Historical US Government rifle and handgun rounds

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orpington

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Does anyone know if there is a site out there that details what rounds were in use by the US Government, by date/era? I cannot seem to find it. It would be interesting to see what round was in use at a particular date and exactly when the decision was made to use another round. Also, any sites that might give the reasoning of the US Military as to why they dropped one particular round and selected another round in its place.

Also, why is the trend towards smaller rounds? I know the .223 is very popular, but it really seems like such a small round relative to rounds utilized in the past, such as .45-70, .30-40 Krag, and .30-06. Any of these three rounds, and others, seem, in my opinion, to be better rounds than the .223.
 
http://www.military.com/army-birthday/history-of-us-army-weapons.html

.45-70, .30-40 Krag, and .30-06. Any of these three rounds, and others, seem, in my opinion, to be better rounds than the .223.
Until you have to carry enough ammo in your basic load to get back from a long range patrol.

A .30 cal ammo can of 30-06 contains about 200 rounds and weighs 15 pounds.
A .30 cal ammo can of 5.56 NATO contains 420 rounds and weighs about 15 pounds.

45-70? You don't even want to go there with 420 rounds on your back!

rc
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...S._Armed_Forces#Out_of_service_.28obsolete.29

wiki has a list of the guns currently used and at one time used by the US military. I suspect if you click on the individual links you might learn why they were used and eventually abandoned.

rc has it correct as far as the tendency toward smaller rounds. A larger round just is not necessarily more powerful and smaller rounds are easier to carry and in some cases can even mean a higher magazine capacity (in handguns mainly).
 
I had a vision,,,

How big would a 30 round magazine be,,,
If it were made for 45/70 cartridges?

That was meant to be somewhat humorous,,,
But I do remember reading that one of the factors,,,
Was definitely about carrying more ammo for the same weight.

The big & slow versus small & fast debate is never going to be over,,,
But a practicality of small caliber cartridges is in weight.

It's like when preppers argue of which is better to carry,,,
200 rounds of 30-06 or 2,000 rounds of .22 LR.

I don't think there is an answer to this debate,,,
It all comes down to personal choice,,,
I'm in the 2,000 round corner.

Aarond

.
 
I agree with the weight reasoning, but also wounding a soldier takes three men off the battle field, killing a soldier only takes one off the board.
 
...but also wounding a soldier takes three men off the battle field, killing a soldier only takes one off the board.
Often said, but no US doctrine has ever set out on the idea that wounding is better than killing.

And it is a highly asymmetrical factor, not at all in our favor. Wounding a US Soldier or Marine might well tie up several others getting him secured and to treatment. Few, if any, of our recent enemies have seemed to devote much effort to immediate first aid and evac. for their wounded. Recovery of the dead, yes, but not so much rushing the wounded off the battlefield like we do.
 
That has never been the official stance on why the government adopts a round.
Whether or not it's an unspoken benefit is, obviously, unspoken by those that matter.
It's true, when fighting a disciplined military. Our conflicts with those since adopting the round have been few enough.

The real reason is technology. When we went from large-bore BP rifles to something like the .45-70, the new round was moving faster, so had more energy and less compensation for drop, and was just as--if not more--effective.
Then .30-06: higher velocity, easier to use at distance, more effective.

The move to 5.56x45 came after the WW2 and Korea eras, after the actual assault rifle got popular. Before then, it was doctrine to have good riflemen put relatively few rounds on target, and have a crew-served weapon provide any massive cover fire if needed. After, and now with fighting closer together more common, it became to give soldier the ability to put more rounds on target quickly and to provide heavier cover fire within their squad. The new larger magazines made that possible, and lighter rounds mean that a single soldier can carry more, and thus be more effective.
 
Also, why is the trend towards smaller rounds? I know the .223 is very popular, but it really seems like such a small round relative to rounds utilized in the past, such as .45-70, .30-40 Krag, and .30-06. Any of these three rounds, and others, seem, in my opinion, to be better rounds than the .223.

