2nd Amendment Case at SCOTUS: STATEMENT OF THE CASE (PART 1)

[Don Hamrick]

Statement of the Case

A. The Scope of the Second Amendment as an Individual Right

On August 24, 2004 the U.S. Department of Justice issued their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, titled, Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right. In that 106 page Memorandum Opinion the Justice Deprtment stated their conclusion on the Second Amendment:

. . . ,we conclude that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to keep and to bear arms. Current case law leaves open and unsettled the question of whose right is secured by the Amendment. [fn10] Although we do not address the scope of the right, our examination of the original meaning of the Amendment provides extensive reasons to conclude that the Second Amendment secures an individual right, and no persuasive basis for either the collective-right or quasi-collective-right views. The text of the Amendment’s operative clause, setting out a “right of the people to keep and bear Arms,†is clear and is reinforced by the Constitution’s structure. The Amendment’s prefatory clause, properly understood, is fully consistent with this interpretation. The broader history of the Anglo-American right of individuals to have and use arms, from England’s Revolution of 1688-1689 to the ratification of the Second Amendment a hundred years later, leads to the same conclusion. Finally, the first hundred years of interpretations of the Amendment, and especially the commentaries and case law in the pre-Civil War period closest to the Amendment’s ratification, confirm what the text and history of the Second Amendment require.

[fn10] Petitioner’s Note: This statement directly contradicts the Memorandum Opinion of Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Plaintiff’s Case No. 04-1435 of October 9, 2002, dismissed with prejudice. In her Memorandum Opinion she stated:

"Miller remains the most authoritative modern pronouncement on the amendment’s meaning and its conclusion that the right to bear arms is limited by the needs of an organized militia has subsequently been echoed by the Supreme Court and followed in this and other circuits."

The Petitioner construes the contradiction under Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence of judicial bias in Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle.

In order to properly determine the scope of the Second Amendment rights an examination of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution and the Preamble to the Bill of Rights must be performed.

The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution reads:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The Petitioner construes from the Preamble that all enforcement, legislative, or litigious actions of the U.S. Government, the States, and the People (the distribution of Tenth Amendment powers between the People, the States, and the United States Government) shall, or are intended to, conform to one or more, or any combination of the six conditions or purposes of the Preamble. These six conditions or purposes are:

(1) in Order to form a more perfect Union,
(2) establish Justice,
(3) insure domestic Tranquility,
(4) provide for the common defence,
(5) promote the general Welfare, and
(6) secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity

Petitioner further construes the scope of the Second Amendment to be part of the definition of the common defence as to be viewed through the Tenth Amendment distribution of powers as including the People reserving the Power to assist and participate in the common defence at the personal and social levels of our constitutional society by reserving the right to be openly armed through the Second, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as we travel the various states to guard against common crimes.

Purpose and Effect of the Preamble [fn11]

[fn11] U.S. Senate, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Annotations of Cases Decided By the Supreme Court of the United States to June 29, 1992; Senate Document No. 103-6; 103d Congress, 1st Session, p. 53.

Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, [fn12] the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution.[fn13] “Its true office,†wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, “is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, ‘to provide for the common defense.’ No one can doubt that this does not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any measures which they deem useful for the common defence. But suppose the terms of a given power admit of two constructions, the one more restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words, but is, and ought to be, governed by the intent of the power; if one could promote and the other defeat the common defence, ought not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation, to be adopted?†[fn14], [fn15]

[fn12] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905)

[fn13] E.g., the Court has read the preamble as bearing witness to the fact that the Constitution emanated from the people and was not the act of sovereign and independent States, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 403 (1819)Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419, 471 (1793)Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 324 (1816)Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901)In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891)

[fn14] Petitioner's emphasis.

[fn15] 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston: 1833), 462M. Adler & W. Gorman, The American Testament (New York: 1975), 63–118

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Memorandum Opinion returns us to that proverbial fork in the road where we must decide between the restrictive or the liberal constructions of the Second Amendment if we are to promote the common defence based upon the soundest principles of interpretation without the contamination of political ideologies. The restoration of the right to openly keep and bear arms is hereby demanded as the proper choice under Joseph Story’s interpretation of the common defence.

