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New Army head - looks like interesting times...

Discussion in 'Legal' started by Preacherman, May 9, 2003.

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  1. Preacherman

    Preacherman Member

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    From MSNBC (http://www.msnbc.com/news/910220.asp?0dm=C1ERO&cp1=1):

    Transforming the Army

    Rumsfeld’s pick to head the Army isn’t likely to sit well with the generals

    By Fred Kaplan
    SLATE.COM

    May 7 — It was thoroughly predictable that, after the swift victory in Gulf War II, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would wage his next war against the hidebound generals of the U.S. Army. Now that war has begun.

    RUMSFELD FIRED HIS first shots last Thursday night when he let it be known that a man named James G. Roche will be his new secretary of the Army.

    Roche is an extremely intriguing — and, to any senior Army officer, an equally shocking — candidate for the job. First, he’s a 23-year veteran, and retired captain, of the Navy. Second, for the past two years, he’s been secretary of the Air Force. It’s unusual enough for Rumsfeld to appoint a service secretary who’s had no experience with the service in question. It’s a blatant poke in the eye to pick someone who comes from a rival service. It’s a poke in the eye and a kick in the groin to name someone who’s built up years of allegiance to two rivals.

    LIGHTENING THE ARMY

    The Washington Post and Washington Times both highlighted the insult when they broke the news in Friday’s editions. However, neither paper noted another fact about Roche that makes his appointment not merely a symbolic slash but a profound and substantive statement on the Army’s future direction. For several years, Roche has been closely associated with a group inside the Pentagon that the Army top brass deeply abhors. This group advocates remaking the military — and especially the Army — into a lighter, faster fighting force.

    The key figure in this group is a little-known — but, within the Pentagon, highly controversial — official named Andrew Marshall. Marshall is the director of Net Assessment, a position created by then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973. Even though it was a politically appointed post, Marshall has cultivated the bureaucratic savvy to remain on the job ever since.

    From 1975 to 1979, while he was still in the Navy, Roche was Marshall’s chief military assistant.

    Through these past 30 years, Marshall has been exceptionally adroit at carving out special projects — taking small strands of ideas scattered in various bureaucratic corners and stringing them together into coherent programs that would otherwise not have come into existence. For the past decade, Marshall’s main project has been what some call “military transformation†or “the revolution in military affairs.†(For a while, the latter was even ascribed an acronym — RMA.)

    STRIKE FORCE

    The premise of RMA is that, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of new technology, it no longer makes sense to keep large military forces permanently positioned in one place, especially not in Europe. Future wars will be in Asia or the Middle East. They will involve precision-guided weapons, which make heavily concentrated forces sitting ducks. They will be lightning wars, they could break out in any number of possible places, they might start with little warning, and they must be fought with great agility. One implication of this vision was that the U.S. military should focus more on buying missiles, long-range aircraft, unmanned drones, and “smart bombs.†Another implication was that ground forces would play a smaller role and that the Army must be reformed, made lighter and lither, so it can be transported more rapidly and supported on the battlefield with shorter, less vulnerable supply lines.

    In the years when Roche worked with Marshall, the RMA concept hadn’t yet been fully hatched. But, according to associates of both men, they have stayed in close touch ever since. Roche also has a long association with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Both worked in the State Department’s policy-planning staff in the early ’80s and have remained good friends. Wolfowitz too is a strong RMA advocate.

    After retiring from the Navy in 1983 and serving a brief stint as Democratic staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roche went to work for the analytic center of the Northrop Corp. (which later became Northrop Grumman). Over the next 17 years, Roche (who, years earlier, had also earned an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School) rose through the corporate ranks, knocking once-moribund outfits into profitable shape at each step. Finally, he took charge of its defense electronics and systems sector. It was a position that gave him firm grounding in an important dimension of “transformation†theory — the idea that the electronics inside, say, an airplane are more important than the airplane itself. It was from this position that Rumsfeld recruited Roche to be secretary of the Air Force, in May 2001.

    Around this same time, Rumsfeld — having taken the Pentagon’s helm just a few months earlier — started conducting a comprehensive review of the entire U.S. military. Rumsfeld had known Marshall from 25 years earlier, when he briefly served as secretary of defense under President Ford. Now he put Marshall in charge of a major swath of the review. To no one’s surprise, the review took on an RMA flavor.

    The Army establishment hated Rumsfeld’s review, and many generals openly rebelled against it. After a yearlong fight, the culture of the Pentagon — where defense secretaries come and go, but four-star generals stay forever — proved too strong. Rumsfeld had to retreat, notching up just one significant budgetary victory (the cancellation of the Army’s Crusader artillery gun, which Rumsfeld had fingered as too big and bulky for the swift and mobile military of the future).