Better? Better for WHAT, is the question. It just doesn't take a 150+ grain .30+ caliber bullet to kill a man, and that was understood by some folks a long time ago. (.276 Pederson, .280 British, 6mm Lee Navy, .276 Enfield, 7x57 Mauser, and so forth) But militaries are very conservative, very resistant to change, and things like weight savings, increased individual soldier ammo load, and maneuver warfare via covering fire really took a long time to catch on.
 
Here is a book worth looking for.
A History of Modern U.S. Small Arms Ammunition
by Hackley, Wooden, and Scranton

I think there may be a sequel as well.

It is well researched and authoritative.

You may be able to find it at some library or by interlibrary loan. I found it worth buying (under $50).
 
This might be of interest, a FREE 78 page history of the ammunition industrial base.


http://www.jmc.army.mil/Docs/History/Ammunition Industrial Base v2 - 2010 update.pdf


Here is another interesting reference.

Small-Arms Ammunition Production and Acquisition: Too Many Eggs in One Basket?
by Major Mark W. Siekman, USAR, Dr. David A. Anderson, and Allan S. Boyce

http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct10/spectrum_smallarms_ammo.html

"This paper examines the United States’ small-arms ammunition acquisition strategy for meeting the Army’s current operational and training requirements, as well as for the increase in the future force structure. It compares the current operational requirements for small-arms ammunition with present production capabilities and limitations in order to determine if the defense industrial base needs to make changes to the acquisition strategy."


ms704_chart2.gif
"This chart shows the total small-arms ammunition required by the Army for three existing and possible situations: for peacetime operations and training after the Cold War and before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, during fiscal year 2005, and during the “total war” scenario of World War II."
 
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The resources several of you directed me to are most interesting! If others know of other fantastic resources, please let me know!

It sounds like the .223 was adopted because of the practical reason of the weight of a large number of rounds. I never would have thought of that as being the reason. I tend to enjoy shooting many of the older rounds that were available in black powder days; having said that, I really enjoy my .270, which is a necked-down .30-06, and I didn't think it could get much better than the .30-06 class of ammunition.
 
There is also the economics, and conversation of strategic materials in manufacturing during times of war.

A 30-06 has enough brass, lead, & copper in it to make 2+ 5.56 rounds.

A 45-70?
Maybe six.

Rc
 
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The 45-70 did not work out for Custer. The Battle of San Juan Hill in the Spanish war in Cuba sealed the fate of slow cartridges. The US Army realized then that the superior power and range of modern high power cartridges made any form of slow cartridge obsolete for all time. High speed cartridges are more accurate have vastly better range, and cause much greater wounds than a 45-70 or anything like it. As I have used both the 7.62 NATO and 5.56 NATO in combat I was pleased with the performance of both in my experience. Combat is not much like hunting or target shooting. Rate and volume of fire is important. If you like big cartridges, the .50 cal used in "Ma Deuce" is perfect. I also think the 30-06 Garand was a great combat rifle but I am glad I did not have to lug one around or shoot it hanging out of a window with it like my M-16.
 
Crowcifier666 said:
I agree with the weight reasoning, but also wounding a soldier takes three men off the battle field, killing a soldier only takes one off the board.

A myth very commonly perpetuated in civilian and military circles. With no documentation supporting it. But it is safe to say the reason why the switch was made to 5.56 was weight. Lighter rounds means more ammo per soldier and a lighter rifle. The military is all about making things lighter so we can carry more stuff.
 
Often said, but no US doctrine has ever set out on the idea that wounding is better than killing.

A myth very commonly perpetuated in civilian and military circles. With no documentation supporting it.

Doesn't mean it's not true, though I agree, these days there aren't many opponents of the US that are actively retrieving their wounded off the battle field. But in the Vietnam era (closer to the switch to 5.56), I see it being strategically viable. OTOH, there doesn't seem to be "battle fields" anymore, or uniforms, rules of engagement, etc.

