ghost squire said;
Lets see somewhere around 16 US soldiers killed somewhere around 300 Somalis...
Perhaps you should head back down to the library and check the book out again. There were more then 16 US soldiers involved. From
Black Hawk Down Atlantic Monthly Press First Edition 1999 page 5:
Counting the three surveillance birds and the spy plane high overhead, there were nineteen aircraft, twelve vehicles, and about 160 men.
18 American soldiers died. It is only possible to estimate the number of Somali casualties. I think that 300 is a very conservative estimate. From
Black Hawk Down pages 289-290:
At Mogadishu's Volunteer Hospital, surgeon Abdi Mohamed Elmi was covered with blood and exhausted. His wounded and dead countrymen had started coming in the evening before. Just a trickle at first, despite the great volume of shooting going on. Vehicles couldn't move on the streets so the patients were carried in or rolled in on handcarts. There were burning roadblocks throughout the city and the American helicopters were buzzing low and shooting and most people were afraid to venture out.
Before the fight began, the Volunteer Hospital was virtually empty. It was located down near the Americans' base by the airport. After the trouble had started with the Americans most Somalis were afraid to come there. By the end of this day, Monday, October 4, all five hundred beds in the hospital would be full. One hundred more wounded would be lined in the hallways. And Volunteer wasn't the bigest hospital in the city. The numbers were even greater at Digfer. Most of those with gut wounds would die. The delay in getting them to the hospital--many more would come today then came yesterday--allowed infections to set in that could no longer be successfully treated with what antibiotics the hospital could spare.
The three-bed operating theater at Volunteer had been full and busy all through the night. Elmi was part of a team of seven surgeons who worked straight through without a break. He had assisted in eighteen major surgeries by sunrise, and the hallways outside we rapidly filling with more, dozens, hundreds more. It was a tidal wave of gore.
Black Hawk Down very clearly states that it most often took a minimum of 3-4 rounds to down a single person.
Really?? Outside of the engagement that SFC Howe related (and instantly became proof positive that we never should have cancelled the beloved M14 for every internet commando who never humped a ruck a day in his life and who's sole experience with his beloved M14 was carrying an M1A from the trunk of his car to the firing line at the range), how many more examples can you find?
And those are the hits that connected, theres no telling how many were missed considering the M4 is technically a 4 MOA weapon.
4 MOA is the minimun acceptable accuracy standard. However you can go into any arms room and pick up an M4 or M16 of any vintage at random and most likely shoot 2 MOA with it. BTW the 4 MOA standard is all that was required for an M14 to be acceptable.
I'm gonna have to go with 7.62 here.
Bad choice, according to
Black Hawk Down which according to you is the ultimate means by which we should judge the effectiveness of our issued small arms in combat, 7.62 may be just as bad.
From pages 45 and 46:
Nelson had set up near the center of the road facing west. Up to his right was an alley, where he could see Somalis aiming guns his way. Nelson had set up near the center of the road facing west. Up to his right was an alley, where he could see Somalis aiming guns his way. Nelson had set up near the center of the road facing west. Up to his right was an alley, where he could see Somalis aiming guns his way. Nelson’s gun scattered them, all but one, an old man with a bushy white Afro, further down, who seemed so intent on shooting west that he was unaware of the big gun down the alley to his left. He was till a little too far away to shoot, but Nelson could see the man maneuvering in his direction. The 60 gunner knew what the old man was trying to do. DiTomasso had spread the word that Chalk Four was struck one block northwest of their position. The old man was obviously looking for a better vantage point to shoot at Eversmann and his men.
“Shoot him, Shoot him,” urged his assistant.
“No, watch,” Nelson said. “He’ll come right to us.”
And sure enough, the man with the white Afro practically walked right up to them. He ducked behind a big tree about 50 yards off, hiding from Eversmann’s Rangers, but oblivious to the threat off his left shoulder. He was loading a new magazine in his weapon when Nelson blasted about a dozen round into him. They were “slap” rounds, plastic coated titanium bullets that could penetrate armor, and he saw the rounds go right through the man, but the guy still got up, retrieved his weapon, and even got a shot or two in Nelson’s direction. The machine gunner was shocked. He shot another twelve rounds at the man, who nevertheless managed to crawl behind the tree. This time he didn’t shoot back.
“I think you got him,” said the assistant gunner.
But Nelson could still see the Afro moving behind the tree. The man was kneeling and evidently still alive. Nelson squeezed off another long burst and saw bark splintering off the bottom of the tree. The Afro slumped sideways to the street. His body quivered but he seemed to have at last expired. Nelson was surprised how hard it could be to kill a man.
I don’t know how you could read this and still damn 5.56 and praise 7.62. Either everyone who has used SFC Howe’s displeasure with M855 as related in the book to damn the round either somehow missed this part or they simply ignored it because it didn’t fit into their preconceived notion of how our Soldiers should be equipped.
