Monkeyleg
Member.
This story ran on Free Republic's site. I thought it might be an inspiration to those of us who are trying to get CCW bills passed in our own states.
*********
The Missouri Miracle [how a 12-year struggle brought about a MO license to
carry law
THE MISSOURI MIRACLE by K. L. Jamison
In 1990 WMSA Board member Keith Rice went through the concealed carry
provisions of the various states and made two lists. One list consisted of
provisions he liked, the other was provisions he didn't like. He presented
these lists to the WMSA Board with the motion that we write a concealed
carry bill for Missouri. The Board processed these proposals into three
lists; one we liked, one we didn't like, ant the last we didn't especially
like, but would take if it meant passing a bill. I took these lists and
wrote a detailed bill, which the Board subsequently approved.
Then we were stumped. We had been an organization for less than two years
and did not know how to get a bill moving in the legislature. We shared our
bill with other activists and groups. The NRA thought that we had no chance,
but we are Missourians, and must be shown. John Ross, later the author of
Unintended Consequences, hired a professional lobbyist to push the bill. He
vastly simplified the bill, found a sponsor, and it passed the house by a
nearly three to one margin. The hearing on the bill was notable for the
generous testimony of Texas activist Suzanna Gratia, who survived the Luby's
cafeteria massacre, while her revolver was in her vehicle. Recounting the
murder of her parents, she asked the legislators if they were being
similarly attacked, and she was present with a gun wouldn't they want her to
take the shot. "Not necessarily", said one of the legislators, proving that
Darwin was wrong, and the fittest are not always the survivor.
The bill stalled in the Senate, where our hopes would be dashed for many
years. After Governor Carnahan was elected we began to expect low down dirty
tricks to be used against us, and legislators' willing and often brainless
participation. On one occasion the governor promised three different
senators that the same prison would be built in their district if they voted
against us. These geniuses knew that at least two of them would be screwed,
and still voted with the governor.
Our statewide grassroots umbrella organization began as "The Conference",
then Missouri Legislative Issues Council, Missourians Against Crime, and now
Missourians for Personal Safety. The constant was the leadership of a
Missourian willing to sacrifice his time, occupation, and life to learn the
ways and the players of the Capital Building. It was an education. One
representative told a delegation of women that he would be in favor of
License to Carry if it was just them, but had to worry about the „other‰
people. If he had met a group of left-handed Chicano Chiropractors he would
have said the same patronizing thing.
Another representative met with us, assured us that he was 100% on our side,
and would do anything to ensure that our bill passed. Days later an unknown
ally sent us a fax of a letter the same representative had sent the
opposition, assuring them that he was 100% on their side and would do
anything to stop our bill. This creature claimed to be our friend until he
was confronted with the fax, and advised to prove his friendship by the end
of the day. He did not and did not get re-elected. We became "accustomed" to
legislators blowing smoke and outright lies.
Some attempted to use and abuse us. One legislator spoke at our rally,
announced that he was sponsoring our bill because he was such an advocate of
License to Carry. Later that day we learned that he had agreed to accept
amendments to the bill, amendments he knew were unacceptable to us. I
confronted him on this, and was told that he was tired of people like me
telling him what to do one day a year when he had to deal with it all
session. We had been cautioned to be polite, so I did not tell him that I
was active on this issue all year round, and I had advocated it last
session, when he voted against us. I have since changed my policy.
It got worse. One year we finally had the votes to pass the senate; the vote
was scheduled for a vote at the very end of the session. On the big day,
extra security was noted. The word was that a Senator's life had been
threatened if he did not vote for our bill. The Senate quickly closed ranks
and refused to take up the bill. Days later, when the session was over,
Banks blandly told a newspaper that our chairman, Steve Coleman, had told
him that if he did not vote our way, he could not support Banks in future
elections. "Since there was no alternative to me", Banks claimed, "That
meant he was going to kill me." That this absurd excuse for lying to his
fellow senators was not taken as an affront by his fellow senators was an
important lesson to us.
Dealing with these arrogant, dishonest, closed minds was emotionally
draining. We stubbornly persevered. In late 1997, we were asked to support a
bill in the 1998 session calling for a referendum in 1999. This was
presented as a condition of passing any License to Carry law. We were
opposed. No one had asked for a popular vote when concealed weapons were
banned in 1879, and civil rights should not be subjected to a vote. The NRA
had just achieved a resounding win on an anti-gun referendum in Washington
State, and expected the same result with a pro-gun referendum. We warned
that they would face the same obstacles as the Hancock anti-tax referendum;
taxpayer money, equipment, facilities, and personnel would be used against
us. Unfortunately, we were right.
