Preacherman
Member
From the Stratfor weekly newsletter (www.stratfor.com):
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
05 March 2004
The War in Iraq: Redefining and Refocusing
Summary
The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
war in Iraq is reshaping itself, and that is redefining the
entire conflict -- and returning attention to Saudi Arabia.
Analysis
The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
war in Iraq is reshaping itself -- and that is redefining the
broader war. There are two aspects of this. The rate at which the
United States is incurring casualties in Iraq has declined
dramatically during the past month. One American died on March 2;
the last American deaths before that occurred Feb. 19. The tempo
of attacks on U.S. forces has declined, although not as
dramatically as the number of casualties. This indicates that the
guerrilla forces focused on U.S. troops have declined in both
number and quality.
The primary focus of guerrilla operations no longer seems to be
U.S. forces. The focus appears to be on Iraqis who collaborate
with the United States, and, more generally, on the Shiite
community. The Shia did not rise against the U.S. occupation and
have worked with the United States to facilitate a transfer of
power that will make them the dominant force in Iraq --
reflecting the fact that the Shia are 60 percent of the
population. Attacks on the Shia were signaled early last month
when a CD-ROM written by top al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
was captured by U.S. forces. The document on the CD-ROM indicated
a change in strategy, at least by the jihadist guerrilla faction,
away from the United States and toward the Shiite community.
The synchronized attacks on Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala
that killed at least 170 people and injured hundreds more on
March 2 -- Ashoura, a major religious occasion in Shiite Islam --
manifested this shift.
The guerrilla movement is split between the remnants of the
Baathist government and foreign jihadists who entered Iraq to
fight the United States. The two factions are different
ideologically and operationally. Ideologically, the Baathists are
secular and the jihadists are religious. Operationally, the
Baathists have focused on what might be called conventional
guerrilla warfare, concentrating on small-unit engagements with
American forces. The jihadists engage more in classical militant
operations against softer targets, in particular using suicide
bombers.
Since December 2003, we have been noting a decline in Baathist
operational capabilities. The decline has not been a straight
line down by any means, but it is now an undeniable reality. They
are certainly not what they were during the Ramadan offensive in
November 2003. Indeed, that offensive will probably be regarded
as their high-water mark. As the Baathist capabilities have
contracted, the relative significance of the jihadists has
increased. It appears that their numbers have risen, but that
might well be an illusion created by the decline of the
Baathists.
The leader of the jihadists appears to be al-Zarqawi, who has
made a fundamental strategic decision. First, it is clear that he
does not believe that the United States can be defeated by a
guerrilla war. Although that might have appeared conceivable
during the summer and fall of 2003, the failure of the Baathist
offensive, the redeployment of U.S. forces, the improvement in
U.S. intelligence and shifts in U.S. tactics have made American
forces impervious to guerrilla attacks. In effect, the United
States has won that campaign, and al-Zarqawi knows it.
Following from this first point, al-Zarqawi appears to have
reached a second conclusion: The primary cause of the failure of
the guerrilla war lies with Iraq's Shiite community. Had the Shia
acted in concert with the Sunnis, the U.S. position in Iraq would
have become untenable last fall. The guerrilla war in the Sunni
Triangle -- coupled with an intifada in the Shiite regions --
would have made continued American occupation of Iraq impossible.
If the United States had not withdrawn, it would have had to pull
its forces back into small, well-defended enclaves with minimal
control over the countryside. The situation would have resembled
Afghanistan.
Al-Zarqawi's analysis of what would have happened had there been
a violent uprising south of Baghdad is not at all unreasonable.
The United States did not have sufficient forces to suppress a
nationwide insurrection, nor did its political requirements
permit using an Israeli model for confronting an intifada and a
guerrilla war. The consequences of a Shiite rising would have
presented a grave problem for the United States.
