The Box Method

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Vern Humphrey

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The Box Method is a way of fighting the firefight that I developed in Viet Nam, while commanding A-1/61 Infantry. I had first used something like it my previous tour as an Adviser with 4/48 ARVN Infantry. What I will present here is the fully developed method.

First of all, realize that as soon as the first shots are fired, EVERYONE will be under cover. Forget the nonsense about running away from a far ambush, charging a near one, and so on. Everyone takes cover or dies.

Now, as a drill, imagine you have just been fired on and take cover. Look in the general direction where you imagine the enemy to be. In real combat, you'd see very little -- the enemy is under cover, too. So you can't SEE targets, or really tell exactly where he is.

But there is an area immediately between you and the enemy where you know he ISN'T (unless you're nose to nose.) Draw an imagainary line, marking that area. No enemy short of the line.

Now look up a bit higher, and you can see another area where the enemy can't be -- up in the sky. Draw another imaginary line there, too. No enemy above the line.

Select the left and right limits of your sector -- and there's the box. Two horizontal lines, and the enemy is between them, two vertical lines marking your sector limits. In practice, the box is rarely more than 3 front sights high (try it and see) and usually much less.

Shoot into the box, spacing your shots carefully, and fill the box with bullets. Be sure to overlap the shots of the men on your right and left, and shoot low -- a hit short of the box every now and then will still ricochet into the box.

For training, we would set up an enemy "position" with C-Ration boxes, and make sure they were invisible to the selected friendly position. Troops would take up positions, and we would stretch white engineer tape, letting them guide us, to form the upper and lower bounds of the box. The stakes holding the tape marked the sectors.

Afterwards, the troops would go forward and look at the targets -- we always had plenty of hits -- and we reminded the troops that even if you miss a few, enough kills will usually drive the enemy out of position.

Next, we trained with a few targets that were invisable, but "marked" by a stake and piece of tape. The mark indicated a suspected enemy location (located by motion, flash, dust, etc.) and trained the troops to shoot all around that marked area -- taking out a target they couldn't see, but had a good indication that it was there.

We had NCOs and officers carry magazines of solid tracer. In action, a leader would mark sector by firing pairs of shots -- two left, two right, and two center, to mark the sector. This "zig-zag" allowed troops who couldn't see the whole sector to estimate where it was.

Leaders who detected a target would fire repeatedly at it -- meaning "Everyone fire at this target." When the target was neutralized, the zig-zag meant "go back to covering your sector."

The one exception to the "no full auto fire with hand-held weapons" rule was for leaders -- a full auto burst of tracer meant "Machineguns engage this target."

The Box Method is both a way to train individual riflemen in real combat shooting, and a leader-and-unit (collective training) drill. In addition, it offers one thing the Infantry School still hasn't figured out -- a way for a leader to control fires even in combat.
 
Interesting technique. Out of curiosity, what is it that the Infantry School teaches leaders to control fires and why does it not work?
 
The Infantry School doesn't try to actually teach fire control.

The manual says, "You can use sound if the troops can hear." (Which is to say, you can't control them after the shooting starts.)

"Or hand and arm signals." (Get between your troops and the enemy, and start waving your arms.)

"Or local SOP." (We don't know -- maybe someone in the field can figure it out.)
 
Which manual? I believe yours may be out fo date. Out of curiousity, I made a quick check of two manuals.

I checked FM 7-8 (which is currently under revision) and it had a fairly generic description of the acceptable method that could be used and a decent description of how to give a proper fire command.

FM 3-22.68 has 7 pages devoted to fire control and a comprehensive section on fire commands, complete with the standardized hand and arm signals. The technique you describe is generally covered (use tracer; unit SOP's dictate meaning) by the section on prearranged signals.

More detailed instruction on specific techniques is given in IOBC, ICCC and Ranger School. I am sure the NCOES system covers them as well. Techniques are further refined at the unit level, which is appropriate as techniques are often equipment dependant. (Techniques that work for a Bradley platoon may not be optimum for a light infantry platoon.)

I have used the methods I learned at the Infantry School and have never had a problem.

