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#shooter

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Fifty bullets fired at three unarmed men last Saturday. Forty-three fired at an armed man last year. Forty-one fired at Amadou Diallo. All by New York police; all cases fatal.

Why so many bullets? "Contagious shooting," proposed the New York Times in a front-page story on Monday. "An officer fires, so his colleagues do, too."

It's natural to grope for a rational or mechanical explanation in cases like these. But it's not clear which kind of explanation this contagion is. If it's rational, it should be judged like any rational process, and cops should be culpable for it. If it's mechanical, it should be controlled like any mechanical process, starting with the guns supplied to police. We can't keep doing what we've been doing: giving cops high-round semiautomatic weapons because we trust them not to blast away like robots, then excusing them like robots when they blast away.

Supposedly, contagious shooting was coined four decades ago to explain copycat police fire during riots. Once you start describing a behavioral phenomenon as a predictable sequence of events—"post-traumatic stress disorder," for example—people start reading it as an excuse. Seven years ago, during the Diallo case, a lawyer for one of the accused officers pointed out that "contagious shooting" was in the New York Police Department patrol guide. "I suspect that this phenomenon may play an active role in this case for my client," he told reporters.

What makes contagious shooting a handy legal defense is its mechanical portrayal of behavior. You're not choosing to kill; you're catching a disease. In the Diallo era, the NYPD patrol guide explained that the first shot "sets off a chain reaction of shooting by other personnel." Officers "join in as a kind of contagion," said the Times. They "instinctively follow suit," said the Daily News, as one shot "sparks a volley from other officers." On Monday, the Times said contagious shooting "spreads like germs, like laughter." One former NYPD official called it the "fog of the moment." Another said "your reflexes take over." A third told CNN, "It's sort of like a Pavlovian response. It's automatic. It's not intentional."

This mess of metaphors is telling. Nothing can behave like germs, sparks, laughter, fog, instinct, and conditioning all at once. That's the first clue that "contagious" is being used not to clarify matters, but to confuse them. Another clue is that the same people who invoke it often point out that the number of shootings by police is low and has been falling. An urge that's so commonly resisted can't be irresistible.

Here's a third clue: Prior to Monday, "contagious shooting" had appeared in 25 articles in Nexis. Half of them were about cops or soldiers; the other half were about basketball. Three years ago, for example, contagious shooting "rubbed off" among Duke players; last year, it "spread" among the Philadelphia 76ers. Anyone who follows sports knows that writers reach for such silly metaphors when they have no idea why something happened.

Maybe cops can get off with this defense. But it carries a price. If lethal police reactions really are contagious, then the sensible response is to control them like a disease. As Al Sharpton—who says 10,000 things a year and is right at least twice—pointed out Monday, contagious shooting as an explanation for this week's tragedy is "even more frightening" than malice, since it implies that such incidents will recur. The most famous invocation of contagion in law enforcement, delivered eight decades ago by Justice Louis Brandeis, became a centerpiece of the 1966 Miranda case. "Crime is contagious," Brandeis wrote. "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."

How can you control a contagion of police overreaction? By controlling the crucial mechanism: guns. The key number in the Diallo case wasn't 41; it was 16. Two of the four officers accounted for 32 of the 41 bullets, because each of them emptied his weapon. NYPD rules "require that the officers carry nine millimeter semi-automatic pistols with 16 shots in the magazine and the first trigger pull being a conventional trigger pull and all subsequent trigger pulls being a hair trigger pull," one defense lawyer told the jury. That's why the officers fired so many shots so fast: Their guns, loaded with 64 rounds, "were all capable of being emptied in less than four seconds."

Same thing this week. Thirty-one of the 50 bullets reportedly came from one officer's 16-round semiautomatic. One reload, two clips, total mayhem.