The rising did not occur, and -- from al-Zarqawi's point of view
-- this has redefined the war. For him, the problem is not the
Americans. They could have been defeated if the Shia had only
played the appropriate role. But the Shia did not play their
role, and thereby saved the Americans. Therefore, the Shia are
the real enemy. In effect, the traditional fault line in the
Islamic world between Sunni and Shia has opened up. To be more
precise, the jihadists now see the key to victory in Iraq as
being a war against the Shia that either shatters them, or --
ideally -- forces them to change course and fall in behind the
jihadists. If that were to happen, the United States would be
defeated.
It is not at all clear that al-Zarqawi can succeed in his
mission. His support within the Iraqi Sunni community is not
overwhelming, particularly among Sunni leaders. Moreover, the
assumption that the Sunnis could win a showdown with the Shia is
doubtful. Finally, the United States is still in Iraq and clearly
is siding with the Shia against the jihadists. The jihadists can
launch the kinds of attacks they did this week, but the net
result is not likely to be either capitulation by the Shia or a
change of course. The likely result will be that al-Zarqawi will
find himself trapped between the Sunni elite, the Shia and the
United States -- a very tough place to be. Al-Zarqawi is not
going to win his point in Iraq.
Iran and the Islamic World
Still, his analysis applies to the broader Islamic world. The
Iraqi Shia did not rise against the Americans for two reasons.
First, they did not want to do anything that might result in a
Sunni government in Iraq. They had their fill of that under
Saddam Hussein. Second -- and this is more important -- the
Iranians who had helped organize and define the Iraqi Shiite
community had their own strategic interests. Iran wanted Iraq
either neutralized or turned into a protectorate of Iran. Iraq
was Iran's historical enemy, and the American problems in Iraq
gave the Iranians the opportunity they needed to redefine the
geopolitical status of Iraq -- a fundamental national interest
for Iran.
The Iranians were more concerned with pursuing their national
interests than their ideological and religious principles. They
were confronted with the choice of siding with their Islamic --
albeit Sunni -- brothers and driving the United States out of
Iraq, or siding with the United States against the Sunnis. They
decided to side with the United States. Their national interest
superseded their religious interests, or possibly they felt so
estranged from the Sunnis that they did not see a common
religious bond. Either way, the Iranians decided it was in their
interest not to drive the Americans out.
In the broader Islamic context, Iran is aligning with the United
States. This makes the U.S. position in the region impregnable --
or as close to it as possible. It also means that Saudi Arabia,
some of whose key subjects had been instrumental in financing al
Qaeda without significant interference from the Saudi state, is
now in very deep trouble. Regardless of antipathy between the
jihadists, including al Qaeda, and the Saudi government, Saudi
Arabia's problems affect them.
If the Islamic world is going to be torn by Sunni-Shiite strife,
then it needs to be remembered that, while the Shia are a small
minority in the Islamic world taken as a whole, they are a
powerful force -- and represent the majority population -- in the
Persian Gulf. For example, the Saudi oil fields are in a Shiite-
dominated region of Saudi Arabia. The entente between the United
States and Iran makes Iran enormously powerful in the Persian
Gulf region, both as the most powerful indigenous military force
and because of its ties to Shia throughout the region. As Iranian
domination of Iraq increases through a Shiite government there,
Saudi vulnerability increases dramatically.
In any generalized conflict between Sunnis and Shia, the Saudis
are vulnerable to both direct military action from Iran and
indirect subversion from their own Shiite population. Facing an
internal challenge from jihadists, the Saudis can quickly find
themselves trapped between the conservatives and the Iranian-
backed Shia. The conservatives might decide that the territorial
integrity of Saudi Arabia is of less importance than the
purification of the House of Saud, while the Iranians might view
the rise of a more extremist government in Riyadh as worth the
price of dominating Saudi oil fields. In other words, the Sunni-
Shiite confrontation could dramatically redraw the map of the
region.
The United States is, of course, the catalyst for all of this.
