Black powder use on this day in history

[RPRNY]

I agree. Always saying that the Indians had better weapons. You can chock it up to one thing, Crazy Horse was a genius at tactics and Custer wasn't.

No. You can't chock it up to one thing. The superiority of Indian arms is a fact. We have broken it down for you by rifle and caliber. That you don't want to hear it doesn't change the facts.

 

[Crawdad1]

Half of the Indians present had nothing more than their bow. Not exactly overpowering fire power.

But I don't know enough about this battle to continue to debate it.

 

[Tommygunn]

I never did think very highly of Custer even during the Struggle. He benefited greatly by the quality of his men in the Michigan Brigade to get him out of jams that he was always rushing head long into.

I think all commanders "benefit greatly" from the "quality of (their)....men." Custer was as I said, a good tactician, a middling strategist. A "limited soldier."
It is all too easy to dislike him....many have seen him portrayed as a cad, a fool, an arrogant impulsive nationalist, always treating the Indians as nothing more than ignorant savages, willing to tear into anything.

The truth was somewhat more complex. In the Plains Indian Wars, Custer more than once held his troopers back from pursuing Indians into an ambush situation of the kind that army commanders like Fetterman had fallen for and paid with their lives and their mens' lives.
Yet he was also that arrogant commander who thought he had the world by its tail.
He loved his wife Libby dearly and his relationship with her would have made for a classic romantic novel....
And he cheated on her and likely sired children with an Indian woman.
He participated in most every major Civil War Battle, led 11 major charges and had that many horses shot out from under him.
He also negligently blew the brains out of his own horse in his first Plains War campaign.
He wrote a fascinating autobiography.
He also boasted wildly and greatly exxagerated his war kills at Washita and other places.
He was a great American Hero.
In his own mind.

 

[Ephraim Kibbey]

Do not forget that in his hurry to beat the other Army units to the battle, he left the Gatling guns that might have equalized his fire power with his baggage train so they would not slow his advance and then attacked before they could be brought up. This was the definitive "Cluster [Error.]"

 

[Tommygunn]

Do not forget that in his hurry to beat the other Army units to the battle, he left the Gatling guns that might have equalized his fire power with his baggage train so they would not slow his advance and then attacked before they could be brought up. This was the definitive "Cluster [Error.]"

The battlefield was hilly, with coulees. The Gatlings would not have a good field of fire. In addition they were cumbersome and often delayed cavalry movement especially over rough terrain. Ironically, though, delaying the 7th might have saved Custer as it would have made his rendezvous with the Terry/Gibbon column much more likely.
An interesting side note to this history is the positively horrible mistakes General Alfred Terry made in leading that column of cavalry that contributed to the debacle of The Little Bighorn fight. But that's another story........

 

[4v50 Gary]

I added the bold emphasis. I think that his "last in class" graduating place sums up what kind of student of military tactics he was.

Last in the class is an enviable position. Besides the silver dollar each cadet traditionally gives the goat, it is a tough position to attain. You have to earn enough demerits and mess up enough but yet not enough to be expelled. Translated: It meant you were the party animal of the class. He probably frequented the off limits tavern Benny Haven.

Other notable goats include Henry Heth (his memoirs which include his experience at West Point are a hoot), the division commander whose men began the Battle of Gettysburg, and; George Pickett who led the fatal charge that ended the Confederate offensive at Gettysburg.

 

[Loyalist Dave]

I cannot imagine the recoil that their Springfield carbines were producing, due to the black powder fouling that must have been building up inside the bore of their carbines ( from firing hundreds of rounds of black powder cartridges ) without having the ability to clean their weapons.

Breech loading black powder firearms do not suffer from the bore fouling that the muzzleloaders do. The following round blows fouling out the muzzle ahead of the projectile. The Indians armed with breech loading repeating rifles didn't seem to have any difficulties.