This is why Mayor David Dinkins and his police commissioners, including Ray Kelly, originally opposed giving cops semiautomatic weapons. In 1993, when they gave in, they put a 10-round limit on the clips. A year later, Mayor Rudy Giuliani and his commissioner lifted the cap. They argued that cops shouldn't be outgunned and would handle the weapons responsibly. It's the same argument the National Rifle Association makes for the freedom to use firearms: Guns don't kill people; people kill people.

Contagious shooting blows that argument away. If cops fire reflexively, there's no moral difference between people and guns. They're both machines, and based on recent shootings, we should limit clips or firing speed to control their damage. No responsibility, no freedom.

Alternatively, we could reassert that police are free agents, to be trusted with weapons and held responsible—not excused with mechanical metaphors—when they abuse them. You can't have it both ways.
http://www.slate.com/id/2154631/?nav=tap3

Is the contagious shooting something PDs as a whole encourage or discourage? Are most police taught to just empting their weapon into the target?
 
#shooter said: Is the contagious shooting something PDs as a whole encourage or discourage? Are most police taught to just empting their weapon into the target?

Have you researched this any yourself before posting this? Or is asking a facetious question your way of being critical in S&T without doing it bluntly?

I think you'll find the answer is of course not.


#shooter has extended the rope to any who wish to make a noose with it. We can discuss this in the venue of training, or you can try to cop bash. Your choice . . . that choice will have consequences. S&T doesn't give you the latitiude you have in L&P to opine over this subject in such fashion.
 
Contagious Fire??

It happens. It's a training issue. Thomas J Aveni M.S. of the Police Policy Studies Council addressed the issue in his 2003 paper Officer Involved Shootings: What We Didn't Know Has Hurt Us Aveni calls them Bunch Shootings. I have excerpted this from his paper:
http://www.theppsc.org/Staff_Views/Aveni/OIS.pdf

The "Bunch-Shooting" Paradox

So-called "bunch shootings," whereby several officers confront an armed suspect in a given incident, seem to elict an elevated number of rounds being fired per officer. Until recently, very limited data existed regarding this phenomenon. That early data which did exist suggested that officers firing alone discharged an average of 2.7 rounds while officers firing in "bunches" fire an average of 5.9 rounds per officer, per incident. That's a 118% increase in the number of shots fired when officers fire in "bunches". Keep that figure in mind for a minute.

Data recently obtained from Los Angeles County (LAC) unearthed some startling new revelations about bunch-shootings. The LAC data represents most of the law enforcement shootings in that county from 1998-2002, excluding LAPD, for which data is currently unavailable. The LAC data proved to be a very rough gold mine. It consisted of a series of loosely structured narratives that left many questions unanswered. However some surprising patterns began to emerge when this data was analyzed. Readers should be forwarned that this data does include a number of incidents where shots fired by officers saw the employment of not only handuns, but also long guns (shotguns, semi-auto rifles, and MP5 submachine guns). The LAC data has one other major shortcoming: It omits ALL police shootings in which officer fired at suspects, but missed altogether. One could reasonable conclude that inclusion of those shootings in which officers missed with all of their shots fired would further diminish hit ratios, but it is unknown to what extent that this might be the case.

That explains where Aveni got his data from. Now we'll look into what he thinks happens:

While much more focused research needs to be pursued on this issue, if one were inclined to speculate further at this juncture, bunch-shootings seem to embody the essence of so-called "emotional contagions". Using the proverbial "crowded theater" as a hypothetical example, two people smelling smoke in an otherwise empty theater would likely exit the threater briskly, but without panic. The emotional synergy in a crowded theater would unleash a very different set of dynamics. This may also be the case in bunch-shootings. Since this "contagion" theorem would be highly difficult to quantify, the data was closely examined again to look for more discernable and quantifiable variables that might influence bunch-shooting performance.

