A Memorial Day Thought - Japanese Style

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MechAg94, I probably should have said "potentially the most industrially powerful nation on Earth" or "among the most industrially powerful nations on Earth". I was trying to draw a comparison between the geographically-isolated, resource-rich, and industrial infrastructure-laden United States, and the far-flung, overextended, resource-poor, and industrially-inefficient Empire of Japan. And this does not even address agriculture. But certainly, America's military and industrial power were far from their peak in December 1941.
 
I had a miliary history professor who thought the Japanese screwed up by attacking Pearl. He thought they should have invaded the Phillipines which would have obligated us to send our fleet out. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese navy had better planes, pilots, and better naval gunnery and operations (especially night operations). Ignoring US possessions all together as mentioned above might have been a good move as well.

Japan bombed US military installations in the Philippines right after the Pearl Harbor attack, and landed troops Dec. 22, 1941. The campaign lasted until early 1942. The Philippines had been the strategic objective because she sat between Japan and the oil and rubber fields further down south.

Your professor was correct in saying that the US would have sent the Pacific Fleet out after the Philippines was attacked. That was exactly why Tokyo decided to attack Pearl. Despite advantages the IJN might have enjoyed at that time, what better way to neutralize USN in the Pacific than sinking the ships when they were nearly defenseless?
 
Re: the Aleutians

Let us not forget, (i can't b/c my granfather was among them) that at least one of the divisions sent to counter the invasion of the aleutians (7th Inf) were sent ashore equipped for North africa (lighter weight Desert Uniforms and uninsulated boots). those of you from AK, just how cold IS that part of the state in mid may?
 
Historical nonsense

...to say nothing of their [Japanese] comparative backwardness in small arms and particularly armor, if not aviation and shipbuilding (at least at the outbreak of the war) is another.

You are egregiously misinformed or desperately hoping WE are. We're not. :scrutiny:

The "comparative backwardness" produced the Zero, which was not seriously challenged in terms of performance until we developed the Corsair. The P-40 Warhawks and FM2 Wildcats were outgunned and Zeros could - and did - literally fly rings around each, especially the P-40. Our pilots developed techniques to address the Zero's faults (notably, lack of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks) and maximize their own plane's characteristics, but going into the war with Warhawks and Buffaloes, we were severely deficient.

The Japanese never developed larger tanks but, for the terrain the heaviest fighting was in and the forces they primarily engaged, did not really need them. It was only when they encountered the Sherman that Japanese tanks were at a severe disadvantage.

Neither is there anything wrong with the Arisaka rifle. Every country in the world EXCEPT the US armed its forces with bolt-action rifles and the Arisaka was accurate and reliable. Japanese PISTOLS were garbage, however.

Our torpedoes were a disgrace. Period. They would turn back on the launching vessel or fail to detonate on impact. The Navy, with the same incompetent, wilfull blindness that ignored the development of aviation, refused to acknowledge those defects. The result was many subs lost to their own torpedoes or sunk by the ships they attacked, or their escorts.

By comparison, the Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo was superior in EVERY aspect. It carried a bigger warhead at faster speed over a longer distance with greater accuracy. AND it actually detonated when it struck the target.

I would dispute the plausibility of Japan even assembling a theoretically sufficient force and getting it to the coast without it being mauled to the point of uselessness, let alone its fate were it to successfully establish a beachhead.

Then you continue to ignore historical fact to make baseless assertions.

FACT: The Pearl Harbor task force - SIX CARRIERS, with all their escort vessels and oilers - sailed all the way from Japan to PH and was never spotted; the US Navy did not even know that fleet had left the home waters. Tell us again how an invasion fleet could not have hit US soil.:rolleyes:

FACT: After Midway, the US Navy was confident that the IJN could not launch an attack for several months. Yet a cruiser group was not even spotted, still less engaged, until it literally blew through the Allied ships at Savo Island, inflicting a defeat so severe the Navy covered up the story.

Revisionism is hard to pull off when the facts contradict the fantasy, isn't it........
 
Japanese PISTOLS were garbage, however.

Not entirely true. The Type 94 Pistol, the so-called "surrender pistol" was poorly designed, and even more poorly made. An exposed sear bar was it's most obvious fault.