LD

 

[Don McDowell]

The troopers didn't carry hundreds' of rounds on them. Probably 20 rounds maybe 40 and a dozen for their sidearms. The fouling would of been a bad problem, due mostly to the dirty ammunition. But the battlefield archeology shows, other than Keog's formation, there was no battle lines formed. Reno and Benteen were pinned down after being decimated on the meadow below their final formation.
Custer's first real attempt at battle with something other than a sleeping camp of old men and women during the night, turned out to be quite the debacle. The absolute overwhelming force they ran into that day on the Greasy Grass, I'm not sure air support would of saved them. Keep in mind this same batch of Indians about 3 days before had whipped Crooks column to a stand still about 100 miles south.
The Little Bighorn Battlefield is something to behold, you can still smell the fear and the death on Last Stand hill.

 

[Jimster]

Hindsight is 20/20. I think Custer was a hero. Visiting Last Stand Hill is on my bucket list. I have a Cimarron/Uberti 7th Cav. Edition SAA and now I need a Pedersoli 45-70 trapdoor carbine.

 

[4v50 Gary]

From an Indian account that I read, the Indians weren't aware of who was attacking them. They knew it was only the US Cavalry. Leading the charge across the river was a brave man whom they shot down. This broke the charge and his body was retrieved by the retreating column. The man? Custer. He died early in the battle. Only after the battle was over did the Indians identify their assailant.

 

[daboyleroy]

In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook’s forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties–about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke’s Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.

Indeed, it was at times even difficult to get soldiers to fire at all. After the Battle of Gettysburg, 24,000 loaded muskets were recovered; only 12,000 of them had been loaded more than once, 6,000 had from three to 10 rounds in the barrel, and one weapon had been loaded 23 times! One conclusion is that a great number of soldiers are simply posturing and not trying to kill the enemy.

At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost–Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags–the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, ‘crack’ cavalry regiment.

High fire very plainly took place at the Little Bighorn, most notably on Reno’s skirmish line in the valley. Troopers went into battle with 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition and 24 rounds of Colt ammunition. About 100 troopers on Reno’s line may have fired half of their ammunition toward the southern edge of the Indian village. The 5,000 bullets only hit one or two Indians, but they certainly damaged the lodges. A Hunkpapa woman, Moving Robe, claimed ‘the bullets shattered the tepee poles,’ and another Hunkpapa woman, Pretty White Buffalo, stated that ‘through the tepee poles their bullets rattled.’ The relatively low muzzle velocity of the Springfield meant that the soldier would have had to aim quite a bit over the head of an Indian for any chance to hit him at long distance. If the officers called for the sights to be set for 500 yards to hit Indians issuing from the village–and did not call for a subsequent sight adjustment–by the time the Indians approached to 300 yards, the bullets would be flying 12 feet over their heads. As a comparison, the modern M-16 round, traveling at 3,250 feet per second, has an almost flat trajectory, and the bullet will hit where it is aimed with very little sight adjustment.

The soldiers’ difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm’s way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits.

Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The ‘bunkie’ was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter.

George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer’s weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat.

 

[Tommygunn]

In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook’s forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties–about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke’s Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.

Indeed, it was at times even difficult to get soldiers to fire at all. After the Battle of Gettysburg, 24,000 loaded muskets were recovered; only 12,000 of them had been loaded more than once, 6,000 had from three to 10 rounds in the barrel, and one weapon had been loaded 23 times! One conclusion is that a great number of soldiers are simply posturing and not trying to kill the enemy.

At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost–Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags–the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, ‘crack’ cavalry regiment.

High fire very plainly took place at the Little Bighorn, most notably on Reno’s skirmish line in the valley. Troopers went into battle with 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition and 24 rounds of Colt ammunition. About 100 troopers on Reno’s line may have fired half of their ammunition toward the southern edge of the Indian village. The 5,000 bullets only hit one or two Indians, but they certainly damaged the lodges. A Hunkpapa woman, Moving Robe, claimed ‘the bullets shattered the tepee poles,’ and another Hunkpapa woman, Pretty White Buffalo, stated that ‘through the tepee poles their bullets rattled.’ The relatively low muzzle velocity of the Springfield meant that the soldier would have had to aim quite a bit over the head of an Indian for any chance to hit him at long distance. If the officers called for the sights to be set for 500 yards to hit Indians issuing from the village–and did not call for a subsequent sight adjustment–by the time the Indians approached to 300 yards, the bullets would be flying 12 feet over their heads. As a comparison, the modern M-16 round, traveling at 3,250 feet per second, has an almost flat trajectory, and the bullet will hit where it is aimed with very little sight adjustment.