The Preamble to the Bill of Rights

Congress of the United States

Begun and held at the City of New-York, on Wednesday, March 4, 1789

THE Conventions of a number of States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution. [fn16]

RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all, or any of which Articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.

ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

[fn16] Petitioner's emphasis.

Petitioner asserts that the collective effect of (1) the Preamble to the Constitution; (2) Preamble to the Bill of Rights; (3) the shall not be infringed clause of the Second Amendment; (4) the Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV; (6) the delegation of the President being the Commander in Chief of the Militia of the several States in Section 2, Article II; (7) the clause in Article IV, Section 4 stating, “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence,†all serve as a barrier to federal firearms laws through the Commerce Clause of Section 8, Article I of the U.S. Constitution and prohibits the States from enacting laws by the same barriers through the Fourteenth Amendment.

“A right vested in a citizen means that he has the power to do certain acts, or to possess certain things, according to the law of the land.†Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall 386, 1 L.Ed. 648.

“Among the historic liberties protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.†Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d. 711.

The change in the official policy of the United States government on the Second Amendment is contained in Footnote 3 to the U.S. Supreme Court Brief on May 7, 2002, for the United States in Opposition to Timothy Joe Emerson v. United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 01-8780; Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor General and Council of Record.

That portion of Footnote 3 reads:

The current position of the United States, however, is that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals, including persons who are not members of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to possess and bear their own firearms, subject to reasonable restrictions designed to prevent possession by unfit persons or to restrict the possession of types of firearms that are particularly suited to criminal misuse. See Memorandum From the Attorney General To All United States Attorneys, Re: United States v. Emerson, Nov. 9, 2001. A copy of that memorandum is appended to this brief.

B. Stare Decisis Based on United States v. Miller 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

Petitioner disagrees with State Oil Co. v. Khan 522 U.S. 3, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199, where in that case it was said that, “The doctrine of stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.†See Appendix H for a dissenting opinion on Stare Decisis from Jon Roland of the Constitution Society. Petitioner asserts that it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right than that it be just simply and expediently settled lest we violate the Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government as stipulated in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution and introduce a Nihilistic Form of Government as we may already find under the Patriot Act where the Rule of Law suddenly becomes the Rule of Suspicion. See Appendix I for The Ninth Circuit's Interim Report: Task Force on Self-Represented Litigants Comments on the Ninth Circuit pro se Task Force Report by Charles W. Heckman, Dr. Sci., A Matter of Justice Coalition (AMOJ) Committee for the Ninth Circuit. Much of what is detailed in that Report has occurred in all of Petitioner’s cases, from the U.S. District Court to the U.S. Supreme Court to the extent that Petitioner wrote his political poem reflecting the People’s disdain for the state of American justice today. See Appendix J for Petitioner’s political poem, A Nihilistic Government, This United States.

“When the United States Supreme Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both houses of Congress and signed by the President, it should do so only for the most compelling constitutional reasons.†Mistretta v. United States, 488 US 361 (1989), 109 S Ct 647, 102 L Ed 2d 714.

The Petitioner further construes that if any particular law or any whole section of law fails to fulfill any number of these six purposes then those laws are unconstitutional and are therefore void in accordance with Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Compare the U.S. Department of Justice’s Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, dated August 24, 2004, with Judge Huvelle’s Memorandum Opinion in Appendix B. Her Memorandum Opinion will be found to be in error and the case should then be overturned and should then be remanded back to that District Court for trial. And all other subsequent Memorandum Opinions dismissing Petitioner’s other cases with prejudice will also be overturned as they were based on Judge Huvelle’s faulty opinion.

