Bruce Schneier: on school shootings

[dave_pro2a]

Bruce Schneier is a world renowned cryptographer and security expert (several books, quoted in every major news publication, etc.).

In a bio written by editor of Dark Reading Bruce had this to say about shool shootings:
http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=114230&WT.svl=news1_1

"Schneier won't shy away from the hot-button topics in IT security or physical security. Last week, for example, he told a reporter at a Tacoma, Wash.-based radio station after the school shooting there, that metal detectors would be a waste of money. 'The goal isn't to stop shootings in schools. It's to stop shootings,' he says, by investing in ways to ensure a kid doesn't resort to violence at all. 'If a kid shoots another kid in the playground because there's a metal detector in the building,' then the physical security was ineffective, he adds.

'That's a tough message for people to hear.'"

Notice he said you stop school shooting by dealing with the children, NOT by banning guns.

Now that makes a lot of sense. It seems to place the real responsibility (for school shootings) where it belongs, at the feet of parents and school teachers -- those responsible for showig children how to 'grow-up', gain coping skills, become well-adjusted adults, etc.

Until we have those responsible for raising kids actually do whatever it takes to impart good morals, critical thinking skills, a sense of self-responsibility, the ability to connect actions and consequences, and frankly, get them to adopt 'normal' values -- then we keep having school shootings. And if the schools become as safe as a bank vault (through metal detectors, police officers, etc) then the shootings will just occur down the street.

 

[mbt2001]

I get his cryptogram newsletter. It is a refreshing read... Great fellow with well thought out ideas.

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html To sign up or read back issues.

Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you can carry on board. Last week's foiling of a major terrorist plot and the subsequent airport security changes graphically illustrates the difference between effective security and security theater.

None of the airplane security measures implemented because of 9/11 -- no-fly lists, secondary screening, prohibitions against pocket knives and corkscrews -- had anything to do with last week's arrests. And they wouldn't have prevented the planned attacks, had the terrorists not been arrested. A national ID card wouldn't have made a difference, either.

Instead, the arrests are a victory for old-fashioned intelligence and investigation. Details are still secret, but police in at least two countries were watching the terrorists for a long time. They followed leads, figured out who was talking to whom, and slowly pieced together both the network and the plot.

The new airplane security measures focus on that plot, because authorities believe they have not captured everyone involved. It's reasonable to assume that a few lone plotters, knowing their compatriots are in jail and fearing their own arrest, would try to finish the job on their own. The authorities are not being public with the details -- much of the "explosive liquid" story doesn't hang together -- but the excessive security measures seem prudent.

But only temporarily. Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-on items won't make us safer, either. It's not just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.

It's easy to defend against what terrorists planned last time, but it's shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we've wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets -- stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people in front of airport security -- and too many ways to kill people.

Security measures that attempt to guess correctly don't work, because invariably we will guess wrong. It's not security, it's security theater: measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.

Airport security is the last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. Sure, it'll catch the sloppy and the stupid -- and that's a good enough reason not to do away with it entirely -- but it won't catch a well-planned plot. We can't keep weapons out of prisons; we can't possibly keep them off airplanes.

The goal of a terrorist is to cause terror. Last week's arrests demonstrate how real security doesn't focus on possible terrorist tactics, but on the terrorists themselves. It's a victory for intelligence and investigation, and a dramatic demonstration of how investments in these areas pay off.

And what can you do to help? Don't be terrorized. They terrorize more of us if they kill some of us, but the dead are beside the point. If we give in to fear, the terrorists achieve their goal even if they are arrested. If we refuse to be terrorized, then they lose -- even if their attacks succeed.

Not to be OT, but just to give you a sample of his writing... Very in line with The High Roader thinking.

I am not sure what his personal stance on RKBA is, but I have never come across him saying that we should do away with them. I think if most people used the above "paradigm" for their logic then we wouldn't have the problems that we do today across the board... America seems to be a series of Salem Witch hunts with people, groups and objects (such as guns)...