I'll have to look for that book. I believe that the situation in Chile is somewhat more complicated than it appears.
I concur, and let us remember that no single book is the final word on the situation - or on any situation. Nonetheless, Kornbluh's study is a significant contribution to our knowledge of the events surrounding 9-11-1973, a day of infamy for Chile, Latina America, and the world community. It is an excellent place to start.
I would never begin to defend the Pinochet regime, but I believe that it is possible that the US was genuine concerned about having another Soviet-backed government in this part of the world.
That is absolutely a bona fide concern.
As an electoral victory by
Salvador Allende appeared increasingly likely, it was this concern that prompted President Nixon's National Security Advisor,
Henry Kissinger, in summer 1970 to order professional analysts in the CIA, State Department, and Defense Department to conduct a major study into the implications for the United States of a victory at the polls by Allende and his Unidad Popular coalition.
The intelligence assessment that they produced in August 1970 was called National Security Study Memorandum 97. "Regarding threats to US interests," NSSM 97 stated, "we conclude that:
1. The US has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic interests.
2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende victory."
Furthermore, they did not foresee "any likely threat ot the peace of the region." NSSM 97 concluded that an Allende election victory carried no strategic, military or regional threat to US interests in security and stability. A secret CIA supplement addressed the advantages and disadvantages of fostering a coup.
According to the CIA
There is almost no way to evaluate the likelihood that such an attempt would bve successful even if it were made. An unsuccessful attempt, involving as it probably would revelation of US participation, would have grave consequences for our relations with Chile, in the hemisphere, in the United States and elsewhere in the world."
SteveS asked:
What would have happened if Allende has stayed in power?
Interesting question. In my humble opinion, his socialist economic policies would have caused considerable problems for many Chileans. The economy would have hit the skids, and it is a strong possibility that the Chileans would either have impeached him and removed him from office, or have simply voted him out in the 1976 presidential elections. Maybe they would have kept parts of his platform since nationalization of Chilean copper really was wildly popular at the time. In the end it's hard to tell, of course, but remember that the most important thing here is that it was rightly a decision for the Chileans to make, not for Nixon, Kissinger and a handful of their domestic cronies and Chilean allies.
The US could have simply voiced its opinion that Allende was picking wrong-headed economic policies while nonetheless pledging not to interfere with the long tradition of constitutional rule in Chile. Instead, the US gave weapons and encouragement to men who subsequently murdered Chilean General Rene Schneider, a constitutionalist, thus paving the way for a putsch by General Pinochet and 18 years of fascism.
As former US Secretary of State
Colin Powell observed, "It is not a part of American history that we are proud of."
Carebear, the USG taught its national security doctrine and counter-insurgency warfare to Latin American military pupils, who then went home to their US-supplied armies and police forces and overthrew their elected government, ran death squad ops against civilians, tortured dissidents, and generally repressed their own populations. The US should not protect corrupt governments from the wrath of their own people.