The Box Method

[Blackhawk 6]

Redhat,
Interesting read, though I always take COL Hackworth's articles with a grain of salt. None of the formations mentioned are in use currently and at present rifle companies have 3 platoons.

I would much prefer the double column formation to the wedge formation outlined in the article were I forced to choose between the two.

My only issue was with the reaction to the L-shaped ambush. I would not push the trail platoon of my left column deeper into the killzone in order to come on line. Instead I would have the platoon come on line to the left, moving it out of the killzone (perhaps only partially) and positioning it for a possible envelopment.

Vern,

I am still curious as to how you controlled rates of fire/methods of engagement using the box method.

 

[AhmuqGB]

It seems like it would make more sense to put the lead platoon in a wedge to cover a broader front to eliminate the need for scouts in the two follow on platoons. This would also ensure that if contact was made to the front there would be just 1 platoon in contact making C2 much easier and allowing the ompany commander a few seconds to assess the situation as his lead platoon leader develops the situation. I would agree that platoons in column coompany in wedge does not offer many advantages though. I'm more used to seeing it the other way around. I'm a big fan of making contact with smallest element possible and maintaining options. Not saying 2 up in a double column is bad, it gives you a devastating amount of Firepower up front. but when you make contact you're commited. 2/3rds of your maneuver forces are commited. As for the ambush part, I agree with BH6 on that, it doesn't make sense to send an element diagonally across and deeper into the KZ verses swinging to the left and maybe getting hold of and rolling the flank of the ambush line(sory for the non-doctrinal terminology BH6.)

 

[Vern Humphrey]

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What if the squad comes in contact with a three man element? It does not take a platoon to attack 3 men.
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Tactics which assume everything will go your way are called "fragile tactics." In combat, you realise you don't KNOW how many enemy you are in contact with -- what you THINK is three men may well be a dozen or more. You must therefore use robust tactics -- tactics designed to cope with averse conditions.

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The two fire team squad is a combat proven maneuver element.
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Proven not as flexible as a three fire team maneuver element.

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I am still curious as to how you controlled rates of fire/methods of engagement using the box method.
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Methods are simple -- you either work the box, or concentrate on point targets, and the tracer system allows you to do that. "Rates of fire" are more of a table-top tactic than a field tactic. There's no real advantage to firing especially fast, for example, if you have no targets. If you do have targets, you don't need to tell people to engage then quickly.

 

[Texian Pistolero]

At the risk of changing the subject, there has been universal derision of IOBC (infantry officer basic), as being a BIG waste of time. I went through in 1974, and was really frustrated with how often I was taught "familiarization", which was sit in the bleachers and watch a sergeant blow something up.

What brings this to mind is the author of "This Man's Army", said the same thing.

So this has been true for decades.

Why can't IOBC be made much better?

Turn it into a slightly reduced form of Ranger School.

Have a professional reading list that is drawn totally outside Dod,

Biography of Chesty Puller
Warfighting (by Marine Commandant Al Grey)
To Hell and Back
(dozens more)


as somebody once asked, why does the Army take something intrinsically interesting, like war, and make it boring?

Not to flame, but my question is valid.

I would have much preferred to lean a FEW thing very well, instead of a lot od stuff half a**ed.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

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At the risk of changing the subject, there has been universal derision of IOBC (infantry officer basic), as being a BIG waste of time. I went through in 1974,
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IOBC and IOAC have been improved, as has Basic and OSUT. But there remains a "service school mentality" - as if the word "school" tends to force people into a classroom mentality.

There is an enormous amount of table-topping in the service schools, when facilities like the National Training Center offer so much near-combat experience, and we don't take advantage of them.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is another beef -- there is no real system to take lessons learned, put them in Field Manuals, and update training publications and service schools in a systematic manner.

 

[Blackhawk 6]

Tactics which assume everything will go your way are called "fragile tactics." In combat, you realise you don't KNOW how many enemy you are in contact with -- what you THINK is three men may well be a dozen or more. You must therefore use robust tactics -- tactics designed to cope with averse conditions.

Following that logic a platoon-leader could not "assume" the enemy force was of a size his platoon would be capable of maneuvering against. The same logic would then dictate a company commander not maneuver against the element for fear it may be too large as well.