Did I say it was the first study ever about this subject? No... I said it directly led to the adoption of the 5.56. And I stand by that.
Did I say it was the first study ever about this subject? No... I said it directly led to the adoption of the 5.56. And I stand by that.
"Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon" published by the ORO. Basically it states that a gun that provides a random cone of controllable fire is superior to one that provides precise single shots, and that the chance of hitting someone with a rifle bullet is as random as the chance of getting hit by a shell fragment. " published by the ORO. Basically it states that a gun that provides a random cone of controllable fire is superior to one that provides precise single shots, and that the chance of hitting someone with a rifle bullet is as random as the chance of getting hit by a shell fragment.
You are not correct.
Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon is the
Hitchman Report that I mentioned in my earlier post. It did not lead to the adoption of the .22 caliber service weapon as you claim. It led the Army down a totally different path.
Project SALVO was the first step in the search for the
random cone of controllable fire. Project SALVO ran from 1953-1960 and produced a number of different multiple barrel rifles, multiple bullet cartridges and shothells loaded with flechettes. When Project SALVO ended, the search for the ever elusive random cone of controllable fire went into another program called SPIW or Special Purpose Individual Weapon that would fire a cartridge loaded with flechettes. When the SPIW program failed to yield a usable weapon the entire concept of the
random cone of controllable fire was dropped. It was resurrected in 1987 when the
Advanced Combat Rifle program started. Many of the ideas that were tried in both Project SALVO in the 1950s and SPIW in the 1960s were resurrected for the ACR program. ARES Olin introduced a bullpup that used a unique fully enclosed 5mm 45 grain tracer cartridge. Mcdonnell Douglas Helicopter Company submitted a recoil operated .338 caliber rifle that fired a multiple flechette round that had a total projectile weight of 70 grains that consisted of three flechettes. AAI submitted a rifle that fired a single flechette in a sabot. Steyr-Mannlicher submitted a rifle that fired a single flechette in a sabot from a plastic cased round. Colt submitted a modified M16 that fire a duplex type (two projectiles) round that was very similar to rounds that were tried in the 1950s in Project SALVO. HK submitted it’s G11 which fired a 4.92 mm caseless round. The manufacturers took two different paths in the quest for the mythical
random cone of controlled fire. Some used multiple projectiles and some used very small calibers that produced little to no recoil so they were easily controllable at a high rate of fire.
None of these projects was successful and the Army decided that none of the test rifles gave us any more capability then we had with our then standard M16A2. The ACR program was then terminated. But the quest for random cones of controlled fire continues to this day with the OICW program. This program has so far yielded a very heavy and cumbersome weapon that fires a 20mm grenade with an expensive electronic fusing system. The idea is to detonate the grenade over the head of the enemy creating the random cone of controlled fire to rain down upon his head.
So where did the 5.56x45 round come from if the quest for the random cone of controlled fire isn’t what gave us a .22 caliber service rifle?
Well it dates back to a project completed by the
Development and Proof Services at Aberdeen Proving Ground Maryland. The same report from SLA Marshall that started us down the road looking for the random cone of controlled fire, really only had damning things to say about one of our Korean war small arms. That was the M2 Carbine. There had been bitter reports coming out of Korea about the M2 Carbine jamming during cold weather and having very inadequate stopping power. The chief of Aberdeen’s Small Arms and Aircraft Weapons Section, Mr. G.A. Gustafson under took a project to:
Design and Fabricate a High-Velocity Caliber .22 Cartridge, Modify a Standard M2 Carbine to Fire the Cartridge, Evaluate the Weapon-Ammunition Combination. The program ran from 13 November 1952 to 21 August 1953 and concluded:
The M2 Carbine is capable of good performance when modified to fire caliber .22, 41 grain bullets to velocities in excess of 3,000 fps.
The caliber .22 Carbine performance, when compared with that of the caliber .30, M2 Carbine, was markedly superior with respect to velocity, trajectory, penetration and accuracy in both semi- and full-automatic fire.
The caliber .22 bullets have less striking energy than the caliber .30 Carbine bullets at all ranges; however, the caliber .22 has more then enough energy to satisfy present criteria for lethality to ranges of at least 400 yards.
The extremely good burst-fire dispersion performance, the light weapon weight, and the high striking energy at close range, make the caliber .22 Carbine worthy of study as a replacement for the caliber .45 submachine gun.
The caliber .22 Carbine compares favorably with the M1 rifle in firing against regulation targets up to a range of 300 yards.
