Afghanistan: Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory

[Jeff White]

idd,
Sorry I meant he furthered an agenda with Tailwind. and that as far as I know he had no involvement with Tailhook. Sometimes I think faster then I type.

The good Col. makes some good points. Afghanistan is a mess, it always has been and always will be.

But I have to ask, how would you handle things? Before you can criticize the way something is being done, you should at leats have a viable alternative.

Jeff

 

[BigG]

Beam me up, Scotty. No intelligent life here.

 

[Obiwan]

It is not so much that He(IDD) is right.....

Just that everyone else is wrong

Disclaimer: I no longer read his posts....but the pattern was clear when I went to ignore mode!

 

[idd]

But I have to ask, how would you handle things?

"Rothstein delivered his report in January. It was returned to him, with the message that he had to cut it drastically and soften his conclusions. He has heard nothing further."

First, I'm not an expert on specops or counterterrorism, and I have very limited information. I work in the private sector where if I make decisions based on bad intel, I pay the price. If I keep employees on staff who consistently misinform me, I pay a price. If I consistently make false reports to my clients, I pay a price. I can't just whitewash it and blame "liberals in the media" or the guy who ran the office before I did. Those kinds of excuses just don't cut it in private firm in a free market.

Second, when I hire consultants, I listen to them even if they tell me things that I do not want to hear. Also, if I am facing a particular problem on the horizon, then it's not the time to demote my top expert on that particular type of problem.

Third, I have a budget. There are a lot of projects I would like to work on, but given the realities of manpower and money, I have to pick and choose. The fact is that the Bush administration pulled out lots of Arabic-speaking specops troops and agents from Afghanistan for its Iraq war. Resources that would have been available for the war on the Taliban were redirected for the war on Iraq - a country that was not behind the attacks on the WTC, Cole, Khobar, or the embassies. I consider it a strategic error.

Jeff, have you seen Steve Coll's book, Ghost Wars? Clarke's book has gotten the headlines - and is an important piece of this puzzle - but Coll's book has far more historical depth.

 

[7.62FullMetalJacket]

Arabic-speaking specops troops and agents from Afghanistan for its Iraq war

Uh, they don't speak Arabic in Afghanistan (except at Al Qaeda camps and some Koranic revivals).

 

[Sean Smith]

The fact is that the Bush administration pulled out lots of Arabic-speaking specops troops and agents from Afghanistan for its Iraq war.

The two principal languages in Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian). The offical language of Iraq, on the other hand, is Arabic.

It pays to know something about what you are talking about, you know.

 

[TaurusCIA]

demote my top expert on that particular type of problem.

keep employees on staff who consistently misinform me

Clarke did not misinform he just didn't create a plan to combat the "urgent threat" that he was crying wolf about. Rushing to enact a 3 to 5 year plan that addresses only one element of risk to the US without determining how that fits into the whole strategic plan would not be prudent.

Clarke brought no plan to address the urgent threat that he was concerned about. If he had then...9/11??

CLARKE: The Blue Sky memo I believe you're referring to was part of an overall update of the Delenda Plan. And it was a part generated by the Central Intelligence Agency. We, my staff, generated the rest of the update.

GORTON: And the goal of that plan was to roll back Al Qaida over a period of three to five years, reducing it eventually to a rump group like other terrorist organizations around the world.

CLARKE: Our goal was to do that to eliminate it as a threat to the United States, recognizing that one might not ever be able to totally eliminate everybody in the world who thought they were a member of Al Qaida. But if we could get it to be as ineffective as the Abu Nidal organization was toward the end of its existence; it didn't pose a threat to the United States. That's what we wanted. The CIA said that if they got all the resources they needed, that might be possible over the course of three years at the earliest.

GORTON: And then Delenda and that Blue Sky proposal, I take it, were pretty much the basis of what you recommended to Condoleezza Rice in January of 2001: covert assistance to the Northern Alliance, you know, more money for CIA activities, something called choosing a standard of evidence for attributing responsibility for the Cole, new Predator reconnaissance missions and more work on funding?