I was surprised to see it used in the movie 'Serenity'; they went for an eclectic weapons selection in that movie.

The Type 14 Nambu pistol was well designed, having borrowed much from the Glisenti M1910. They were very seviceable, and the pre-war models show excellent fit and finish. The "Baby Nambu", chambered in 7mm Nambu, is an excellent example of a general staff pistol, a scaled down version of the service pistol, much like the Model M (M1903) Colt was for the American General Staff. (Those who didn't like Pearl-handled Smith & Wessons.)

The Type 26 Revolver was also used in some numbers in WWII, having served in the Russo-Japanese War. It's use was similar to the Nagant revolver in Russia and the Enfield Revolver in Britain in WWII. Another well made, if somewhat obsolete sidearm.

SO, when you refer to Japanese pistols being garbage, be sure you are talking about the Type 94 and only the Type 94, otherwise you are a font of misinformation.
 
Nambu pistols

The Type 14 Nambu pistol was well designed, having borrowed much from the Glisenti M1910. They were very seviceable, and the pre-war models show excellent fit and finish.

Whatever their benefits, they were chambered in an impotent caliber. Hardly ideal for a service sidearm, even a back-up one.

Now please explain how a difference of opinion as to the merits of one service sidearm constitutes being
... a font of misinformation.
:scrutiny:
 
Tory, if you reread my post, or even the part you quoted, you'll see that I made an exception for aviation and shipbuilding. Regarding small arms and armor, sure, the Arisaka was fine, I know the US was the only nation with a widely-issued semiauto rifle, but Japan's infantry machine guns were second-rate, their pistols were third-rate, and they didn't even bother to develop a submachine gun until late in the war. As for Japanese tanks being adequate until they encountered the Sherman, that itself ought to be an indication as to their deficiencies in armor. But none of that is really relevant to why a Japanese invasion of the US was not feasible.

A surprise raid on a naval base in Hawaii is a far cry from landing troops and establishing a beachhead on the west coast of the US. Even then, they failed to reduce all the fuel dumps or hit any fleet carriers (to their great misfortune). The Normandy invasion and the Leyte Gulf landings would have been minor, easily achieved and supported operations by comparsion. I'm curious as to how the Japanese Army and Navy could have supplied an invasion force in the US with a logistical chain thousands and thousands of miles long, with an insecure rear, through hostile waters when they could barely maintain smaller forces much closer to the home islands.

The assertion that a Japanese invasion of the continental United States was for all intents and purposes essentially impossible is hardly "revisionism", it's realism. That Japan was strong enough to inflict the occasional defeat on the US Navy is not in dispute. It seems clear that they were hardly in a position to mount an invasion in the first six months of the war, and their ability to do so declined dramatically with each passing month until their final and total defeat.
 
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If you had rephrased your statement to "The Japanese pistols were chambered in an inadequate cartridge", I'd be inclined to agree with you, as that is the case. (FYI, all the other nations in WWII except the US and the Soviet Union also used inadequate service pistol cartridges, in my opinion.) However, to state "Japanese pistols were garbage" as you did lumps you in your own statement,
You are egregiously misinformed or desperately hoping WE are. We're not.

See the difference?

Heck, Even in you'd have prefaced it with "In my opinion, Japanese pistols were garbage, I'd at least agree that your opinion is yours. I was merely calling you out on what appeared to be a statement of (false) fact.

FWIW, the 8mm Nambu was ballistically close to the 158 gr. LRN .38 Spl. , the common US Police load of the same era.

BTW, you were spot on about the rest.
 
--------quote-----------
These are the only quotes I could find from Gen
Yamamoto..Don't see anything about the sleeping
monster. From here.
------------------------

Look at your link again. It has the exact quote I referred to, about "running wild for six months to a year," with a recognition that after that initial period of time, things will get impossible for the Japanese.

--------quote------------
Tell us again how an invasion fleet could not have hit US soil.

Revisionism is hard to pull off when the facts contradict the fantasy, isn't it........
-------------------------

Again, winning an isolated cruiser battle or a successful surprise attack is a very different prospect than a sustained invasion campaign. As subsequent events proved, the Japanese could not even muster the logistical strength to defeat a single division of Marines at Guadalcanal, which by comparison to an invasion of the US was practically in their back yard.

