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Defense Today
February 1, 2006
Pg. 1
Designing Small Destroyer Would Cost Years, Billions Of Loss
By Dave Ahearn
Designing a new, much smaller destroyer would cost the Navy at least part of its $7.5 billion investment in developing the cutting-edge DD(X) destroyer that now is poised for construction, and also would mean five years or so in designing and developing what would be a far lesser warship, a key admiral said in an interview.
Rear Adm. Mark Buzby, deputy director for surface warfare, said the resultant ship wouldn't provide the Navy with many capabilities it requires to counter the current and clearly foreseeable threat environment.
Further, the salient point here is that the Navy may not have the luxury of years to design another destroyer, he said.
While he declined to respond to a question specifically citing the threat of China and its 700-plus radar-guided missiles aimed at waters near Taiwan, an island the Navy might have to defend from a Chinese invasion, he did say the DD(X) would be vital to meet the sort of threat posed by a near-peer competitor nation.
China is amidst an enormous military buildup, purchasing or producing advanced destroyers, aircraft and super-quiet submarines. The Chinese navy in the next decade is on track to become larger than the U.S. Navy.
The DD(X) destroyer would be a stealthy ship, showing up on enemy radar screens as a small commercial vessel.
Buzby's comments come as some military analysts have suggested the Navy could obtain much of the advances of the DD(X) destroyer, a 14,500-ton ship, in a vessel costing far less that would displace perhaps 9,500 tons, or a frigate size of roughly 7,000 tons or so.
But Buzby said that the DD(X) would be a 14,500-ton ship because that is what is required to provide the capabilities the Navy needs to counter clearly visible threats in the near future.
The DD(X) already has been down-sized, Buzby noted. When the Navy began conceptualizing the ship, estimates of its size ranged from 9,000 to 17,000 or 18,000 tons.
Then the Navy began jettisoning some less-needed capabilities, establishing those most critical, and worked down from 18,000 tons to a 14,500 ton weapons platform, he said
To further diminish the ship by any substantial amount would mean losing capabilities required to meet known threats, he said.
For example, a downsized ship might still have two guns (the Advanced Gun System), capable of destroying targets as much as 100 miles distant, but it might lack sufficient numbers of Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells for missiles.
The DD(X) would use VLS to provide a shield against airborne threats, both for itself and for other Navy ships.
Further, a downsized ship might not have the stealthy sloping hull and reverse-raked bow that afford the DD(X) the ability to elude enemy radar detection, he said.
As well, a smaller vessel might not have the stability in high seas of a 14,500 ton ship, a critical point in a craft intended to conduct helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle operations from its aft deck, he noted.
The next destroyer "needs the open ocean sea-keeping capabilities" of the DD(X), he said.
In moving to take out any single segment of the DD(X) during a downsizing move, that could affect the overall capability of the ship to counter the threats it must address, Buzby said.
Design and development of this futuristic ship "was not just a capricious" exercise in blithely assembling unrelated systems. Rather, "this was a fairly well thought-out" system of interrelated components working together as a unified entity, he said.
Losing Time, Money
Designing a new ship would leave a five- to-six-year gap in providing futuristic capabilities, "at a minimum," Buzby said.
Deciding at this late hour to deep-six the DD(X) design and start from scratch to plan a smaller vessel would create "a five- to six-year gap to get to where we are today" with the DD(X), ready for construction to begin, he said.
One proposal for designing a smaller destroyer would, to be sure, call for building four, or perhaps five, DD(X)s before shifting to a smaller destroyer, which by that time might be more or less fully designed.
But Buzby said the DD(X) is poised for a construction run now, having passed a critical design review in the fall, and this spring being set for a final design review and construction contract.
Further, he said, roughly $7.5 billion has been spent thus far on research and development of the new ship, and part of that investment would be lost if the DD(X) is abandoned or cut short in favor of a smaller ship.
To be sure, he added, some of the cutting-edge technology in the DD(X) program could be scavenged and incorporated in the sister ship, the future CG(X) cruiser, and in the next-generation CVN 21 aircraft carrier, such as sensors and radar suites.
The Navy, which at one time proposed building perhaps 24 to 30 DD(X)s, more recently suggested building just eight of the ships. Some lawmakers have suggested building just five, or perhaps one or two as technology demonstrators, or building no DD(X)s, moving instead to design a smaller and cheaper ship.
But the question is what would take the place of the DD(X) if another ship is to be designed and developed, and when that vessel might be available.
While Buzby declined to address the threat of China specifically, "there are capability gaps that exist today" in addressing threats posed by "a major peer competitor," he said.
