A recent thread about the January SCOTUS decision in Arizona v. Johnson, was closed, in part, because it seemed, IMHO, that folks were a little confused over the "new" SCOTUS ruling.
Prior to this SCOTUS decision, under the auspices of a "Terry Stop" an officer had to have an articulable suspicion that the actor is, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity, and then further has articulable concern that the actor is armed or dangerous in order to justify a pat down of the outer garments for the sole perpose of ascertaining if said actor is armed.
Now, under Johnson, a person, either driver or passenger(s), may be asked to exit a vehicle, without having suspicion of any criminal activity, and be patted down for weapons if there is a concern about them being armed or dangerous. The difference between Terry and Johnson seems to be that there be no need for the suspicion of criminal activity before the frisk for weapons can be conducted. This, as SCOTUS indicated is indeed an expansion of police authority to search at a traffice stop.
Too bad that previous thread was highjacked with an unneeded full text version of the Terry decision; worse was the fact that someone criticized those involved in the discussion as being uninformed when it appeared the opposite was the case.
Here is the basic question posed to SCOTUS, which they affirmed:
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-1122
Here's an analysis of the decision:
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Arizona_v._Johnson
Prior to this SCOTUS decision, under the auspices of a "Terry Stop" an officer had to have an articulable suspicion that the actor is, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity, and then further has articulable concern that the actor is armed or dangerous in order to justify a pat down of the outer garments for the sole perpose of ascertaining if said actor is armed.
Now, under Johnson, a person, either driver or passenger(s), may be asked to exit a vehicle, without having suspicion of any criminal activity, and be patted down for weapons if there is a concern about them being armed or dangerous. The difference between Terry and Johnson seems to be that there be no need for the suspicion of criminal activity before the frisk for weapons can be conducted. This, as SCOTUS indicated is indeed an expansion of police authority to search at a traffice stop.
Too bad that previous thread was highjacked with an unneeded full text version of the Terry decision; worse was the fact that someone criticized those involved in the discussion as being uninformed when it appeared the opposite was the case.
There it is, in it's entirety. Too many members get into these discussion who quite frankly don't have a clue about what they are discussing. Then it turns into a circular discussion that goes round and round for 100 or so posts until one of the staff gets tired of it and closes it.
Members have a responsibility to do some basic research before they sit down at the keyboard and pronounce their opinion.
A Terry Search must include the element of suspicion that the person is involved in a crime or about to be involved in a crime. This would seem to me to eliminate the passengers in a routine traffic stop for a minor violation from being removed from the car and patted down under this latest ruling. If the officer couldn't articulate what criminal activity he thought the suspect was involved in when he patted the suspect down for weapons, he would lose any fruits of that search as it would be illegal.
The idea that officers are going to routinely search everyone in every car they stopped is just ridiculous.
Next time do some research so you can come to the thread and make an educated, intelligent post and the discussion will be allowed to continue. This one is done.
Here is the basic question posed to SCOTUS, which they affirmed:
In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction, may an officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the officer has an articulable basis to believe the passenger might be armed and presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds to believe that the passenger is committing, or has committed, a criminal offense?
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-1122
Here's an analysis of the decision:
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Arizona_v._Johnson
In an opinion so spare that the Supreme Court did not labor long to produce it, the Justices on January 26 unanimously expanded the control that police can exercise at the scene of roadside traffic stops. The ruling brought an enlargement of “stop and frisk” authority.
The Court has returned often to the constitutional environment that prevails along the nation’s streets and highways when police officers see a traffic violation in progress, and decide to pull over the offending vehicle. In a series of rulings, dating back nearly four decades, it has slowly built up a complex array of Fourth Amendment concepts, most of which have added to the officers’ authority “to control the scene,” as the Court put it again on Monday in further expanding that power.
That expansion has been based, in large part, on the Court’s concern that there is a considerable risk that any traffic stop could quickly escalate into “a violent encounter,” because more crime may actually be afoot than merely a violation of traffic laws, and driver or passengers may want to prevent its detection. That was the rationale the Court used again in deciding Arizona v. Johnson (07-1122).
With fewer than four full pages of analysis in a nine-page opinion, the Court decided that police may order a passenger out of a stopped vehicle, and then conduct a “pat-down search” (a frisk) if they have reason to believe that the rider may be armed and dangerous. (In this particular, it was assumed that the officer involved had such a reason, but that could be tested when the case returns to Arizona state courts.)
The case involved a gang patrol by officers who were checking out a suspect neighborhood in Tucson. When a car passed, one officer ran a check on the license plate, and discovered that the insurance on that vehicle had been suspended. So, while there was no suspicion of any other crime, the officers stopped the vehicle. Officer Maria Trevizo engaged the back-seat passenger, Lemon Montrea Johnson, in conversation, and began talking with him after noticing he was wearing what she considered to be something of a gang emblem, a blue bandanna.
She learned he was from the town of Eloy, the site of prominent gang activity, and that he had done time on a burglary conviction. She ordered him out of the car, and frisked him, finding a gun located near his waist. She then handcuffed him. He was charged with illegal gun possession (among other offenses), and was convicted on that charge. An Arizona appeals court threw out the conviction, finding that Officer Trevizo had no right to pat-down passenger Johnson, since she had no reason to believe he had committed any crime.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ran over the Court’s past precedents dating back to Terry v. Ohio in 1968, and concluded that the “combined thrust” of the past rulings was that officers who conduct routine traffic stops may perform a frisk of a driver and any passenger if they had “reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” The opinion then went on to conclude that the principle would now be made clear cut Fourth Amendment law.
If the traffic stop is not unduly prolonged by search activity following the initial stop, the opinion said, it has not been concluded for Fourth Amendment purposes until the police have completed exercising control of the scene — including a frisk when they believe someone in the vehicle may be armed and dangerous.