Invading the US West Coast and sustaining a fighting force here would have been an effort of several orders greater magnitude, and was emphatically not within the capabilities of the Japanese in WWII.
 
Errata

Regarding the supposed advantages of the Nambu pistol as a military sidearm, Wikipedia reports as follows:

A crude but serviceable weapon, the Nambu was considered the best Japanese sidearm of the World War II era. However given the generally poor quality of Japanese side arms of this period, that is a small honor. The Nambu was not the equivalent of 1911 Colt or the Walther P-38 and was crude even compared to the Russian Tokarev.

The Nambu was further hampered by its weak 8 mm ammunition which was considerably less powerful than comparable western rounds like the .45 ACP and the 9 mm Luger.

The most frightening problem with the Nambu involved the poorly-designed sear. This resulted in the weapon being discharged accidentally if too much pressure was applied to the receiver or slide, a potentially deadly mistake in combat. Apparently, the Nambu was so poorly made, some pistols would fall apart as the weapon was being fired, potentially injuring the wielder. The Nambu's safety catch was also completely useless, and the magazine springs were weak.

We will acknowledge that guns made in 1943 or later were noticeable inferior to the earlier versions and that such early Nambus were not crudely made. That said, the cartridge is NOT the equivalent of a .38 Special. The Nambu's 102 gr. bullet puts it far closer to a mere .380. While it points well, its ergonomics are less than stellar as well.


Now the invasion debate. The question was not whether such an assault was realistic or sustainable; the assertion was that it was impossible. The exact claim was:

The assertion that a Japanese invasion of the continental United States was for all intents and purposes essentially impossible is hardly "revisionism", it's realism.

We were arrogant, ignorant and insolent enough to declare that an air raid on PH was "impossible;" in part because the Japanese were believed to suffer from genetic poor vision which prevented them becoming pilots. I submit that the actual photos, ours and theirs, of the attack prove the fallacy of that argument.

That we believed PH was too shallow for torpedoes, equally false, has already been noted twice.

We believed it was impossible for us NOT to notice a task force leaving the Home Islands, still less for it to get close enough to attack w/o being spotted. Appalling wrong (Thank you, Adm. Kimmel).

We believed the Japanese would not repeat the sneak attack tactic they used first on the Mongols and again on the Russians. More stupidity (see above).

Would it be easy? Hardly. Exponentially more difficult than simply attacking Hawaii? Absolutely. Eventually repelled? Probably.

But that does not make such an attack and landing "impossible."

Here's a scenario: The IJN lands a force sufficient to hold an area in Northern CA long enough to secure and supply an airfield, using planes provided by carriers. From this base, said planes bomb the dams on the Colorado River and the railroad tunneLs through the Rocky Mountains. Eventually the invasion force and the base are destroyed.

NOW, how do we replace the hydroelectric energy from the bombed-out dams? And restore the areas devastated by the flood wall when the dams broke? And replace the water from the reservoirs that irrigated the fields that grew the food needed to maintain an industrial force supplying armies on 3 fronts? :scrutiny:
 
Tory, I hear what you're saying, "never say never". I'll happily amend my flat assessment of "impossible" to "of extremely remote likelihood" or "presenting such a multitude of nearly unsurmountable challenges that it could be regarded as practically impossible" if that presents my point in a more reasonable manner. But I still maintain that the logistic difficulties of the hypothetical invasion were of such size that the prospect of a Japanese landing in force on the west coast is not too far from fantasy. In any case, it's nice to have a good solid discussion about WWII with a fellow history buff who actually cares about the subject! :)
 
Agreed

I still maintain that the logistic difficulties of the hypothetical invasion were of such size that the prospect of a Japanese landing in force on the west coast is not too far from fantasy.

Works for me. ;)

As for those who say my "What if?" is impossible, note that the German navy (Kriegsmarine) developed a plan to put float planes within a hanger/chamber on the deck of supply subs, sail to the Gulf of Mexico, and launch the planes to bomb the locks of the Panama Canal. Interservice bickering killed what could have been a brilliant stroke.
 
For what it's worth, the suggestion that the Zero didn't meet its match until the Corsair came on line is a wee bit inaccurate. Pilots flying Wildcats routinely defeated Zeros, and when the Hellcat came into service, the Zero ceased to be the terror of the Pacific.