Part of the deal to pass the bill was that Governor Carnahan would stay out
of the referendum. However, he was up to his neck in it from the beginning.
His daughter, personal lawyer, and everyone with a state contract, or hoped
to have a state contract lined up against us. His daughter, Robin Carnahan,
headed the committee against us. This committee appears to have decided that
it could lie faster than we could tell the truth, and it was right. Every
advertisement against Prop B was a lie. People on the state payroll
crisscrossed the state spreading these lies. The U.S. Attorney offices in
Kansas City and St. Louis used federal money, equipment, and personnel to
spread these lies. People on the state payroll used state money and
facilities to spread these lies. The media, if it had ever read the bill
would know that it was being lied to, but reprinted the lies as if they were
true. We were advised to take the high road and not call them liars; and we
saw how well that worked.
The opposition conducted a poll of the ballot language which determined that
60% of the state would vote in favor of License to Carry. Outraged that the
people might "speak wrong", the governor's lawyer filed a suit with the
Missouri Supreme Court to change the ballot language. The defendants in the
suit were Attorney General Jay Nixon and State Auditor Claire McCaskill,
both of whom hate us. The suit claimed that by law ballot language was
limited to 50 words, and the Proposition B language was 58 words. Therefore,
the ballot language had to be re-written, by people who hate us. The parties
effectively sabotaged the ballot language by adding a fiscal note which made
it appear that the measure would cost each county $500,000.
In the end, election fraud was needed to beat us. The St. Louis machine
cranked out votes from dogs and dead people while polling places expected to
vote heavily our way did not have enough ballots. A contest was not
seriously considered. Under Missouri law, we would have to prove that the
fraud was the deciding factor, and the only remedy was a new election. We
did not have another $4 million for a new election.
Organization for another License to Carry bill began the day after Prop B
failed. Our persistence paid off. Greg Jeffrey of Missourians for Personal
Safety became a fixture in the Capital Building, familiar to the
legislators, and an authority on legislative procedure. We would use this
institutional memory to craft our successful strategy and bill.
In the fall of 2002, members of MPS met with NRA-ILA representative Mary Ann
Bradfield. Over the following year Ms. Bradfield would pass License to Carry
bills in Colorado as well as a gun industry protection bill. We were the
fortunate beneficiaries of her very good year. Over a long meeting, and
subsequent meetings, an acceptable bill was hammered out. The bill was not
as good as we would have liked. However, given the ill-considered Prop B
referendum, we were forced to accept the most restrictive such law in the
nation. Opponents would later say that it was the most permissive law in the
nation; this time we called them liars.
Building on Greg Jeffrey's work with the legislature, the new bill contained
provisions that we knew the legislature would accept, and restrictions with
which we could live. The bill was crafted to use existing equipment to do
background checks and issue licenses. The cost was set high enough to ensure
that it would receive a positive fiscal note. A non-partisan sponsorship was
necessary. Missouri boasts the most virulently partisan political process in
the country. A bi-partisan effort was necessary for success. On the other
hand, if we were not facing a Democratic governor, some of the Republicans
would have voted against us.
A communications system was established between the ILA representative and
MPS. This network would be used many times in the coming months with the
result that we all spoke as one and a consensus was reached on new issues.
One of these new issues was the age limit. The original bill required an
applicant to be 21. One of our legislators complained that the son of an
Idaho legislator was shot and killed by a drunken college student who had a
concealed carry license. The full story has still not come out, but the
price of a favorable vote was to raise the age to 23.
Governor Holden reflexively, viscerally opposed our bill. When he ran for
the office, he responded to our inquiry with a vicious, hateful rejection.
Every time he spoke on the subject the hate was evident in his voice.
Despite the Governor's hate, our bill passed. We had hoped to finally have a
vote in the Senate, and would have counted it a victory if we put a bill on
the Governor's desk. We did both, and more.
Governor Holden vetoed License to Carry on 3 July, 2003 (now declared
Dependence Day) in Senator Gibbon's district near St. Louis. He picked the
date so that the event would be overlooked in the 4th of July festivities.
