briansmithwins
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I've recently read the paper 'Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan
Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer ' and have serious concerns regarding the quality of the analysis, for reasons I will demonstrate below.
The original is here: https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDN2JkOTRjNzktMzE0NC00MDRkLTk0M2EtN2M4NGY0MGE4MjY5
However, open source data state that the majority of infantry combat with small arms occur at ranges below 300m. The overwhelming majority occurs below 200m. This is in direct conflict with Major T. Ehrhart's paper: Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer.
My primary question concerns ranges of engagement. Major T. Ehrhart states 'Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy, often at ranges beyond 300 meters'.
He cites as his sources: Interview with MAJ (P) Vern Randall, National Police Zone G3 mentor, Afghanistan, August 31, 2009. MAJ Randall stated that “The average small arms engagement range here in RC-East is 500 meters” and 'After-action reviews and comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters.'
How many people were interviewed or surveyed? What survey questions were asked. How representative were the locations and personnel surveyed? Was Major Randall's location typical?How large is Major Randal's location? Are there any other locations surveyed, or personnel besides Major Randal? What is the time frame of the survey? What is his sample size?
The entire point of Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer rests on this one issue: What is the range troops fight at?
From the research I've done from open sources, it would seem that either the Afghan theater is a extreme outlier when it comes to engagement ranges or Major T. Ehrhart's main premise is wrong.
Unfortunately, there don't seem to be any open sources of studies done on the average range of firefights in Afghanistan. So I'm forced to consult older works that analyze WWII, Korea, and Vietnam.
Works that are declassified are ORO-R-13 (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951) which deals with the Korean War and Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria, Vol. 2, which uses data from WWII (both European and South Pacific theaters), Korea, and Vietnam.
ORO-R-13 (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951)
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDNzQ4MTU4NTktNDBhYS00ODJiLTk4OGMtYWY2YTZkYmViMGQz
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria, Vol. 2
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDMGVjMDA4NDUtZjc0ZC00NzY3LWFhMDMtNDIyOTMyZDY0OTIz
These two studies used completely different methodologies to determine the average range of infantry engaging the enemy in combat. However, both point to an average range of engagement that is surprisingly short, and both studies are consistent with each other.
First, the ORO-R-13 report, (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951), is a study of combats that occurred when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) entered the Korea War in late 1951. That study determined by interviewing and surveying combat troops that:
'The average effective infantry fire with weapons lighter than the machine gun was consistently less than 200 yards. In no instance was it established, in the operations brought under survey, that any significant move by enemy forces had been stopped and turned by rifle and carbine fire alone at ranges in excess of that figure.'
'But in interrogating the witnesses to these various encounters, in no case could it be established that a decisive fire from rifle and carbine was delivered at a range in excess of 200 yards. There is only this type of exception to be noted: enemy patrols were frequently engaged at slightly beyond 200 yards range ; the first fire might knock down one or two of their number; the others then scampered away. However, when an enemy patrol or larger body is walking into a concealed position under such conditions
that the defenders feel their advantage, they customarily hold fire until it is within the 200-yard zone.'
ORO-R-13, p7-8
The Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria used a different method to determine ranges. That study reviewed combat photographer footage from WWII (both European and South Pacific theaters), Korea, and Vietnam to determine how men were actually fighting in combat. The available 800 reels of film were reviewed and 777 usable samples of combat firing where range could be estimated were used.
The study determined that:
'Considering the variety of sources, however, the data are quite consistent in showing that the bulk of small arms combat takes place at under 100 meters, and a negligible percent of firings or casualties takes place beyond 300 meters.'
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness, Vol.2 p D-18
Please note, this includes troops firing M1 Garands, BARs, M14 rifles, and M60 GPMGs, not just M1 carbines and M16s.
I don't have access to or read either German or Russian to look for any applicable studies, but I find it consistent that after extensive combat experience, both the Third Reich and the Soviets adopted rifles (StG-44, SKS and AK-47) firing intermediate cartridges. The only possible conclusion is that both felt that a ~300m effective range was adequate for infantry rifles.
ORO did find that, in Korea, ranges did go up when fires from the BAR and LMG were included. but this simply demonstrates the need for squad and platoon level automatic weapons, and does not add to the discussion regarding the individual infantry soldier's best firearm.
