O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2020), which requires individuals to obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant Nathan Ernest Hatch was charged with carrying a pistol in a public place without a permit in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (the “permit-to-carry statute”). Hatch filed a pretrial motion to strike down the statute, arguing it violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion and later convicted Hatch of the charged offense. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. Because the permit-to-carry statute does not violate the Second Amendment, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. On the evening of January 8, 2018, Hatch was driving to work when his truck broke down in the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Airport Commission. When airport police officers stopped to assist him, Hatch informed the officers that he might have a handgun in a backpack in the back seat of his truck. He also confirmed that he did not have a permit to carry a pistol. After the officers searched his truck and discovered a loaded, uncased pistol in the backpack, they placed Hatch under arrest. The Metropolitan Airport Commission charged Hatch with carrying or possessing a pistol without a permit in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a, a gross misdemeanor. Hatch filed a pretrial motion to strike down the permit-to-carry statute, 3
arguing that the requirement that an individual obtain a permit to carry a firearm violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to Hatch, the permit-to-carry statute fails to survive strict scrutiny which requires a statute to be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The district court denied the motion. Hatch then waived his right to a jury trial and submitted his case to the district court on stipulated
facts. The district court found Hatch guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to 180 days in the county workhouse but stayed execution of the sentence for 2 years. On appeal, Hatch renewed his argument that the permit-to-carry statute violates the Second Amendment because it fails to survive strict scrutiny. State v. Hatch,
No. A20-0176, 2020 WL 6390933, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 2, 2020). By contrast, the State argued the statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny, which only requires a statute to be substantially related to an important governmental objective. Id. The court of appeals did not resolve the parties’ dispute because it concluded the permit-to-carry statute survives the more stringent standard of strict scrutiny. Id. at *3. We granted Hatch’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. 2013). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and should only be struck down “when absolutely necessary.” Id. (quoting In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Minn. 2011)). Accordingly, we will “uphold a statute unless the challenging party demonstrates that the statute is unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing State v. Yang, 744 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009)). 4
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.1 Hatch argues the permit-to-carry statute violates the Second Amendment because it fails to survive strict
scrutiny. We disagree.2 To survive strict scrutiny, the challenged law must be “justified by a compelling
government interest” and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 21 (Minn. 2014) (stating same). A law is narrowly tailored if it is the “least restrictive means” for addressing the government’s articulated interest. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The narrow tailoring requirement, however, “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable . . . alternative, nor does it require a dramatic sacrifice of the compelling interest at stake.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original). Although strict scrutiny is “a demanding standard,” Brown, 564 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has rejected “the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact."