In an ongoing examination of bunch-shootings, discernable patterns that tend to differentiate them from more "typical" lethal encounters become recognizable. Many bunch-shootings embody extremely chaotic and complex charactoristics. In them we find many of our barricaded gunman scenarios, our drawn out foot pursuit and vehiclular pursuit scenarios and involving heavily armed suspects. Yes, the Newhall incident was a bunch-shooting, as was the FBI Miami shootout, as was the North Hollywood shootout. Hardened career criminals, or those with extreme ideological affiliations (or both) also seem to disproportionately to confront police in bunch shooting scenarios. Or, we might more accurately suggest that more officers are being dispatched to confront suspects under these more challenging circumstances. Such confrontations do attract police in larger numbers, contibuting to the increased likelyhood that bunch-shootings will occur.

All of the facts are not in on the New York shooting. We do know that there was an undercover operation in the nightclub looking for violations so they could close it down. We also know that there was a confrontation in the club where the victim of the shooting loudly stated he was going to get his gun. The officer who was undercover in the bar, overheard the confrontation, followed the suspects to their vehicle and attempted to stop them from driving off.

http://www.policeone.com/officer-shootings/articles/1193602/

According to the sources, two undercovers were at the strip joint as part of the NYPD's new Club Enforcement Initiative. The program was started after the July slaying of 18-year-old Jennifer Moore of New Jersey , who partied at a Chelsea club before being abducted, raped and killed in a Weehawken hotel. The undercovers, who usually worked in Manhattan, were on the last night of their two-month Queens job to try to nail the Kalua and other clubs on such violations as drugs and underage prostitution.

Inside the club, one of the plainclothes cops sat next to a woman he thought was a hooker and might proposition him, the sources said.

Suddenly, a burly man approached them and told the woman that he had heard she had gotten into a fight with a group of guys earlier in the club. It was unclear what it was over.

The man said, " 'Don't worry, baby, I got you covered,' and he takes her hand, and he rubs it across [the gun in] his waistband," a source said. "Then he tells her, 'That's what I'm here for.' "

It's unclear how the man smuggled his weapon past the metal detector outside the club. He likely was a regular who knew the bouncer at the door and may have worked there part time, helping with security, the sources said.

The undercover then went outside the club and radioed his backup to tell them there was a man inside with a gun. It was around 3:30 a.m.

While the undercover was outside, the suspect came out along with the girl and others, since it was around closing time.

The undercover watched as an argument erupted between Bell 's group, which included three male pals and the beefy man with the gun, and four other men - with the woman in the middle of them, the sources said.

The woman was overheard saying to the men arguing with Bell 's pals, "I'm not doing you all. I'll do one or two, but not all," according to the sources.

Around the same time, the undercover said he heard Bell's friend Joseph Guzman tell his buddies, "Yo, get my gun! Get my gun! Let's get my gun from the car! Yeah, we're gonna f- - - him up!" the sources said.

The undercover, thinking there was about to be a drive-by shooting in front of the club involving Bell's group, followed Guzman, Bell and two others to their car.

"It's getting hot! Something's going to happen! Something's going down!" the undercover radioed to his backup.

He hurried to the front of Bell 's Altima, which was parked on the side of nearby Liverpool Street , and jumped in front of it.

That's when the undercover put his right leg up on the hood of the Altima and began screaming that he was a cop, the sources said.

By now the backup officers were on their way to the scene.

The cop was leaning over the hood of the car to try to see the hands of the people inside and make sure they didn't have any guns, they said. But Bell floored the gas pedal and headed for the cop, the sources said, striking him and badly cutting his knee.

One of the Altima's passengers - who possibly had a gun - jumped out of the back of the car, the sources said.

Around the same time, an unmarked Toyota Camry driven by a plainclothes police lieutenant and another cop behind him pulled up, but overshot Bell 's car. A police van with an officer and the narcotics detective then managed to block Bell 's car in.

Bell 's Altima first struck the police van in the driver's desperate bid to escape, then backed up and struck the roll-down metal doors of a commercial building behind him. He then revved his car again toward the undercover - which prompted the cop to scream, "He's got a gun!" and start firing, according to the sources, with the bullets passing through Bell 's car.