The soldiers’ difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm’s way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits.

Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The ‘bunkie’ was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter.

George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer’s weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat.

Having studied this fight beyond all reason, my take is that both Custer's weapons as well as the Indians' contributed to the 7th's defeat. Neither were the primary cause, really, there were more important factors, such as the Indians's readiness for battle in typically poor circumstances.
Custer's use of repeating Spencer carbines in the Civil War had an excellent effect on battle. During that war, no Union formation equipped with repeaters, was overwhelmed by Confederates. Custer was out numbered in every Civil War Battle he engaged in, yet he won every one.
True also is the fact his Civil War men were better trained and much more committed than his 7th cav. Men. But repeater rifles certainly can make a big difference in Close fighting.

 

[Steel Horse Rider]

Repeating rifles do not only make a difference in firepower they also make a difference in attitude of the bearer. I think General Patton's attribution towards the M1 Garand is very accurate as to determining the outcome of the land based battles in WWII.

 

[Clayguy]

Custer's first, and most fatal, error was underestimating his enemy.

Custer's first, and most fatal, error was underestimating his enemy.

Absolutely! Just 10 years earlier LTC (brevet) Fetterman and his entire force of 80 officers and enlisted were lured into an ambush and killed in 20 minutes by a force of about 2000 Sioux. Fetterman had made an earlier statement that with 80 men he could walk thru the Sioux Nation. Apparently, Custer had forgotten about the Fetterman Massacre, or perhaps figured he was the better warrior. No matter, in both cases, they underestimated the war fighting ability and numbers of their enemy.

 

[Jim K]

Every analysis of "Indian" armament I have seen indicates that no matter the quality of the weapons, the natives were poor shots who rarely practiced, believing that firing in the direction of the enemy was all that was necessary for the "gun medicine" to work. And,like guerrilla fighters through the ages, their ammunition supply was limited and unreliable. So, even when they had parity or better in weapons, they were unable to capitalize on those numbers.

Several studies have concluded that Custer's troops were poorly trained and many simply panicked, (understandable given the circumstances). At least some of the "war stories" about failure of the trooper's carbines and ammunition were concocted later to explain how the vaunted U.S. cavalry could have suffered such a defeat at the hands of a bunch of "savages". (Anyone who thinks racism is a recent invention or involves only White-Black relations needs to study the attitude of most Whites (and many Blacks) toward the "red" man.)

In spite of all the excuses and all the scholarly studies, the simple fact is that the troops were badly led, badly outnumbered and fought poorly.

Jim

 

[Clayguy]

There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer’s Field (the square-mile section where Custer’s five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer’s Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.

Survivors of the remaining seven companies of the 7th Cavalry asserted that the Indians were equipped with repeating rifles and mentioned Winchesters as often as not. Major Marcus Reno claimed: ‘The Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it.’ Although some white survivors claimed to be heavily outgunned, Private Charles Windolph of Company H was probably closest to the truth when he estimated that half the warriors carried bows and arrows, one-quarter of them carried a variety of old muzzleloaders and single-shot rifles, and one-quarter carried modern repeaters.
The above from
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn-were-the-weapons-the-deciding-factor.htm


The firearms analyses has verified 47 different types of guns used by the warriors. A forty-eighth weapon is represented by metal arrowheads, showing that the stereotypical bow and arrow was also used. By using modern crime laboratory firearms identification techniques it was possible to discover that a minimum number of 415 guns were used by the Indians.