In assessing the DD(X) program, "this ship helps fill that void," he said.
While the current Arleigh Burke DDG 51 Class of destroyers aren't stealthy, China possesses hundreds of radar-guided missiles. As well, North Korea and Iran also possess sophisticated missiles technology.
It is critical for the Navy to deploy ships able to counter nations with advanced military capabilities, he indicated.
Otherwise, lacking platforms with stealth and other advances, the Navy might be confronted with unpalatable choices such as foregoing a mission, altering the concept of operations as to how to fight a war, or being forced to take other difficult steps.
But should the Navy possess DD(X)s in sufficient number, then "a ship with this capability would be useful," he said.
Two Shipyards
Buzby also endorsed the rationale that Congress decided upon in mandating that DD(X)s will be built in two shipyards, widely separated geographically. General Dynamics Corp. unit Bath Iron Works shipyards is in Maine, while Northrop Grumman Corp. unit Ship Systems has yards in Louisiana and Mississippi.
When Hurricane Katrina caused substantial damage to Ship Systems yards, the storm caused no major damage to Bath Iron Works.
"Certainly strategically there is sense in not having one shipyard" be the only one capable of building surface combatants, he said.
The current plan to build DD(X)s at a pace of merely one per year might entail some extra costs, perhaps $300 million per ship, to split the work between General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, it has been estimated. Building all DD(X)s at a single yard might yield efficiencies and volume savings, according to this view.
And that argument can be made, Buzby said, noting that one might choose to have all the work performed by just one contractor to obtain more efficiencies and cost reductions.
But with the threat of storms, or terrorist attacks, or some debilitating sicknesses that might strike across a given region, "that's probably strategically wise not to limit yourself" to one yard, he said.
And the savings of using just one yard might be overstated.
For example, Bath Iron and Ship Systems, while separated by more than 1,000 miles, easily can exchange computerized blueprints for the DD(X), so that in essence it is more akin to a ship being designed in a single yard.
The key, he concluded, is to move the DD(X) program forward in a manner that spends tax dollars wisely and well, while providing capabilities required to counter enemy threats and meeting needs of warfighters, and at the same time meeting mandates of Congress.
The Navy must "come up with the most cost-effective and congressionally approved" means of providing all that, a plan that yields best value for the military and taxpayers, he said.
February 1, 2006
Pg. 1
Designing Small Destroyer Would Cost Years, Billions Of Loss
By Dave Ahearn
Designing a new, much smaller destroyer would cost the Navy at least part of its $7.5 billion investment in developing the cutting-edge DD(X) destroyer that now is poised for construction, and also would mean five years or so in designing and developing what would be a far lesser warship, a key admiral said in an interview.
Rear Adm. Mark Buzby, deputy director for surface warfare, said the resultant ship wouldn't provide the Navy with many capabilities it requires to counter the current and clearly foreseeable threat environment.
Further, the salient point here is that the Navy may not have the luxury of years to design another destroyer, he said.
While he declined to respond to a question specifically citing the threat of China and its 700-plus radar-guided missiles aimed at waters near Taiwan, an island the Navy might have to defend from a Chinese invasion, he did say the DD(X) would be vital to meet the sort of threat posed by a near-peer competitor nation.
China is amidst an enormous military buildup, purchasing or producing advanced destroyers, aircraft and super-quiet submarines. The Chinese navy in the next decade is on track to become larger than the U.S. Navy.
The DD(X) destroyer would be a stealthy ship, showing up on enemy radar screens as a small commercial vessel.
Buzby's comments come as some military analysts have suggested the Navy could obtain much of the advances of the DD(X) destroyer, a 14,500-ton ship, in a vessel costing far less that would displace perhaps 9,500 tons, or a frigate size of roughly 7,000 tons or so.
But Buzby said that the DD(X) would be a 14,500-ton ship because that is what is required to provide the capabilities the Navy needs to counter clearly visible threats in the near future.
The DD(X) already has been down-sized, Buzby noted. When the Navy began conceptualizing the ship, estimates of its size ranged from 9,000 to 17,000 or 18,000 tons.
Then the Navy began jettisoning some less-needed capabilities, establishing those most critical, and worked down from 18,000 tons to a 14,500 ton weapons platform, he said
To further diminish the ship by any substantial amount would mean losing capabilities required to meet known threats, he said.
For example, a downsized ship might still have two guns (the Advanced Gun System), capable of destroying targets as much as 100 miles distant, but it might lack sufficient numbers of Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells for missiles.
The DD(X) would use VLS to provide a shield against airborne threats, both for itself and for other Navy ships.
