The more I think about this decision, the more apparent a couple of things becomes. Before I get into those, I want to briefly touch on the historical constitutional standards. Depending on which constitutional right is being addressed, there are three basic, established constitutional standards of review. Here they are, boiled down to my perception of them:
First, rational basis -- If there's any rational basis for a law, it will be upheld. -- AKA: Gov't wins.
Second, intermediate scrutiny -- A law must be substantially related to an important gov't interest -- AKA: Gov't usually wins, but it's a closer call.
Third, strict scrutiny -- A law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov't interest -- AKA: Plaintiff usually wins.
It's important to note that in all of the scenarios listed above, the burden remains at all times with the Plaintiff to show that a law is unconstitutional. It's just easier under strict scrutiny than under the other two. Now, on to a couple of other things:
First, this text:
"We reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” Bruen, p. 15 (internal citations omitted)
I'll freely admit that I was one of the ones hoping to get a ruling stating that strict scrutiny was required in 2A challenges. I didn't get that, and I'll reserve judgment until I've seen how this shakes out. With that said, the standard we've got looks awfully good at first blush. We've gone from the "2A Two-step," which: (a) the burden remained with the Plaintiff; and (b) courts in restrictive jxs were freely using to justify all manner of restrictions, to a framework in which the
government must justify its restriction, if the Plaintiff can show that his or her conduct falls under the 'plain text' of the 2A. That looks a bit like shifting the burden off the Plaintiff to me.
Second, footnote 9:
"That said, because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry." Bruen, p. 30.
That looks an awful lot like a flag that SCOTUS is open to other 2A challenges.