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From the Washington Times (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030408-31735912.htm):
Mogadishu lessons help foil Saddam's strategy
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's strategy of creating a "series of Mogadishus" in Iraq's southern cities failed because the United States committed overwhelming firepower and political will, unlike in Somalia in 1993, Pentagon officials said yesterday.
The sources said U.S. commanders are growing increasingly confident that the urban tactics displayed in uprooting the Fedayeen Saddam fighters in the south bode well for expected close-in attacks and tunnel-to-tunnel fighting in Baghdad.
The commanders are so certain that the capital is nearing a state of disarray that two A-10 Thunderbolts have been dispatched directly over it to attack paramilitaries and the city's last line of defense, Special Republican Guard units.
Baghdad's air defenses once lay so thick and overlapping that a lumbering A-10 could never enter its airspace.
One unknown is what, or who, is hiding in a complex of natural and man-made tunnels under the city. The CIA has obtained drawings of the extensive network. At some point, U.S. occupiers will have to enter this underground.
The allies' rout of the Fedayeen stirs memories of urban battles in Somalia nearly 10 years ago.
At the time, a joint U.S. task force tried to subdue warlord gangs and capture their leaders so that humanitarian workers could save starving Somalis. The force consisted of extremely light infantry: Army Rangers, Delta Force, some infantry and helicopters. There was no armor.
AC-130 gunships had been withdrawn because some Clinton administration officials feared that the planes' machine guns and cannons did too much damage. After 18 service members were killed in an operation retold in the "Black Hawk Down" book and movie, President Clinton withdrew troops from the Horn of Africa nation.
The disaster in Mogadishu became legend among Islamic terrorists as a lesson in how to defeat the Americans.
Several Pentagon sources say the Ba'ath Party regime repeatedly referred to "Black Hawk Down" in military training. As the allied invasion neared, Baghdad sent thousands of Fedayeen fighters into southern cities to create "a series of Mogadishus," one Pentagon source said.
The source said the regime believed that if the Fedayeen caused dozens of combat deaths, the U.S. troops would leave, just as they did in Somalia.
It didn't work. British and Americans methodically secured the cities of Basra, Nasiriyah, Najaf, Karbala and Kut, fighting door to door if necessary.
"You have to look at the basic context in which we fought," said a senior Pentagon official involved in war planning.
"In Mogadishu, we were in the process of pulling out. We had already given an SOS. There wasn't any sense of mission in what we were doing. In Iraq, every Pfc. says we're here to kick Saddam's *** and liberate the Iraqi people. These people know what they are doing there. And that direction comes from the American president."
He added, "The big difference between Mogadishu and Iraqi urban areas is these guys know they have a president who is backing them."
Andy Messing, a former Army Green Beret who did humanitarian work in Somalia, said another big difference is that the current war plan devoted resources to winning over the populace.
The allies brought in relief supplies, and Army civil affairs officers moved into secured areas to restart basic city services. Mr. Messing said those critical features were missing in Mogadishu.
"We're doing all the things we should be doing," said Mr. Messing, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation. "We are not meeting the kind of angry resistance we faced in Mogadishu. You go in with the fist and then you open your hand. The military didn't open our hand in Somalia."
Mr. Messing said this war presents a "new paradigm." For the first time, conventional commanders are welcoming — at the insistence of Pentagon civilian policy-makers — a greater role for special-operations forces. These forces include not only combatants, but also civil affairs and psychological warfare officers to directly reach Iraqi citizens.
The Fedayeen tactics resemble the techniques of Somalis: firing from among civilians using rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
The Fedayeen did succeed in slowing the allied advance, often fighting to the death.
But in the end, the British and U.S. soldiers and the Marines prevailed. Unlike the Rangers in Mogadishu, the Americans here enjoyed the backing of helicopter gunships, M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
The military had put emphasis since 1993 on urban combat. Infantrymen have suffered relatively low casualties as they methodically cleansed neighborhoods of Fedayeen, room by room.
In Somalia, most townspeople sided with the warlords; everyone seemed to own a rifle. It was different this time, with the Fedayeen despised by most locals.
"The problem in entering Mogadishu was that everyone was against us," a senior U.S. official said. "In this case, everyone is pointing out the Fedayeen."
Intelligence collection also played a major part in capturing the southern cities.
Tips from citizens enabled the coalition to bomb a building in Basra where more than 200 Fedayeen were meeting. During the weekend, U.S. Central Command learned of a sighting of Lt. Gen. Ali Hassan al Majid, whom Saddam put in charge of defending southern Iraq. His house was bombed.
The allies now believe they killed the man, aka "Chemical Ali," who gassed the Kurds and brutally cracked down on the Shi'ites after the 1991 war.
In Baghdad, commanders are taking one chunk of the city at a time and report only sporadic resistance at this point. They benefit from one key surveillance tool not present in Somalia: spy drones that can loiter for hours, telling soldiers in real time where the Fedayeen are lurking.