"The undercover thought they had more than one gun. He thought they would do anything to get away. He was yelling, 'Let me see your hands!' " one source said.

At this point the backup officers began arriving:
One of the Altima's passengers - who possibly had a gun - jumped out of the back of the car, the sources said.

Around the same time, an unmarked Toyota Camry driven by a plainclothes police lieutenant and another cop behind him pulled up, but overshot Bell 's car. A police van with an officer and the narcotics detective then managed to block Bell 's car in.

Bell 's Altima first struck the police van in the driver's desperate bid to escape, then backed up and struck the roll-down metal doors of a commercial building behind him. He then revved his car again toward the undercover - which prompted the cop to scream, "He's got a gun!" and start firing, according to the sources, with the bullets passing through Bell 's car.

"The undercover thought they had more than one gun. He thought they would do anything to get away. He was yelling, 'Let me see your hands!' " one source said.

The other cops, thinking they were under attack, started firing at the car, too.

At one point, the detective thought his gun had jammed and so reloaded his magazine and emptied the clip again at the car, firing 31 bullets.

Bell was killed, Guzman critically injured, and a third friend, Trent Benefield, was shot. They are expected to live.

Benefield later told a friend from his hospital bed that he and his buddies didn't know the undercovers were cops.

He told investigators, "I got into the car, and there was all this shooting."

It was unclear when the other four men who were originally fighting with Bell and his pals fled the scene. They were spotted leaving in a black SUV.

Bell had been arrested three times in the past: twice for drugs and one on a gun rap in a case that was sealed. Guzman has been busted nine times, including for armed robbery. He spent two stretches in state prison in the '90s. Benefield has a sealed record as a juvenile for gun possession and robbery.

Some marijuana was later found near the Altima, and investigators believe that it may have been tossed out by the group before the gunfire. Two bullet casings also were recovered from the Altima, although cops said they do not believe they were from a police gun.

In my next post we'll discuss the dynamics involved in shooting at moving vehicles.

Jeff
 
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Shooting at moving vehicles is always controversial. Unless you're carrying an M72A3 LAW, AT4, RPG or other light antiarmor weapon, you don't have enough gun to disable a vehicle. So why shoot at all?

Steven D. Ashley, M.S., M.L.S., MFCI, ARM-P and Thomas Aveni, MSFP of the Police Policy Studies Council addressed the issue o in an article entitled:
Vehicular Assault: Fight or Flight? originally published in Police & Security News, September-October 2005.

The complete article can be found here:
http://www.theppsc.org/Staff_Views/Aveni/Vehicular.Assault.htm

Shooting at the occupants of moving vehicles is more frequent then you might think. From the article:
There is no known national data regarding the frequency with which officers shoot at moving vehicles. From what informal data[1] that we have, and depending upon the jurisdiction, such shootings may account for as many as 8% of police deadly force incidents. It’s also difficult to locate data regarding the number of officers struck by vehicles. We do know that 143 officers died after being struck by vehicles during the ten year period from 1995 to 2004. While this figure represents only 8.7% of the overall officers killed figure, 18% of law enforcement officers “accidentally” killed during the same period died from injuries they suffered after being struck by a vehicle. And, while most of these undoubtedly were accidental, at least some are likely to have been intentional, or as the result of carelessness or recklessness on the part of suspects.

In fact, every year there are a number of high profile incidents involving officers shooting at vehicles that they report were trying to run them down, usually during a pursuit or an escape attempt. Incidentally, it’s worth noting that the kinetic energy of an oncoming vehicle isn’t always what kills police officers. Getting pinned between an oncoming car and a fixed object, or simply being crushed, dragged or run over by a moving vehicle can also prove fatal.