There is a reason we make contact with the smallest element possible and exercise tactical patience. However, at some point a leader needs to assess the size and composition of the enemy force he is facing in order to be able begin issueing commands. That is his job. If not, we would have divisions maneuvering against a three-man element.

As it relates to a squad's ability to maneuver, I pose the same question worded slightly differently. A squad comes in contact with what the squad leader believes to be a three-man element. Are you really saying we need to commit an entire platoon to the attack?

Proven not as flexible as a three fire team maneuver element.

Perhaps, but still proven as a viable maneuver element.

Methods are simple -- you either work the box, or concentrate on point targets, and the tracer system allows you to do that. "Rates of fire" are more of a table-top tactic than a field tactic. There's no real advantage to firing especially fast, for example, if you have no targets. If you do have targets, you don't need to tell people to engage then quickly.

Perhaps you and I are using different terminology. When I refered to methods of engagement I meant the class of fire with respect to the weapon for the machinegun. When I referred to rates of fire I meant the doctrinal rate of fire. Of particular interest is how you would transition from one class or rate of fire to another as is frequently required during a hasty attack.

 

[Blackhawk 6]

Turn it into a slightly reduced form of Ranger School.

While it sounds good in theory, it is much worse in practice. We are fortunately moving away from IOBC being focused on preparing lieutentants focusing for Ranger School and focusing instead on preparing them to lead platoons. The quality of platoon leaders arriving at units was horrible prior to the shift.

The two courses have much in common, but both fufill a purpose. IOBC lays the foundation upon which additional training, either at the unit or in Ranger School, can be conducted. At present, about 50% of IOBC is conducted in the field.

Unfortunately most lieutenant's don't know what they don't know. I have had the "pleasure" of watching a number of senior lieutenants and junior captains fail to apply basic principles/knowledge taught in the basic course. The best comments regarding the success or failure of IOBC continue to come from, not the graduates of the courses, but from their commanders in the field. Likewise for ICCC (IOAC).

There is an enormous amount of table-topping in the service schools, when facilities like the National Training Center offer so much near-combat experience, and we don't take advantage of them.

The CTC's see plenty of business. Prior to the recent hostilities, units rotated to the CTC's on a regular basis. Most, if not all, battalion commanders received at least one rotation and it was not uncommon for Company Commanders and Platoon Leaders to have multiple rotations. When the war in Iraq began, there was a slight decline but CTC rotations are now an intrinsic part of units' preparations for deployments to Iraq/Afghanistan. Case in point, 3 BDE/ 3 ID just returned from an NTC rotation in preparation for a pending deployment to Iraq, having previously spent 14 monthes in the AOR and having returned only a year ago.

As to CALL and the ability to integrate lessons learned into doctrinal pulications, you'll get no arguement from me.

 

[AhmuqGB]

facilities like the National Training Center offer so much near-combat experience

I've had three rotations to CTCs and as many in combat and NTCs are far from replicating the experience. CTCs do provide some valuable experience, but they fail to replicate some fairly critical elements present in combat. If I had to choose a type of training as most closely replicating combat simunitions would be my first choice.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is another beef -- there is no real system to take lessons learned, put them in Field Manuals, and update training publications and service schools in a systematic manner.

While I agree with that comment, I have a fear that we may go too far with incorporating techniques into doctrine and make it too situationally dependent. CALL is working hard to keep pace with the huge influx of lessons learned from OIF and OEF and getting out to the doctrine writers, school houses, and most importantly the units deploying into theater. An example of changing too fast I believe is the incorporation of the Contemporary Operating Environment into training prior to fully developing what we need it to accomplish at the tactical. I'll get off my CALL soap box though. I agree Vern, but I would highlight/underline/bold/italicize the Systematic manner part of your comment. Not sure if we are working on the system or just using the firehose technique.

 

[Texian Pistolero]

Thanks for all comments re IOBC. I went through exactly 30 years ago. Hope things are better.


I would suggest going through all lesson plans. If you find the word "familiarization", either make it real or cut it out all together.

 

[Blackhawk 6]

Unfortunately, approval for modifications to the lesson plans occurs at echelons above reality. I am sure you know the drill. "Forward your recommendation and we'll staff it. If we think it has merit we'll forwarded it where it will be staffed...." That said, there are a group of dedicated instructors making every effort to ensure the lieutenants recieve the information they need to be successful platoon leaders in combat despite constraints.