He picked Senator Gibbon's district because it recorded an overwhelming vote
against Prop B. Governor Holden's presence in the district was intended to
influence Senator Gibbon's vote; he failed. His veto message claimed, among
other superstitions, that the bill allowed persons convicted of domestic
violence to have licenses in violation of federal law. No state law can
authorize violating federal law, something one would expect a governor to
know. Editorialists, none of whom appear to have taken high school civics,
repeated the Governor's nonsensical claims without question.
The next step was the veto session. The house was considered safe to
override, the senate was uncertain. To override, both houses had to pass the
bill by 2/3's of the membership, not just those who showed up for work; this
was 109 in the house and 23 in the senate. Because Senator DePasco had died,
leaving his seat empty, arguably we needed on 22 in the senate, but no one
was sure. Pressure was put on Senator Mathewson to defect to the Governor.
Bob and Wanda Brown of the Central Missouri Shooters Alliance organized
local business leaders to keep his mind right.
Senator Gibbons was heavily lobbied by both sides. He actually read the
research and discovered that the apocalyptic predictions of the opposition
were contradicted by the experience of 44 other states. WMSA was
unsuccessful in changing the minds of local senators; but we reduced
enthusiasm for the Governor's position and prevented defection to the
Governor's side. We also discovered that the candidates for Senator
DePasco's old seat favored License to Carry. The prospect of a veto-proof
majority for a less restrictive bill in the coming session convinced at
least one senator to vote with us.
Leading up to the vote, Mary Ann Bradfield repeatedly met with legislators
on our bill and the Industry Protection Act to prohibit frivolous suits
against the gun industry. A reliable source says that Ms. Bradfield told the
legislators that if they could only vote for one bill, to vote for License
to Carry. In any event, the legislature overturned vetoes of both bills.
The veto session was set for 10 and 11 September, 2003. To win we would have
to keep every vote we received on the original vote, and pick up one vote in
the Senate. Senator Dolan, one of our votes on the bill, had been called up
for National Guard duty, and was stationed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Getting
the Senator back when thousands of other National Guardsmen had been
extended for duty in the war was not likely. Still, persons involved in the
attempt seemed uncommonly optimistic.
Keeping all of our votes had never been done. Picking up a vote, much less
two votes was considered to be the stuff of miracles. A conference call
among MPS activists came to a consensus that regardless of the odds, we
would continue to fight as hard as possible. If nothing else was
accomplished, we would lay a basis for a new bill in the next session.
On 10 September, 2003, activists met with NRA-ILA representative May Ann
Bradfield in Representative Crawford's office for last minute strategy. We
came believing that we had no chance, but were laying a basis for the next
session. The strategy was to thank our friends, and then see what happened
in the house vote.
The building was filled with anti-abortion activists. They had reserved
every inch of the building and the lawn outside. Some were worried that we
would be lost in the crowd, but we filled our pockets with „Guns Save Lives‰
buttons, and mingled. By the end of the day, the anti-abortion crowd looked
like our crowd. In truth, they were our crowd.
By noon, the house had overturned the veto on our bill. The vote was 115 to
39. This is significant, in the original vote, it was 111 to 42; not only
did we pick up votes, the governor lost votes. This has never happened.
Neither one of these results has ever happened.
People in the know seemed to be very optimistic whenever Senator Dolan was
mentioned. The only cloud was the fragile state of the decisions reached by
Senators Mathewson and Gibbons. They were on our side, but subject to fits
when lectured by our advocates. The decision was made not to lobby them any
longer. This was contrary to our policy of the last thirteen years. The
trick was to prevent zealous advocates from antagonizing them. The solution
was easy for an old Infantryman, we posted guards on their doors. No one was
told not to see them; our people were told it was not necessary. For the
rest of the day none of our people approached them. This kind of discipline
seems to have made an impression.
The following day Senator Dolan arrived in the Capital Building. There is a
reliable report that the Governor had an angry confrontation with him as he
walked toward the Senate chamber. The governor's aid did have a
confrontation with Senator Dolan after the vote in which he called him
everything but a senator. The Senate took up our bill and passed it 23 to
10. Not only had we kept all of our votes, we gained one. Senator Gibbons
had been persuaded by our arguments. Senator Mathewson stayed with us
because he knew were never going to give up. Senator Mathewson is
perceptive.