CLARKE: That's right, Senator.

FIELDING: But what's bothering me now is that not only did you interview with us, but you also spent more than six hours with the congressional joint inquiry. And I've read your information, and, I mean, that's a very serious body and very serious inquiry -- not that we're not. But I can't believe over six hours you never expressed any concern to them that the Bush administration didn't act with sufficient urgency to address these horrible potential problems if you felt that way.

Did you ever list for the joint inquiry any of the measures that you thought should have been taken that weren't?

CLARKE: I think all the measures that I thought should have been taken were in the plan that I presented in January of 2001 and were in the NSPD that the principals approved in September, September 4th, 2001. There were no additional measures that I had in mind other than those that I presented. And as I did explain, both to the commission and to the joint inquiry, those proposals, which ultimately were adopted by the principals committee, took a very, very, very long time to make it through the policy development process.

ROEMER: So you're saying that the frustration got to a high enough level that it wasn't your portfolio, it wasn't doing a lot of things at the same time, it was that you weren't getting fast enough action on what you were requesting?

CLARKE: That's right.

My view was that this administration, while it listened to me, didn't either believe me that there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem.

And I thought, if the administration doesn't believe its national coordinator for counterterrorism when he says there's an urgent problem and if it's unprepared to act as though there's an urgent problem, then probably I should get another job.

His own words there is an "urgent threat" here is a 3 to 5 year plan (January of 2001). September 4th, 2001 he still has the same 3 to 5 year plan. It looks like old Clarkey boy was not responding to the urgent threat? It looks more like he was offended that his 3 to 5 year plan was not given the priority he wanted. It might have been a good idea for him to have worked a little more on the urgent threat plan over that 8-9 month period.

GORTON: Now, since my yellow light is on, at this point my final question will be this: Assuming that the recommendations that you made on January 25th of 2001, based on Delenda, based on Blue Sky, including aid to the Northern Alliance, which had been an agenda item at this point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had all been adopted say on January 26th, year 2001, is there the remotest chance that it would have prevented 9/11?

CLARKE: No.

 

[TaurusCIA]

The fact is that the Bush administration pulled out lots of Arabic-speaking specops troops and agents from Afghanistan for its Iraq war.

The problem with experts is that their conclusions almost always support their positions.

The two principal languages in Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian). The offical language of Iraq, on the other hand, is Arabic.

 

[idd]

The problem with experts is that their conclusions almost always support their positions.

That may be why they hired an expert outside the government who doesn't have a dog in that fight. BTW, this was the original reason for creating the CIA. It was originally envisioned as a pure intelligence-gathering agency.

Uh, they don't speak Arabic in Afghanistan (except at Al Qaeda camps and some Koranic revivals).

Uh, aside from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, i.e., the the very people we were chasing. Uh, it might come in handy when they raid an Al Qaeda safehouse and discover documents and/or take Al Qaeda fighters prisoner.

The two principal languages in Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian).

The principal language of Al Qaeda is Arabic.

His own words there is an "urgent threat" here is a 3 to 5 year plan (January of 2001). September 4th, 2001 he still has the same 3 to 5 year plan.

That's because Bush didn't get around to approving the plan submitted by Clarke until September 2001.

It might have been a good idea for him to have worked a little more on the urgent threat plan over that 8-9 month period.

It looks like he tried, but his bosses were obsessed with Saddam and distracted by other issues. In April 2001 the Bush administration released the government’s annual terrorism report with no extensive mention of Osama bin Laden as in prior years. A State Department official told CNN that the Clinton administration had made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden. Between January 21 and September 10, 2001 President Bush made 104 public statements on Saddam Hussein.

Similarly, at an April meeting of deputies Clarke urged a focus on Al Qaeda. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz responded, “No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al-Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States."