Its original intention was the unilateral governance of Iraq. The
guerrilla war created a dependency on the Shiites -- and on Iran
-- that runs counter to the original plan. At the same time, the
Iranian decision to underwrite U.S. presence in Iraq in exchange
for a long-term strategic advantage did more than simply save the
day for the Americans. It set in motion a potential conflict
between Sunnis and Shia that has two possible benefits. The first
is to divert the attention of jihadists from the United States to
the Shia. The second is to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia even
further, forcing the Saudis to look again to the United States as
the guarantor of their national security.
Obviously, neither Sunnis nor Shia want the United States to reap
the rewards of their conflict. Sunni and Shiite leaders in Iraq
have worked vigorously in the past few days to present a united
front against al-Zarqawi. In the broader war, a letter from al
Qaeda, which appears to be authentic, stated that al Qaeda was
neither involved in the bombings of Shia in Iraq, nor did it
approve of them. On the other hand, the letter did refer to the
Shia as infidels, which drives home the point: Al Qaeda does not
want to benefit the United States, but its hostility toward the
Shia runs deep. A confrontation with the Shia, in the end, could
prove irresistible.
We have long discussed the growing U.S.-Iranian entente. Now that
it is here, it has generated the inevitable jihadist response.
The most important question in the next few weeks will be whether
the jihadist attacks on the Shia in Iraq -- and elsewhere, such
as in Pakistan and Lebanon -- will resonate among the Sunni
masses. At the moment, it does not seem to be working, but the
situation is volatile. Moreover, the Sunnis in Iraq might not
respond, but if Sunnis in other countries do respond and begin
attacking Shia, the conflict could spread dramatically and
quickly.
The U.S. Dilemma
There are two problems for the United States. The first is that
its dependency on the Iranians and the Shia could rapidly trap
them in unpleasant ways. The United States could quickly become
hostage to Iranian geopolitical dreams. Second, it follows that
the United States must work quickly to establish a balance of
power in the region. The traditional balance is between Iran and
Iraq. Whatever was promised Iran, if the Iraqi Shia can be
convinced that they have a national interest separate from their
religious interests, Iraq could become a counterweight. There is
tension between An Najaf, the seat of Iraqi Shia, and Qom, Iran's
religious capital. It is not clear that that tension is enough to
hang a strategy on, but the United States must find a way to
contain Iranian ambitions before the solution becomes the
problem.
If the United States is going to be the counterweight, then it
needs a geographical base to build on. Iraq can serve as a base
only if there is a broader regional framework into which it is
integrated. That means that two countries become vital to the
United States again: Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Turks, in the
end, have too many common interests with the United States not to
cooperate. It is the Saudis who become the real focus of
attention.
The Saudis have consistently miscalculated since Sept. 11. As a
result, they are moving into their worst nightmare: a domestic
insurrection, rising Shiite power and a hostile United States.
From the standpoint of Riyadh, things can't get much worse. The
Saudis have three choices. They can ally with the jihadists, and
face the United States and Iran together -- not a good idea. They
can try to make a deal with Iran and face the jihadists and the
Americans -- an even worse idea. Or they can turn back to the
United States and use American power to crush the jihadists at
home and serve as a shield against Iran -- not a great choice,
but the best of a bad lot. It is the choice they will have to
make.
That will mean the Saudis not only will shut down all financial
support for al Qaeda, but also will give the United States direct
access to Saudi intelligence files -- without exception -- and
access to Saudi nationals who are working with al Qaeda. That
will be the American price for any deal. If the Saudis make that
deal, al Qaeda will become much more visible to the United States
globally. It will mean the United States is likely to be in a
position to liquidate al Qaeda.
In the end, the United States can turn lemons into lemonade.
Having miscalculated on the guerrilla war and having been forced
to rely on the Shia and the Iranians, the United States -- if it
is both nimble and implacable -- can wind up running the table.