In the aftermath of one of these incidents, the inevitable Monday Morning Quarterbacking usually fixates on the question of why didn't the officer simply step out of the way? From the article:
The Two Second Rule

There is a common assumption that officers can simply step out of the path of an oncoming automobile. While that might sometimes be true, determining the validity of that assumption requires a case-by-case examination of all relevant facts. Some items to be considered would include the distance between the officer and the oncoming vehicle, the officer’s exact location in relation to the vehicle, the velocity of the oncoming vehicle, the vehicle’s acceleration potential and closing rate, and factor’s influencing the officer’s ability to exit the “fatal funnel” projected by the vehicle, such as slippery footing. We should also ask whether the officer was injured, fatigued or disoriented from preceding events to the extent that his or her abilities to react effectively were diminished.

Published 0-60 mph acceleration rates are largely irrelevant in many shooting scenarios. However, vehicle acceleration rates over a 20 foot distance – from a standing start – are relevant, as that is generally the distance within which many officers are standing when attacked by drivers of moving vehicles. In reviewing published data[2], it appears that virtually any vehicle on the road is capable of accelerating fast enough to cover 20 feet in two seconds. Setting the speed/lethality issue aside for a moment, the implications relative to officer reaction time are obvious.

Typically, what we see in many of these scenarios, by virtue of distance and vehicle speed, is that there are about 2 seconds or less to react once the vehicle has initiated movement toward the officer. This “two second” rule of thumb impacts everything from the officer’s ability to move out of harm’s way to whether his or her later shots are likely to strike the suspect’s vehicle at a “questionable” angle.

Simply put, if an officer has put himself in the poor position of being directly in front of or directly behind a vehicle and the vehicle moves towards him, there may not be time to move off the line of attack. In this case there is no doubt that the undercover officer put himself in a bad position:
"It's getting hot! Something's going to happen! Something's going down!" the undercover radioed to his backup.

He hurried to the front of Bell 's Altima, which was parked on the side of nearby Liverpool Street , and jumped in front of it.

That's when the undercover put his right leg up on the hood of the Altima and began screaming that he was a cop, the sources said.

The cop was leaning over the hood of the car to try to see the hands of the people inside and make sure they didn't have any guns, they said. But Bell floored the gas pedal and headed for the cop, the sources said, striking him and badly cutting his knee.

He had nowhere to go when Bell floored the gas pedal. He didn't even have the two seconds to react and was injured. The backup officers arrived at which point:

One of the Altima's passengers - who possibly had a gun - jumped out of the back of the car, the sources said.

Around the same time, an unmarked Toyota Camry driven by a plainclothes police lieutenant and another cop behind him pulled up, but overshot Bell 's car. A police van with an officer and the narcotics detective then managed to block Bell 's car in.

Bell 's Altima first struck the police van in the driver's desperate bid to escape, then backed up and struck the roll-down metal doors of a commercial building behind him. He then revved his car again toward the undercover - which prompted the cop to scream, "He's got a gun!" and start firing, according to the sources, with the bullets passing through Bell 's car.


The undercover officer facing another attack from Bell opened fire. How much time did he have to make that decision?

While much has been written about officer reaction times in deadly force encounters, not as much has been done regarding the issue of deadly force against moving vehicles. Bill Lewinski’s Tempe Study[3] offers insights that literally scream for attention in this regard. Previous literature has suggested that stop-reaction time – the time it takes for someone actively engaged in an action to react to a new stimulus – is approximately one second. Bringing sophisticated technology to bear, Dr. Lewinski’s research suggests that a multi-tasking officer might require as much as 7/10 of a second to process a “stop stimulus” when firing during a simple multi-task sequence. Is running away from the path of an oncoming car an example of multi-tasking? Most would agree that it would be a strenuous, chaotic and stressful one at that. How will reaction times influence the final shots fired? Let’s combine some facts already established and a few speculative and/or hypothetical concepts with the firing potential of most semi-automatic pistols.