This is a conservative estimate as groups of round balls, on which these techniques are not as effective, were counted as one gun per caliber.
Indian arms included the .44 caliber Henry, .44 caliber Model 1866 Winchester, and the .44/.40 caliber Model 1873 Winchester, all repeating rifles. The army in 1876 did not issue repeating rifles

The army's single shot Springfield was simply not as fast as the repeating rifles, although it was more powerful and more accurate than the majority of the Indian arms. Indian arms also included the army's Springfield carbine and Colt revolver. These arms could have been captured either in the Rosebud fight or the valley fight against Reno and, in addition, some were no doubt taken from Custer's men during the battle. Antiquated muzzle loading firearms were also well represented. NEXT >>

The above from
https://www.nps.gov/mwac/libi/firearm.html

This is a quote from an unidentified officer who was at the Battle of Rosebud Creek just 8 days before Little Bighorn. "The firing was now terrific, the repeating rifles used by the Indians enabling them to make it one continuous volley. Officers who were through the [Civil] war and were there say that they never in their experience saw anything hotter." Apparently, the Sioux (led by Crazy Horse) had a fair amount of repeating rifles at Rosebud. These same Sioux fought Custer at Little Bighorn. Certainly no single factor determined the outcome at Bighorn, but it does seem that the Indians with repeating rifles had a real impact on the outcome of the battle.

 

[Tommygunn]

Every analysis of "Indian" armament I have seen indicates that no matter the quality of the weapons, the natives were poor shots who rarely practiced, believing that firing in the direction of the enemy was all that was necessary for the "gun medicine" to work. And,like guerrilla fighters through the ages, their ammunition supply was limited and unreliable. So, even when they had parity or better in weapons, they were unable to capitalize on those numbers.

Several studies have concluded that Custer's troops were poorly trained and many simply panicked, (understandable given the circumstances). At least some of the "war stories" about failure of the trooper's carbines and ammunition were concocted later to explain how the vaunted U.S. cavalry could have suffered such a defeat at the hands of a bunch of "savages". (Anyone who thinks racism is a recent invention or involves only White-Black relations needs to study the attitude of most Whites (and many Blacks) toward the "red" man.)

In spite of all the excuses and all the scholarly studies, the simple fact is that the troops were badly led, badly outnumbered and fought poorly.

Jim

What I've read on Indian warriors' acumen tells me they were superb shots with bow and arrow. I find it hard to believe they attributed any magic to firearms, since it is known many actually reloaded cartridges for their rifles and pistols. They understood projectile weapons very well.

 

[daboyleroy]

Check out
http://www.astonisher.com/archives/museum/white_cow_bull_little_big_horn.html

https://www.nps.gov/mwac/publications/pdf/tech94b.pdf

http://www.prwbooks.com/remember_li...iers__and_scouts_tell_their_stories_53065.htm

 

[daboyleroy]

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cg...ty=History.Reno.p0606&id=History.Reno&isize=M


Reno, Marcus A., 1835-1889, (Marcus Albert) / The official record of a court of inquiry convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879, by the President of the United States upon the request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th U.S. Cavalry, to investigate his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876
(1951)

The official record of a court of inquiry convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879 by the President of the United States upon the request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th U. S. Cavalry to investigate his conduct at the battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876 PDF (747.7 KB)

 

[daboyleroy]

"The US Army was not allowed to go after the Indians unless they were caught in the act of raiding. Some of the Indian agencies became sanctuaries for raiding and collecting scalps. Fort Sill was the worst.


In 1874 generals Sheridan and Sherman came up with a plan to subdue the Indians. The plan was blessed by Grant. The Army chased the Cheyennes, Kiowas, Comanches and some smaller tribes all over what is now western OK, western TX south of the Red River and the TX panhandle. At that time the area was called Llano Estacado (the staked plains). It's part of the area formerly known as the Great American Desert.


When an Indian encampment was found it was burned and the food stuffs destroyed. Many thousands of horses were captured and shot or sold at auction. Within a period of four months the Indians were subdued.


Suggested reading: The Carbine and the Lance, The Story of Old Fort Sill by Col. W. S. Nye. "

 

[RWMC]

The battlefield was hilly, with coulees. The Gatlings would not have a good field of fire. In addition they were cumbersome and often delayed cavalry movement especially over rough terrain. Ironically, though, delaying the 7th might have saved Custer as it would have made his rendezvous with the Terry/Gibbon column much more likely.
An interesting side note to this history is the positively horrible mistakes General Alfred Terry made in leading that column of cavalry that contributed to the debacle of The Little Bighorn fight. But that's another story........

