Sean Smith
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- Joined
- Dec 28, 2002
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Preface: This is something I wrote a while before the war started. It is speculation on what Iraq would have to do in order to have a chance of "winning" a war against the U.S.
Some of it has come true, and some of it hasn't happened. At least not yet. It does appear that this is, in general, the strategy that Iraq is actually persuing. It does not, however, appear that they are executing it well enough to significantly hinder our operations. At any rate, hopefully this will provoke some more thought than the "talking head" idiocy you see on CNN. So here goes...
How could Saddam Hussein fight against the United States? By any kind of objective measure, the second Persian Gulf War is shaping up to be a spectacular cakewalk. Iraq is weaker now than it was in 1990, and with an even bigger U.S. edge in all forms of military technology it seems that the Iraqi position is hopeless. But is it?
The answer is, surprisingly, no. Of course, Iraq has no hope of winning a “conventional†force-on-force engagement with the U.S. military. But forming up a phalanx in the open desert and charging is not the only way to wage war, and America can win all the battles and still lose the war. The fact that we are still discussing Saddam Hussein at all is a testament to that fact. Iraq has the means to make military victory so costly that it is indistinguishable in the public mind from defeat.
The United States has a vast superiority in air power, providing both an immense intelligence advantage, and wide-ranging striking power that is largely invulnerable to Iraqi counter-measures. The latest M1 tanks are essentially immune to all Iraqi anti-tank weapons, and can destroy all Iraqi armored combat vehicles with near-total impunity. This advantage cannot be overstated, since ground forces (not air forces) destroyed the vast majority of Iraqi armor in the last war. And finally, U.S. forces have a vast superiority in the human quality and training of their soldiers.
It follows, then, that the Iraqi forces need to find some way to negate, offset or minimize these considerable disadvantages. This might seem like a hopeless task. But there are many examples in military history of the weak defeating the strong. Victory isn’t about what you have, but how you use what you have. In other words, adapting ends and means to resources available.
So let’s talk about ends first. What is the larger political goal of Iraqi resistance to a U.S. invasion? Something along the lines of, “The complete overthrow of American economic and military power†is simply not a realistic goal. On the other hand, past defeats of the United States do suggest some ambitious, but achievable, political objectives:
1. Compel U.S. military forces to leave the country.
2. Discourage future American intervention in the region.
3. Discredit the United States and its policies.
If these goals seem unachievable, consider the example of Somalia. With nothing but disorganized clan-based paramilitary groups and armed civilian mobs, one Somali warlord precipitated the total withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the country. In terms of U.S. policy in Africa, it was a spectacular defeat for the United States that still resounds to this day. In this light, Iraq’s prospects suddenly seem less gloomy.
Which leads us right into the means used to achieve the end. The means, of course, are constrained by the resources available. This is why a conventional military campaign is not an acceptable means for the Iraqis to use; they do not have the human, material, or technical resources to pull it off. But a conventional military campaign is not the only option, which is why the Iraqi position is not completely hopeless. Iraq does have the means to pursue an unconventional campaign that would have an excellent chance of accomplishing Saddam Hussein’s larger political objectives.
However, to do so Saddam Hussein would have to take a number of steps that run contrary to his nature as a dictator. He would have to de-centralize command and control of his armed forces. He would even have to devolve authority to use chemical and biological weapons down to the lowest possible level. For maximum effect, he would have to arm the population he has ruled. These are all dangerous and radical things for a dictator to do. What is a tyrant without his tyranny?
This matters because U.S. forces will almost certainly attack Iraqi communications, and largely wipe them out, within the opening hours of a campaign. Centralized control of the Iraqi armed forces will be impossible under these circumstances. An Iraqi force organized on the assumption of micro-management from the highest levels will degenerate into a formless mass of targets. This was essentially what happened in our first war against Iraq, and part of the reason why it was such a quick victory.
To accomplish its policy objectives, Iraq needs to fight a different kind of war… a chaotic, de-centralized urban battle that dispenses with all traditional moral limitations on the use of force in war. In can be described, in general, as follows:
I. Basic Principles
a. Avoid large-scale, force-on-force engagements in open terrain.
b. Deploy armed forces almost exclusively in urban areas.
c. De-centralize command and control to the maximum extent possible.
d. Employ propaganda to incite the civilian population to resist the attacker.
e. Use the international media to influence world public opinion.
II. General advantages for defenders of urban terrain
a. Severely limits U.S. mobility, especially of heavy weapons like tanks.
b. Limits effectiveness of U.S. technical intelligence systems.
c. Plentiful cover and concealment for defending forces.
d. Harder to deliver firepower effectively due to constrained lines of sight.
e. American firepower advantage cannot be exploited without killing more civilians.
f. Armed forces can hide in civilian population.
g. Civilian population can provide manpower to directly participate in the fighting.
