5.56 and support weapons

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Readyrod

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This is not a caliber war question, I'm interested in the support weapons. I always figured that the 5.56 was effective as part of a system that includes machine guns, etc. Does anyone have any good thoughts/stories about how or when the support weapons are used?
 
The support weapon of the 5.56 rifle/ carbine and light machine gun (M-16/M-4 and M-249 respectively) are typically artillery and air strikes.

Tactic: Use the small arms to hem in an opponent, then turn the building he's hiding in to rubble with arty and air strikes. :D

Other support weapons include the M-240 (.308 medium machine gun) and the Browning M-2 (.50 BMG). Some units will also employ the Mk19 (Fulla uto belt fed 40mm grenade launcher), but all generally use a similar tactic.
 
Support weapons do one of two things

1) Fix the enemy in place to allow troops to maneuver
2) Kill the enemy

In WW2 the US Army went with #1, the .30 cal M1919 MG had a low rate of fire and high dispersion. It was outstanding at keeping the enemies head down, but against a single point target it didn't work all that well. The BAR had a very small magazine that either made it a magazine fed rifle, or a really crappy LMG. US doctrine emphasized using supporting weapons (MG's, mortars, etc) to pin the enemy to allow the rifleman to maneuver to their flank and kill them with aimed rifle fire.

Germany on the other hand believed their support weapons were for #2 the MG34 and MG42 were both very accurate for a MG. The MG42's extremely high rate of fire ensured target area saturation, making them very effective killers. The high rate of fire and low dispersion however made them relatively ineffective at pinning a large unit in place, as ammo was soon exhausted and the beaten zone was small. German doctrine during WW2 was to emplace the MG's in the most advantageous position and use the rest of the rifle squad to prevent enemy troops from closing to destroy it. The support weapon in a German platoon was actually the rifle.

The US military over the years has continued to go with #1 as their method of usage. Squad level machine guns are not designed to be definitive man killers (regardless of folks putting optics on them), that is reserved for the rifleman up close. Doctrine has evolved in our current conflict to use the supporting arms to pin the enemy to allow troops to maneuver AWAY from the enemy so we can drop a JDAM on them. With our complete air superiority it makes sense to do things this way.

In more isolated circumstances, I think the current trend in the US military to load down the individual solider works against the usage of supporting weapons to fix the enemy. It's very difficult (and down right exhausting) to out maneuver a lightly equipped enemy, even when they are only foot mobile, when we're forced to do it on foot. If we're going to have troops haul that much gear and be relatively unmaneuverable, our current support weapon systems should transition to being the primary killers. Otherwise we should lighten our troops load to again give them the tactical mobility they need to do the job effectively.

-Jenrick
 
"Doctrine has evolved in our current conflict to use the supporting arms to pin the enemy to allow troops to maneuver AWAY from the enemy so we can drop a JDAM on them. With our complete air superiority it makes sense to do things this way. "

Sending a $150 million dollar aircraft to drop a $68 thousand dollar missile on $40 dollars worth of terrorist doesn't make monetary sense but it saves lives so...........(Shrug)
 
Jenrick that is a decent overview.

The current strategy employed is one where the soldiers are more or less bait, and when someone tries to attack that bait they get pinned down and then killed by artillery or air support.
This poses less risk to the soldier and keeps casualties down.

It does however requires control of the skies and would be very different facing a more advanced enemy that had good MANPADs spread throughout the region that they could shoot at aircraft as it headed towards the target area (like could be the case in Iran.)
This is one of the large differences in the US invasion of Afghanistan compared to the Soviet Invasion a few decades ago.
The US was providing SAMs to the insurgents that made air superiority a lot less useful to the Soviet occupiers.
They would set up ambushes for Soviet jets and especially helicopters, and as they approached a target and passed over insurgents on the way those insurgents would shoot them down. So the aircraft was shot down long before it had allowed itself within range of the target area.
Since heavy armor is nearly impossible to use in the rugged mountain environments, when the benefits of air superiority are largely lost as well it pits infantry and light vehicles against insurgents.


A population with widespread SAMs spread about and not contained in easily destroyed or seized armories, would be very difficult to use the current strategy on.
In such a scenario the troops would likely become lighter and more maneuverable and need to close on the enemy and kill them more frequently.
This would certainly result in more casualties, because while the US soldiers may be a better fighting force, small arms vs small arms would result in ratio of casualties much greater.
 
Sending a $150 million dollar aircraft to drop a $68 thousand dollar missile on $40 dollars worth of terrorist doesn't make monetary sense but it saves lives so...........(Shrug)

Factor in the $400K the government loses for every KIA covered by SGLI and estimated lifetime medical costs for anyone maimed in same action. Then add in the cost of losing and replacing trained personnel and increased recruiting costs the bloodier your volunteer-staffed war is, etc.

At a certain point in the equation there is a tipping point where an hours' worth of the multi-decade life cycle of the $150 million dollar aircraft to deliver the $68K ordnance to kill a couple bad guys armed with an AK and a flintlock musket actually does make economic sense.

This is one of the large differences in the US invasion of Afghanistan compared to the Soviet Invasion a few decades ago.
The US was providing SAMs to the insurgents that made air superiority a lot less useful to the Soviet occupiers.
They would set up ambushes for Soviet jets and especially helicopters, and as they approached a target and passed over insurgents on the way those insurgents would shoot them down. So the aircraft was shot down long before it had allowed itself within range of the target area.

SAMs were only a consideration late in the war. Earlier on the Soviets had the same ownership of the airspace. Their inability to win in Afghanistan was due to a laundry list of problems and issues, with limited enemy air defense capability being only a very small part of the story.
 