Mogadishu lessons help foil Saddam's strategy
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's strategy of creating a "series of Mogadishus" in Iraq's southern cities failed because the United States committed overwhelming firepower and political will, unlike in Somalia in 1993, Pentagon officials said yesterday.
The sources said U.S. commanders are growing increasingly confident that the urban tactics displayed in uprooting the Fedayeen Saddam fighters in the south bode well for expected close-in attacks and tunnel-to-tunnel fighting in Baghdad.
The commanders are so certain that the capital is nearing a state of disarray that two A-10 Thunderbolts have been dispatched directly over it to attack paramilitaries and the city's last line of defense, Special Republican Guard units.
Baghdad's air defenses once lay so thick and overlapping that a lumbering A-10 could never enter its airspace.
One unknown is what, or who, is hiding in a complex of natural and man-made tunnels under the city. The CIA has obtained drawings of the extensive network. At some point, U.S. occupiers will have to enter this underground.
The allies' rout of the Fedayeen stirs memories of urban battles in Somalia nearly 10 years ago.
At the time, a joint U.S. task force tried to subdue warlord gangs and capture their leaders so that humanitarian workers could save starving Somalis. The force consisted of extremely light infantry: Army Rangers, Delta Force, some infantry and helicopters. There was no armor.
AC-130 gunships had been withdrawn because some Clinton administration officials feared that the planes' machine guns and cannons did too much damage. After 18 service members were killed in an operation retold in the "Black Hawk Down" book and movie, President Clinton withdrew troops from the Horn of Africa nation.
The disaster in Mogadishu became legend among Islamic terrorists as a lesson in how to defeat the Americans.
Several Pentagon sources say the Ba'ath Party regime repeatedly referred to "Black Hawk Down" in military training. As the allied invasion neared, Baghdad sent thousands of Fedayeen fighters into southern cities to create "a series of Mogadishus," one Pentagon source said.
The source said the regime believed that if the Fedayeen caused dozens of combat deaths, the U.S. troops would leave, just as they did in Somalia.
It didn't work. British and Americans methodically secured the cities of Basra, Nasiriyah, Najaf, Karbala and Kut, fighting door to door if necessary.
"You have to look at the basic context in which we fought," said a senior Pentagon official involved in war planning.
"In Mogadishu, we were in the process of pulling out. We had already given an SOS. There wasn't any sense of mission in what we were doing. In Iraq, every Pfc. says we're here to kick Saddam's *** and liberate the Iraqi people. These people know what they are doing there. And that direction comes from the American president."
He added, "The big difference between Mogadishu and Iraqi urban areas is these guys know they have a president who is backing them."
Andy Messing, a former Army Green Beret who did humanitarian work in Somalia, said another big difference is that the current war plan devoted resources to winning over the populace.
The allies brought in relief supplies, and Army civil affairs officers moved into secured areas to restart basic city services. Mr. Messing said those critical features were missing in Mogadishu.
"We're doing all the things we should be doing," said Mr. Messing, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation. "We are not meeting the kind of angry resistance we faced in Mogadishu. You go in with the fist and then you open your hand. The military didn't open our hand in Somalia."
Mr. Messing said this war presents a "new paradigm." For the first time, conventional commanders are welcoming — at the insistence of Pentagon civilian policy-makers — a greater role for special-operations forces. These forces include not only combatants, but also civil affairs and psychological warfare officers to directly reach Iraqi citizens.
The Fedayeen tactics resemble the techniques of Somalis: firing from among civilians using rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.
The Fedayeen did succeed in slowing the allied advance, often fighting to the death.
But in the end, the British and U.S. soldiers and the Marines prevailed. Unlike the Rangers in Mogadishu, the Americans here enjoyed the backing of helicopter gunships, M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
The military had put emphasis since 1993 on urban combat. Infantrymen have suffered relatively low casualties as they methodically cleansed neighborhoods of Fedayeen, room by room.
In Somalia, most townspeople sided with the warlords; everyone seemed to own a rifle. It was different this time, with the Fedayeen despised by most locals.
"The problem in entering Mogadishu was that everyone was against us," a senior U.S. official said. "In this case, everyone is pointing out the Fedayeen."
Intelligence collection also played a major part in capturing the southern cities.
Tips from citizens enabled the coalition to bomb a building in Basra where more than 200 Fedayeen were meeting. During the weekend, U.S. Central Command learned of a sighting of Lt. Gen. Ali Hassan al Majid, whom Saddam put in charge of defending southern Iraq. His house was bombed.
The allies now believe they killed the man, aka "Chemical Ali," who gassed the Kurds and brutally cracked down on the Shi'ites after the 1991 war.
In Baghdad, commanders are taking one chunk of the city at a time and report only sporadic resistance at this point. They benefit from one key surveillance tool not present in Somalia: spy drones that can loiter for hours, telling soldiers in real time where the Fedayeen are lurking.