    The Army generals who fought Rumsfeld on the Crusader and other issues two years ago were, in many cases, the same generals (and retired generals) who openly criticized his war plan two months ago during the heat of battle in Iraq. Some of these generals used their critique of the war plan to reinforce their long-standing campaign against the RMA school’s advocacy of a lighter Army. They said Rumsfeld’s war plan called for too few troops and tanks; it was too light. Then, to the surprise of many and for reasons not yet not understood, the critics were proved wrong.

    TURNING THE TABLES

    Now, with his postwar political favor riding high, Rumsfeld is turning the tables, using the triumph of the “light†force in Iraq as a weapon — the rhetorical equivalent of heavy artillery — in his renewed battles against the Army brass. And in that battle, James Roche will be the wedge that breaches through the line.

    Rumsfeld signaled his intentions a few weeks ago, when he told the Army secretary, Thomas White, that he wanted to replace him with someone new. Then, after White marked June 9 as his date of departure, Rumsfeld had Wolfowitz call White to tell him to move out by May 9. Already, Rumsfeld had made it clear that he would accept the resignation of Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, with whom he had tangled several times, most recently when Shinseki told a congressional committee that “hundreds of thousands†of U.S. troops would have to stay in Iraq after a war, a view that Wolfowitz was called out to denounce in harsh terms. (The new chief of staff is likely to be Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of Centcom, who directed Gulf War II and remained loyal to Rumsfeld throughout.)

    Civilian service secretaries are often figureheads, but they have enormous statutory authority, and Roche is likely to exercise that authority with Rumsfeld’s blessing. Eliot Cohen, the author of Supreme Command and an experienced military consultant, notes, for example, that service secretaries have enormous influence over the appointments of new generals. A key ingredient of “military transformation†is the grooming of new military leaders, and Roche will take a hand in that. “If I were a creative Army captain, I’d find Roche’s appointment kind of exciting,†Cohen said. “If I were a three-star general, I’d be very scared.â€
     
  2. Blackcloud6

    Blackcloud6 Member

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    Funny how those "hide-bound" generals just won a war and conqured a country with an obsolete heavy force.
     
  3. Navy joe

    Navy joe Member

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    I'm all for rapid movement forces, "From the Sea" warfare, and reduction in permanently deployed forces. I think where these modernization guys really step on their crank is when they insist that there is no need for heavy armored forces and want more infantry fighting vehicles and light fast air droppable recon type tanks.

    RPG's aren't going away. Even backwater third world country can make them cheap and plenty. Infantry will always have to go on the ground, and when they are there they do not need the support of some smart cruise missile loitering over the battlefield. They do not need a cool plastic rifle linked to their laptop. They need big, ugly, slow, expensive to support heavy tanks and close air support( A-10). Organic mobile firepower that has the means to stand and slug it out without getting shot full of holes.
     
  4. Boats

    Boats member

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    Gen. Franks and his staff are not the hidebound brass in the SecDef's sights. That target rich environment is at the Pentagon.

    I was a sailor, but I follow procurement issues for all of the services with some interest because their spending priorities, like anyone's, reflect their interests, but not necessarily their best interests. All of the services have questionable projects, guarded like fiefdoms, that are borderline moronic.

    For an eternity the Army has been advocates of weapons platforms, like the Comanche, that don't add capability over the current line unit, or are too massive for MAC, like the Crusader. Taking months to get set pieces into place is a luxury that brushfire wars will not allow. I feel for the troops at the Korean DMZ if they ever get into it with North Korea because they will be heavily outnumbered and the Army seemingly takes weeks to get anywhere in any force.

    The Air Force has been highly resistant to drone aircraft and has a historical disdain for developing CAS or massive MAC assets. Even now they don't train enough FACs for the groundpounders to meet demand.

    The Navy built the Seawolf when the Soviets/Russians already couldn't detect the current boats. The Navy never seems interested in developing a RO/RO fleet of any size or speed. Mercifully, they have been ensuring that all non-carrier warships can vert launch TLAMs.

    The Marine Corps has their Osprey, which should be renamed to the Albatross. I appreciate the Corps' deployment flexibility, but the Navy doesn't fund them as well as it should.

    All of the services could stand a prolonged bout of introspection concerning their relative missions and service overlap. The Cold War is over and resources should be shifted and doctrine adjusted to reflect that fact. It won't be Rumsfeld providing the resistance to that.

    This is not to say that Rumsfeld is right about everything. The supply lines in GWII were too exposed and had too light security forces. However, old school paranoiacs like Shinseki have to go and go now. I have now doubt that if General Shinseki had planned the Iraqi invasion, we'd still be watching the build-up.:rolleyes:
     
  5. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Let's just hope that we never have to fight an army that's willing to fight.