'The equation alters radically as soon as automatic fire, either from the BAR or the LMG, is added to the rifle volume. The killing-stopping zone then lengthens anywhere from 200 to 400 yards, depending upon the number of automatic weapons, the ability of the gunners, the governing terrain conditions, the weather, visibility, and general situation.'
ORO-R-13, p7-8
Unfortunately for Major T. Ehrhart's central premise, this shows that troops firing the M1 Garand, BAR, M1919 LMG, M14, and M60 GPMG, all weapons firing full power rifle cartridges, still only rarely engaged the enemy past 400m.
This graph sums up the issue quite well.
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness, Vol.2 p E-20
The only conclusion I can draw is that either Major T. Ehrhart is wrong about the normal range of engagement in Afghanistan (possibly due to a statistically unrepresentative or inaccurate sample) or the conditions in Afghanistan are radically different from every other place the Army and Marines have fought in the 20th century. If the true normal range in Afghanistan is 500m should we be re-equipping our troops with a weapon that's useful there, but will be less than idea under almost every other circumstance?
This is vital because all firearms are a series of compromises. If infantry rifles are optimized for the occasional few percent of times they are needed for 500m shots (and this presumes that individual soldiers can be uniformly trained to make 500m shots) they can not be optimum for the vast majority of times they are needed below 200m as shown by the decision of many experienced armies to abandon the full-power rifles for intermediate cartridges during WII and after. If those post-war studies are correct, more troops will die if they are armed with a 500m target rifle that's less than idea for close range combat than if they have a effective short range weapon that optimized for the under 200m fight.
Please note, I'm not saying that the M4, chambered in 5.56, firing SS109, is the ideal infantry rifle, or that the current training is perfect. Nor am I saying that more effective ammunition can't be developed for the M4, preferably with better terminal ballistic effects.
There are a lot of clues in the papers I've cited about why infantry fights under 200m, but that, along with discussion of just what improvements could be made to the M4 and its ammunition is another topic.
BSW
Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer ' and have serious concerns regarding the quality of the analysis, for reasons I will demonstrate below.
The original is here: https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDN2JkOTRjNzktMzE0NC00MDRkLTk0M2EtN2M4NGY0MGE4MjY5
However, open source data state that the majority of infantry combat with small arms occur at ranges below 300m. The overwhelming majority occurs below 200m. This is in direct conflict with Major T. Ehrhart's paper: Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer.
My primary question concerns ranges of engagement. Major T. Ehrhart states 'Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy, often at ranges beyond 300 meters'.
He cites as his sources: Interview with MAJ (P) Vern Randall, National Police Zone G3 mentor, Afghanistan, August 31, 2009. MAJ Randall stated that “The average small arms engagement range here in RC-East is 500 meters” and 'After-action reviews and comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters.'
How many people were interviewed or surveyed? What survey questions were asked. How representative were the locations and personnel surveyed? Was Major Randall's location typical?How large is Major Randal's location? Are there any other locations surveyed, or personnel besides Major Randal? What is the time frame of the survey? What is his sample size?
The entire point of Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer rests on this one issue: What is the range troops fight at?
From the research I've done from open sources, it would seem that either the Afghan theater is a extreme outlier when it comes to engagement ranges or Major T. Ehrhart's main premise is wrong.
Unfortunately, there don't seem to be any open sources of studies done on the average range of firefights in Afghanistan. So I'm forced to consult older works that analyze WWII, Korea, and Vietnam.
Works that are declassified are ORO-R-13 (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951) which deals with the Korean War and Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria, Vol. 2, which uses data from WWII (both European and South Pacific theaters), Korea, and Vietnam.
ORO-R-13 (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951)
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDNzQ4MTU4NTktNDBhYS00ODJiLTk4OGMtYWY2YTZkYmViMGQz
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria, Vol. 2
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B09fZpC9S7gDMGVjMDA4NDUtZjc0ZC00NzY3LWFhMDMtNDIyOTMyZDY0OTIz
These two studies used completely different methodologies to determine the average range of infantry engaging the enemy in combat. However, both point to an average range of engagement that is surprisingly short, and both studies are consistent with each other.
