Many officers who served the Union during the Civil War and were familiar with the Spencer's firepower were very reluctant to exchange the repeating Spencer for the new single shot Springfield .45. So why did the Army change from the Spencer to the Springfield? There appear to be two main reasons the Army made the change—one financial and one tactical. After the Civil War, the Army was forced to cut back on expenditures. The Army had recognized that a soldier armed with a repeating rifle would expend a large amount of ammunition during battle whether he had a clear target in sight or not. The belief was that with a single shot rifle, the soldier would become more efficient with his ammunition and take only clear shots at his target
Then, when the magazine is empty and only one or two targets are left, the gun can be single loaded very quickly. This option is not nearly as convenient for the unlucky Henry shooter. If reloading becomes necessary, the Spencer's magazine can be refilled far more rapidly than a Henry. If everyone is missing and both the Henry and Spencer must be reloaded, the Spencer armed skirmisher can overtake a Henry shooter. A positive advantage of the Spencer design is that the magazine is safer to reload, since the muzzle is always pointed down range. A common misconception is that Spencers are more difficult to operate and prone to jamming. With the wrong ammunition, or a weak magazine spring, this is true. However, a properly prepared Spencer is as smooth and reliable as any Henry on the line.
There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer's Field (the square-mile section where Custer's five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer's Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.
The success of Henry's rifles ensured Winchester's success, and the primary weapon carried by the Indians at the Little Bighorn was either Henry's model or the slightly altered Winchester Model 1866. Both fired a .44-caliber Henry rimfire cartridge. The Henry used a 216-grain bullet with 25 grains of powder, while the Winchester used a 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of powder. Velocity was 1,125 feet per second. Cartridges were inserted directly into the front of the Henry magazine, while the Winchester 1866 had a spring cover on the right side of the receiver. The carbine and the rifle had a capacity of 13 and 17 cartridges respectively.
What, then, was the reason that the soldiers made such a poor showing during the West's most famous Army-Indian battle? While Custer's immediate command of 210 men was wiped out and more than 250 troopers and scouts were killed in the fighting on June 25-26, the Indians lost only about 40 or 50 men. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that weapons are no better than the men who use them. Marksmanship training in the frontier Army prior to the 1880s was almost nil. An Army officer recalled the 1870s with nostalgia. "Those were the good old days," he said. "Target practice was practically unknown." A penurious government allowed only about 20 rounds per year for training--a situation altered only because of the Custer disaster.
Then, when the magazine is empty and only one or two targets are left, the gun can be single loaded very quickly. This option is not nearly as convenient for the unlucky Henry shooter. If reloading becomes necessary, the Spencer's magazine can be refilled far more rapidly than a Henry. If everyone is missing and both the Henry and Spencer must be reloaded, the Spencer armed skirmisher can overtake a Henry shooter. A positive advantage of the Spencer design is that the magazine is safer to reload, since the muzzle is always pointed down range. A common misconception is that Spencers are more difficult to operate and prone to jamming. With the wrong ammunition, or a weak magazine spring, this is true. However, a properly prepared Spencer is as smooth and reliable as any Henry on the line.
There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer's Field (the square-mile section where Custer's five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer's Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.
The success of Henry's rifles ensured Winchester's success, and the primary weapon carried by the Indians at the Little Bighorn was either Henry's model or the slightly altered Winchester Model 1866. Both fired a .44-caliber Henry rimfire cartridge. The Henry used a 216-grain bullet with 25 grains of powder, while the Winchester used a 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of powder. Velocity was 1,125 feet per second. Cartridges were inserted directly into the front of the Henry magazine, while the Winchester 1866 had a spring cover on the right side of the receiver. The carbine and the rifle had a capacity of 13 and 17 cartridges respectively.
What, then, was the reason that the soldiers made such a poor showing during the West's most famous Army-Indian battle? While Custer's immediate command of 210 men was wiped out and more than 250 troopers and scouts were killed in the fighting on June 25-26, the Indians lost only about 40 or 50 men. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that weapons are no better than the men who use them. Marksmanship training in the frontier Army prior to the 1880s was almost nil. An Army officer recalled the 1870s with nostalgia. "Those were the good old days," he said. "Target practice was practically unknown." A penurious government allowed only about 20 rounds per year for training--a situation altered only because of the Custer disaster.