As a retired infantryman, I am sure you are aware that the function of doctrine is to provide guidelines for the conduct of operations and not to prescribe the exact method to be used. Manuals are meant to be guides not playbooks.

I appreciate you sharing the SOP your company used. Its always good to add another tool to the tool box. If you make it to Ft. Benning, shoot me a PM. Perhaps we can link-up.
 
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I checked FM 7-8 (which is currently under revision) and it had a fairly generic description of the acceptable method that could be used and a decent description of how to give a proper fire command.
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Fire commands only work when people can hear -- before the shooting starts in other words.

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FM 3-22.68 has 7 pages devoted to fire control and a comprehensive section on fire commands, complete with the standardized hand and arm signals. The technique you describe is generally covered (use tracer; unit SOP's dictate meaning) by the section on prearranged signals.
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"Unit SOP" means soldiers leave OSUT not knowing the language of the unit they will join.

And, as I pointed out, when the manual says "unit SOP" it really means "We don't know -- maybe someone in the field can figure it out."
 
Fire commands only work when people can hear -- before the shooting starts in other words.

In my expereince fire commands most certainly work when the shooting is going on. It may be more difficult, but then nothing is easy in combat.

Unit SOP" means soldiers leave OSUT not knowing the language of the unit they will join.

Soldiers leave OSUT not knowing a lot about the unit that they will join. We are fortunate that there are competent NCO's whose job it is to teach them the things they need to know when they arrive.

And, as I pointed out, when the manual says "unit SOP" it really means "We don't know -- maybe someone in the field can figure it out."

I prefer to think that "Unit SOP" actually means "We are not arrogant enough to think we can come up with a solution that will work for everyone in every situation. We understand that there are a number of viable techniques and we have confidence in subordinate leaders to select those they believe are best for their unit."

I appreciate the latitude the manual affords me.
 
It seems like a good system! Did it ever go to hell in the confusion? For example, you fire a full auto burst somewhere and the M60 gunner didn't even notice it?
 
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In my expereince fire commands most certainly work when the shooting is going on. It may be more difficult, but then nothing is easy in combat.
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There's no reason to make as difficult as possible. A real fire-fight is chaotic, and it's a leader's problem to restore order and control -- which demands standardized, well practiced methods.


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Soldiers leave OSUT not knowing a lot about the unit that they will join. We are fortunate that there are competent NCO's whose job it is to teach them the things they need to know when they arrive.
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So why have them know even less?

I know of cases were men went straight into combat, no orientation or unit training at all -- that was common in the early days of the Korean War, and I had personal experience of it at Cam Lo Mountain.

Men going into combat need to speak the language of combat.


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I prefer to think that "Unit SOP" actually means "We are not arrogant enough to think we can come up with a solution that will work for everyone in every situation.
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That assumes that the Army only has two speeds, Stop and Full Ahead.

In fact, well-tested and standardized methods are what is needed, with units supplementing them as required.

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We understand that there are a number of viable techniques and we have confidence in subordinate leaders to select those they believe are best for their unit.
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As an excuse for failure to train, that's second only to "But the parents don't care."


:D
 
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Did it ever go to hell in the confusion? For example, you fire a full auto burst somewhere and the M60 gunner didn't even notice it?
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Firefights are confusion and chaos by definition. Yes -- there will be times when someone doesn't get the word. One way to deal with that is to emphasize the chain of command in action. Team leaders must stick with their teams closely and watch for Squad Leader signals. Squad leaders must stick with their squads closely and watch for Platoon Leaders, and so on.

A good deal of problems were caused by Army doctrine -- for example, A-1/61 was a mechanized unit. When mounted, the "Commander's Hatch" is where the .50 machinegun is. That really causes problems -- because you can lead, or you can be a machinegunner, but you can't be both.

We took squad leaders and platoon leaders out of those "commanders' hatches" and put PFCs in their place. The leaders rode behind them -- and led instead of shooting.
 
We operated from the South China Sea to the Laotian Border, right across the top of North Vietnam.

We had several fights -- including some around Cam Lo. When I took over, firefights were very chaotic. In fact, not long before I took command, an ambush patrol from A-4/12 CAV (our brigade Cav troop) prematurely sprung an ambush, everyone opened up full auto, and while they were reloading, they got their butts kicked.

