technology, and intends to contract with them for a demonstration of the AUSTRAC system’s compatibility with current FinCEN technology. FinCEN is also soliciting help from several large wire service providers to borrow data to run through an in-house, secure, proof-of-concept system. This data, already required by law to be maintained and recorded, can then be easily accessed and cross-referenced with the Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports that FinCEN currently warehouses.

Information collected from these transfers will provide authorized law enforcement agencies with valuable pieces to the terrorist funding and money laundering puzzles.

The feasibility study is expected to be delivered to Congress by late spring 2006.

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National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States

Monograph on Terrorist Financing

Staff Report to the Commission
...
After Bin Ladin relocated to Afghanistan in 1996, al Qaeda made less use of formal
banking channels to transfer money, preferring instead to use an informal system of
money movers or bulk cash couriers. Supporters and other operatives did use banks,
particularly in the Gulf region, to move money on behalf of al Qaeda. Prior to 9/11 the
largest single al Qaeda expense was support for the Taliban, estimated at about $20
million per year. Bin Ladin also used money to train operatives in camps in Afghanistan,
create terrorist networks and alliances, and support the jihadists and their families.
Finally, a relatively small amount of money was used to finance operations, including the
approximately $400,000–500,000 spent on the September 11 attacks themselves.
....
The U.S. government had recognized the value of enlisting the international community
in efforts to stop the flow of money to al Qaeda entities. U.S. diplomatic efforts had
succeeded in persuading the United Nations to sanction Bin Ladin economically, but such
sanctions were largely ineffective. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, necessary partners in any
realistic effort to stem the financing of terror, were ambivalent and selectively
cooperative in assisting the United States. The U.S. government approached the Saudis
on some narrow issues, such as locating Bin Ladin’s supposed personal wealth and
gaining access to a senior al Qaeda financial figure in Saudi custody, with mixed results.
The Saudis generally resisted cooperating more broadly against al Qaeda financing,
although the U.S. government did not make this issue a priority in its bilateral relations
with the Saudis or provide the Saudis with actionable intelligence about al Qaeda fundraising
in the Kingdom. Other issues, such as Iraq, the Middle East peace process,
economic arrangements, the oil supply, and cutting off Saudi support for the Taliban,
took primacy on the U.S.-Saudi agenda.

The net result of the government’s efforts, according to CIA analysis at the time, was that
al Qaeda’s cash flow on the eve of the September 11 attacks was steady and secure.
....
Bringing jihadist fund-raising prosecutions remains difficult in many cases. The inability
to get records from other countries, the complexity of directly linking cash flows to
terrorist operations or groups, and the difficulty of showing what domestic persons knew
about illicit foreign acts or actors all combine to thwart investigations and prosecutions.
Still, criminal prosecutors now have regular access to information on relevant
investigations, and the Department of Justice has created a unit to coordinate an
aggressive national effort to prosecute terrorist financing.
....
Since the September 11 attacks and the defeat of the Taliban, al Qaeda’s budget has
decreased significantly. Although the trend line is clear, the U.S government still has not
determined with any precision how much al Qaeda raises or from whom, or how it spends
its money. It appears that the al Qaeda attacks within Saudi Arabia in May and November
of 2003 have reduced—some say drastically—al Qaeda’s ability to raise funds from
Saudi sources, because of both an increase in Saudi enforcement and a more negative
perception of al Qaeda by potential donors in the Gulf. However, as al Qaeda’s cash flow
has decreased, so too have its expenses, generally owing to the defeat of the Taliban and
the dispersal of al Qaeda. Despite our efforts, it appears that al Qaeda can still find money
to fund terrorist operations. Al Qaeda now relies on the physical movement of money and
other informal methods of value transfer, which can pose significant challenges for those
attempting to detect and disrupt money flows.

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