 

[Don Hamrick]

Statement of the Case (Continued)

C. The U.S. Merchant Seaman & the Second Amendment

The U.S. Coast Guard is required by law, (46 U.S.C. § 7301(b), 7302, 7303, 7306(a)(3), 46 U.S.C. Appendix § 1295), and by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as an individual right to endorse a Merchant Mariner’s Document with “National Open Carry Handgun†when a U.S. Able Seaman presents a certificate of course completion for a firearms recertification course for the 9mm handgun, the 12-ga. Shotgun and the M14 rifle when that training is a requirement of an Able Seaman aboard a U.S. merchant vessel in accordance with 46 U.S.C. § 7306(a)(3). The Coast Guard does not have the authority to deny an application for an endorsement for National Open Carry Handgun presenting “applicable examination†and “educational requirement†when the Able Seaman is not a prohibited person from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922 et seq simply because of omissions in Coast Guard regulations. Nor does the Coast Guard have the authority to deny such an application where the United States Constitution’s Second Amendment, the Bill of Rights, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments or Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation directly apply. The Thirteenth Amendment is just as much an individual right to keep and bear arms as is the Second Amendment but for a different purpose, even for U.S. Merchant Seamen not employed aboard ship, but living ashore in the United States.

At 1:49 P.M. on November 25, 2002 with the signature of President George W. Bush the Homeland Security Act of 2002 became law. On March 1, 2003 the U.S. Coast Guard was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan dated November 25, 2002.

In light of the transference of the U.S. Coast Guard Petitioner questions the efficacy of 49 U.S.C. § 2103, in that the Secretary of Transportation “has general superintendence over the merchant marine of the United States and of merchant marine personnel insofar as the enforcement of this subtitle is concerned and insofar as those vessels and personnel are not subject, under other law, to the supervision of another official of the United States Government. In the interests of marine safety and seamen’s welfare, the Secretary shall enforce this subtitle and shall carry out correctly and uniformly administer this subtitle. The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of this subtitle.â€

The question is that if the general superintendence over the merchant marine of the United States and of merchant marine personnel is transferred to the Department of Homeland Security then what role will the U.S. Merchant Marine play under the Department of Homeland Security.

It is a logical presumption that the circumstances necessitating the reorganization of the Federal government establishing the Department of Homeland Security also take into account the fighting force of the U.S. Merchant Marine personnel as a viable resource to augment security plans of our nations seaports to restore Second Amendment rights of not only the U.S. Merchant Marine personnel but also to law abiding citizens in order to maintain the balance of power between the People, the State, and the Federal government, that one part shall never gain an excessive advantage over the other?

Petitioner’s case is for a Writ of Mandamus to President Bush directing the U.S. Coast Guard to endorse Petitioner’s Merchant Mariner’s Document with “National Open Carry Handgun.†This endorsement would blend exceptionally well in a greater role for the Merchant Marine industry under the Department of Homeland Security as falling under the original meaning of the Preamble to the United States Constitution and the Preamble to the Bill of Rights supporting the right to keep and bear arms in interstate and intrastate commerce as well as for personal security of the individual U.S. citizen.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of State and Federal firearms laws that infringe, restrict, or prohibit the right to travel while openly armed under the Second Amendment for the purpose of personal security and the security of a free state as violating the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as establishing a form of legislated slavery and/or involuntary servitude as defined by the 1856 U.S. Supreme Court case in Dred Scott v. Sanford.

One of the general requirements and classifications for able seaman is “qualified professionally as demonstrated by an applicable examination or educational requirement†as per 46 U.S.C. 7306(a)(3). The naval document stipulating the requirements for small arms training is OPNAVINST 3591.1C, “Small Arms Training and Qualification†qualifying it as applicable examination or educational requirement. The Secretary of Transportation [or the Department of Homeland Security, as the case may be] may prescribe regulations to carry out this chapter as per 46 U.S.C. 7301(b). However, Petitioner questions that when the Coast Guard is transferred to the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003 will the Secretary of Homeland Security prescribe regulations to carry out the same function for firearms training for Able Seaman?

Capt. J. P. Brusseau admits there are no laws or regulations governing an endorsement for national open carry handguns or small arms and light weapons. When there are no laws or regulations a U.S. Coast Guard officer is bound by his Oath of Office to look to the U.S. Constitution for guidance. When the U.S. Constitution compels action in defense of constitutional rights that Coast Guard officer does not have the authority to exercise his discretion in denying an application for an endorsement relying upon the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.

