Many of the statements made by the author appear to be aimed at very large church buildings/congregations. In most of the churches I've been to it would take less than ten steps (and one perforated door greeter) for a shooter to move from outside to in-range of the congregation and/or minister. "Denying access" sounds great, but absent some very discerning and forceful people at the door (the exact opposite of those usually appointed to those duties) even the most non-violent of threats are not going to be successfully turned back or delayed. This is a complete non-starter for most churches.
Working with the police ahead of time may make some sense. Again, especially in very large churches where floorplans and blueprints may help them strategize their siege and infiltration of the structure. That may help them, when they finally arrive. (How many people can an active shooter kill in 5-15+ minutes before
an officer arrives?) It isn't going to do a lot to save many lives.
An active shooter will have the most "success" in that kind of scenario in the first minute or so. He's going to be in a target rich environment facing shocked and bewildered people who will hit every exit simultaneously.
Last negative point: lockdown plan! First off, the idea of isolating the shooter sounds wonderful, until you consider that you'd be locking him IN, WITH his victims. And then consider that he's going to want to be in the most populous part of the church when he starts his attack, which is the sanctuary. And then pause to reflect that most churches are largely deserted
except for the sanctuary during services. (Nurseries, etc. aside.) So what a lockdown accomplishes is dropping a piranha in the goldfish bowl and patting yourself on the back because he can't get out.
Yeah. And all his targets are locked into the biggest room in the building, with him. This is a church service, not a college dorm, classroom block, or office building.
Fortunately, most life safety and fire codes are going to prevent this from being enacted anyway. Public assembly places MUST have exits unlocked at all times the building is in use. Wiring up some kind of remote "lockdown switch" would require electric door locks, or door closers with the doors set to lock automatically, neither of which are going to be common outside a prison (or again, probably even legal from a building code standpoint).
In the end, his core suggestions are the only good ones. Direct physical confrontation. Close the distance (as he said) and engage the threat. That involves great courage and presence of mind by the congregants who can do so, but it is the only practical way of slowing down an active shooter and ending his actions as soon as possible.
Massed counterattack by the largest number of able congregants, using any contact or edged weapon they have or can find, has ended the actions of active shooters (even coordinated terrorist efforts) in the past, and is certainly making the very best of a horrifying situation.
Considering the collateral-target-rich environment, any counterattack using firearms is extremely risky and should be undertaken with great caution. Of course, ending a killing spree may justify grave risk, but any possible positioning or shot angle adjustments should be made to reduce the likelihood of hitting others trying to escape.