We are in a new phase of the war, and eyes are now turning back
to the original target: Saudi Arabia.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
05 March 2004
The War in Iraq: Redefining and Refocusing
Summary
The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
war in Iraq is reshaping itself, and that is redefining the
entire conflict -- and returning attention to Saudi Arabia.
Analysis
The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
war in Iraq is reshaping itself -- and that is redefining the
broader war. There are two aspects of this. The rate at which the
United States is incurring casualties in Iraq has declined
dramatically during the past month. One American died on March 2;
the last American deaths before that occurred Feb. 19. The tempo
of attacks on U.S. forces has declined, although not as
dramatically as the number of casualties. This indicates that the
guerrilla forces focused on U.S. troops have declined in both
number and quality.
The primary focus of guerrilla operations no longer seems to be
U.S. forces. The focus appears to be on Iraqis who collaborate
with the United States, and, more generally, on the Shiite
community. The Shia did not rise against the U.S. occupation and
have worked with the United States to facilitate a transfer of
power that will make them the dominant force in Iraq --
reflecting the fact that the Shia are 60 percent of the
population. Attacks on the Shia were signaled early last month
when a CD-ROM written by top al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
was captured by U.S. forces. The document on the CD-ROM indicated
a change in strategy, at least by the jihadist guerrilla faction,
away from the United States and toward the Shiite community.
The synchronized attacks on Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala
that killed at least 170 people and injured hundreds more on
March 2 -- Ashoura, a major religious occasion in Shiite Islam --
manifested this shift.
The guerrilla movement is split between the remnants of the
Baathist government and foreign jihadists who entered Iraq to
fight the United States. The two factions are different
ideologically and operationally. Ideologically, the Baathists are
secular and the jihadists are religious. Operationally, the
Baathists have focused on what might be called conventional
guerrilla warfare, concentrating on small-unit engagements with
American forces. The jihadists engage more in classical militant
operations against softer targets, in particular using suicide
bombers.
Since December 2003, we have been noting a decline in Baathist
operational capabilities. The decline has not been a straight
line down by any means, but it is now an undeniable reality. They
are certainly not what they were during the Ramadan offensive in
November 2003. Indeed, that offensive will probably be regarded
as their high-water mark. As the Baathist capabilities have
contracted, the relative significance of the jihadists has
increased. It appears that their numbers have risen, but that
might well be an illusion created by the decline of the
Baathists.
The leader of the jihadists appears to be al-Zarqawi, who has
made a fundamental strategic decision. First, it is clear that he
does not believe that the United States can be defeated by a
guerrilla war. Although that might have appeared conceivable
during the summer and fall of 2003, the failure of the Baathist
offensive, the redeployment of U.S. forces, the improvement in
U.S. intelligence and shifts in U.S. tactics have made American
forces impervious to guerrilla attacks. In effect, the United
States has won that campaign, and al-Zarqawi knows it.
Following from this first point, al-Zarqawi appears to have
reached a second conclusion: The primary cause of the failure of
the guerrilla war lies with Iraq's Shiite community. Had the Shia
acted in concert with the Sunnis, the U.S. position in Iraq would
have become untenable last fall. The guerrilla war in the Sunni
Triangle -- coupled with an intifada in the Shiite regions --
would have made continued American occupation of Iraq impossible.
If the United States had not withdrawn, it would have had to pull
its forces back into small, well-defended enclaves with minimal
control over the countryside. The situation would have resembled
Afghanistan.
Al-Zarqawi's analysis of what would have happened had there been
a violent uprising south of Baghdad is not at all unreasonable.
The United States did not have sufficient forces to suppress a
nationwide insurrection, nor did its political requirements
permit using an Israeli model for confronting an intifada and a
guerrilla war. The consequences of a Shiite rising would have
presented a grave problem for the United States.