33 CFR, Subchapter H codifies the International Ship & Port Security (ISPS) Code; the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) XI-2; and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 2002. 33 CFR § 104.220 imposes an unwarrated risk of injury or death for unarmed crew members performing the requisite security duties. Training in and arming crew members with firearms in the performance of these security duties will reduce liability for injuries and deaths.

Nothing in the laws cited above positively or even remotely, prohibits the U.S. Coast Guard from endorsing Merchant Mariner’s Documents with National Open Carry Handgun or Small Arms and Light Weapons.

D. Government Racketeering and the Second Amendment.

The Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 states: “In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.â€
Evidence of Racketeering Activity

(Compare With Appendix I)

(1) Obstruction of Justice by U.S. Department Justice: The U.S. Department of Justice wilfully and maliciously obstructed justice for political gain, withheld evidence vital to Petitioner’s RICO Act case (No. 03-2160), and violated Petitioner’s right to due process, etc., in order to keep their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General on Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right from the Petitioner. See Appendix C for a chronology of these events.

(2) Extortion (18 U.S.C. § 872): The U.S. Supreme Court violated its own Rule 40(2) and the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, by forcing the Petitioner, in Case No. 03-145, to pay their filing fee when the Petitioner was a fully document U.S. Seaman before the Petitioner’s appeal would be accepted as filed.

(3) Article III Violation - Judicial Bias in the U.S. Supreme Court Against a Pro Se Petitioner with a Second Amendment case: The U.S. Supreme Court exhibited “bad behavior†under Article III in a display of judicial bias against a pro se plaintiff with a Second Amendment case. Compare the Docket Reports for the Silveira case (No. 03-51) and the Hamrick case (No. 03-145).

(4) Extortion (18 U.S.C. § 872): The U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit violated the Seamen’s Suit law by requiring the Petitioner, in Case No. 02-5334 and Case No. 03-5021, to pay their respective filing fees before the Petitioner’s appeal would be accepted as filed.

(5) Extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872 is a predicate act of “racketeering activity†under the RICO Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

(6) False Statements 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a): Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle’s Memorandum Opinion in Petitioner’s Case No. 02-1435 was proven to be infested with erroneous conclusions based on a false reliance on Miller and probably from a political ideology misconstrued as the rule of law by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General on the Second Amendment.

(7) False Statements 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a): Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle’s Memorandum Opinion in Petitioner’s Case No. 02-1434 was an erroneous application of qualified and absolute immunity assisted by inadmissible evidence getting entered into the record as admissible evidence, and other judicial irregularities.

(8) Obstruction of Justice by Judges: Judge Richard W. Roberts, in answer to Petitioner’s Motion for Recusal in Case No. 03-2160 (RICO Case) stated: “I recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.†Judge Reggie B. Walton was erroneously assigned to Petitioner’s Case No. 03-2160, because Judge Reggie B. Walton is NOT a judge from ANOTHER district but he IS a judge from the SAME district as Judge Richard W. Roberts. How did Judge Walton get selected to preside over the Plaintiff’s case when Judge Walton was, at that time, presiding over another Second Amendment case, Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004)? Judge Walton ruled in the Seegars case that the Second Amendment does not apply to the citizens of the District of Columbia. This ruling gave Judge Walton a predisposition to rule with bias against the Petitioner’s RICO Act case alleging the United States is racketeering an unlawful and an unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment as evidenced in Petitioner’s judicial track record in Case No. 02-1434 and Case No. 02-1435.

(9) Complaint of Judicial Misconduct filed with the Judicial Council for the DC Circuit by the Petitioner was Denied: The appeal for review was also denied. The Petitioner alleged judicial bias and/or judicial activism against plaintiffs, whether represented or pro se, with Second Amendment cases as an individual right exists in the U.S. District Court for DC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court in review of all of Petitioner’s cases. Petitioner’s allegations range from irrelevant (inadmissable) evidence was admitted as relevant evidence in Petitioner’s original cases: Case No. 04-1434 and No. 04-1435; to the DC Circuit rubber stamping the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice without examining the merits of Petitioner’s case in a fair and impartial manner.