    Jeff
     
  6. amprecon

    amprecon Member

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    I've always been a proponent of reducing the services to three, land, air and sea.

    Everyone that I bring this idea to usually looks at me funny and thinks it absurd, and maybe for good reason. But I believe it needs to be given some serious consideration.

    I spent 10 years in the Navy and I saw alot of duplicity and redundancy and in some cases it's necessary. But for example, for the Air Force to order the F-15 and F-16 and the Navy to order F-14's and F-18's is redundant when both aircraft can do the same thing save the F-14 and F-18 can land on carriers.

    I'm sure the Army and Marine Corp have alot of the same equipment. The Air Force had the F-111 Aardvark electronic counter warfare aircraft and the Navy uses the EA-6B Prowler which I believe the Air Force is using as well.

    I'd hate to see the Navy lose the air wings, but if the same job can be done with less bureaucracy and less money spent then it needs serious consideration.

    Why not train all pilots to land on carriers? Why not train all pilots in close ground support as the Marine pilots are? Why not train all soldiers to Marine Corps standards? Sure, you might have less of them, but you would have a much larger Marine capable force.

    There is a great potential to streamline the forces and still maintain or even exceed their performance all the while saving millions of taxpayer dollars.
     
  7. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    There is plenty that could be changed in the military. For instance, how many C17s could we buy if we cancelled the F22?

    How many fast roll on/roll off transport ships can we build for the cost of the Seawolf submarine?

    Why can't we keep the F/A 18, F16 and F15 in production? Where is the Air Force that can challenge those aircraft in air to air combat? Does anyone know? Who is buildding a fighter that makes those obsolete?

    Why do we need the V-22 Osprey when we could put the CH53 back into production? Why don't we replace the CH46 with the CH47?

    Why not build a super Paladin instead of Crusader? Crusader was so expensive and so heavy because it had to have the capability of providing the same amount of steel on target as a much larger number of Paladins and M198s.

    Why did the Apache do so poorly in Operation Iraqi Freedom? Well, it's not designed to fight pure. If those old school paranoiacs had been permitted to deploy the Corps Field Artillery assets that would have fired SEAD missions for the Apaches, the atttack against the Medina Division would have went much better. Of course giving the commander the correct force mix to fight doctrinally against even the 5th rate enemy that was the Iraqi army wouldn't have permitted the Secretary of Defense to prove his pet theories.

    The recent victory in Iraq was not a validation of Transformation. I suggest that it won't be validated until we fight an enemy that wants to fight. The results might not be as good.

    The Secretary of Defense better be concerning himself with the ability of our industrial base to sustain our high tech forces. We have been reduced to buying back CH47s from our allies to upgrade to MH47s to replace the ones we lost in Afghanistan and the Phillipines.

    Jeff
     
  8. Waitone

    Waitone Member

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    I just love it when warfare takes an evolutionary step the professional pundits and politicians think "new way to fight war" therefore forget everything we learned in the past and we'll just do what's new. Thankfully we have military leaders who know what its like to have one's bacon hanging in the fire to stop this nonsense.

    Gulf II was unique for a lot of reasons; one of which was "light" forces. Change any number of factors and the story would be different. Examples? Iraq has an air force with teeth. Iraq has a force with mobile artillery. Iraq has mechanized forces. We lucked up when we opted to move fast vs protecting our supply lines. It could have been a disaster.

    All the gee-whiz toys would be worthless in the Phillipines. Put Iraq in the mountains and life is different. Open desert warfare is ideal for mobile warfare. Mountains ain't. Jungles ain't. Was the Apache worthless in view of its failures? Don't think so. The Apache suffered from the wrong tactics. It was designed to operate at the forward edge of the battle area where everything behind it was swept clean with no enemy forces behind them. Apaches were not used as they were designed.

    Does he army need to get light? Yep! That too. Does it need to look like Marine units? Nope. Different jobs, different environments. Can the army learn from combined arms operations? You betcha. So does other branches. Does that mean the US needs to get rid of its heavy units? Bad mistake. Remember well that a $50.00 RPG round can defeat a Bradley, stop an Abrahms, and drop an Apache. Who ever calls the shots on hardware had better have a good idea of tactics or a lot of 19 year old pimpled face grunts will pay the price.
     
  9. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    Waitone, doesn't it seem that we did what we did in Iraq, in the way we did it, just because of what the Iraqis didn't have? So: If we have an enemy who has what Iraq did not have, isn't it reasonable to think we'd do things differently?

    SFAIK, our air power is unmatched. SFAIK, our competence in the use of artillery and mobile armor is unmatched. That seems to be the Israeli take, from what I've read.