Japan started the war with cutting edge aircraft that rapidly became inferior once America's war machine started up. In fact, except for their torpedoes, everything the Japanese developed was outclassed rapidly.

As for bombing the Panama Canal, that was the intended purpose of the Japanese carrier submarines. They just weren't able to pull it off before they lost the capability of projecting power that far.
 
Yes, but.......

For what it's worth, the suggestion that the Zero didn't meet its match until the Corsair came on line is a wee bit inaccurate. Pilots flying Wildcats routinely defeated Zeros, and when the Hellcat came into service, the Zero ceased to be the terror of the Pacific.

Heck, The Flying Tigers in their P-40s shot down Zeros - that does not mean the planes were equally matched. Note also that, after Midway, the cream of the IJN pilots were GONE. As the IJN did not rotate its experienced pilots the way we did, they never passed their knowledge and skills on to new pilots. Lucky for us.....

There is also the matter of sheer numbers. As Stalin observed, "Quantity has a quality all its own." Fill the sky with planes and you will inflict harm on your opponent.

The Hellcat and Corsair (The Whistling Death) were the planes that brought us to par w/the Zero. Even then, it was only .50 BMG versus 20MM cannon.:scrutiny:

Can we all agree that the nonsense about "naval conferences," retired IJN officers, and a friend's cousin's chiropodist's neighbor reading a magazine while on a plane with Yamamoto's great goddaughter is a complete fabrication to provide pointless "justification" for the Second Amendment? AND that such "justification" is not needed and such tawdry attempts actually defame it?
 
What movie was it that brought to point the problems
with the torpedoes ? I believe John Wayne was in it.
They dangled a torpedo above with a crane and then
dropped it to see if the firing pin would do it's job.
They tried it over and over. Was it a sub movie with
Clark Gable and John Wayne ? I can't recall the name
of it. I think Clark Gable hits his head and Wayne has
to take over. Maybe it wan't even John Wayne. Maybe
it was someone else, but I'm pretty sure Mr.Gable
was the skipper.

I don't know hardly anything about weapons
and Japanese weapons are even further down my
"don't know" list, but isn't is a fact that the Japanese
light machine gun was another weapon the Allies really
dreaded ? It had a strange cooling system if I
recall correctly. It looked like a large set of washers
going down the barrel. Or am I thinking of some other
type weapon they used. I believe it loaded with a mag
from the top of the receiver, or with a straight clip
sitting horz to the receiver something like a British Sten.

Anyone know ?
 
As for those who say my "What if?" is impossible, note that the German navy (Kriegsmarine) developed a plan to put float planes within a hanger/chamber on the deck of supply subs, sail to the Gulf of Mexico, and launch the planes to bomb the locks of the Panama Canal.

it is my understanding that a japanese carrier sub with a full load of 3 "Seiran" floatplanes was enroute to panama when the war ended. And upon cessation of hostilities that ALL IJN subs including the carrier were ordered to surface and make themselves known to Allied forces.

THE last Seiran is now on display at the smithsonian, restored to near mint but non-flyable condition.
 
Can we all agree that the nonsense about "naval conferences," retired IJN officers, and a friend's cousin's chiropodist's neighbor reading a magazine while on a plane with Yamamoto's great goddaughter is a complete fabrication to provide pointless "justification" for the Second Amendment? AND that such "justification" is not needed and such tawdry attempts actually defame it?

I would generally agree with that. However, I recall reading (don't remember the details, but I believe the incident predated WWI) about some British diplomat or statesman (perhaps even Churchill?) attempting to assuage his German counterpart's concerns about the strength of the British Army by jokingly remarking that if Great Britain ever landed an invasion force in Germany, Germany could simply dispatch the Berlin Police to arrest them - obviously a wry observation about the relative sizes of their armies. I wonder if the "rifle behind every blade of grass" quote had a similar origin - i.e., a Japanese diplomat or military figure reassuring his American interlocutor of Japan's lack of interest in and inability to invade the US by playing to American pride in private firearms ownership. Perhaps something for www.snopes.com to take a look at.
 