Keeping the votes in a veto override is unheard of. Gaining votes is a
miracle. We have a miracle. Keeping it will be the trick.
*********
The Missouri Miracle [how a 12-year struggle brought about a MO license to
carry law
THE MISSOURI MIRACLE by K. L. Jamison
In 1990 WMSA Board member Keith Rice went through the concealed carry
provisions of the various states and made two lists. One list consisted of
provisions he liked, the other was provisions he didn't like. He presented
these lists to the WMSA Board with the motion that we write a concealed
carry bill for Missouri. The Board processed these proposals into three
lists; one we liked, one we didn't like, ant the last we didn't especially
like, but would take if it meant passing a bill. I took these lists and
wrote a detailed bill, which the Board subsequently approved.
Then we were stumped. We had been an organization for less than two years
and did not know how to get a bill moving in the legislature. We shared our
bill with other activists and groups. The NRA thought that we had no chance,
but we are Missourians, and must be shown. John Ross, later the author of
Unintended Consequences, hired a professional lobbyist to push the bill. He
vastly simplified the bill, found a sponsor, and it passed the house by a
nearly three to one margin. The hearing on the bill was notable for the
generous testimony of Texas activist Suzanna Gratia, who survived the Luby's
cafeteria massacre, while her revolver was in her vehicle. Recounting the
murder of her parents, she asked the legislators if they were being
similarly attacked, and she was present with a gun wouldn't they want her to
take the shot. "Not necessarily", said one of the legislators, proving that
Darwin was wrong, and the fittest are not always the survivor.
The bill stalled in the Senate, where our hopes would be dashed for many
years. After Governor Carnahan was elected we began to expect low down dirty
tricks to be used against us, and legislators' willing and often brainless
participation. On one occasion the governor promised three different
senators that the same prison would be built in their district if they voted
against us. These geniuses knew that at least two of them would be screwed,
and still voted with the governor.
Our statewide grassroots umbrella organization began as "The Conference",
then Missouri Legislative Issues Council, Missourians Against Crime, and now
Missourians for Personal Safety. The constant was the leadership of a
Missourian willing to sacrifice his time, occupation, and life to learn the
ways and the players of the Capital Building. It was an education. One
representative told a delegation of women that he would be in favor of
License to Carry if it was just them, but had to worry about the „other‰
people. If he had met a group of left-handed Chicano Chiropractors he would
have said the same patronizing thing.
Another representative met with us, assured us that he was 100% on our side,
and would do anything to ensure that our bill passed. Days later an unknown
ally sent us a fax of a letter the same representative had sent the
opposition, assuring them that he was 100% on their side and would do
anything to stop our bill. This creature claimed to be our friend until he
was confronted with the fax, and advised to prove his friendship by the end
of the day. He did not and did not get re-elected. We became "accustomed" to
legislators blowing smoke and outright lies.
Some attempted to use and abuse us. One legislator spoke at our rally,
announced that he was sponsoring our bill because he was such an advocate of
License to Carry. Later that day we learned that he had agreed to accept
amendments to the bill, amendments he knew were unacceptable to us. I
confronted him on this, and was told that he was tired of people like me
telling him what to do one day a year when he had to deal with it all
session. We had been cautioned to be polite, so I did not tell him that I
was active on this issue all year round, and I had advocated it last
session, when he voted against us. I have since changed my policy.
It got worse. One year we finally had the votes to pass the senate; the vote
was scheduled for a vote at the very end of the session. On the big day,
extra security was noted. The word was that a Senator's life had been
threatened if he did not vote for our bill. The Senate quickly closed ranks
and refused to take up the bill. Days later, when the session was over,
Banks blandly told a newspaper that our chairman, Steve Coleman, had told
him that if he did not vote our way, he could not support Banks in future
elections. "Since there was no alternative to me", Banks claimed, "That
meant he was going to kill me." That this absurd excuse for lying to his
fellow senators was not taken as an affront by his fellow senators was an
important lesson to us.
Dealing with these arrogant, dishonest, closed minds was emotionally
draining. We stubbornly persevered. In late 1997, we were asked to support a
bill in the 1998 session calling for a referendum in 1999. This was
presented as a condition of passing any License to Carry law. We were
opposed. No one had asked for a popular vote when concealed weapons were
banned in 1879, and civil rights should not be subjected to a vote. The NRA
had just achieved a resounding win on an anti-gun referendum in Washington
State, and expected the same result with a pro-gun referendum. We warned
that they would face the same obstacles as the Hancock anti-tax referendum;
taxpayer money, equipment, facilities, and personnel would be used against
us. Unfortunately, we were right.
