No scrutiny level specified in the Heller decision.
More lawsuits. Yay! (sarcasm)
More lawsuits. Yay! (sarcasm)
JUSTICE BREYER moves on to make a broad jurisprudential
point: He criticizes us for declining to establish a level
of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions.
He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally
expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis), but rather a judge-empowering “interestbalancing
inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens
a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests.”...
...since this case represents this
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,
one should not expect it to clarify the entire field,
any more than Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145
(1879), our first in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left
that area in a state of utter certainty. And there will be
time enough to expound upon the historical justifications
for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those
exceptions come before us.