The SAW m 249 is useful due to it's ability to be carried in most any situation that an M4 would. A heavier cartridge would add significantly to the weight of a full combat load. The addition of a short stock and snub barrel makes it suited to the kind of urban combat we CURRENTLY engage in. We dont follow the doctrine you guys are talking about in most areas.

Frequent jams are an issue with it due to it chewing up the soft 5.56 brass. They were talking about producing a harder round to help with that but i dont know if it ever happened.
 
I can say after two deployments as a SAW gunner, you can do alot more than "suppress" the enemy with it. Also, with the full length barrel you can accurately put rounds into a person sized target at 600m. As far as jamming, I only experienced 1 severe jam that required more than a second to remedy, and I rarely had jams at all (mostly an issue after
running blanks without getting a real good cleaning afterwards or crappy mags). Cleaning was a major part of keeping it going, just like the M4s. Since I primarily did mounted operations last deployment like convoy escort and MSR patrols, I used a short barrel, collapsable stock, no bipod, iron sights and a front grip. I kept a 100rnd soft drum on it, plus 3 more attached to my vest, along with 6 30rnd mags on a thigh rig. I also had another 2-4 200rnd drums in the vehicle. I ran this setup so I can quickly dismount and provide covering fire and then easily maneuver with my team. Also at one point we did some exercises in which the SAW gunners were point man such as trench/cave clearing and clearing houses. I honestly prefered it over a carbine at times. Granted, when I was going to chow I'd sometimes jack my room mates M4 but for the most part I loved my SAW. I dont foresee the military doing away with it anytime, at least I see no reason to.

-Eric
 
That's cool nortexeric. Anyone have any stories about grenade launchers. I just read Generation Kill and it was a good read. I read roughly the same story a while ago by one of the officers there and it was good too. They mention the support weapons a lot. thats kinda what got me interested.
 
I read roughly the same story a while ago by one of the officers there and it was good too.
Kaboom, by Matt Gallagher perhaps? BullfrogKen and I met him and heard him speak at the Army Heritage Center a few months back.
 
Some observations from fairly recent combat in built up urban environments...

5.56 is fairly effective at suppression, but in an urban environment does not kill the enemy. 7.62 and even 25mm and 40mm HE are ineffective at this as well. They simply do not penetrate enough to effectively kill enemy hiding deep in masonry buildings, or firing down alleyways with 3 blocks worth of buildings as cover. The most effective weapon to both suppress and kill the enemy is the M2 .50 cal and 120mm cannon.

Traditional maneuver doctrine doesn't work well either. It is difficult for a largely mounted force to flank a light infantry in a dense urban environment, and it is a favorite tactic of the insurgency to force a dismount with a small arms/RPG ambush and emplace anti-personnel IEDs to catch the dismounts as they try to maneuver.

Likewise, fixing the enemy with small arms and destroying them with standoff munitions such as JDAMs and artillery is also problematic. Collateral damage is a serious concern in a built up enviroment, especially in the modern "3 block" war.

The most effective technique is to identify and fix with 5.56 and 7.62, while bringing embedded .50 cal, 120mm and Hellfires to bear to penetrate and kill the target with minimal collateral.

Again, this only applies to dense urban environments, different techniques work better when fighting in the woods, the desert, or the mountains. I focus on the urban environment because that is where the bulk of my experience and training lies.
 
Sending a $150 million dollar aircraft to drop a $68 thousand dollar missile on $40 dollars worth of terrorist doesn't make monetary sense but it saves lives so...........(Shrug)

How much damage can a $40 terrorist do left unmolested? Rhetorical question. Either drop $68k on them or send your uncle, brother, husband, wife, son, daughter in to go get them.

Still a waste of money?
 
Support weapons do one of two things

1) Fix the enemy in place to allow troops to maneuver
2) Kill the enemy

In WW2 the US Army went with #1, the .30 cal M1919 MG had a low rate of fire and high dispersion. It was outstanding at keeping the enemies head down, but against a single point target it didn't work all that well. The BAR had a very small magazine that either made it a magazine fed rifle, or a really crappy LMG. US doctrine emphasized using supporting weapons (MG's, mortars, etc) to pin the enemy to allow the rifleman to maneuver to their flank and kill them with aimed rifle fire.

Germany on the other hand believed their support weapons were for #2 the MG34 and MG42 were both very accurate for a MG. The MG42's extremely high rate of fire ensured target area saturation, making them very effective killers. The high rate of fire and low dispersion however made them relatively ineffective at pinning a large unit in place, as ammo was soon exhausted and the beaten zone was small. German doctrine during WW2 was to emplace the MG's in the most advantageous position and use the rest of the rifle squad to prevent enemy troops from closing to destroy it. The support weapon in a German platoon was actually the rifle.

The US military over the years has continued to go with #1 as their method of usage. Squad level machine guns are not designed to be definitive man killers (regardless of folks putting optics on them), that is reserved for the rifleman up close. Doctrine has evolved in our current conflict to use the supporting arms to pin the enemy to allow troops to maneuver AWAY from the enemy so we can drop a JDAM on them. With our complete air superiority it makes sense to do things this way.

In more isolated circumstances, I think the current trend in the US military to load down the individual solider works against the usage of supporting weapons to fix the enemy. It's very difficult (and down right exhausting) to out maneuver a lightly equipped enemy, even when they are only foot mobile, when we're forced to do it on foot. If we're going to have troops haul that much gear and be relatively unmaneuverable, our current support weapon systems should transition to being the primary killers. Otherwise we should lighten our troops load to again give them the tactical mobility they need to do the job effectively.

-Jenrick
Quoted for being a fantastic post.
 
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