Part of the deal to pass the bill was that Governor Carnahan would stay out
of the referendum. However, he was up to his neck in it from the beginning.
His daughter, personal lawyer, and everyone with a state contract, or hoped
to have a state contract lined up against us. His daughter, Robin Carnahan,
headed the committee against us. This committee appears to have decided that
it could lie faster than we could tell the truth, and it was right. Every
advertisement against Prop B was a lie. People on the state payroll
crisscrossed the state spreading these lies. The U.S. Attorney offices in
Kansas City and St. Louis used federal money, equipment, and personnel to
spread these lies. People on the state payroll used state money and
facilities to spread these lies. The media, if it had ever read the bill
would know that it was being lied to, but reprinted the lies as if they were
true. We were advised to take the high road and not call them liars; and we
saw how well that worked.
The opposition conducted a poll of the ballot language which determined that
60% of the state would vote in favor of License to Carry. Outraged that the
people might "speak wrong", the governor's lawyer filed a suit with the
Missouri Supreme Court to change the ballot language. The defendants in the
suit were Attorney General Jay Nixon and State Auditor Claire McCaskill,
both of whom hate us. The suit claimed that by law ballot language was
limited to 50 words, and the Proposition B language was 58 words. Therefore,
the ballot language had to be re-written, by people who hate us. The parties
effectively sabotaged the ballot language by adding a fiscal note which made
it appear that the measure would cost each county $500,000.
In the end, election fraud was needed to beat us. The St. Louis machine
cranked out votes from dogs and dead people while polling places expected to
vote heavily our way did not have enough ballots. A contest was not
seriously considered. Under Missouri law, we would have to prove that the
fraud was the deciding factor, and the only remedy was a new election. We
did not have another $4 million for a new election.
Organization for another License to Carry bill began the day after Prop B
failed. Our persistence paid off. Greg Jeffrey of Missourians for Personal
Safety became a fixture in the Capital Building, familiar to the
legislators, and an authority on legislative procedure. We would use this
institutional memory to craft our successful strategy and bill.
In the fall of 2002, members of MPS met with NRA-ILA representative Mary Ann
Bradfield. Over the following year Ms. Bradfield would pass License to Carry
bills in Colorado as well as a gun industry protection bill. We were the
fortunate beneficiaries of her very good year. Over a long meeting, and
subsequent meetings, an acceptable bill was hammered out. The bill was not
as good as we would have liked. However, given the ill-considered Prop B
referendum, we were forced to accept the most restrictive such law in the
nation. Opponents would later say that it was the most permissive law in the
nation; this time we called them liars.
Building on Greg Jeffrey's work with the legislature, the new bill contained
provisions that we knew the legislature would accept, and restrictions with
which we could live. The bill was crafted to use existing equipment to do
background checks and issue licenses. The cost was set high enough to ensure
that it would receive a positive fiscal note. A non-partisan sponsorship was
necessary. Missouri boasts the most virulently partisan political process in
the country. A bi-partisan effort was necessary for success. On the other
hand, if we were not facing a Democratic governor, some of the Republicans
would have voted against us.
A communications system was established between the ILA representative and
MPS. This network would be used many times in the coming months with the
result that we all spoke as one and a consensus was reached on new issues.
One of these new issues was the age limit. The original bill required an
applicant to be 21. One of our legislators complained that the son of an
Idaho legislator was shot and killed by a drunken college student who had a
concealed carry license. The full story has still not come out, but the
price of a favorable vote was to raise the age to 23.
Governor Holden reflexively, viscerally opposed our bill. When he ran for
the office, he responded to our inquiry with a vicious, hateful rejection.
Every time he spoke on the subject the hate was evident in his voice.
Despite the Governor's hate, our bill passed. We had hoped to finally have a
vote in the Senate, and would have counted it a victory if we put a bill on
the Governor's desk. We did both, and more.
Governor Holden vetoed License to Carry on 3 July, 2003 (now declared
Dependence Day) in Senator Gibbon's district near St. Louis. He picked the
date so that the event would be overlooked in the 4th of July festivities.