Thank you for your service, herrwalther.
 
Two additional thoughts on 45-70 vs later ammo. The Native Americans Custer went up against had greater fire power in that they could launch several arrows in the time that a soldier could load and fire only one round with the single shot trapdoor. Of course the soldier did have greater range.

The weight of the bullet and trajectory had an effect on deployment tactics. I remember learning about "plunging fire" (machine guns) many years ago that is no longer part of doctrine due to the use of lighter bullets that don't retain enough energy when used this way. It was probably a terrible waste of ammo too.
 
Two additional thoughts on 45-70 vs later ammo. The Native Americans Custer went up against had greater fire power in that they could launch several arrows in the time that a soldier could load and fire only one round with the single shot trapdoor. Of course the soldier did have greater range.

It was not really about launching arrows. Custer was defeated by an enemy that greatly outnumbered his troops, and many many were armed with repeating rifles that were appropriate for the close range fight that occurred. Custer's troops were armed with a weapon intended to kill horses and men at hundreds of yards with very deliberate accurate fire; it was not a good choice for engaging in a fast moving, close range firefight.

The weight of the bullet and trajectory had an effect on deployment tactics. I remember learning about "plunging fire" (machine guns) many years ago that is no longer part of doctrine due to the use of lighter bullets that don't retain enough energy when used this way. It was probably a terrible waste of ammo too.

In an age when small, light weight, infantry mortars and machineguns did not exist massed plunging fire was a viable tactic. One advantage of the cartridges of the blackpowder era is some limited ability to place fire on a reverse slope the enemy is using for cover. Very limited ability.
 
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I think at least one 45-70 cartridge is still used by the U.S. Military. IIRC a 45-70 blank cartridge is used in some line throwing guns by the Navy and Coast Guard. Can anybody confirm this?
 
You get no argument from me, Nom de Forum.

I have used the 45-70 falling block for hunting for the past 10 years, so I am very aware of the limitations, relative to faster & lighter bullet modern cartridges. It is a worth while challenge.
 
On the .45-70 not working for Custer at Little Big Horn, it is true Custer got his a** waxed but this was not entirely the fault of the .45-70. The ammunition supplied the 7th Cav was copper cased rather than the specified brass case the Trapdoor Springfield was designed to use. The copper cases were prone to the extractor tearing the case rim rather than extracting the shell. The troopers then had to extract the shell with a knife to reload. Again, this alone did not seal their fate. Little Big Horn was a combination of many things not the least of which was G.A. Custer's underestimation of his enemy and his overconfidence in his abilities. The best analysis's of Little Big Horn that I have read indicate that CPT Tom Custer's Troop was the only group to lay down their mounts in a defensive perimeter and make a good fight of it. These analysis's indicate the rest of the 7th made a running fight for high ground but were overwhelmed by very superior numbers. The much maligned Maj. Reno lead his men in a running fight to the high ground occupied by the 7th's Trains commanded by CPT Benteen. Reno & Beteen ordered thier men to dig in and fight. They held out until relieved by GEN Crook. As to the Battle of San Juan Hill, I wonder how a .45-70 bolt-action would have fared against the Spanish Mausers? To compare single shot trapdoor actions against magazine fed bolt-actions and say the caliber is the problem is not a good analysis of the situation. I would also point out that the US Army & Navy began adopting magazine fed smaller caliber bolt-action rifles with the 1892 Krag in .30-40. This was 6 years before San Juan Hill. Our esteemed politicians and the ossified military leadership just did not push for the rapid fielding of the Krag rifle.

The US Military has a long and inglorious history of choosing weapons and ammunition through political manipulation and expeditious supply chain choices. Many if not most of the time the wants and needs of the front line troops are 2nd or 3rd considerations of choice.