(10) Abuse of Absolute & Qualified Immunities: The incident that triggered Petitioner’s constitutional tort claim against the U.S. Coast Guard (Case No. 02-1434) was a publishable article written by the Petitioner emailed to Capt. J. P. Brusseau, USCG, Director of Field Activities, Marine Safety, Security & Environmental Protection at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC. The article was about unarmed law-abiding citizens getting murdered by criminals in today’s society with its huge amount of federal, state, and local gun control laws and ordinances. Capt. Brusseau misconstrued the article as a death threat. Because the Petitioner, at that time, was aboard a U.S. Government pre-position vessel anchored off the coast of Lithuania he orders to the Petitioner’s employer to have the Petitioner put ashore at Hotel Klaipeda to await the arrival to two civilian special agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) to determine whether Capt. Brusseau’s perceived threat was real or imaginery. The NCIS special agents determined that the Petitioner intended no threat whatsoever toward Capt. Brusseau and was allowed to return to the vessel. However, the vessel had departed for a 10-day exercise with the U.S. Navy. The Petitioner subsequently had to stay at Hotel Klaipeda for a total of 12 days. The next port of call for the vessel was Tallinn, Estonia where the Petitioner was driven to rejoin the vessel.

Petitioner’s RICO Act case (No.03-2160) at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia was dismissed with prejudice on August 16, 2004. The U.S. Department of Justice issued their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General on the Second Amendment on August 24, 2004, just 8 days after the dismissal with prejudice, but withheld it from public release until December 2004, well after the presidential elections. The Justice Department’s Memorandum Opinion was vital evidence to Petitioner’s case which could have led to Court to deny the government’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and allowed the case to proceed to trial. The U.S. Department of Justice as subverted justice for political gain and the Petitioner cannot prevail in any of his cases for his constitutional rights.

(11) Petitioner Resorted to Guerilla Warfare Litigation to Collect Evidence of Judicial Bias & Corruption in the Pursuit of Justice: Suspecting judicial bias in Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia the Petitioner initiated Guerilla Warfare Litigation against the National Rifle Association (NRA), the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and the KeepAndBearArms.com (KABA)(Case No. 04-2040) in order to collect evidence of judicial bias. In terms of the Preamble the bias and corruption of the federal courts have caused a disturbance in the Domestic Tranquility over the Second Amendment which threatens the safety and security of society and this nation which serves to defeat the Common Defense and denigrate the General Welfare. The judicial bias derives from Judge Walton’s and Judge Huvelle’s reluctance or refusal to promptly rule on Petitioner’s motions allowing time for the Government’s motion to dismiss with prejudice to be entered into the record and thereby promptly dismissing Petitioner’s cases. The libel case against the NRA, SAF, and KABA was Petitioner’s tactic to expose the Court’s eagerness to assist Petitioner’s case to trial since it was against Second Amendment advocacy groups. Judge Richard J. Leon took the bait by issuing a Case Management Order on December 2, 2004 before the Petitioner could prepare his objection to defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Petitioner construes the Case Management Order as evidence of judicial bias when it is viewed with Petitioner’s other cases where the judges were failing or refusing to act in Petitioner’s favor. Having acquired evidence of judicial bias in Judge Leon, Petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice.

The judicial history of all of Petitioner’s cases can be construed as prima facie evidence of racketeering activities of the Judicial and Executive Branches with support from the Legislative Branch of the United States Government in support of an unlawful and unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment in violation of the Ninth Amendment rights of the People and the Tenth Amendment’s distribution of power between the People, the States, and the United States Government.

 

[Don Hamrick]

Statement of the Case (Final)

E. The Second Amendment v. International Treaties & Conventions

The U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects and the U.N. Programme of Action resulting thereof in conjunction with the U.N. Department of Disarmament Affairs’ Disarmament Agenda for the 21st Century (DDA Occasional Papers No. 6, October 2002) and in conjunction with the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee’s (MSC) Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 dated May 29, 2002)’s anti-gun recommendations in paragraphs 45 and 46 are direct attacks on Second Amendment.