On the subject of "solvng the torpedo problem" the real story as to how the cause was discovered is hairraising in and of it's self.

seems the investigating officer (Charles B "Swede" Momsen) decided to take a fully stocked sub to an isolated cove of Kahoolawe in the Hawaiian Islands, and fired torpedoes into a cliff face untill one failed to explode. he then went into the water himself (along with others of course) and secured and brought aboard the failed, and still live, topedo for examination.

for those who don't know what was causing it, the design of the initiator on those topedoes was made with the firing pin being driven toward the rear, the pins were too heavy and if fired and making a hit at a 90deg angle the inertia of the heavy pin was too much for the spring in the initiator to overcome resulting in soft hits on the firing cap. a lighter firing pin fixed this problem.
 
We also have to take into account Japan had been fighting the British and the commonwealth, China and various other nations since the 20s and other with the Russians until they were repelled. That took a large part of the infantry made active so they never really had the manpower to do such things. The best the could do is to cause an event that would cause the US to give up or catch it in ways that weren't traditional battles.

Its not like the Japanese had much choice though. Resources on the island are rather limited, from a lack of oil, poor ore and so on that required it to go out and find another country that had these resources, when the US were doing the same. It was quite inevitable that it was going to lead to war eventually many years before Pearl Harbor.
 
What movie was it that brought to point the problems with the torpedoes
I don't know the movie, but I can tell you an amusing story.

At Midway, an American sub appeared near one of the Japanese carriers after McClusky's first attack (I don't recall which carrier). Anyway, the Japanese crewmen were in the process of abandoning their ship when the aforementioned sub fired a torpedo. It hit the carrier dead-on, and made a really ugly dent. Then the warhead broke off and sank. Then the propulsion unit floated to the surface. A few Japanese sailors swam over to it, grabbed on, and were able to float on it until they were picked up. Whoops!

And as for the Aleutians being a diversion... sorta. The failed invasions of Port Moresby and Tulagi (well, Tulagi was taken, but it was of secondary importance) were the Southern tip of the trident, and we stopped that one at Coral Sea. Midway and the Aleutians were the center and northern points. The idea was to create a wall, starting from the Aleutians in the North, to Midway in the Central Pacific, and ending at New Guinea in the South. American naval forces would, in theory, be unable to take the westward route to Australia, China, and Eastern Russia (and a few other places).

It would be fair to say, however, that Midway was a far, far more important target than Moresby or the Aleutians. Aside from the strategic implications of the specific islands, these two invasions were intended to divert American resources to fight somewhere other than Midway, thus weakening them significantly. It very nearly worked at Coral Sea. It would not be accurate to say that they were intended as simple "the enemy thinks we're attacking there, but we're really attacking over here" diversions.

But the whole thing was a Charlie Foxtrot anyway. Anybody with half a brain knew that Midway was the target. The whole "AF is short of water" ruse is complete and utter poppycock (I know, I know, Hal Holbrook made it sound so convincing). Nimitz was no fool, and Yamamoto knew it. The only problem was that Nagumo couldn't amphibious assault his way out of a wet paper sack, and one single US Navy Lt. Commander was able to plant his squadron's bombs on the decks of all four Japanese fleet carriers.
 
The invasion of the western United States was NEVER considered by Japan when Pearl was hit. All they had in their minds was to make the strike on Pearl Harbor and get back to Japan without losing any of their carriers. As to the shallow running torpedoes, these were taken into consideration and perfected by Japan months before the strike. Read Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept", all 800 pages. It lays it all out. The United States had already written off the Phillipines as indefensible and no thought was given to sending the fleet there.
 
Not convinced

Aside from the strategic implications of the specific islands, these two invasions were intended to divert American resources to fight somewhere other than Midway, thus weakening them significantly. It very nearly worked at Coral Sea.

Coral Sea was before Midway; so much so that there time enough for one of our carriers (Yorktown, IIRC) to return to PH, repair the worst of the damage and redeploy to Midway. While the "wall" theory works, Coral Sea was not designed to draw forces from Midway in the same manner as the Aleutian campaign.

The invasion of the western United States was NEVER considered by Japan when Pearl was hit. All they had in their minds was to make the strike on Pearl Harbor and get back to Japan without losing any of their carriers.

True, but not the issue debated. The controversy was, first, whether the Japanese were deterred by an armed citizenry [ :rolleyes: ]; then, whether such an attack was "impossible."
 
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