PS The .45-70 Trapdoor Springfield Rifle remained as a limited standard US Military rifle until the adoption of the US Rifle M1 Grand in 1937. Many of the state militias were still armed with the .45-70 until then. As far as I know, no active troops used the .45-70 after the Spanish American War.
 
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You get no argument from me, Nom de Forum.

I have used the 45-70 falling block for hunting for the past 10 years, so I am very aware of the limitations, relative to faster & lighter bullet modern cartridges. It is a worth while challenge.

The 45-70 is a favorite of mine also. Keep it under 200 yards and it is a very versatile hunting cartridge. You have to wonder if Custer's troops had been armed with something like a Marlin 1895 Cowboy how things would have gone. Would it only prolong the inevitable or would the volume of fire persuade the Sioux to lay siege or break-off contact? Perhaps if besieged Custer may have been rescued by Reno.
 
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On the .45-70 not working for Custer at Little Big Horn, it is true Custer got his a** waxed but this was not entirely the fault of the .45-70. The ammunition supplied the 7th Cav was copper cased rather than the specified brass case the Trapdoor Springfield was designed to use. The copper cases were prone to the extractor tearing the case rim rather than extracting the shell. The troopers then had to extract the shell with a knife to reload. Again, this alone did not seal their fate. Little Big Horn was a combination of many things not the least of which was G.A. Custer's underestimation of his enemy and his overconfidence in his abilities. The best analysis's of Little Big Horn that I have read indicate that CPT Tom Custer's Troop was the only group to lay down their mounts in a defensive perimeter and make a good fight of it. These analysis's indicate the rest of the 7th made a running fight for high ground but were overwhelmed by very superior numbers. The much maligned Maj. Reno lead his men in a running fight to the high ground occupied by the 7th's Trains commanded by CPT Benteen. Reno & Beteen ordered thier men to dig in and fight. They held out until relieved by GEN Crook. As to the Battle of San Juan Hill, I wonder how a .45-70 bolt-action would have fared against the Spanish Mausers? To compare single shot trapdoor actions against magazine fed bolt-actions and say the caliber is the problem is not a good analysis of the situation. I would also point out that the US Army & Navy began adopting magazine fed smaller caliber bolt-action rifles with the 1892 Krag in .30-40. This was 6 years before San Juan Hill. Our esteemed politicians and the ossified military leadership just did not push for the rapid fielding of the Krag rifle.

The US Military has a long and inglorious history of choosing weapons and ammunition through political manipulation and expeditious supply chain choices. Many if not most of the time the wants and needs of the front line troops are 2nd or 3rd considerations of choice.

PS The .45-70 Trapdoor Springfield Rifle remained as a limited standard US Military rifle until the adoption of the US Rifle M1 Grand in 1937. Many of the state militias were still armed with the .45-70 until then. As far as I know, no active troops used the .45-70 after the Spanish American War.

At about the same time Custer was being hindered with cartridge rim shearing the British were setting themselves up for the same thing with their .450 Martini-Henrys. Just a few years later they learned their lesson of the false economy of using weak cases fighting the Zulus and other tribes in Africa.

Custer's biggest problem was never really the quality of his weapons. Custer was Custer's biggest problem.

Even with bolt action 45-70s those 7mm Spanish Hornets would have been decidedly more formidable in 1898. Even the Krag with its "unique" magazine would have been at a noticeable rate of fire disadvantage.

"The US Military has a long and inglorious history of choosing weapons and ammunition through political manipulation and expeditious supply chain choices. Many if not most of the time the wants and needs of the front line troops are 2nd or 3rd considerations of choice." This is almost an understatement.
 