The Tempe Study determined that a Glock (G17) with a 10 lb. trigger facilitated shots being fired at intervals of about 0.25 seconds. That has confirmed our own anecdotal observations with a shooting timer, that an officer can fairly typically fire 4 shots per second from a 9mm Glock 17. Combine what we know with a few observed characteristics of incidents involving officers shooting at moving vehicles. If an officer finds himself 20 feet in front of an oncoming vehicle that is merely closing at a rate of 10 mph (14.6 fps) that vehicle will reach the point where he was standing in about 1.37 seconds. If the vehicle is closing at 20mph, it’s moving at 29.2 fps and will reach the officer’s original position in 0.68 seconds.

If the officer is faced with the prospect of reacting to the impending threat with his/her handgun holstered, it will typically take 1.78 to 2.00 seconds[4] to draw and fire one round. If the officer has been trained to fire strings of shots in rapid succession as long as a threat is perceived as being persistent, it’s easy to envision how and why everything after the first shot fired might result in non-frontal strikes to the oncoming vehicle. Even if the officer initiated firing with his/her gun drawn, the reaction time[5] to the first sighted shot fired (.54 seconds) would likely lead to the third or fourth shot fired resulting in non-frontal hits to the vehicle, depending upon its closing speed.

The Policeone article doesn't give us any idea of the distances involved, but the undercover officer, already badly injured from Bell's first attempt to escape probably had 2 seconds or less to decide to shoot and to shoot.

Was the undercover officer's use of force legal? Based on the information that is available to us I would say yes. Did he put himself in a poor position? Yes. What about the other officers firing? Did they reasonably believe that they were firing to stop the attack on the undercover officer? Again I'd say yes.

Would there have been better ways to handle the situation? I think so, but I don't have any idea what other resources were available. Calling in marked units to make a felony stop on the Altima might have been a better way to solve the tactical problem. However if the undercover officer reasonably believed that a driveby shooting was about to happen, there might not have been time to make that call.

Every use of force situation is different and you have to act on the information available to you at the time. They also almost always happen very fast.

What lessons can we learn from this?

Jeff
 
How can you control a contagion of police overreaction? By controlling the crucial mechanism: guns.

If the police were all armed with revolvers and a third of the # of shots had been fired, would there be as much outrage? I think the outrage would be the same, 3 unarmed men were shot by police, one killed on his wedding day. It might be more difficult to grandstand though as the # of shots fired wouldn't contribute as much to the "excessiveness" of the situation.

The article is missing the point, IF an investigation shows the cops used poor judgment and failed to follow policy and this resulted in the tragedy, they should be held accountable. IF there were circumstances that all came together to create an unavoidable situation, that should mitigate the actions of those involved.

I don't know if this is relevant here but are there situations where high capacity handguns were a decisive factor? My feeling is that police should have as much firepower as they can comfortably carry on their hip. For home defense I know I want a high-cap mag.
 
This is not cop bashing, I am asking a legit question. Are police academies training cadets to empty their weapons if they have to fire? What is the hit ratio? It is my understanding that if you rapid fire your hit % goes down. Of coarse this is different for every weapon/caliber. I would think muzzle climb would reduce accuracy. In a crowded/urban area, you would think this is unacceptable.

The test I wish to apply is “If this involved CCW rather than police, would it be a justified shoot?” and “if this is what police are being trained to do, are these tactics (if you have to fire, fire until your weapon is empty) sound for CCW?” Granted shooting a car is a whole different matter all together, thanks for your info Jeff White, well done indeed.

I do not wish to see the police under armed, but I do think that the use of deadly force, police and CCW should be aligned, but this is a different thread topic. I do agree, for now, with the author’s assessment that either police are responsible for all their bullets or not. I view is they are and should be held accountable, which is a different issue from “is this a legit shoot?” If a bystander was hit by one of the 50+ bullets, would they be held liable? Luckily, that did not happen.
 
JW:

That was a potful of interesting data & analysis.