The rising did not occur, and -- from al-Zarqawi's point of view
-- this has redefined the war. For him, the problem is not the
Americans. They could have been defeated if the Shia had only
played the appropriate role. But the Shia did not play their
role, and thereby saved the Americans. Therefore, the Shia are
the real enemy. In effect, the traditional fault line in the
Islamic world between Sunni and Shia has opened up. To be more
precise, the jihadists now see the key to victory in Iraq as
being a war against the Shia that either shatters them, or --
ideally -- forces them to change course and fall in behind the
jihadists. If that were to happen, the United States would be
defeated.
It is not at all clear that al-Zarqawi can succeed in his
mission. His support within the Iraqi Sunni community is not
overwhelming, particularly among Sunni leaders. Moreover, the
assumption that the Sunnis could win a showdown with the Shia is
doubtful. Finally, the United States is still in Iraq and clearly
is siding with the Shia against the jihadists. The jihadists can
launch the kinds of attacks they did this week, but the net
result is not likely to be either capitulation by the Shia or a
change of course. The likely result will be that al-Zarqawi will
find himself trapped between the Sunni elite, the Shia and the
United States -- a very tough place to be. Al-Zarqawi is not
going to win his point in Iraq.
Iran and the Islamic World
Still, his analysis applies to the broader Islamic world. The
Iraqi Shia did not rise against the Americans for two reasons.
First, they did not want to do anything that might result in a
Sunni government in Iraq. They had their fill of that under
Saddam Hussein. Second -- and this is more important -- the
Iranians who had helped organize and define the Iraqi Shiite
community had their own strategic interests. Iran wanted Iraq
either neutralized or turned into a protectorate of Iran. Iraq
was Iran's historical enemy, and the American problems in Iraq
gave the Iranians the opportunity they needed to redefine the
geopolitical status of Iraq -- a fundamental national interest
for Iran.
The Iranians were more concerned with pursuing their national
interests than their ideological and religious principles. They
were confronted with the choice of siding with their Islamic --
albeit Sunni -- brothers and driving the United States out of
Iraq, or siding with the United States against the Sunnis. They
decided to side with the United States. Their national interest
superseded their religious interests, or possibly they felt so
estranged from the Sunnis that they did not see a common
religious bond. Either way, the Iranians decided it was in their
interest not to drive the Americans out.
In the broader Islamic context, Iran is aligning with the United
States. This makes the U.S. position in the region impregnable --
or as close to it as possible. It also means that Saudi Arabia,
some of whose key subjects had been instrumental in financing al
Qaeda without significant interference from the Saudi state, is
now in very deep trouble. Regardless of antipathy between the
jihadists, including al Qaeda, and the Saudi government, Saudi
Arabia's problems affect them.
If the Islamic world is going to be torn by Sunni-Shiite strife,
then it needs to be remembered that, while the Shia are a small
minority in the Islamic world taken as a whole, they are a
powerful force -- and represent the majority population -- in the
Persian Gulf. For example, the Saudi oil fields are in a Shiite-
dominated region of Saudi Arabia. The entente between the United
States and Iran makes Iran enormously powerful in the Persian
Gulf region, both as the most powerful indigenous military force
and because of its ties to Shia throughout the region. As Iranian
domination of Iraq increases through a Shiite government there,
Saudi vulnerability increases dramatically.
In any generalized conflict between Sunnis and Shia, the Saudis
are vulnerable to both direct military action from Iran and
indirect subversion from their own Shiite population. Facing an
internal challenge from jihadists, the Saudis can quickly find
themselves trapped between the conservatives and the Iranian-
backed Shia. The conservatives might decide that the territorial
integrity of Saudi Arabia is of less importance than the
purification of the House of Saud, while the Iranians might view
the rise of a more extremist government in Riyadh as worth the
price of dominating Saudi oil fields. In other words, the Sunni-
Shiite confrontation could dramatically redraw the map of the
region.
The United States is, of course, the catalyst for all of this.