I was fortunate enough to have an opportunity to go over the ground after the first firefight we were in -- that's where I made the observation about not finding bullet holes in the trees low enough to jump up and touch them.

We soon went to the coast, and spent a while patrolling in the sands. We used that to train and perfect the techniques. Then we went across the Cua Viet River and had a fight with elements of the 27th Naval Sapper Battalion, and it was a whole 'nother ball game
 
Were there ever problems with officers being singled out for return fire because of their large number of outgoing tracers?
 
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Were there ever problems with officers being singled out for return fire because of their large number of outgoing tracers?
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Not that we could tell. There were heavy casualties among officers (my company had 16 company commanders while in Viet Nam, with seven killed and eight wounded -- and 7 of us were wounded more than once.) I think the key here is that we boosted efficiency enough to overcome any minor disadvantages -- we could kill them much faster than they could kill us.

Remember also, Chuck was not famous for using the sights, either.
:D
 
We had NCOs and officers carry magazines of solid tracer.

That seems like a lot of guys shooting tracer, was there ever any confusion?

Leaders who detected a target would fire repeatedly at it -- meaning "Everyone fire at this target." When the target was neutralized, the zig-zag meant "go back to covering your sector."

Seems like it could again get confusing if said officers and NCOs continued to engage targets, or did they check fire while the squad/platoon engaged the known enemy location?

soldiers leave OSUT not knowing the language of the unit they will join

Have soldiers even arrived at the unit "knowing" the language on the unit? Mech verses light, striker, or airborne, they all speak slightly different languages. OSUT gives them the minimum standard to be successful in the army and it is up to the unit to continue to develop those soldiers. How many of them have even conducted platoon live fires with a real squad leader and platoon leader before arriving at the unit?

All of my experience has been in urban terrain and in deserts. this technique doesn't seem all bad, but I can't think of many instances that I could have used it in. So far as Mechanized infantry goes it fails to address integrating your bradleys and their systems. Therein lies the problem. I think the important part is making sure that leaders have a fundamental understanding of the need and importance of fire control and distribution. How they accomplish that does not matter as much as the fact that it is getting done (and it is getting done).

long story short, i guess I just don't think there is one "right" answer that fits the bill for all units that can be taught to intial entry soldiers and employed in every aspect of the modern battlefield.
 
For the sake of arguement, let's assume this is THE method for fire control and I am a platoon leader in your company. Hand and arm signals and voice commands have been determined to be ineffective methods of communicating.

How do my soldiers differentiate between my tracers, the platoon sergeant's tracers, my squad leaders' tracers and all of the team leaders' tracers not to mention the machine guns tracers?

How do I direct my machinegun teams into position?

How do I tell them whether or not I want them to go into action on the bipod or tripod?

How do I specify the rate of fire and method of engagement for the machineguns? How do my team leaders?

How do my team leaders specify targets for their grenadier?

How do my team leaders specify the method of engagement/munition to be employed?

Once I get the ball rolling, how do I give new sectors of fire as another platoon assaults from a flank?

How do I direct one squad to pick-up and assault while another shifts fire to avoid fratricide?

You said:
"Or hand and arm signals." (Get between your troops and the enemy, and start waving your arms.)
Then you said:
Team leaders must stick with their teams closely and watch for Squad Leader signals. Squad leaders must stick with their squads closely and watch for Platoon Leaders, and so on.
Exactly what signals are the team leaders and squad leaders watching for? Hand and arm signals? If everbody is sticking together so closely, why can't we issue fire commands?

What happens when I have been operating for two weeks, I am critically low on ammo and my resupply comes with no tracer?

What is wrong with using my GCP, PEQ-2A, or 40mm ground burst illum?

I am not trying to be argumentative. I appreciate the fact that you had success with this technique in combat. What I do not appreciate is derogatory comments about the Infantry School because you take issue with the level of detail provided in the manual.