He picked Senator Gibbon's district because it recorded an overwhelming vote
against Prop B. Governor Holden's presence in the district was intended to
influence Senator Gibbon's vote; he failed. His veto message claimed, among
other superstitions, that the bill allowed persons convicted of domestic
violence to have licenses in violation of federal law. No state law can
authorize violating federal law, something one would expect a governor to
know. Editorialists, none of whom appear to have taken high school civics,
repeated the Governor's nonsensical claims without question.
The next step was the veto session. The house was considered safe to
override, the senate was uncertain. To override, both houses had to pass the
bill by 2/3's of the membership, not just those who showed up for work; this
was 109 in the house and 23 in the senate. Because Senator DePasco had died,
leaving his seat empty, arguably we needed on 22 in the senate, but no one
was sure. Pressure was put on Senator Mathewson to defect to the Governor.
Bob and Wanda Brown of the Central Missouri Shooters Alliance organized
local business leaders to keep his mind right.
Senator Gibbons was heavily lobbied by both sides. He actually read the
research and discovered that the apocalyptic predictions of the opposition
were contradicted by the experience of 44 other states. WMSA was
unsuccessful in changing the minds of local senators; but we reduced
enthusiasm for the Governor's position and prevented defection to the
Governor's side. We also discovered that the candidates for Senator
DePasco's old seat favored License to Carry. The prospect of a veto-proof
majority for a less restrictive bill in the coming session convinced at
least one senator to vote with us.
Leading up to the vote, Mary Ann Bradfield repeatedly met with legislators
on our bill and the Industry Protection Act to prohibit frivolous suits
against the gun industry. A reliable source says that Ms. Bradfield told the
legislators that if they could only vote for one bill, to vote for License
to Carry. In any event, the legislature overturned vetoes of both bills.
The veto session was set for 10 and 11 September, 2003. To win we would have
to keep every vote we received on the original vote, and pick up one vote in
the Senate. Senator Dolan, one of our votes on the bill, had been called up
for National Guard duty, and was stationed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Getting
the Senator back when thousands of other National Guardsmen had been
extended for duty in the war was not likely. Still, persons involved in the
attempt seemed uncommonly optimistic.
Keeping all of our votes had never been done. Picking up a vote, much less
two votes was considered to be the stuff of miracles. A conference call
among MPS activists came to a consensus that regardless of the odds, we
would continue to fight as hard as possible. If nothing else was
accomplished, we would lay a basis for a new bill in the next session.
On 10 September, 2003, activists met with NRA-ILA representative May Ann
Bradfield in Representative Crawford's office for last minute strategy. We
came believing that we had no chance, but were laying a basis for the next
session. The strategy was to thank our friends, and then see what happened
in the house vote.
The building was filled with anti-abortion activists. They had reserved
every inch of the building and the lawn outside. Some were worried that we
would be lost in the crowd, but we filled our pockets with „Guns Save Lives‰
buttons, and mingled. By the end of the day, the anti-abortion crowd looked
like our crowd. In truth, they were our crowd.
By noon, the house had overturned the veto on our bill. The vote was 115 to
39. This is significant, in the original vote, it was 111 to 42; not only
did we pick up votes, the governor lost votes. This has never happened.
Neither one of these results has ever happened.
People in the know seemed to be very optimistic whenever Senator Dolan was
mentioned. The only cloud was the fragile state of the decisions reached by
Senators Mathewson and Gibbons. They were on our side, but subject to fits
when lectured by our advocates. The decision was made not to lobby them any
longer. This was contrary to our policy of the last thirteen years. The
trick was to prevent zealous advocates from antagonizing them. The solution
was easy for an old Infantryman, we posted guards on their doors. No one was
told not to see them; our people were told it was not necessary. For the
rest of the day none of our people approached them. This kind of discipline
seems to have made an impression.
The following day Senator Dolan arrived in the Capital Building. There is a
reliable report that the Governor had an angry confrontation with him as he
walked toward the Senate chamber. The governor's aid did have a
confrontation with Senator Dolan after the vote in which he called him
everything but a senator. The Senate took up our bill and passed it 23 to
10. Not only had we kept all of our votes, we gained one. Senator Gibbons
had been persuaded by our arguments. Senator Mathewson stayed with us
because he knew were never going to give up. Senator Mathewson is
perceptive.
Keeping the votes in a veto override is unheard of. Gaining votes is a
miracle. We have a miracle. Keeping it will be the trick.