By way of coincidence, I was just approached to be a guest instructor for an IOBC class on fire control measures. Go figure.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

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Following that logic a platoon-leader could not "assume" the enemy force was of a size his platoon would be capable of maneuvering against. The same logic would then dictate a company commander not maneuver against the element for fear it may be too large as well.
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That's table-top tactics. In the real world, tactical decisions are event-oriented, not theory-oriented. The key to undertanding robust tactics is to realize that combat involves dealing with unstructured problems with incomplete information.

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I've had three rotations to CTCs and as many in combat and NTCs are far from replicating the experience. CTCs do provide some valuable experience, but they fail to replicate some fairly critical elements present in combat. If I had to choose a type of training as most closely replicating combat simunitions would be my first choice.
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It depends on the level of operations -- for larger units, the NTC is head-and-shoulders above anything we've ever head, particularly in the integration of all arms. For live fire, Shugart-Gordon is pretty good.

In terms of analyzing the disparity in tank-killing systems between US and potential enemies, or understading the reconnaissance battle, the NTC has been invaluable.

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While I agree with that comment, I have a fear that we may go too far with incorporating techniques into doctrine and make it too situationally dependent.
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A valid issue -- I tend to come down on the side of "use real-world examples." Otherwise, we have nothing to go on by the imagination of the guy writing the field manual -- who is often a junior officer whose main job is to be a classroom instructor, and who has little training in the identification and use of all the information available. Writing doctrine is a big job, not one that is assigned as an additional duty.

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CALL is working hard to keep pace with the huge influx of lessons learned from OIF and OEF and getting out to the doctrine writers, school houses, and most importantly the units deploying into theater. An example of changing too fast I believe is the incorporation of the Contemporary Operating Environment into training prior to fully developing what we need it to accomplish at the tactical. I'll get off my CALL soap box though. I agree Vern, but I would highlight/underline/bold/italicize the Systematic manner part of your comment. Not sure if we are working on the system or just using the firehose technique.
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The way to get past the firehose technique is to systematize the process. CALL gets a huge amount of information, which should be processed, analyzed and prioritized, and then fast-tracked as appropriate into training and doctrine publications. All too often, however, it isn't. Instean, they put out the same huge amount of information, barely processed, often in forms that wind up in File 13.

 

[AhmuqGB]

It depends on the level of operations -- for larger units, the NTC is head-and-shoulders above anything we've ever head, particularly in the integration of all arms. For live fire, Shugart-Gordon is pretty good.

Shugart-Gordon does not allow live fire training. At best Regiment and SF can conduct simmunition training, but most conventional units only execute training there with MILES.

In terms of analyzing the disparity in tank-killing systems between US and potential enemies, or understading the reconnaissance battle, the NTC has been invaluable.

I have to raise the BS flag on that one. Unless they have changed the NTC and other CTCs in the past 3 years, there is a huge disparity in the actual tank killing capabilities of US systems and those replecated at the CTC. I've seen M1s in action, and I can outright say a T-72 can NOT kill an M1 Abrams tank with a frontal shot with Sabot or any other round. If you went with the CTCs the T72s perform on par with the Abrams. Even desert storm showed the capabilities of the M1 against T-72/T80s where Companies in the offense were destroying Battalions of T-72s in the defense. CTCs make the opfor unrealisticly equal to provide a training challenge to the tankers and mechanized infantry soldiers.

That's table-top tactics. In the real world, tactical decisions are event-oriented, not theory-oriented. The key to undertanding robust tactics is to realize that combat involves dealing with unstructured problems with incomplete information

I think BH6 has a valid point and question though. Squads can maneuver with their fire teams, it's called a squad attack and it is a battle drill. That's not-table top tactics, it is used every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. One team provides a base of fire and the other maneuvers. Lastly, to thing that theory plays no part in decision making is a little off. If we look at Doctrine as the "theory", theory is used to make up for experience. 2LTs have no experience base to help them in tactical decesions. After gaining Experience they rely more on that and become faster at tactical decision making, but the theory still remains as the basis of their decisions.

 

[Blackhawk 6]

CTCs make the opfor unrealisticly equal to provide a training challenge to the tankers and mechanized infantry soldiers.