Citing from the IMO/MSC Circ. 623/Rev.3 dated May 29, 2002’s firearms section:

¶45 The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged.

¶46 Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.

It has been fully documented that piracy attacks on merchant ships have steadily increased in the last 10 years with a growing number of crew members getting murdered by fully automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Indeed, an unarmed crew is an open invitation to pirates and terrorists alike to board a ship and kill its crew with little or no risk to the pirates or terrorists. The crew might as well invite them to dinner before the pirates and terrorists begin their slaughter.

There are several remedies for treaties that abrogate, infringe, or nullify the Second Amendment rights of the American seafarer aboard U.S. flag vessels. Citing from Corpus Juris Secundum: Treaties:

Part IV. Relation To, and Conflict With, Other Laws

§ 13. Generally

Without express authority from Congress, or authority otherwise clearly indicated, the courts are bound to recognize treaties as lawfully made. However, the courts have the authority to declare the invalidity of a treaty in a proper case where the rights of citizens are involved.

§ 14. Acts of Congress

Treaties and acts of Congress, are placed on the same footing and are of like obligation, so that neither having any inherent superiority over the other, either may supersede the other. Even so, neither treaties nor laws passed pursuant to them are free from the restraints of the United States Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights. United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 134 f.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998)[fn17]

[fn17] United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 134 f.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998). Italics and underlining are Petitioner’s emphasis for the Second Amendment rights of U.S. seafarers.

Petititoner notes that the United States is omitted in the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As literally worded, does this omission give the United States government the power to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States? Or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law? Or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws? If this literal interpretation is correct then a constitutional amendment is necessary to correct this tyranny.

“We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force.â€

Ayn Rand, The Nature of Government
The hypocrisy of the Judicial and Executive Branches of the U.S. Government on the Second Amendment as an individual right will likely continue if Alberto Gonzales is confirmed as the Attorney General. On January 18, 2005 Mr. Gonzales stated “that he supports extending the expired federal assault weapons ban†(Washington Times, Jan. 19, 2005, A4) and further stated that “he wants Congress to get rid of a requirement that would eliminate part of the USA Patriot Act this year, despite complaints that it is too intrusive.†(Ib.)

The Petitioner, Don Hamrick, respectfully prays that his Petition for Writ of Certiorari be accepted on reason that the case has imperative public importance having certain constitutional questions that require immediate determination in the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Appendix J: A Nihilistic Government, This United States (political poem)

A Nihilistic Government, This United States
By Don Hamrick (Petitioner)
© 2004 Don Hamrick

Give us this day our daily servilism,
So that actual freedom may never taunt,
The spirit in us, into a future pugilism.
Lest the government forever haunt.
How long?

Henry Hyde confessed that fateful day,
The Constitution, no longer relevant.
‘Tis our fault we are slaves today,
We refused to be freedom’s adjuvant.
How long?

Our Republican government, overthrown,
By the Department of Homeland Insecurity.
Terrorism, its propaganda, overblown,
Freedom guaranteed by enslavement to security.
How long?

A new mythos proclaimed from this nihilism,
Only deadens our sense of discernment.
From this ethos of paranoia comes this falabilism,
You can’t be trusted. But trust the government.
How long?

Deceiving us in a blanket of security,
That we are safe from a world of dangers.
Forever oppressed our sense of responsibility,
To protect ourselves from such harbingers.
How long?

In vain we plead our Second Amendment right
To contest government edicts from on high.
The courts rule our arguments as so much tripe.
They say it does not apply on the thigh.
How long?

Three doors of government slammed shut
Leaving us to agitate for want of freedom.
The rule of law now is anything but,
As we live in this wretched thraldom.
How long?

How long will we sit and cower,
Resenting those who act above the law,
Before we stand up for balance of power,
To stop the advancing rape of law.
How long?

Lost to us now our Bill of Rights.
This Nihilistic government frights.
Will it be much longer?​

 

[Don Hamrick]

:banghead: Well! What the hell do you expect me to do when the NRA refuses to help me and every attorney I ask turns me down?

I had to go it alone! I had no choice!