III. Some Tactical Considerations
a. Make extensive use of mines, obstacles, booby traps, demolitions, and pre-emplaced chemical weapons.
b. Mix armed forces with the civilian population.
c. Arm the civilian population, to include women and children if possible.
d. Hit and run with small groups, e.g. snipers and RPG teams.
e. Use crowds of civilians as cover for attacks.
f. Stage atrocities to blame on the attacking forces.
g. Plan well in advance to minimize need for higher-level direction of operations.
h. Do not allow civilian evacuation of urban areas.
IV. Short-Term Goals
a. Inflict as many casualties on the Americans as possible.
b. Create situations that force U.S. forces to kill large numbers of civilians.
c. Slow the tempo of military operations as much as possible.
V. Long-Term Goals
a. Cause American forces to withdraw as a result of politically unacceptable loss of life (both military and civilian).
b. Discourage future American intervention in the region.
c. Discredit the United States and its policies.
VI. Prerequisites
a. Willingness to accept disproportionate losses in order to cause U.S. casualties.
b. Willingness to delegate authority to an extreme degree.
c. Ability to cope with extremely chaotic conditions.
d. Willingness to sacrifice your civilian population for tactical or propaganda advantage.
This may seem like an utterly barbaric strategy. And it is. But it also works, and it would be naïve in the extreme to think that the tyrannical dictators that we find ourselves fighting are above such behavior. Especially since what I described above is almost exactly what the Somalis did in the Battle of Mogadishu. Add “jungle†to “urban†above, and you essentially have the victorious North Vietnamese strategy. Sure, the U.S. won virtually all the battles. Sure, the casualty exchange ratio was something like 10:1, if not higher. But who cares? War does not exist in a vacuum of battles and campaigns; it is supposed to accomplish a political goal. The American military in particular has a tendency to want to dissociate itself from everything but fighting battles. But battles are a means, not an end. In Vietnam and Somalia, the enemy accomplished their ends, and the U.S. didn’t. In the end, that is all that matters in war.
None of which to say that American defeat in Iraq is certain if they use this strategy. Quite the opposite. However, of the many bad strategic options for Saddam Hussein to choose from, this is the path most likely to lead to an outcome other than total defeat.
Some of it has come true, and some of it hasn't happened. At least not yet. It does appear that this is, in general, the strategy that Iraq is actually persuing. It does not, however, appear that they are executing it well enough to significantly hinder our operations. At any rate, hopefully this will provoke some more thought than the "talking head" idiocy you see on CNN. So here goes...
How could Saddam Hussein fight against the United States? By any kind of objective measure, the second Persian Gulf War is shaping up to be a spectacular cakewalk. Iraq is weaker now than it was in 1990, and with an even bigger U.S. edge in all forms of military technology it seems that the Iraqi position is hopeless. But is it?
The answer is, surprisingly, no. Of course, Iraq has no hope of winning a “conventional†force-on-force engagement with the U.S. military. But forming up a phalanx in the open desert and charging is not the only way to wage war, and America can win all the battles and still lose the war. The fact that we are still discussing Saddam Hussein at all is a testament to that fact. Iraq has the means to make military victory so costly that it is indistinguishable in the public mind from defeat.
The United States has a vast superiority in air power, providing both an immense intelligence advantage, and wide-ranging striking power that is largely invulnerable to Iraqi counter-measures. The latest M1 tanks are essentially immune to all Iraqi anti-tank weapons, and can destroy all Iraqi armored combat vehicles with near-total impunity. This advantage cannot be overstated, since ground forces (not air forces) destroyed the vast majority of Iraqi armor in the last war. And finally, U.S. forces have a vast superiority in the human quality and training of their soldiers.
It follows, then, that the Iraqi forces need to find some way to negate, offset or minimize these considerable disadvantages. This might seem like a hopeless task. But there are many examples in military history of the weak defeating the strong. Victory isn’t about what you have, but how you use what you have. In other words, adapting ends and means to resources available.
So let’s talk about ends first. What is the larger political goal of Iraqi resistance to a U.S. invasion? Something along the lines of, “The complete overthrow of American economic and military power†is simply not a realistic goal. On the other hand, past defeats of the United States do suggest some ambitious, but achievable, political objectives:
1. Compel U.S. military forces to leave the country.
2. Discourage future American intervention in the region.
3. Discredit the United States and its policies.
If these goals seem unachievable, consider the example of Somalia. With nothing but disorganized clan-based paramilitary groups and armed civilian mobs, one Somali warlord precipitated the total withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the country. In terms of U.S. policy in Africa, it was a spectacular defeat for the United States that still resounds to this day. In this light, Iraq’s prospects suddenly seem less gloomy.