First, the ORO-R-13 report, (Infantry Operations and Weapons 27 October 1951), is a study of combats that occurred when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) entered the Korea War in late 1951. That study determined by interviewing and surveying combat troops that:
'The average effective infantry fire with weapons lighter than the machine gun was consistently less than 200 yards. In no instance was it established, in the operations brought under survey, that any significant move by enemy forces had been stopped and turned by rifle and carbine fire alone at ranges in excess of that figure.'
'But in interrogating the witnesses to these various encounters, in no case could it be established that a decisive fire from rifle and carbine was delivered at a range in excess of 200 yards. There is only this type of exception to be noted: enemy patrols were frequently engaged at slightly beyond 200 yards range ; the first fire might knock down one or two of their number; the others then scampered away. However, when an enemy patrol or larger body is walking into a concealed position under such conditions
that the defenders feel their advantage, they customarily hold fire until it is within the 200-yard zone.'
ORO-R-13, p7-8
The Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness Criteria used a different method to determine ranges. That study reviewed combat photographer footage from WWII (both European and South Pacific theaters), Korea, and Vietnam to determine how men were actually fighting in combat. The available 800 reels of film were reviewed and 777 usable samples of combat firing where range could be estimated were used.
The study determined that:
'Considering the variety of sources, however, the data are quite consistent in showing that the bulk of small arms combat takes place at under 100 meters, and a negligible percent of firings or casualties takes place beyond 300 meters.'
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness, Vol.2 p D-18
Please note, this includes troops firing M1 Garands, BARs, M14 rifles, and M60 GPMGs, not just M1 carbines and M16s.
I don't have access to or read either German or Russian to look for any applicable studies, but I find it consistent that after extensive combat experience, both the Third Reich and the Soviets adopted rifles (StG-44, SKS and AK-47) firing intermediate cartridges. The only possible conclusion is that both felt that a ~300m effective range was adequate for infantry rifles.
ORO did find that, in Korea, ranges did go up when fires from the BAR and LMG were included. but this simply demonstrates the need for squad and platoon level automatic weapons, and does not add to the discussion regarding the individual infantry soldier's best firearm.
'The equation alters radically as soon as automatic fire, either from the BAR or the LMG, is added to the rifle volume. The killing-stopping zone then lengthens anywhere from 200 to 400 yards, depending upon the number of automatic weapons, the ability of the gunners, the governing terrain conditions, the weather, visibility, and general situation.'
ORO-R-13, p7-8
Unfortunately for Major T. Ehrhart's central premise, this shows that troops firing the M1 Garand, BAR, M1919 LMG, M14, and M60 GPMG, all weapons firing full power rifle cartridges, still only rarely engaged the enemy past 400m.
This graph sums up the issue quite well.
Evaluation of Small Arms Effectiveness, Vol.2 p E-20
The only conclusion I can draw is that either Major T. Ehrhart is wrong about the normal range of engagement in Afghanistan (possibly due to a statistically unrepresentative or inaccurate sample) or the conditions in Afghanistan are radically different from every other place the Army and Marines have fought in the 20th century. If the true normal range in Afghanistan is 500m should we be re-equipping our troops with a weapon that's useful there, but will be less than idea under almost every other circumstance?
This is vital because all firearms are a series of compromises. If infantry rifles are optimized for the occasional few percent of times they are needed for 500m shots (and this presumes that individual soldiers can be uniformly trained to make 500m shots) they can not be optimum for the vast majority of times they are needed below 200m as shown by the decision of many experienced armies to abandon the full-power rifles for intermediate cartridges during WII and after. If those post-war studies are correct, more troops will die if they are armed with a 500m target rifle that's less than idea for close range combat than if they have a effective short range weapon that optimized for the under 200m fight.
Please note, I'm not saying that the M4, chambered in 5.56, firing SS109, is the ideal infantry rifle, or that the current training is perfect. Nor am I saying that more effective ammunition can't be developed for the M4, preferably with better terminal ballistic effects.
There are a lot of clues in the papers I've cited about why infantry fights under 200m, but that, along with discussion of just what improvements could be made to the M4 and its ammunition is another topic.
BSW