There is another aspect of high-round-count shootings that might be considered, something that might be termed "follow the leader's example." To be more explicit, when one team member starts shooting, the other team members also shoot in the same direction. Sort of like an infantry fire team leader seeing/reacting to an enemy, opening up and having the automatic rifleman, grenadier, & rifleman trained to open up at the TL's lead.

The follower shooters take for granted the justification for opening up, as that determination has already been made by a team member, the perceieved leader for that engagement.

Which leads me to wonder how much this phenomenon (if valid/real/etc) is a product of training and how much is a product of survival instinct?

Also, how many of the NY policemen involved (in the recent unpleasantness) had a military background, especially infantry?
 
Jeff White said:
Was the undercover officer's use of force legal? Based on the information that is available to us I would say yes. Did he put himself in a poor position? Yes. What about the other officers firing? Did they reasonably believe that they were firing to stop the attack on the undercover officer? Again I'd say yes.

Based on the article Jeff provided, and unless other information comes to light contradicting any of that information, I think Jeff's assessment is sound.

The undercover officer was justified in firing because he reasonably perceived that the driver of the car intended to kill him, and that the people in the car possessed the elements of Ability, Opportunity, and Jeopardy. Other means of defending himself were precluded by the specifics of the situation.

The other officers were justified in firing because they also reasonably perceived that the undercover officer's life was in immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger of death or grave bodily harm, and because there was no other immediately-available means to stop the deadly attack they perceived to be present.

#shooter said:
The test I wish to apply is “If this involved CCW rather than police, would it be a justified shoot?”

I believe so, based upon the same criteria outlined above. A CCW holder is justified in firing whenever he or she reasonably believes there is an immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger of death or grave bodily harm to himself or to an innocent other.

Caveat: because a CCW holder does not have a duty to follow and apprehend a criminal, it is possible that the otherwise-justifiable shooting would not be justified in this situation if the CCW holder had followed the suspected criminal outside to confront him. The CCW holder is legally required to avoid confrontation when possible, but the officer's legal duty in this case required him to act.

#shooter said:
... and “if this is what police are being trained to do, are these tactics (if you have to fire, fire until your weapon is empty) sound for CCW?”

Officers are not trained to fire until their firearms are empty. They are trained to fire until the threat is stopped.

Every reputable CCW trainer teaches exactly the same thing: fire until the threat is stopped.

The specific number of rounds fired has absolutely nothing to do with whether the shooting is justified or not justified. All that really matters is whether the threat still exists at the moment the trigger is pulled, each and every time.

pax
 
Officers are not trained to fire until their firearms are empty. They are trained to fire until the threat is stopped.

I had an officer tell me the same thing when doing a ride along in Nashville. He followed up by stating that regardless of the offical rule, his policy was to shoot to slide lock, reload, and assess. Maybe that would have changed after the first firefight he was in, but he was serious as a heart attack.
 
Does shoot until the threat has ended equal shoot to slide lock in an incident that takes several seconds to resolve? Lewinski’s Tempe Study showed that an officer could shoot 4 rounds a second from a Glock 17 with the New York trigger. If the incident under discussion took 12 seconds from the undercover firing the first shot to the Altima stopping, it is entirely possible for the detective to have fired his initial magazine, speed reload and fire a second. And if he accounted for 31 of the 50 rounds fired the other 4 officers would have fired an average of 4.75 rounds each, which is less then the 5.9 rounds that Aveni's data suggests is the average for a bunch-firing incident.

Jeff
 
It's a training issue.
Jeff is right.
Last summer I was training with ISP troupers and members of the FBI rapid response team. For the second year, we were taught to shoot 2 and assess, shoot 2 and assess, etc. We were also given the go word of the day. I don't remember what it was, but it was obviously a neutral word, not "shoot" or "gun".
Later, while approaching a hostage situation, the trainer yells "shoot" in our ear pieces. Yep, you guessed it: not only did 1/2 the troupers/agents fire their weapons, most of them fired until slide lock. I think a few even reloaded and started in again.
Keep in mind these were not rookies, just folks who were never properly trained by Uncle Sugar or by their respective departments.
Steve
 
I think there's a lot of important issues in this situation that bear discussion. One of which may be a problem of communication and identification.