    Just because we go to a more mobile force-system and go for a faster deployment capability doesn't mean we'll totally abandon our other war toys and tactics...

    Art
     
  10. Blackcloud6

    Blackcloud6 Member

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    >>However, old school paranoiacs like Shinseki have to go and go now. I have now doubt that if General Shinseki had planned the Iraqi invasion, we'd still be watching the build-up.<<

    So they guy who, by force of personality, got the army to field the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams in 3 years and drove the development of the Future Combat System is an Old School Paraanoiac?

    The reason why he got on bad terms with Rumsfeld is that he fought for the Crusader whyich we could have used very effectively in GWII. But nobody is allowed to stand up to Rummy's super ego.

    If it wasn't for 911 and Rumsfeld's daily TV show, he would have been canned two years ago.

    He's not too different from MacNamara is my book. Thinks he's smarter than all the officers with 25-30+ years service.
     
  11. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Blackcloud6,
    Careful about picking on Rumsfeld around here. He's right up there with Bush II with a lot of members here...he can't do any wrong. He's the greatest military mind since von Clauswitz. :rolleyes:

    The sad part is that we'll pay in blood for his foolishness. I predict that history will put him him right up there with MacNamara.

    The very idea that no enemy will ever figure out countermeasures to our technology is insane. Right now those who would harm us are reviewing our recent victory and looking for ways to nullify our advantages. They will come up with some. It's the way things are, and always have been. This idea that we are somehow omnipotent militarily is dangerous. Yet the public feels that way. I wonder how many young men and women will have to die before the people recognize Rumsfeld for what he is, a corporate executive who has no understanding of war or the men and women he asks to fight it for him.

    Digital communications and fire control will not make lessons that were learned in blood obsolete. They may make it easier to mass forces at the decisive place and time on the battlefield, but they won't replace those forces. Weather will still interfere with our air ops. And we'll never be able to build enough aircraft to keep them orbiting the battlefield 24/7.

    Jeff
     
  12. Blackcloud6

    Blackcloud6 Member

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    >>Digital communications and fire control will not make lessons that were learned in blood obsolete. They may make it easier to mass forces at the decisive place and time on the battlefield, but they won't replace those forces. <<

    Jeff:

    You are right on the mark.

    Our major problem is getting to the fight, I feel that money would be better spent on C-17 like aircraft and the HSV (High Speed Vessel).

    One this GWII showed me is that infantry is still the most important arm on the battlefield and there needs to be well protected veheicles to support them, transport them and provide firepower.

    The FCS is a great idea except for one part, the requirement to fly it in a 50 year old airplane desgin: the C-130. Thje design trades to do so place too much of a weight burden on the vehicle.

    The final straw on my feelings for Rumsfeld was when the press was reporting that "the plan" was failing because of the stretched supply lines and vulnerability to ambushes, what came out of DoD was that the paln was "Tommy Frank's plan." But when victory happened, it bacame "Rumsfeld's plan."

    As the old saying goes: "Victory has 100 father while defeat is an orphan."
     
  13. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    Jeff & Blackcloud6: I got over any sort of "veneration" of VIPs when I watched multi-star generals quivering and pooping in worry about ICBMs. That was in 1957, during the Hungarian crisis. I was a peon at Hq US European Command, in Paris. I tend toward a "Hackworthian" view of the military...

    That said, I think you're jumping a bit early at Rumsfeld, et al. You might well prove out to be correct, but my opinion is that it's too early to hold your views. MacNamara's "management" concept screwed up an entire military system and destroyed morale pretty much on a system-wide basis. So far, that's not our problem.

    As for enemy figuring countermeasures, which enemy do you have in mind? Most of our current thinking, I believe, doesn't foresee any serious conflict with Russia, China or India before another ten or fifteen years--as near as I can tell.

    Weather? That's a real problem if we can't pick and choose as to when WE attack somebody, or if somebody attacks us under cover of bad weather. Even so, a GPS doesn't care about the weather. It's sorta like the USPS motto...

    My gripe with stuff like the Herc is that while the design seems okay, good to go, the age of the airframes means we oughta build brand-new critters. Osprey? Neat idea, but too much violation of the KISS principle in defiance of Mr. Murphy.

    $0.02 and FWIW and all that...

    :), Art
     
  14. Waitone

    Waitone Member

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    That's a 10-4 there good buddy! It was real clear to me the military had its hands all over ther operation. Rummy was no doubt poking, prodding, irritating, challenging, infuriating, etc. the brass. Which in my opinion is his job. The brass knew exactly what the Iraqi's had and more importantly what they didn't have. The US was therefore able to use the required combat power to achieve its goals.