Bottom Line: This is an interesting technique that obviously served you and your men well. I respect that and thank you for sharing it. But it is not the only technique and just because the Army has chosen not to standardize it or any other technique does not mean that:

1. Fire Control is not being taught by the Infantry School.(It is)
2. Everyone else's techniques do not work.(They do)
3. Methods of fire control are not being used on the battlefield everyday by young leaders who are every bit as resourceful and competent as you were. (They are)
4. Officers and NCO's charged with preparing soldiers for the rigors of combat do not care about their soldiers well-being. (They do)
 
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Vern,
Did you specify a high initial rate of fire to gain fire superiority? How did you maneuver elements that weren't in contact into a position where they could engage the enemy? When everyone is face down in the dirt, micro terrain will most likely block their view of the enemy. What CC methods did you use to bring your force into position to fire into the target box, PRC-25, hand and arm signals, SOP, runners?

Jeff...stealing this thread for Strategies and Tactics..;)
 
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Seems like it could again get confusing if said officers and NCOs continued to engage targets, or did they check fire while the squad/platoon engaged the known enemy location?
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In general, leaders lead. When they engage, they engage semi-automatic, with single shots. All commands are multiple shot commands - a pair to mark sector, continuous to mean "everyone shoot here" or full auto to mean "machineguns engage this target."

If you suddenly get a cone of fire on a target the squad or platoon leader is engaging, that's no disaster -- after all, there IS a target there! And all you have to do is shoot the zig-zag again to resume sector coverage.

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Have soldiers even arrived at the unit "knowing" the language on the unit? Mech verses light, striker, or airborne, they all speak slightly different languages.
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That doesn't mean we should try to make the problem worse. Teaching a standard method of fire control in NCO and Officer Basic, and in OSUT would go a long way toward making infantry units more effective.

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How do my soldiers differentiate between my tracers, the platoon sergeant's tracers, my squad leaders' tracers and all of the team leaders' tracers not to mention the machine guns tracers?
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Location tells you who is shooting -- near you, it's your squad leader. Only machineguns fire full auto -- and the only full auto command addresses only machineguns.

You change sectors by re-firing the zig-zag, so you can easily accomodate maneuver.

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Did you specify a high initial rate of fire to gain fire superiority?
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No -- no need to. Troops will fire rapidly automatically -- the trick is to get them to slow down. A side benefit of the Box Method is that the methodical approach does cause some slowing of what would otherwise be runaway fire.

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How did you maneuver elements that weren't in contact into a position where they could engage the enemy?
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You almost always need to wait a minute -- go forward, get information, and then begin maneuver. The Army, with two fireteams to a squad is at a disadvantage here. The platoon is the lowest element with real maneuver options.

Normally at company level, maneuver is by radio. At platoon level, it may be by face-to-face communication behind the firing line.

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When everyone is face down in the dirt, micro terrain will most likely block their view of the enemy. What CC methods did you use to bring your force into position to fire into the target box, PRC-25, hand and arm signals, SOP, runners?
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You just articulated a great secret -- small units disintegrate into individuals when the shooting starts. You have to re-build unit cohesion under fire. We had several ways to do that, including the 5-Step Drill (Take cover, locate the enemy, return fire, locate the man on your right and left, relay orders and information.)

The Box Method is what allows you to gain superiority in the initial engagement. As you gain superiority, you rebuild the Chain of Command and begin to maneuver platoons. You also use supporting artillery and other systems at this point.
 
The Army, with two fireteams to a squad is at a disadvantage here. The platoon is the lowest element with real maneuver options.

Not true. Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fires, or fires potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.(Per FM 3-90 & FM 101-5-1)

A squad executing bounding overwatch is maneuvering. A squad executing Battle Drills 1a, 3, 4, and 6 is maneuvering.

What is true is that the most common mistake for an inexperienced or untrained squad leader to make is to maneuver to boldly, compromising his control of either his base of fire element or his maneuver element.
 
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Not true. Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fires, or fires potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission
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Paper is one thing, combat is another.

A squad employing bounding overwatch comes under fire -- typically the bounding team is fired on. What happens?

That team has its hands full -- they may have a casualty or two. What do they do? Take cover and return fire, try to secure the casualties.