Remember, Custer was not only offered the Gatling guns, but General Terry offered him General Gibbons' 2nd Cavalry. Basically, Custer did not want to share any possible victory with anyone else. His selfish, glory-hunting greed played an important deadly part in this victory of the Indians over the 7th. Even with the help of the 2nd Cavalry, victory was not an absolute guarantee, but at least there might not have been the wholesale defeat that ensued without them. Maybe.

 

[RWMC]

Half of the Indians present had nothing more than their bow. Not exactly overpowering fire power.

But I don't know enough about this battle to continue to debate it.

The bow and arrow was considered to be just as effective as the .45 Colt out to 50 yards. Both weapons could kill at longer ranges, but to specifically and consistently hit what you was intentionally aiming at ( and during the heat of the battle), 50 yards was about the limit.

 

[RWMC]

The troopers didn't carry hundreds' of rounds on them. Probably 20 rounds maybe 40 and a dozen for their sidearms. The fouling would of been a bad problem, due mostly to the dirty ammunition. But the battlefield archeology shows, other than Keog's formation, there was no battle lines formed. Reno and Benteen were pinned down after being decimated on the meadow below their final formation.
Custer's first real attempt at battle with something other than a sleeping camp of old men and women during the night, turned out to be quite the debacle. The absolute overwhelming force they ran into that day on the Greasy Grass, I'm not sure air support would of saved them. Keep in mind this same batch of Indians about 3 days before had whipped Crooks column to a stand still about 100 miles south.
The Little Bighorn Battlefield is something to behold, you can still smell the fear and the death on Last Stand hill.

If I am not mistaken, I believe I recall that each trooper was issued 24 cartridges for his revolver, and 100 cartridges for his carbine. The trooper probably carried 20 rifle cartridges on his person and the rest more than likely in his saddlebags. But the troopers who were battling it out on top of Reno Hill eventually had the extra ammunition from the pack train at their disposal; which consisted of thousands of rounds of ammunition. This is what I was referring to with my original statement but I failed to clarify. My apologies.

 

[RWMC]

A major issue was the copper-cased ammunition held in leather carriers created a green film that would basically weld the casing into the breech of the carbine when fired. This sometimes jammed the rifle or carbine by preventing extraction of the fired cartridge case. A jam required manual extraction with a knife blade or similar tool, and could render the carbine version of the weapon, which had no ramrod to remove stuck cases, useless in combat except as a club.

The inherent weakness of the trapdoor carbine was its extractor. When it broke in battle as some did at Little Bighorn, troopers were forced to use knives to extract empty cartridge cases, and still keep their head down.

Some say Custer had visions of running for president and a victory at Little Bighorn would cement his chances.

What a coincidence; after the disaster at the Little Big Horn, all of the .45-70 ammunition in use at that time was recalled, and a newer design was shipped out to the troops as a replacement. Imagine that. . .

 

[Tommygunn]

Remember, Custer was not only offered the Gatling guns, but General Terry offered him General Gibbons' 2nd Cavalry. Basically, Custer did not want to share any possible victory with anyone else. His selfish, glory-hunting greed played an important deadly part in this victory of the Indians over the 7th. Even with the help of the 2nd Cavalry, victory was not an absolute guarantee, but at least there might not have been the wholesale defeat that ensued without them. Maybe.

Custer was always an egotistical glory - monger, for sure. But in the mid 19th century U. S. Army, he did not have a corner on that market. Many fellow commissioned officers were very much the same.....just not quite as colorful.
How he would have faired with the 2nd cav. in tow is an unknown since differences in strategic philosophies might have actually detracted from unit efficiency.
His refusal to absorb the 2nd cav may very well have been due to his ego, but it is dangerous to always assume that the things that were done and seem wrong in retrospect were always due to ego problems. Custer may have had legitimate reasons that were never recorded by history. Many of his fellow officers like Benteen and Reno had grievances against Custer and were jealous of his popular fame. It was these officers who would survive and inform history what, from their perspective, went wrong at the Little Bighorn.
These men would not paint a pretty picture of the Son of the Morning Star. His wife, Libby, outlived most of the critics and forever staunchly defended her husband's reputation, but plenty of people remained to tarnishing as well.