The problem with experts is that their conclusions almost always support their positions.
That may be why they hired an expert
outside the government who doesn't have a dog in that fight. BTW, this was the original reason for creating the CIA. It was originally envisioned as a pure intelligence-gathering agency.
Uh, they don't speak Arabic in Afghanistan (except at Al Qaeda camps and some Koranic revivals).
Uh, aside from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, i.e., the
the very people we were chasing. Uh, it might come in handy when they raid an Al Qaeda safehouse and discover documents and/or take Al Qaeda fighters prisoner.
The two principal languages in Afghanistan are Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian).
The principal language of Al Qaeda is Arabic.
His own words there is an "urgent threat" here is a 3 to 5 year plan (January of 2001). September 4th, 2001 he still has the same 3 to 5 year plan.
That's because Bush didn't get around to approving the plan submitted by Clarke until September 2001.
It might have been a good idea for him to have worked a little more on the urgent threat plan over that 8-9 month period.
It looks like he tried, but his bosses were obsessed with Saddam and distracted by other issues. In April 2001 the Bush administration released the government’s annual terrorism report with no extensive mention of Osama bin Laden as in prior years. A State Department official told CNN that the Clinton administration had made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden. Between January 21 and September 10, 2001 President Bush made 104 public statements on Saddam Hussein.
Similarly, at an April meeting of deputies Clarke urged a focus on Al Qaeda. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz responded, “No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al-Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States."
Here's part of the problem. Clarke told Rice and her assistance Hadley that bin Laden's Al Qaeda network was an urgent problem, that Taliban was giving aid, comfort and protection to Al Qaeda, and that the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) was materially aiding the Taliban with weapons, support, intelligence, and even men. Rice looked at it and decided that dealing with bin Laden and Al Qaeda required first a firm policy dealing with the Taliban, which first required a firm policy with Pakistan, with meant dealing with Kashimir, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan-India relations. There was a whole ball of yarn there, and bin Laden was viewed as just one thread. BTW, the Clinton administration had a similar problem.