What can the other team do? All they can do is add to the fire base -- in a very predictable manner (an enemy who doesn't know where the stationary team is can easily estimate where and how they will go into action.)

With three teams, the third team can reinforce the base of fire, maneuver right, or maneuver left -- that's THREE options, whereas the two-fireteam squad has only one.
 
Vern,
Are you advocating a return to the 11 or 12 man squad? I think that you can have the same maneuver options with two fire teams as long as your squad leaders keep the teams far enough apart in travelling overwatch. I think the trail team can maneuver, it doesn't have to reinforce the team in contact. We have the M249 SAW now. That gives out fire teams a sustained automatic fire capability you didn't have in Vietnam and I didn't have for most of my career. The M203, while not the grenade launcher the M79 is, does give you a rifle in the fire team that wasn't there when you were in Vietnam.

The Army does have standardized fire commands, but they need to be addressed in unit SOPS and OP orders. There are two many ways to control the rate and distribution of fire that are dependant on how the unit is equipped and organized. PAQ-4s and PEQ-2s along with laser pointers have changed the game at night. But not all units are equipped the same. The Personal Role Radio or even the widespread use of FRS radios either privately purchased or bought by the unit on IMPAC cards have finally given us reliable radio communication down to the soldier level. I think the options are too diverse and varied to tie yourself down by standardizing the entire army.

Don't take this as a criticism of the box method. I had never seen it before and it's another tool for the leader to put in his tool box.

Jeff
 
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Are you advocating a return to the 11 or 12 man squad? I think that you can have the same maneuver options with two fire teams as long as your squad leaders keep the teams far enough apart in travelling overwatch.
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The squad size is not as important as the organization. In Singapore, I worked with a 7-man squad (or "section" as they call it), with 2-man "groups" or teams.

The two fireteam squad just doesn't have the flexibility -- if the teams are so far apart one team isn't engaged, then the engaged team is toast.

With two teams, all you can really do is establish a base of fire. With three teams, you can maneuver right and left with the support of the base of fire.

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The Personal Role Radio or even the widespread use of FRS radios either privately purchased or bought by the unit on IMPAC cards have finally given us reliable radio communication down to the soldier level.
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I agree that radio is the key to modern tactics. With personal radio, you have capabilities that far exceed such simple fire control systems as I've outlined here. However, the Box is still a valid method of visualizing the target and engagning an enemy not visible to the rifleman.
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I think the options are too diverse and varied to tie yourself down by standardizing the entire army.
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The problem is without a standard system, there is no system at all. If we don't adopt and train a standard system, we are left where the British were in the Boer War:

"What did you think we should 'ccomplish,
Warfare learned in a breath?
Knowledge to fit the occasion
In the first brief brush with death?"
 
You are assuming away options for a two fire team squad. A squad in contact can establish a base of fire and maneuver or only establish a base of fire. What if the squad comes in contact with a three man element? It does not take a platoon to attack 3 men. If a squad is incapable of maneuver, what size element constitutes the assault element in a platoon attack of a fortified position?

The squad's ability to maneuver against an enemy force is dependant upon the size of the enemy force the squad is in contact with just like a platoon or company.

Paper is one thing, combat is another.
The two fire team squad is a combat proven maneuver element. Once again, it is being used with success on a daily basis. You may prefer a different task organization, but that does not invalidate the current one.

That team has its hands full -- they may have a casualty or two. What do they do? Take cover and return fire, try to secure the casualties.
We can decrease the effectiveness of any maneuver element by inflicting casualties. A fire team that allows their attack to stall because it sustains a casualty requires remediation.

The squad size is not as important as the organization. In Singapore, I worked with a 7-man squad (or "section" as they call it), with 2-man "groups" or teams.

I do not doubt this was an effective organization but I will dispute that a 2-man base of fire element is as effective as a 4-man base of fire element or that a 2-man maneuver element is as effective as a 4-man maneuver element.

I would also point out that the Singapore Army recently transitioned from a 3 group section to a 2 group section, organized along similar lines to a U.S. Army squad, minus the rifleman. Evidently, they felt the 2 group section had more to offer.;)
 
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