Which leads us right into the means used to achieve the end. The means, of course, are constrained by the resources available. This is why a conventional military campaign is not an acceptable means for the Iraqis to use; they do not have the human, material, or technical resources to pull it off. But a conventional military campaign is not the only option, which is why the Iraqi position is not completely hopeless. Iraq does have the means to pursue an unconventional campaign that would have an excellent chance of accomplishing Saddam Hussein’s larger political objectives.
However, to do so Saddam Hussein would have to take a number of steps that run contrary to his nature as a dictator. He would have to de-centralize command and control of his armed forces. He would even have to devolve authority to use chemical and biological weapons down to the lowest possible level. For maximum effect, he would have to arm the population he has ruled. These are all dangerous and radical things for a dictator to do. What is a tyrant without his tyranny?
This matters because U.S. forces will almost certainly attack Iraqi communications, and largely wipe them out, within the opening hours of a campaign. Centralized control of the Iraqi armed forces will be impossible under these circumstances. An Iraqi force organized on the assumption of micro-management from the highest levels will degenerate into a formless mass of targets. This was essentially what happened in our first war against Iraq, and part of the reason why it was such a quick victory.
To accomplish its policy objectives, Iraq needs to fight a different kind of war… a chaotic, de-centralized urban battle that dispenses with all traditional moral limitations on the use of force in war. In can be described, in general, as follows:
I. Basic Principles
a. Avoid large-scale, force-on-force engagements in open terrain.
b. Deploy armed forces almost exclusively in urban areas.
c. De-centralize command and control to the maximum extent possible.
d. Employ propaganda to incite the civilian population to resist the attacker.
e. Use the international media to influence world public opinion.
II. General advantages for defenders of urban terrain
a. Severely limits U.S. mobility, especially of heavy weapons like tanks.
b. Limits effectiveness of U.S. technical intelligence systems.
c. Plentiful cover and concealment for defending forces.
d. Harder to deliver firepower effectively due to constrained lines of sight.
e. American firepower advantage cannot be exploited without killing more civilians.
f. Armed forces can hide in civilian population.
g. Civilian population can provide manpower to directly participate in the fighting.
III. Some Tactical Considerations
a. Make extensive use of mines, obstacles, booby traps, demolitions, and pre-emplaced chemical weapons.
b. Mix armed forces with the civilian population.
c. Arm the civilian population, to include women and children if possible.
d. Hit and run with small groups, e.g. snipers and RPG teams.
e. Use crowds of civilians as cover for attacks.
f. Stage atrocities to blame on the attacking forces.
g. Plan well in advance to minimize need for higher-level direction of operations.
h. Do not allow civilian evacuation of urban areas.
IV. Short-Term Goals
a. Inflict as many casualties on the Americans as possible.
b. Create situations that force U.S. forces to kill large numbers of civilians.
c. Slow the tempo of military operations as much as possible.
V. Long-Term Goals
a. Cause American forces to withdraw as a result of politically unacceptable loss of life (both military and civilian).
b. Discourage future American intervention in the region.
c. Discredit the United States and its policies.
VI. Prerequisites
a. Willingness to accept disproportionate losses in order to cause U.S. casualties.
b. Willingness to delegate authority to an extreme degree.
c. Ability to cope with extremely chaotic conditions.
d. Willingness to sacrifice your civilian population for tactical or propaganda advantage.
This may seem like an utterly barbaric strategy. And it is. But it also works, and it would be naïve in the extreme to think that the tyrannical dictators that we find ourselves fighting are above such behavior. Especially since what I described above is almost exactly what the Somalis did in the Battle of Mogadishu. Add “jungle†to “urban†above, and you essentially have the victorious North Vietnamese strategy. Sure, the U.S. won virtually all the battles. Sure, the casualty exchange ratio was something like 10:1, if not higher. But who cares? War does not exist in a vacuum of battles and campaigns; it is supposed to accomplish a political goal. The American military in particular has a tendency to want to dissociate itself from everything but fighting battles. But battles are a means, not an end. In Vietnam and Somalia, the enemy accomplished their ends, and the U.S. didn’t. In the end, that is all that matters in war.
None of which to say that American defeat in Iraq is certain if they use this strategy. Quite the opposite. However, of the many bad strategic options for Saddam Hussein to choose from, this is the path most likely to lead to an outcome other than total defeat.
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