A Memorial Day Thought - Japanese Style
- Thread starter The_Shootist
- Start date
- Status
----------quote--------
The whole "AF is short of water" ruse is complete and utter poppycock (I know, I know, Hal Holbrook made it sound so convincing).
------------------------
Where do you get that this never happened? Keegan cited it in Intelligence in War, and he's not the only respectable historian to have done so.
The whole "AF is short of water" ruse is complete and utter poppycock (I know, I know, Hal Holbrook made it sound so convincing).
------------------------
Where do you get that this never happened? Keegan cited it in Intelligence in War, and he's not the only respectable historian to have done so.
I've been pretty familiar with this subject (Pacific Theatre) for quite some time, and to the best of my knowledge, no credible historian with scholarly works to his credit has unearthed any serious Japanese invasion plan or intent. If anyone here knows of such a thing, I would sincerely be interested to know about it.
In any case, what would be more worrisome to professional military planners in the late '30s and early '40s - a bunch of scattered amateurs with rifles and shotguns (whether or not that's an accurate description of America's shooting culture at the time, I suspect that's how it would be viewed in foreign military circles), or the difficulties of transporting numerous divisions across thousands of miles of ocean and establishing a beachhead on the coast of the third or fourth-largest nation on Earth, and then supplying said beachhead, while already in a state of alarming overextension and resource scarcity.
As for the "AF is short of water" ruse, I think antsi is right. I was under the impression from reputable sources (as best I recall) that that was broadcast to confirm the identity of AF (Midway) in the IJN code in use at the time, and thus to predict the target of the Japanese operation.
In any case, what would be more worrisome to professional military planners in the late '30s and early '40s - a bunch of scattered amateurs with rifles and shotguns (whether or not that's an accurate description of America's shooting culture at the time, I suspect that's how it would be viewed in foreign military circles), or the difficulties of transporting numerous divisions across thousands of miles of ocean and establishing a beachhead on the coast of the third or fourth-largest nation on Earth, and then supplying said beachhead, while already in a state of alarming overextension and resource scarcity.
As for the "AF is short of water" ruse, I think antsi is right. I was under the impression from reputable sources (as best I recall) that that was broadcast to confirm the identity of AF (Midway) in the IJN code in use at the time, and thus to predict the target of the Japanese operation.
Spector said it, Van Der Vaat said it, Puleston said it, Fuller said it, Prange probably said it (although his Midway book gets the boot because he didn't actually write it), and I have no doubt that Keegan did as well.
There is, however, a fellow by the name of Henry Schorreck who wrote something called Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942: The Role of COMINT in the Battle of Midway, published by the Naval Historical Center which states that there is no evidence that such an event took place. It happens that there is no actual transcript of the message to be found in the archives. I checked both US Navy and the National Archives.
What did actually happen was that two critical messages were intercepted on the 16th and 20th of May. The first indicated that the carrier force would take up poisitions 50 miles NW of "AF" for the attack. The only other possibility for "AF" was Oahu, and in order to arrive 50 miles NW of Oahu, the assault force would have to sail right by... you guessed it, Midway. Oahu had been identified as "AH" by the beginning of May anyway. The second message was a revision of the IJN's naval code. "AF" was changed to "MI."
There is, however, a fellow by the name of Henry Schorreck who wrote something called Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942: The Role of COMINT in the Battle of Midway, published by the Naval Historical Center which states that there is no evidence that such an event took place. It happens that there is no actual transcript of the message to be found in the archives. I checked both US Navy and the National Archives.
What did actually happen was that two critical messages were intercepted on the 16th and 20th of May. The first indicated that the carrier force would take up poisitions 50 miles NW of "AF" for the attack. The only other possibility for "AF" was Oahu, and in order to arrive 50 miles NW of Oahu, the assault force would have to sail right by... you guessed it, Midway. Oahu had been identified as "AH" by the beginning of May anyway. The second message was a revision of the IJN's naval code. "AF" was changed to "MI."
FWIW US Navy battleships were limited in size to what could fit through the Panama Canal. Also, a fighting ship's beam (width) affects how large a broadside it can fire. Japan had no need to be limited to the Panama Canal, so it could build it's capital ships larger. And because it it's sheer size, they could put bigger guns on them.
As a side note, Charlton Heston served at the very end of WWII in Alaska.
As a side note, Charlton Heston served at the very end of WWII in Alaska.
Carl N. Brown
Member
Japanese war college asked their students by at least 1927
to outline best plan for attacking Pearl Harbor. I believe that
there was discussion too of invading the mainland US following
destruction of Pearl Harbor. Documentary related to release
of the movie The Great Raid, for wahtever its worth.
I suspect that the Filipino-American resistence to the Japanese
occupation of the Phillipines may have convinced the High
Command that an attempted conquest of mainland USA would
have been worse.
to outline best plan for attacking Pearl Harbor. I believe that
there was discussion too of invading the mainland US following
destruction of Pearl Harbor. Documentary related to release
of the movie The Great Raid, for wahtever its worth.
I suspect that the Filipino-American resistence to the Japanese
occupation of the Phillipines may have convinced the High
Command that an attempted conquest of mainland USA would
have been worse.
Part of the reasoning was that the American public would likely have reacted differently if our fleet had gotten itself defeated in a naval battle near the Philippines rather than a sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. Would Americans have been equally as fired up to go to war? Probably. Also, the Japanese may have been able to draw on land based planes to augment their naval strength and had all their subs in the area as well. There would also have been little risk of missing the carriers.
Whether we would have sent our fleet to the Philippines or not is another question I couldn't answer. Just a scenario to consider.
Geronimo45
Member
Interesting discussion here... I don't have much to add, but I'll take a crack at it.
Japan is not especially rich in the resources you need to keep an army together - rubber, oil, steel - all useful stuff. A lot of their campaigns around Indonesia were designed to snag said resources, I believe. If they'd snagged their oil and other good stuff, then an attack on the US would be reasonable.
As for Japanese small arms tech, it worked on a lot of the folks they met with. A fair number of dead Chinese, Americans, and British wouldn't call the things underpowered. Sure, they could've been better, but they did work.
A serious invasion of the US? I think China would've been an obstacle to that - you don't invade England when Russia's knocking at your door. Lot of people live in China, and some of 'em were armed.
If one had taken place, I don't think that the average gun owner would've been more than a pest to an invading army. In the early days of the Revolutionary War, the militias had a bad habit of heading for the hills when faced with volley fire from the Brits. Guerilla tactics served irregular American forces much better. Take a dozen hunters with their deer rifles. Or a hundred. See how many would stay after the Japanese brought a few MGs to bear. Or after the aircraft strafed 'em.
Japan is not especially rich in the resources you need to keep an army together - rubber, oil, steel - all useful stuff. A lot of their campaigns around Indonesia were designed to snag said resources, I believe. If they'd snagged their oil and other good stuff, then an attack on the US would be reasonable.
As for Japanese small arms tech, it worked on a lot of the folks they met with. A fair number of dead Chinese, Americans, and British wouldn't call the things underpowered. Sure, they could've been better, but they did work.
A serious invasion of the US? I think China would've been an obstacle to that - you don't invade England when Russia's knocking at your door. Lot of people live in China, and some of 'em were armed.
If one had taken place, I don't think that the average gun owner would've been more than a pest to an invading army. In the early days of the Revolutionary War, the militias had a bad habit of heading for the hills when faced with volley fire from the Brits. Guerilla tactics served irregular American forces much better. Take a dozen hunters with their deer rifles. Or a hundred. See how many would stay after the Japanese brought a few MGs to bear. Or after the aircraft strafed 'em.
- Status