    Now change the Rummy to Aspen; change Bush 43 to Clinton 1; change Iraq to Mogadishu (?sp). While the missions were completely different the principals were the same. Politicians created the mission to which the military planned and asked for certain hardware. The politicans knew better what the military needed than the military and hence created a defeat that echo's to this day.

    Don't get me wrong. The Army in particular has to get lighter and faster but it can not allow well meaning but basically ignorant politicans to make hardware decisions which are not reflected in tactics to be used.

    I am a cracker barrel Civil War nut. One of the many reasons why the American Civil War was so bloody is because it came about in the interection in history of rapidly evolving battlefield technology, lagging tactics designed to deal with changing technology, and inept military leadership on both sides. I say inept because the US didn't have the advantage of almost 600 years of constant large force battles. The US knew small unit tactics but not large scale tactics.

    The danger we face in "transforming" the military is exactly the same danger we fell to in the 1970's when we decided human intelligence is messy and electronic intelligence is clean. We eventually took outselves out of the human intelligence game and it took 30 years for the effect to be seen. I fear in our desire to do war cheap we will do what we can to reduce boots on the ground thinking we can win war from the air. It ain't happened yet though we tried mightly. War for the future will always breakdown to feet on the ground. We are setting ourselves up for failure if we forget our lessons.
     
  15. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    I'm pretty much in accord with the view that a war ain't over until an 18-year-old grunt can sit on his helmet and eat his MREs without worrying about who's behind him. It ain't won until the victor can occupy the ground and have complete control.

    With GPS controlling where a bomb hits, and with remote TV in drones, I think the classic field artillery is less needed than in the past.

    The American automobile and the Abrams' fire control system have proven that computers can function in a harsh environment. Outside of that particular bit of complexity, I'm still a firm believer in the KISS principle and Mr. Murphy's 7/24 competency...

    :), Art
     
  16. fallingblock

    fallingblock Member

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    Dang, Art.....

    I didn't know you were in the Army in the Eisenhower days:)

    I was in two different 155mm towed howitzer F.A. units in 1967/68, and while they could sure put some hurt on the other side...it took a long time to deploy the guns compared to a S.P. Gun, and forever compared to today's remote-T.V. drone or GPS-guided air-delivered ordnance...not to mention being relatively vulnerable to ground attack (Bravo Battery of the 5/42nd F.A. was overrun in Vietnam due to their mistakenly running a fire mission outside their infantry perimeter).

    I agree with your evaluation...there needs to be flexibility to meld the old with the new and keep the edge...;)
     
  17. Leatherneck

    Leatherneck Member

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    Interesting times indeed. Word around the Pentagon is that Roche is Rumsfeld's axe-wielder, as in: "You want to shed 3 Divisions? I'm your man." Further, there is a "study" proposal being finalized that will be executed by Pete Aldridge right after he departs 5/23: "How to reorganize DoD (including the JCS and service staffs)." Watch this space.:scrutiny:

    TC
    TFL Survivor

    Shades of MacNamara
     
  18. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    fallingblock, in November of 1953 I got a (facsimile) signature on a letter from Ike, "Greetings:" and wandered off to Fort (un)Bliss(ful) to begin Basic on January 19th of '54. But who's remembering?

    :), Art
     
  19. fallingblock

    fallingblock Member

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    Art-I got one of those lettersMarch '67..

    But it was facsimile-signed by Lyndon "we've turned the corner' Johnson.:rolleyes:

    Ft. Campbell and the 'temporary' WWII barracks sure made a change from the farm.:)

    I bet it was cold at Ft. Bliss in January!

    It sure was hot at Campbell in July:eek:
    The Army was still trying to convince itself that troops could be 'hardened' to dehydration by denying them water :barf:
     
  20. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    Winters in El Paso are fairly short. We lived in five-man huts which had been condemned by the Red Cross during WW II against use for POWs. Still, better than squad tents or mud-walled huts.

    Those years dramatically reduced my sympathies about complaints from prison inmates as to their "housing". Like a guy who'd done some Stockade time in Pusan once said, "They don't put ya in there for doin' right."

    Thread drift...

    :), Art
     
  21. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Back on Topic...

    Looks like Rumsfeld is having a hard time finding an Army officer who wants to preside over the gutting of his service.

    CNN.com
    May 12, 2003

    Sources: Franks Turns Down Army's Top Job

    By Jamie McIntyre, CNN Washington Bureau

    WASHINGTON -- U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Tommy Franks -- credited for coming up with winning military strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan -- has turned down an offer to be Army chief of staff, the highest job in the service, officials told CNN on Monday.