Consider that the occupants of the car may not have clearly heard the undercover officer with his leg up on the hood of the car saying that he was LE. This may be due to the car's windows being up, the radio on, conversation/yelling or the engine noise as the vehicle was starting or being reved. Add to this the fact that when flooded with adrenaline we have trouble making ourselves understood. We think we're shouting clearly and loudly and our instructors and fellow students only hear squeeks or squeels. The undercover officer may have been subject to the same effects. A combination of these problems may have prevented the Bell group from understanding that they were dealing with a police officer. This could have been the single point of failure that resulted in all the rest of the incident.

Communications and identification is something that we all should consider in our training. How do we insure that we communicate clearly enough to be understood when our bodies reaction to fight/flight stess makes it difficult? Do we practice communicating when we train and do it with others present so that they can tell us if our attempts at communication were clear and understandable? Do we develop short scripts to use in specific situations and practice them just as we practice different shooting techniques such as retention shooting or movement shooting?
 
"He had nowhere to go when Bell floored the gas pedal. He didn't even have the two seconds to react and was injured."

Ah, but according to the media and general public/sheeple, a car is not a weapon. For some unknown reason, 3 tons of metal coming at you being directed by a person with ill intent is not a weapon. The media and sheeple, as you know, are crying "but he had no weapon" which we know is total BS. What's the magic morally correct number of rounds to shoot into a car speeding at you? 2? 5? 8? 'till the damn gun is empty, that's how many. As Polk County Sheriff Grady Judd said, after they cornered that sack of crap who had killed an officer and his dog:

“That’s all the bullets we had, or we would have shot him more,”
 
Ok, I'm gonna be one of those posters who responds to the original post without reading other responses. But I did quick search within the responses for "hair-trigger" and "Glock", and it doesn't look like anyone else has addressed this. Doesn't the NYPD still issue Glocks? Since when does any Glock have a trigger pull which changes from shot to shot?
NYPD rules "require that the officers carry nine millimeter semi-automatic pistols with 16 shots in the magazine and the first trigger pull being a conventional trigger pull and all subsequent trigger pulls being a hair trigger pull," one defense lawyer told the jury. That's why the officers fired so many shots so fast: Their guns, loaded with 64 rounds, "were all capable of being emptied in less than four seconds."
-twency
 
Sounds like the lawyer's trying to say that NYPD officers bump-fire their autoloaders.

Lawyers and their 'hair triggers'. Probably a normal 4-5 pound pull. These are semi-auto, not machine pistols.
 
I agree, training is the main issue. "Contageous shooting" is just a fancy term for going into an abject panic because you haven't been trained properly or you've been trained IMproperly to empty your magazine in the general direction of any possible threat. That said, I do question the advantage of issuing higher capacity firearms of lower power. I'd like to see the NYPD go to GP100's in .41 Magnum, though of course such a shift woulld be pointless without proper training.
 
Yeah, Glock trigger pull is the same shot-to-shot; that's some dumbass lawyer either blowing on a subject he knows nothing about, or trying to influence things.

And the pistols NYPD uses have heavier than standard triggers; that's where the 'New York trigger' came from
 
Yeah, Glock trigger pull is the same shot-to-shot; that's some dumbass lawyer either blowing on a subject he knows nothing about, or trying to influence things.

And the pistols NYPD uses have heavier than standard triggers; that's where the 'New York trigger' came from

Unless he is referring to firing subsequent shots using the reset method. Plenty of instructors out there teaching exactly that, and that's I run my Glocks. I doubt the lawyer is dialed in enough to understand that, but we have no idea of what "experts" or other information sources have been saying.
 
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