This program led to Aberdeen working on finding the optimum military .22 caliber bullet. Mr. G. A. Gustafson and William C. Davis looked at many .22 caliber bullets including some from the SALVO program. One of the most promising was a 68 grain bullet that wasn’t a totally new design but:
Merely a .22 caliber homologue of the caliber .30 M1 ball bullet that had been developed by Army Ordnance during the 1920s for use in long-range machine gun fire.
Trial quantities of the bullets were made by the Sierra Bullet Company and the cartridge cases were made up by Olin’s Winchester/Western Division. Gustafson and Davis concluded that the 41 grain bullet used in the .22 caliber M2 carbine was
too little and the 68 grain Sierra was
too much. In 1955 a letter was drafted to the Chief of Ordnance proposing a 22 caliber cartridge, employing a boattail bullet of approximately 55 grains weight at a muzzle velocity of approximately 3,300 fps for use in a rifle substantially lighter then the M14/T44. They proposed a test program to design the cartridge at Aberdeen and build one experimental rifle to fire it and requested $60.000 funding for the project. The Chief of Ordnance verbally denied the request and the SCHV program died then. Or did it?
In the meantime, back at Ft Benning, the Infantry Board was very interested in the SCHV project and submitted a formal request for a new rifle employing the SCHV concept. The Infantry Board asked for a 6 pound, selective fire .22 caliber weapon, conventionally stocked, holding 20 rounds or more that was effective to 300 yards. However, each layer in the chain of command between Ft Benning and the Pentagon added their input and the requirements ended up being powerful enough to penetrate a steel helmet, body armor or 10-gauge (.135”) steel with trajectory and accuracy equal to or better then the M1 rifle and wounding power equal to or better then the .30 Carbine, out to
500 yards.
It was to meet the requirements of this program that caused Armalite engineers Freemont and Sullivan to scale down Eugene Stoner’s AR10 into the first AR15s. The .223 cartridge was originally called the .222 special and was designed by Eugene Stoner to meet the 500 yard requirement.
While there were some other things involved in getting the AR15 into the hands of American troops, it was born out of the Infantry Board’s request for a 6 pound, selective fire .22 caliber weapon, conventionally stocked, holding 20 rounds or more that was effective to 300 yards. Random cones of controllable fire had absolutely nothing to do with it’s design or adoption.
However did our predecessors do it? They didn't have helicopters to bring them ammunition and they had to go through jungles with a bolt action rifle.
They didn’t move as far or as fast because they were tied to their logistical trains. The couldn’t sustain themselves in a fight as long and often advances stopped before it was a military necessity for them to stop because they were running low on ammunition. Breakthroughs often weren’t exploited and pursuits either didn’t happen or were forced to be abandoned before the enemy force was destroyed.
Really, interesting, so a gun that can go full auto and has virtually no recoil does not tempt troops at all to fire more rounds off then say... a garand? Very interesting statement indeed.
It’s true. Untrained and poorly led troops will have poor fire discipline. Trained troops, led by leaders who know their business will use proper fire discipline. There is no need for mechanical devices to limit a soldiers rate of fire. They are just useless waste. I suppose you’re of the same school of though that put the magazine cut off on the Krag and Springfield rifles. After all if we let the soldiers have ready access to those four rounds in the magazine of their rifles, they will waste the ammo and the supply people won’t be able to keep them supplied. I really didn’t think that school of thought was prevalent any more.
And finally to address your comments about the effectiveness of the 40 mm grenades, I’ll leave you with this from your bible of modern weapons effectiveness,
Black Hawk Down pages 65 and 66:
To Eversmann’s left, Private Anton Berendsen was lying out on the ground firing his M203, a grenade-launcher mounted under the barrel of his M16. Berendsen was aiming east at Somalis who would pop out and spray bullets from behind the rusty tin shacks that protruded at intervals from the stone walls. Seconds after Galentine dove in, Berendsen grabbed his shoulder.
“Oh, my God, I’m hit,” he said. He looked up at Eversmann,
Berendsen scooted over against the wall next to Galentine with one arm limp at his side, picking small chunks of debris from his face.
Eversmann squatted down next to both men, turning first to Berendsen, who was still preoccupied, looking down the alley east.
“Ber, tell me where you’re hurt,” Eversmann said.
“I think I got one in the arm.”
Berendsen began fumbling with his good hand with the breech of his grenade launcher. He couldn’t get it open with one hand. Eversmann impatiently pened the breech for him.
“There’s a guy right down there,” Berendsen said.
Eversmann was too busy with the wound to look. As he struggled to lift up Berendsen’s vest and open his shirt to assess the wound, the private shot off a 203 round one-handed. The sergeant turned to look. It occurred to him that he probably should have fired the round instead of having Berendsen attempt it one-handed. He watched the fist sized shell spiral through the air toward a shack about 40 meters away. It flattened it in a great flash of light, noise, and smoke. The shooting from that place stopped
Doesn’t seem ineffective to me.
Jeff