On the .45-70 not working for Custer at Little Big Horn, it is true Custer got his a** waxed but this was not entirely the fault of the .45-70. The ammunition supplied the 7th Cav was copper cased rather than the specified brass case the Trapdoor Springfield was designed to use. The copper cases were prone to the extractor tearing the case rim rather than extracting the shell. The troopers then had to extract the shell with a knife to reload. Again, this alone did not seal their fate. Little Big Horn was a combination of many things not the least of which was G.A. Custer's underestimation of his enemy and his overconfidence in his abilities. The best analysis's of Little Big Horn that I have read indicate that CPT Tom Custer's Troop was the only group to lay down their mounts in a defensive perimeter and make a good fight of it. These analysis's indicate the rest of the 7th made a running fight for high ground but were overwhelmed by very superior numbers. The much maligned Maj. Reno lead his men in a running fight to the high ground occupied by the 7th's Trains commanded by CPT Benteen. Reno & Beteen ordered thier men to dig in and fight. They held out until relieved by GEN Crook. As to the Battle of San Juan Hill, I wonder how a .45-70 bolt-action would have fared against the Spanish Mausers? To compare single shot trapdoor actions against magazine fed bolt-actions and say the caliber is the problem is not a good analysis of the situation. I would also point out that the US Army & Navy began adopting magazine fed smaller caliber bolt-action rifles with the 1892 Krag in .30-40. This was 6 years before San Juan Hill. Our esteemed politicians and the ossified military leadership just did not push for the rapid fielding of the Krag rifle.

The US Military has a long and inglorious history of choosing weapons and ammunition through political manipulation and expeditious supply chain choices. Many if not most of the time the wants and needs of the front line troops are 2nd or 3rd considerations of choice.

PS The .45-70 Trapdoor Springfield Rifle remained as a limited standard US Military rifle until the adoption of the US Rifle M1 Grand in 1937. Many of the state militias were still armed with the .45-70 until then. As far as I know, no active troops used the .45-70 after the Spanish American War.



Benteen & Reno were not relieved by General Crook; Crook's men had been turned back weeks before by the same Plains Indians at the Battle of the Rosebud. Benteen & Reno were relieved by the Terry/Gibbon column (General Alfred Terry, cmdr of the expedition) when they arrived on the 27th of June.
The "much maligned" Major Reno deserved much maligning; he made a mess of the attack on the southern Indian village. Custer's Indian Scout Bloody Knife was with him, and when he had his brains blown out by an enemy gun, they splattered across Reno's face. Repulsed and alarmed, Reno called for a hasty and completly disorderly retreat back across the Little Bighorn River. This greatly surprised the Indians, who were themselves about to break from their hastily assumed positions (this from historians' interviews with the Indians who participated in the battle a few years after the fact).
Benteen was not much better. Handed a written out order by a trooper in Custer's detachment to bring packs and quickly (meaning "AMMO!") Benteen ignored the order and took position along with Reno.
The remarks about the copper .45-70 were accurate; Custer & his officers supplied their own ammo as they well knew its problems. As to Custer's over estimation of his abilities and underestimation of his enemies; to an extent, yes. But keep in mind several factors.
Custer had always been on the short end of things numerically; in every battle he entered into he had faced and defeated a superior number of enemy, be they Confederate soldiers or Plains Indians, and he had won in every battle. The tactic of hitting a sitting Indian village had been adopted because the army had realized that it worked. In the field the Plains Indians were terrific soldiers with very effective and deadly strategies.
At the Battle of the Little Bighorn reality got turned on its head. Sitting Bull had prophesized about "bluecoats falling into camp" -- meaning their camp would be attacked, but the Indians would win. This gave the warriors the psychological boost they needed, while Custer and his 7th Cavalry were exhausted by a forced march.
Many other mistakes contributed to the inglorious defeat, not all Custer's. General Terry made some truly assinine decisions as well.
What might have saved the Seventh?
:confused:
Tommy Guns.
M-16s.
B.A.R.s
M1 Garands
Phased Plasma rifles in the 40 megawatt range.


"Dust off and nuke 'em from orbit; it's the only way to be sure." :rolleyes:



Or--- better yet, let history be what it is. It's more fun that way....:D
 
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