CTC's are great a training large units in maneuver. They barely scratch the surface in terms of the other battlefield operating systems.

After gaining Experience they rely more on that and become faster at tactical decision making, but the theory still remains as the basis of their decisions.

Excellent point. As I stated earlier, doctrine provides the guidelines for execution. It is experience that dictates how the doctrine is applied. If doctrine did not matter, we would not have War Colleges. It is appropriate for leaders, both NCO and Officer, to periodically revisit doctrine to help focus their experience.

Of course, if you lack a fundamental knowledge of doctrine, it stands to reason that you would think that experience is all that matters.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

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I have to raise the BS flag on that one. Unless they have changed the NTC and other CTCs in the past 3 years, there is a huge disparity in the actual tank killing capabilities of US systems and those replecated at the CTC. I've seen M1s in action, and I can outright say a T-72 can NOT kill an M1 Abrams tank with a frontal shot with Sabot or any other round.
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You are correct that at the CTCs, our forces fight a far more capable enemy than we would ever face in the real world. It's not just equipment -- it's also the level of training and proficiency of the OPFOR and the political situation (the OPFOR can and does use WMD.) That's not an especially bad thing, though, since it exaggerates the impact of poor tactics and makes it easier to determine what works and what doesn't.

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Shugart-Gordon does not allow live fire training. At best Regiment and SF can conduct simmunition training, but most conventional units only execute training there with MILES.
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The last time I was there Shugart-Gordon used live fire -- but I'm not sure what you mean by simmunition. Plastic cases and projectiles were used extensively, and would kill at close range, if you accidently shot someone. There were several different brands -- including one for the .50s. On one of my trips, an O/C was shot in the wrist from about a hundred yards away, and the bullet penetrated, was deflected by the bone, and traveled almost up to the elbow.

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I think BH6 has a valid point and question though. Squads can maneuver with their fire teams, it's called a squad attack and it is a battle drill. That's not-table top tactics, it is used every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. One team provides a base of fire and the other maneuvers. Lastly, to thing that theory plays no part in decision making is a little off. If we look at Doctrine as the "theory", theory is used to make up for experience. 2LTs have no experience base to help them in tactical decesions. After gaining Experience they rely more on that and become faster at tactical decision making, but the theory still remains as the basis of their decisions.
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Excellent points. When it comes to two versus three fireteams, my frame of reference is overall effectiveness, under a broad range of conditions. Under some conditions, two men can fight effectively -- under others, it takes a battalion. The point is, at some degree of intensity, the two fireteam squad begins to be disadvantaged.

When we speak of theory, theory should be experienced based. All tactical doctrine should be based on a scenario. One of the major shortcomings I have found in analysis is failure to document the scenario being used -- so that it subtly changes during the analysis to deal with problems that arise (rather than changing the tactical approach to solve the problem.)

The best scenarios should be actual combat actions -- because that places the scenario beyond the analysts' control, and forces them to deal with problems in a realistic manner.

 

[Double Naught Spy]

Vern, I am a little confused on a lot of the issues of your box method.

Using your parameters that you are under fire from an ambush and everyone had taken cover and the situation is chaotic. The enemy is under cover and not likely to be readily seen. Okay got it.

Now you start your visual search and determine the enemy isn't in the area in front that is beween you and where you think the enemy is. None there. Got it.

You look higher and see another area where the enemy can't be, the sky. Sure enough and probably not, the enemy isn't likely in the sky, but since you know that already, why waste time looking at the sky? Of course, the other notion is that some of the enemy is up in the sky, or at least in the canopy of the forest. Heck, you may not even be able to see much sky in the jungle and the US forces in the Pacific during WWII had some real problems with arboreal shooters.

So, if the enemy is so hard to see, then how do you know he isn't in the trees?

Now you suggest controlled fire covering all aspects of your box in a systematic manner. Cool. But you are under fire and the situation is chaotic, just how are you going to coordinate your box with the boxes of those on either side of you? Just how do you go about systematically shooting your box when you are being fired on?

You suggest shooting low, that a low shot will still ricochet into the box. Well if you know where the box is, why the heck are you shooting low and trying to skip ricochet rounds into the box. Why not just shoot directly? You cannot count on rounds to ricochet off the ground in a desired manner and on dirt, many of your low shots are just going to bury themselves. You are wasting ammo.