 

[Don Hamrick]

Perhaps I should clarify my case strategy:

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari demanding the Individual Right interpretationof the Second Amendment from the Supreme Court springs from a my RICO Act case now at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit allegin the U.S. of racketeering an unlawful and unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment.

I took the RICO Act approach against the United States because NO ONE ELSE WILL - because a pro se plaintiff in a civil case as the freedom to swing his club as he sees fit.

This approach has allowed me to allege treason, high crimes, and/or misdemeanors against President Bush over his refusal to protect the United States from invasion (a mandate in the Constitution) over the invasioln of illegal aliens which allows terrorists to enter our country unannounced in this war on terrorism.

It is the Tenth Amendment POWER of the People to take up arms in defense of this nation under the Common Defence clause of the Preamble to the Constitution - hence we now have the Minuteman Project performing a constitutional duty that the U.S. Government refuses to perform.

I am trying to steer the Supreme Court toward a "Common Defence" interpretation of the "Second Amendment" that would require the American People (law-abiding folks) to be openly armed at all times.

 

[Matt G]

No specific case...

So what's your Prayer For Relief?

An advisory opinion? The S Ct doesn't give 'em.

A declaratory judgment? Okay, according to the Declaratory Judgment Act, federal courts can clarify rights and legal relationships "even before a legislature has mandated a law to take effect, although only in 'cases of actual controversy.'" (O'Brien)

So where's your legal controversy, from the S Ct's point of view?

Getting cert is going to be... unlikely. Heck, to get it on this will take a brief presented by the Solicitor General, IMHO.

 

[Matt G]

Woops. just saw your case. Okay, well, there goes some of my argument-- now you've got a specific case for standing. What's the history on the case?

 

[itgoesboom]

Okay, there are many like me that can't handle reading three pages of legalese.

So, is it possible to sum up, in two or three paragraphs; 1. What you are arguing, 2. what your strategy is, 3. Why you think that you will be succesful?

Thanks.


I.G.B.

 

[Don Hamrick]

DIRECTED TO MATTG Moderator:

ORIGINAL CAUSE OF ACTION:

In 2002When I reported aboard a U.S. Government ammo vessel in Newport News, VA (empty of munitions) I was required to attend a small arms recertification course. I passed that course. I considered that mandatory training as occupational training under 46 U.S.C. 7306(a)(3).

I went to the Coast Guard to apply for an endorsement on my Merchant Seaman's ID card (Merchant Mariner's Document). The Coast Guard denied the application with a final agency action on April 19, 2002 (Patriots Day). Well, it is that date of denial that gives me the drive to push my Second Amendment/RICO Act cases.

That denial gave me grounds/standing. But on another ship later, a U.S. Government pre-position ship anchored off the coast of Lithuania I had been emailing attached PDF articles to the Coast Guard officer in charge of Merchant Mariners' Documents (ID cards). One particular article he perceived was alleged to be threat against his life for denying my application. He sent the Naval Criminal Investigative Service to Lithuania to conduct a criminal investigative interview, pulling me off the U.S. Government vessel. The NCIS determined I was innocent, that my article about murdered victims of crime was a advocacy piece for Second Amendment rights as it was originally intended to be as I wrote it. But the ship I was asked to leave while the company had arranged for me to stay hat the Hotel Klaipedia, had left for a 10-day exercise with the U.S. Navy. The ship's next port of call was Tallinn, Estonia 10 days later. That resulted in my stay at the hotel for a total of 12 days. I was becoming jittering from cultural isolation near the end of those 12 days. Had it not been for Internet cafes I would surely be one pissed off dude.

This provided grounds from my second case, Constitutional Tort claims for damages, although denied at the District Court and the DC Circuit.

The Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief was dismissed with prejudice, affirmed at the DC Circuit and denied certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court.

This gave me grounds to file a RICO Act case for racketeering an unlawful and an unconstitutional protection scheme over the Second Amendment. Hence my case today at the U.S. Supreme Court.

 

[Don Hamrick]

DIRECTED TO ITGOESBOOM:

We had the right to travel intrastate and interstate while wearing a sidearm for the first 100 years after ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Today we don't have that right any longer and I am alleging that the loss of that right endangered our national security.