    Sources said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld informally offered the job to Franks after his first choice, Gen. John Keane, the current vice chief of staff, bowed out.

    The term of the current Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, ends in June, and Rumsfeld is expected to recommend a successor soon, sources said.

    Technically, President Bush nominates the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are then confirmed by the Senate, but Rumsfeld's private recommendations are said the be the determining factor in who gets picked.

    Last week, Franks sidestepped a question about his plans, saying: "The secretary and I have talked about the future. And that's, I think, probably the best I can do right now."

    It is not clear why Franks turned down the prestigious assignment as a member of the Joint Chiefs Staff.

    Although many senior officers are anxious to make more money in the private sector after a lifetime of military pay, sources insist Frank's decision is less about money and more about a lack of enthusiasm for the internecine battles in the Pentagon bureaucracy.

    "This is a man, a combatant commander who has won two wars. He's not really excited about a desk job," one official said.

    Sources said Rumsfeld might turn to one of Franks' deputies to lead the Army, Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, who speaks Arabic and was picked by Rumsfeld to work with Franks before the war.

    Officials close to Rumsfeld said he has been unhappy with the pace of transformation in the Army, and just a few weeks ago fired the civilian in charge, Army Secretary Thomas White.

    Publicly, the Pentagon announced that White had resigned, and Rumsfeld praised his service.

    But Rumsfeld quickly moved to give the job to Air Force Secretary Jim Roche, a trusted friend who shares Rumsfeld vision for the military and is known for a sharp intellect and a penchant for "shaking things up," in the words of one official.

    Sources said Rumsfeld is also unhappy with Shinseki, who drew the Pentagon's ire before the Iraq war by suggesting it would likely take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to secure the peace.
     
  22. Art Eatman

    Art Eatman Administrator Staff Member

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    Interesting about Franks. I can sorta relate to it, having decided long ago that I don't have the patience to be a good administrator.

    Re: "...the internecine battles in the Pentagon bureaucracy." These have been going on since before Allen Drury began writing novels. (Have you read his "Pentagon"?) It take a certain sort of personality to function within this environment, particularly at the upper levels. I've always had difficulty figuring out whether or not I'd ever want to associate with somebody who had a talent for dealing with these battles. :)

    Art
     
  23. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Art,
    I find it interesting that Rumsfeld is having a hard time finding someone who wants to be cheif of staff. Don't let anyone fool you...Tommy Franks had to be able to play the right politics and associated games to get where he is. I think all four stars want to be cheif of staff. What better way to end your career?

    I found this article. Interesting about how it says that GW is concerned over Rumsfeld's relationship with the Army.

    New York Daily News
    May 4, 2003

    Rumsfeld Gets Proud And Loud

    Abrasive style irks some

    By Thomas M. DeFrank, Daily News Washington Bureau Chief

    WASHINGTON - Even among his critics in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, there's little argument that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is entitled to some serious strutting these days.

    But in the flush of Rumsfeld's military victory and personal vindication, some of his senior colleagues are quietly beginning to wonder if he's just a bit too full of himself.

    As the architect of swift and successful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Rumsfeld is the undisputed toast of Bushland, with poll numbers even higher than President Bush's.

    "You have to tip your cap to the guy," one of his detractors inside the administration conceded. "He had a vision, he pushed it - and he was right."

    The dire predictions of retired armchair generals and media noncombatants - who said his battle plan was too light on ground forces and would produce a quagmire and heavy U.S. casualties - were demolished almost as easily as Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard by a military offensive that was victorious three weeks faster than the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

    As Rumsfeld himself gleefully put it last week in Qatar during a victory lap with U.S. troops, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, "Never have so many been so wrong about so much."

    Even former President Bill Clinton praised Rumsfeld last week for his single-minded determination to transform the U.S. military into a leaner, lighter, less-conventional war machine.

    Behind such bouquets, however, there's a sense at senior levels of the Bush administration that Rumsfeld's prickly, abrasive style has a policy downside.

    Bush himself has told friends he's concerned by Rumsfeld's running feud with the Army - a clash of philosophy and style that recently climaxed in the graceless firing of Secretary of the Army Thomas White, a retired Army general close to Secretary of State Powell.

    "The President thinks the relationship between Rummy and the Army is dysfunctional," a senior Bush source told the Daily News. "He's worried that it's starting to get out of hand."

    Moreover, Bush and Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld's onetime deputy who was instrumental in snagging him the Pentagon job, were irritated when Rumsfeld suggested the U.S. could go it alone in Iraq if British Prime Minister Tony Blair couldn't help out because of political pressure at home.

    State of turmoil

    Bush - as well his father, former President George Bush - is also known to be unhappy over continued Pentagon sniping against Powell.

