On Nov. 15, oral arguments were heard on the Heller II case. The very next day, a per curiam order came from the panel, which asked the parties:
(1) After the Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-201.01–1-207.71 (2001)), do gun laws passed by the District of Columbia Council have to be “usual and reasonable” within the meaning of the federal Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-401, which is currently codified at D.C. Code § 1-303.43? Cf. McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 749-54 (D.C. 1978); Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C. v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Maryland & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 125-29 & 125 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fulton v. District of Columbia, 2 App. D.C. 431, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1894).
Answer 1: Yes. The laws must be "usual and reasonable."
(2) What does the term “usual” mean in this statute? Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Firemen’s Ins. Co., 483 F.2d at 1327-28; Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969); Filippo v. Real Estate Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268 (D.C. 1966); Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) (defining usual to mean “ordinary” or “customary”). Is the canon of constitutional avoidance relevant to that question? Cf. Fulton, 2 App. D.C. at 438-39.
Answer 2: The term “usual” refers to regulations that are “common or ordinary,” such as exist generally in state and federal law.
(3) Are the challenged D.C. laws “usual” within the meaning of this statute?
Answer 3: No.
(4) Does the D.C. Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the congressionally enacted Act of June 30, 1906, or of similarly worded federal statutes, receive deference from the federal courts? Cf. Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If so, under what circumstances?[/quote]
Answer 4: No. The Federal Courts owe no deference to the D.C. Court of Appeals.
The answers above, are taken directly from Stephan Halbrooks supplemental brief.
From the questions above, it appears that the panel is seeking a statutory solution thereby avoiding a constitutional question (Theory of Constitutional Avoidance).
If the case is decided upon statutory grounds (as it looks like it might), it will be of little importance to all the other cases.
To directly answer the OP's question, there is no single case currently pending, that will do what we want. Taken together, they will help to clarify the bounds (scope) of the 2A rights.