Further, a downsized ship might not have the stealthy sloping hull and reverse-raked bow that afford the DD(X) the ability to elude enemy radar detection, he said.
As well, a smaller vessel might not have the stability in high seas of a 14,500 ton ship, a critical point in a craft intended to conduct helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle operations from its aft deck, he noted.
The next destroyer "needs the open ocean sea-keeping capabilities" of the DD(X), he said.
In moving to take out any single segment of the DD(X) during a downsizing move, that could affect the overall capability of the ship to counter the threats it must address, Buzby said.
Design and development of this futuristic ship "was not just a capricious" exercise in blithely assembling unrelated systems. Rather, "this was a fairly well thought-out" system of interrelated components working together as a unified entity, he said.
Losing Time, Money
Designing a new ship would leave a five- to-six-year gap in providing futuristic capabilities, "at a minimum," Buzby said.
Deciding at this late hour to deep-six the DD(X) design and start from scratch to plan a smaller vessel would create "a five- to six-year gap to get to where we are today" with the DD(X), ready for construction to begin, he said.
One proposal for designing a smaller destroyer would, to be sure, call for building four, or perhaps five, DD(X)s before shifting to a smaller destroyer, which by that time might be more or less fully designed.
But Buzby said the DD(X) is poised for a construction run now, having passed a critical design review in the fall, and this spring being set for a final design review and construction contract.
Further, he said, roughly $7.5 billion has been spent thus far on research and development of the new ship, and part of that investment would be lost if the DD(X) is abandoned or cut short in favor of a smaller ship.
To be sure, he added, some of the cutting-edge technology in the DD(X) program could be scavenged and incorporated in the sister ship, the future CG(X) cruiser, and in the next-generation CVN 21 aircraft carrier, such as sensors and radar suites.
The Navy, which at one time proposed building perhaps 24 to 30 DD(X)s, more recently suggested building just eight of the ships. Some lawmakers have suggested building just five, or perhaps one or two as technology demonstrators, or building no DD(X)s, moving instead to design a smaller and cheaper ship.
But the question is what would take the place of the DD(X) if another ship is to be designed and developed, and when that vessel might be available.
While Buzby declined to address the threat of China specifically, "there are capability gaps that exist today" in addressing threats posed by "a major peer competitor," he said.
In assessing the DD(X) program, "this ship helps fill that void," he said.
While the current Arleigh Burke DDG 51 Class of destroyers aren't stealthy, China possesses hundreds of radar-guided missiles. As well, North Korea and Iran also possess sophisticated missiles technology.
It is critical for the Navy to deploy ships able to counter nations with advanced military capabilities, he indicated.
Otherwise, lacking platforms with stealth and other advances, the Navy might be confronted with unpalatable choices such as foregoing a mission, altering the concept of operations as to how to fight a war, or being forced to take other difficult steps.
But should the Navy possess DD(X)s in sufficient number, then "a ship with this capability would be useful," he said.
Two Shipyards
Buzby also endorsed the rationale that Congress decided upon in mandating that DD(X)s will be built in two shipyards, widely separated geographically. General Dynamics Corp. unit Bath Iron Works shipyards is in Maine, while Northrop Grumman Corp. unit Ship Systems has yards in Louisiana and Mississippi.
When Hurricane Katrina caused substantial damage to Ship Systems yards, the storm caused no major damage to Bath Iron Works.
"Certainly strategically there is sense in not having one shipyard" be the only one capable of building surface combatants, he said.
The current plan to build DD(X)s at a pace of merely one per year might entail some extra costs, perhaps $300 million per ship, to split the work between General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, it has been estimated. Building all DD(X)s at a single yard might yield efficiencies and volume savings, according to this view.
And that argument can be made, Buzby said, noting that one might choose to have all the work performed by just one contractor to obtain more efficiencies and cost reductions.
But with the threat of storms, or terrorist attacks, or some debilitating sicknesses that might strike across a given region, "that's probably strategically wise not to limit yourself" to one yard, he said.
And the savings of using just one yard might be overstated.
For example, Bath Iron and Ship Systems, while separated by more than 1,000 miles, easily can exchange computerized blueprints for the DD(X), so that in essence it is more akin to a ship being designed in a single yard.
The key, he concluded, is to move the DD(X) program forward in a manner that spends tax dollars wisely and well, while providing capabilities required to counter enemy threats and meeting needs of warfighters, and at the same time meeting mandates of Congress.
The Navy must "come up with the most cost-effective and congressionally approved" means of providing all that, a plan that yields best value for the military and taxpayers, he said.