    "Rumsfeld thinks Powell lacks strategic thinking and that foreign policy is completely adrift," one Rumsfeld ally acknowledged.

    That sort of talk sets teeth chattering at the State Department and in some European capitals. "Rummy's had his hour and his moment," one senior diplomat said. "Now he needs to shrink down and let Powell and diplomacy carry the load."

    That's not a safe bet. Despite a stint as ambassador to NATO in the 1970s, Rumsfeld has always been notably undiplomatic. His tart-tongued, micromanaging style has not endeared him to many of the generals and admirals who frequently feel his wrath.

    "When you walk into his office," one of them delicately said, "you know you're going to get sandpapered."

    "He's the most difficult person I've ever dealt with," echoed a senior Bush official who has tangled with him frequently.

    "He's good, but he's ruthless," a senior official from a domestic cabinet agency added.

    Despite some misgivings, Bush thinks Rumsfeld has done a brilliant job managing the war and asserting civilian control over a military establishment accustomed to having its way during the Clinton years.

    "The President has a lot of confidence in him," said a Bush counselor who is high on the 70-year-old Pentagon boss.

    In a jab at Rumsfeld's high profile, however, he added: "But some of us wonder if he realizes he's too old to run for President."
     
  24. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Then there is this perspective. It does seem that Rumsfeld has it out for the Army. The question is, is it wise to go down this road to transformation. The smaller our forces get, the less capable we will be. If we intend to disengage from the Balkans, Korea, and the middle east, a transformed (smaller) force will meet our needs. Perhaps that's Rumsfeld's plan. Make our forces small enough that we can't engage in some of the missions we are currently doing.

    Jeff



    San Diego Union-Tribune
    May 4, 2003

    Rumsfeld Vs. The Army

    Military needs reform, but smaller isn't necessarily better

    By Robert J. Caldwell

    For Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, America's victory in the three-week Iraq war counted as a double triumph. With U.S. military forces scoring a decisive victory in record time with minimal loss of life, Rumsfeld's controversial strategy and his futuristic vision of a transformed military seemed vindicated. Conversely, Rumsfeld's numerous critics among the armed service's uniformed leadership were undercut.

    This does not, however, end the Pentagon's roiling controversy over military reform and transformation. Far from it.

    Nowhere in the armed forces is that conflict over modernization more bitter and unresolved than in the U.S. Army.

    The Army in particular was dissatisfied with the Iraq war plan, which abandoned the Desert Storm doctrine of using overwhelming force. Senior Army planners wanted more troops and more tanks on the ground in Iraq to assure a rapid victory and minimal casualties. Rumsfeld wanted to rely on air power, precision weapons, special operations forces and a "rolling start" with the three available Army and Marine divisions that could be reinforced later if necessary.

    The arguably risky rolling start strategy carried the day in Washington and then won big in Iraq.

    Score a major win for Rumsfeld in his struggle to transform America's military.

    But the Iraq victory does little or nothing to ease the professional fears among top Army leaders. They worry that the U.S. military's senior service is being shunted aside by civilian theoreticians, meaning Rumsfeld and his deputies. Rumsfeld, for his part, is known to believe that much of the Army remains stuck in Cold War-era thinking, tolerating a force structure too heavy and too slow for the revolution in warfare now occurring.

    The Rumsfeld-Army friction shows in mutually destructive ways.

    When Rumsfeld cancelled the Army's cherished Crusader mobile artillery system last year, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Thomas White balked. The Army brass infuriated Rumsfeld by lobbying Congress behind his back (unsuccessfully) to restore the Army's top priority artillery program, then ready for production.

    Rumsfeld compounds this atmosphere of mistrust by treating Shinseki, a decorated combat veteran who lost part of a foot in Vietnam, with ill-disguised disdain. Rumsfeld undermined Shinseki's authority by naming his replacement 15 months before the scheduled end of Shinseki's tour. On April 25, Rumsfeld summarily fired the conscientious Army Secretary White, whose chief offense was to side with the Army's uniformed leadership.

    This is about more, much more, than simply whether the Army will modernize – that was never in doubt. It is how that modernization will occur and how much further the Army will be reduced in size that is at stake.

    The Army has already been radically downsized. From 18 active duty combat divisions in the 1980s, it was reduced in the 1990s to 10 combat divisions. Rumsfeld is widely believed to favor cutting two or even three more Army divisions from the active duty force. That could shrink the Army from today's 480,000 troops (down from nearly 800,000 a decade ago) to fewer than 400,000 soldiers on active duty. That would be the smallest Army in more than half a century.