I fail to understand the whole business about the squad leader concentrating fire in one area where he believes there is a target and everyone is supposed to concentrate fire on that location, obviously meaning that many of the good guys are then giving up taking care of their own boxes. This seems awfully foolish that you would want people to drop their area of responsibility to simply all focus on one point. That leaves your flanks or other boxes wide open. Not only that, as everyone focusses on that one point, they lose situational awareness of their own boxes.

I was also completely lost on your statement that your box is rarely more than three front sights high. Well, obviously that is going to depend on the distance to the enemy. My estimate is that what you are saying is that the enemy is going to be more than 50 yards away and on level ground. As noted, the enemy may be in the trees. Also, on uneven terrain, the front sight estimate goes right out the window.

You are right that theory should be experience-based, but even experience-based theory can be limited and way overly simplified.

 

[Vern Humphrey]

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Using your parameters that you are under fire from an ambush and everyone had taken cover and the situation is chaotic. The enemy is under cover and not likely to be readily seen. Okay got it.
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Not quite -- if you were ambushed, you'd already be dead. (One of my pet peeves is using the word "ambush" to refer to any sudden contact.)

Most firefights develop from unexpected collisions with the enemy, and people take cover when this happens -- both you and the enemy. People who can be seen by the other side, die. So within seconds of the first shots, everyone still alive is under cover.

Now, there are other situations where this works -- such as in an attack, where you are the base of fire (and the enemy, of course, is under cover.)

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the enemy isn't likely in the sky, but since you know that already, why waste time looking at the sky?
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You are looking up to locate the line where the enemy isn't -- not necessarily the sky. Try simply taking cover in virtually any non-urban environment, and you will see what I mean. Typically, the two lines are about 3 front sights apart.

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So, if the enemy is so hard to see, then how do you know he isn't in the trees?
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He might be (but not likely). Remember, you can also use mortars and artillery, and people who are high above the ground don't survive when that happens. I have to say, I have never personally known of an enemy to be found in a tree during a firefight.

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Now you suggest controlled fire covering all aspects of your box in a systematic manner. Cool. But you are under fire and the situation is chaotic, just how are you going to coordinate your box with the boxes of those on either side of you?
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By observation. That's why the zig zag is so important -- you can tell if it's your sector or not when it is fired. Leaders can re-shoot the zig zag to get overlapping fire.

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Just how do you go about systematically shooting your box when you are being fired on?
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You bring order out of chaos by leading and providing you men with tasks. That's what this system does -- by shooting the zig-zag and by controlling concentrated fire and machineguns, you provide leadership and tasking. You get methodical fire through training and leadership -- and through winning. The more methodical your fire, the more effective it is, and the less effective the enemy.

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You suggest shooting low, that a low shot will still ricochet into the box. Well if you know where the box is, why the heck are you shooting low and trying to skip ricochet rounds into the box. Why not just shoot directly?
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You train men to shoot low for the benefit of the leaders. You train the leaders to watch for low shots. The reason is, if you see NO low shots, you know your people are shooting high. And it's better to shoot too low than too high.

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I fail to understand the whole business about the squad leader concentrating fire in one area where he believes there is a target and everyone is supposed to concentrate fire on that location, obviously meaning that many of the good guys are then giving up taking care of their own boxes.
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A bird in hand is worth two in the bush. If there are NO identified targets, and your suddenly spot one, you can be sure of getting at least one kill by doing this. What happens is a target is detected, overwhelmed by a flurry of fire, and the troops are signaled to go back to shooting the box by the zig-zag. It also allows you to concentrate fire on dangerous or high-payoff targets -- like a machine gun, or an officer.

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I was also completely lost on your statement that your box is rarely more than three front sights high. Well, obviously that is going to depend on the distance to the enemy. My estimate is that what you are saying is that the enemy is going to be more than 50 yards away and on level ground. As noted, the enemy may be in the trees. Also, on uneven terrain, the front sight estimate goes right out the window.
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Try it and see -- take up a very low position, as if you were under fire, in a non-urban environment, and see how high the box is.

Now, of course you could be facing an opponent with some troops at the base of a hill, and the rest near the crest -- but in most firefigjhts, the target box will be very shallow.