Here's part of the problem. Clarke told Rice and her assistance Hadley that bin Laden's Al Qaeda network was an urgent problem, that Taliban was giving aid, comfort and protection to Al Qaeda, and that the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) was materially aiding the Taliban with weapons, support, intelligence, and even men. Rice looked at it and decided that dealing with bin Laden and Al Qaeda required first a firm policy dealing with the Taliban, which first required a firm policy with Pakistan, with meant dealing with Kashimir, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan-India relations. There was a whole ball of yarn there, and bin Laden was viewed as just one thread. BTW, the Clinton administration had a similar problem.

 

[fix]

The principal language of Al Qaeda is Arabic.

Really?

 

[a random jerk]

Uh, aside from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, i.e., the the very people we were chasing. Uh, it might come in handy when they raid an Al Qaeda safehouse and discover documents and/or take Al Qaeda fighters prisoner.

Yeah, because clearly there isn't a single ????ing arabic speaking person left in Afghanistan. And clearly, captured documents/terrorists would have to be deciphered or interrogated right on the spot.

Next up on the idd newswire: BUSH DRINKS HUMAN BLOOD WITH VAMPIRE BATS IN THE AMAZON BASIN

 

[idd]

Really?

Apparently it needed saying.

Yeah, because clearly there isn't a single ????ing arabic speaking person left in Afghanistan.

Not according to Col. Rothstein. The war "effectively destroyed the Taliban but has been significantly less successful at being able to achieve the primary policy goal of ensuring that al Qaeda could no longer operate in Afghanistan," he wrote.

As late as March 28, a Taliban raid on an Afghan Army post in Uruzgan province left two men dead, three wounded, and 10 missing, according to the Center for Defense Information. Apparently, Rumsfeld mispoke when in December 2001 when he claimed on Larry King Live, "The Al Qaeda are gone." I guess he and Shrub both operate from the same faith-based intelligence gathering process.

But who knows? Maybe some random jerk has better intel than a retired US Army colonel whose expertise is unconventional warfare, and who was specifically tasked by the Pentagon to study the war in Afghanistan.

And clearly, captured documents/terrorists would have to be deciphered or interrogated right on the spot.

If you wanted actionable, timely intel, then it might actually be a good idea. If you're relying on ideology and faith-based intelligence ("Iraq *must* have done it! Chalabi says so..."), then why bother getting your facts straight?


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"We found them. We found the weapons of mass destruction." President Bush, 29 May 2003.

 

[thefitzvh]

the usual suspects, the usual drivel...

ugh


James

 

[fallingblock]

Aw, thefitzvh......

But idd is having fun.....

He used the word "Shrub" again just above, to demonstrate his erudite hostility to the President of the U.S..

 

[Bartholomew Roberts]

If you wanted actionable, timely intel, then it might actually be a good idea.

Actually, I worked as a linguist for Naval Security Group and nine times out of ten, you are better off concentrating your linguists in a single area.

You are never going to have as many Arabic linguists as you need to directly support every unit. You are usually much better off centralizing your linguists to a single area where you can funnel work to them rather than trying to guess where a linguist will be needed and assigning it directly to that unit.

The United States has an excellent technological advantage and communications network - look at the Internet for an example. I do not have to be in Afghanistan to translate and analyze documents that are in Afghanistan. With nothing more complicated than a fax machine, I can provide the same services I could if I were there on the ground (actually better since I can't lug around a computer, 40lbs of reference dictionaries, 20 other linguists to ask questions of and a team of analysts to check my work if I'm on the ground). All of this takes no more time than it would if I were actually on site and will probably be better info and MORE timely because I have much better resources to develop the product with when working from a centralized location.

Another benefit to this is work can be prioritized - if something hot comes through my few linguist assets aren't tied up trying to translate last week's chow hall menu in Afghanistan and can be diverted to the high priority targets.

There are exceptions where direct support is desirable and I've worked that side of the house too. Suffice it to say that those exceptions are few and far between and you can divert 90% of the linguists to Iraq (where they can still work on Afghanistan) and still have more than enough linguists to handle those missions. Commanders usually feel differently, but direct support is rarely a necessity in my experience.