    The Army is fully committed to modernization. It wants the lighter, more mobile combat forces appropriate to the technology-driven revolution in military affairs. Shinseki organized the Army's revolutionary new light armored brigades built around the 20-ton Stryker armored vehicle, which is two-thirds lighter than the Army's M1A1 main battle tank. These new 3,500 soldier brigades equipped with 300 Strykers each can be deployed overseas in days compared to the months needed for a heavy armored division.

    Similarly, the Army is eagerly embracing all of the new technology that is remaking warfare. The Army's use of drone reconnaissance aircraft, night-vision gear, precision munitions, information warfare and communications, and combined arms operations were all on brilliant display in Iraq.

    What the Army's leadership fears, and with good reason, is any doctrinal decision to de-emphasize ground combat forces. Cutting two or three more combat divisions out of the remaining force of 10 Army divisions amidst the continuing war against terrorism would certainly suggest just such a doctrinal leap in the dark.

    For all the high-tech gadgetry on display in the Iraq campaign, it was still the Army's M1A1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 155mm self-propelled field artillery that occupied an enemy country, overran his capital city and consummated the U.S. victory. Without American boots on the ground, there could have been no triumph in Iraq or Afghanistan.

    Army leaders also wonder what happens if – or more likely, when – the United States goes up against a heavily armed enemy whose army will fight. Does North Korea come to mind? In that grim event, an American victory would require more than a few Stryker brigades, special forces and air power.

    An Army already stretched from the Balkans to Iraq to Korea cannot get any smaller without unacceptable risks to America's global security interests. This should be especially obvious amidst a continuing war against terrorism that has already produced two shooting wars in 19 months.

    Nor is this the right time to retire the Army's most lethal firepower even if it does take longer to reach the battlefield. Just ask Iraq's Republican Guards.

    Caldwell is a editor of the Insight section.
     
  25. Jeff White

    Jeff White Moderator Staff Member

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    Rumsfeld Moves to Strip Services of Power to Set Equipment Needs

    Wall Street Journal
    May 19, 2003

    Rumsfeld Moves To Strip Services Of Power To Set Equipment Needs

    By Anne Marie Squeo, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

    In an audacious move that seeks to capitalize on the success of U.S. military strategy in Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is launching an initiative that would strip the individual services of the power to establish their military-equipment needs and centralize it within a newly formed Pentagon body.

    Since taking his post in January 2001, Mr. Rumsfeld has pressed the Air Force, Navy and Army to work more closely, increasing coordination and communication to gain advantage on the battlefield. While military officials say that the war in Iraq demonstrated greater cooperation among the services than any previous fight, the defense secretary's new effort is intended to align equipment needs to avoid unnecessary redundancies and cut costs. Such changes could have a financial impact on companies such as Lockheed Martin Corp. of Bethesda, Md., Chicago-based Boeing Co. and Los Angeles-based Northrop Grumman Corp., which garner a huge amount of their sales from the military.

    "The services think about their requirements and how they meet them internally and things only get integrated at the secretary of defense level," Pentagon acquisitions chief Edward "Pete" Aldridge said. Rather, Mr. Rumsfeld is seeking to "establish joint needs for the Defense Department in the beginning so military departments become the providers of those capabilities," Mr. Aldridge said.

    Any plan that seeks to limit the independence and ability of military chiefs to decide how to equip and protect their troops is likely to spark criticism given the already strained relationship between Mr. Rumsfeld and the services. Bush administration efforts to realign the roles and needs of the military services already have spurred several high-profile disputes between the politically appointed officials at the helm of the Pentagon and career military officers.

    Undeterred, Mr. Rumsfeld has asked Mr. Aldridge, who will retire from his official Pentagon post at the end of this week, to lead a 10-person, full-time team in crafting a strategy for realigning the Pentagon's organizational structure to meet this vision. The group includes a representative from each military service, as well as other Pentagon civilians. At least for now, the plan calls for moving quickly, with Mr. Rumsfeld expected to receive an initial status report by mid-June and a formal recommendation by Nov. 1, Mr. Aldridge said. He will serve as a consultant in this role.

    Work already is under way. One possibility being considered is the creation of a new entity within the Pentagon that would include representatives of the services and would set overall military requirements, which are currently established and budgeted for by each individual service. Then the services -- and the defense contractors working with them -- would have a chance to propose a solution and "compete for the best way to accomplish the needs," Mr. Aldridge said.

    The idea is to match needs with solutions before individual services spend hundreds of millions of dollars developing a new weapon system that turns out to be duplicative or no longer necessary. Often reviews of such plans take place after huge investments have been made, gaining strong congressional and industrial support along the way that makes changes difficult.

    While the Pentagon doesn't expect the change in organizational structure to radically affect existing weapons programs, Mr. Aldridge said the overhaul "could change the mix of how many things you buy."
     
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