I have provided ample evidence to support my arguments on this point.

 

[Don Hamrick]

Bumping to head of the line for all to read.

 

[Jim Diver]

nevermind.....

 

[Don Hamrick]

Lets give'm a chance to read all 3 sections.

 

[LawDog]

Opened, to allow discussion of this case.

LawDog

 

[pittspilot]

My guess is cert. denied.

Mr Hamrick,

You certainly made your standing argument stick, but you will get nowhere with this.

Not only that, your brief reads like the worst kind of legalese. While you castigate lawyers, your writing tend to caricature lawyers.

Also, from the other thread.

Alan Burch was almost 7.5 months (225 days) as defense \counsel and hadn't filed the Motion to Dismiss. He was under Ted Olson as Solicitor General. Dennis Barghaan took a fast 2 months, 3 weeks, 4 days (75 days total) to get Judge Reggie B. Walton to dismissed the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. It is the Appellant’s understanding that if evidence does not get admitted into the record at the District Court then that evidence cannot be submitted at the Appellant level.

This remark reveals a remarkable misunderstanding of civil procedure. It's actually kind of interesting that the other guy took that long to file the motion to dismiss. Possibly because your complaint was at the bottom of his pile. Why did you not hit them with any discovery? How about an MSJ motion? What were you doing for those 225 days. Faced with your complaint, I would have looked to dismiss it as well.

Was the dismissal w/ prejudice for failure to state a claim. If so, why did you not get the opportunity to amend?

Also evidence does not get admitted until trial, after motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment and all that other good stuff.

 

[DMF]

I was becoming jittering from cultural isolation near the end of those 12 days. Had it not been for Internet cafes I would surely be one pissed off dude.

This provided grounds from my second case, Constitutional Tort claims for damages . . .

That's even more ridiculous than suing McDonald's because the coffee was hot. No wonder your case was denied.

 

[Don Hamrick]

DIRECTED TO LAWDOG:

I have accomplished what I set out to do. I have distributed information about my Second Amendment case out to a large number of people. I am satisfied with my work done here.

My tactics are intentionally aggressive and perhaps offending. I post my writings in that manner to agitate discussion. I never stay long and a seldom ever return becaus I am too busy with my cases.

The time is long passed for us with basic differences on the Second Amendment to make nice and get along while our country falls into anarchy. While you think my posting style may be heavy handed wait until you see what the U.N. and the FCC has in store for you. You'll think I was soft as a pussy cat.

You folks better start looking at the Second Amendment through the Common Defense clause before it is too late!

PLEASE, Delete me from your membership registration as my mission is accomplished here. Like Johnny Appleseed I planted a bunch of seeds of freedom here. Now it is time to move on.

 

[Justin]

Don, if you plan on leaving there is no need to delete your account.

Also, your posting style is deliberately aggressive and bloated. You're kidding yourself if you think anyone did anything more than lightly skim the info you posted.

No offense, but you come across as a serious jerk, and your posting style makes you look like the Gene Ray of the legal world.

 

[DMF]

. . . wait until you see what the U.N. and the FCC has in store for you.

And with that you have removed all doubt you are nuts.

 

[Don Hamrick]

Tuff ????.

What matters is the legal documents in court and the rule of law. Discussion board postings are analogous to WWF. It's an act you idiots!

 

[pittspilot]

Justin,

How on earth did you come across that guy? That site gave me a serious headache.

I agree about the similarities though.

 

[Justin]

Discussion board postings are analogous to WWF. It's an act you idiots!

Why, you don't say!

 

[Don Hamrick]

TO JUSTIN MODERATOR

If you are implying that accounts are deleted for inactivity after a certain length of time then okay.

Otherwise, PLEASE, delete my registration.

 

[DMF]

. . . you idiots!

Paging Mr. Hamrick . . . paging Don Hamrick . . . you have a call from the Kettle on the white courtesy phone.

 

[Graystar]

Bye bye Don! Remember the words of Lincoln...

"Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak and remove all doubt."

You'll definitely have need for THAT in the future, I can tell!