Its original intention was the unilateral governance of Iraq. The
guerrilla war created a dependency on the Shiites -- and on Iran
-- that runs counter to the original plan. At the same time, the
Iranian decision to underwrite U.S. presence in Iraq in exchange
for a long-term strategic advantage did more than simply save the
day for the Americans. It set in motion a potential conflict
between Sunnis and Shia that has two possible benefits. The first
is to divert the attention of jihadists from the United States to
the Shia. The second is to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia even
further, forcing the Saudis to look again to the United States as
the guarantor of their national security.
Obviously, neither Sunnis nor Shia want the United States to reap
the rewards of their conflict. Sunni and Shiite leaders in Iraq
have worked vigorously in the past few days to present a united
front against al-Zarqawi. In the broader war, a letter from al
Qaeda, which appears to be authentic, stated that al Qaeda was
neither involved in the bombings of Shia in Iraq, nor did it
approve of them. On the other hand, the letter did refer to the
Shia as infidels, which drives home the point: Al Qaeda does not
want to benefit the United States, but its hostility toward the
Shia runs deep. A confrontation with the Shia, in the end, could
prove irresistible.
We have long discussed the growing U.S.-Iranian entente. Now that
it is here, it has generated the inevitable jihadist response.
The most important question in the next few weeks will be whether
the jihadist attacks on the Shia in Iraq -- and elsewhere, such
as in Pakistan and Lebanon -- will resonate among the Sunni
masses. At the moment, it does not seem to be working, but the
situation is volatile. Moreover, the Sunnis in Iraq might not
respond, but if Sunnis in other countries do respond and begin
attacking Shia, the conflict could spread dramatically and
quickly.
The U.S. Dilemma
There are two problems for the United States. The first is that
its dependency on the Iranians and the Shia could rapidly trap
them in unpleasant ways. The United States could quickly become
hostage to Iranian geopolitical dreams. Second, it follows that
the United States must work quickly to establish a balance of
power in the region. The traditional balance is between Iran and
Iraq. Whatever was promised Iran, if the Iraqi Shia can be
convinced that they have a national interest separate from their
religious interests, Iraq could become a counterweight. There is
tension between An Najaf, the seat of Iraqi Shia, and Qom, Iran's
religious capital. It is not clear that that tension is enough to
hang a strategy on, but the United States must find a way to
contain Iranian ambitions before the solution becomes the
problem.
If the United States is going to be the counterweight, then it
needs a geographical base to build on. Iraq can serve as a base
only if there is a broader regional framework into which it is
integrated. That means that two countries become vital to the
United States again: Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Turks, in the
end, have too many common interests with the United States not to
cooperate. It is the Saudis who become the real focus of
attention.
The Saudis have consistently miscalculated since Sept. 11. As a
result, they are moving into their worst nightmare: a domestic
insurrection, rising Shiite power and a hostile United States.
From the standpoint of Riyadh, things can't get much worse. The
Saudis have three choices. They can ally with the jihadists, and
face the United States and Iran together -- not a good idea. They
can try to make a deal with Iran and face the jihadists and the
Americans -- an even worse idea. Or they can turn back to the
United States and use American power to crush the jihadists at
home and serve as a shield against Iran -- not a great choice,
but the best of a bad lot. It is the choice they will have to
make.
That will mean the Saudis not only will shut down all financial
support for al Qaeda, but also will give the United States direct
access to Saudi intelligence files -- without exception -- and
access to Saudi nationals who are working with al Qaeda. That
will be the American price for any deal. If the Saudis make that
deal, al Qaeda will become much more visible to the United States
globally. It will mean the United States is likely to be in a
position to liquidate al Qaeda.
In the end, the United States can turn lemons into lemonade.
Having miscalculated on the guerrilla war and having been forced
to rely on the Shia and the Iranians, the United States -- if it
is both nimble and implacable -- can wind up running the table.
We are in a new phase of the war, and eyes are now turning back
to the original target: Saudi Arabia.
I guess that explains everything.
