DC appeals Parker case to SCOTUS

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ctdonath wrote:

Any word on the required & likely sources of the content of the text?

The requirements for a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari as detailed in the official court rules for SCOTUS:

Rule 14. Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
1. A petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the
order indicated:
(a) The questions presented for review, expressed concisely
in relation to the circumstances of the case, without
unnecessary detail. The questions should be short and
should not be argumentative or repetitive. If the petitioner
or respondent is under a death sentence that may be affected
by the disposition of the petition, the notation “capital case”
shall precede the questions presented. The questions shall
be set out on the first page following the cover, and no other
information may appear on that page. The statement of any
question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included therein. Only the questions set out
in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered
by the Court.
(b) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court
whose judgment is sought to be reviewed (unless the caption
of the case contains the names of all the parties), and a corporate
disclosure statement as required by Rule 29.6.
(c) If the petition exceeds five pages or 1,500 words, a
table of contents and a table of cited authorities. The table
of contents shall include the items contained in the appendix.
(d) Citations of the official and unofficial reports of the
opinions and orders entered in the case by courts or administrative
agencies.
(e) A concise statement of the basis for jurisdiction in this
Court, showing:
(i) the date the judgment or order sought to be reviewed
was entered (and, if applicable, a statement that
the petition is filed under this Court’s Rule 11);
(ii) the date of any order respecting rehearing, and
the date and terms of any order granting an extension
of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari;
(iii) express reliance on Rule 12.5, when a crosspetition
for a writ of certiorari is filed under that Rule,
and the date of docketing of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is
filed;
(iv) the statutory provision believed to confer on this
Court jurisdiction to review on a writ of certiorari the
judgment or order in question; and
(v) if applicable, a statement that the notifications required
by Rule 29.4(b) or (c) have been made.
(f) The constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances,
and regulations involved in the case, set out verbatim
with appropriate citation. If the provisions involved are
lengthy, their citation alone suffices at this point, and their
pertinent text shall be set out in the appendix referred to in
subparagraph 1(i).
(g) A concise statement of the case setting out the facts
material to consideration of the questions presented, and also
containing the following:
(i) If review of a state-court judgment is sought, specification
of the stage in the proceedings, both in the court
of first instance and in the appellate courts, when the
federal questions sought to be reviewed were raised; the
method or manner of raising them and the way in which
they were passed on by those courts; and pertinent quotations
of specific portions of the record or summary
thereof, with specific reference to the places in the record
where the matter appears (e. g., court opinion, ruling
on exception, portion of court’s charge and exception
thereto, assignment of error), so as to show that the federal
question was timely and properly raised and that
this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on a
writ of certiorari. When the portions of the record relied
on under this subparagraph are voluminous, they
shall be included in the appendix referred to in subparagraph
1(i).
(ii) If review of a judgment of a United States court
of appeals is sought, the basis for federal jurisdiction in
the court of first instance.
(h) A direct and concise argument amplifying the reasons
relied on for allowance of the writ. See Rule 10.
(i) An appendix containing, in the order indicated:
(i) the opinions, orders, findings of fact, and conclusions
of law, whether written or orally given and transcribed,
entered in conjunction with the judgment
sought to be reviewed;
(ii) any other relevant opinions, orders, findings of
fact, and conclusions of law entered in the case by courts
or administrative agencies, and, if reference thereto is
necessary to ascertain the grounds of the judgment, of
those in companion cases (each document shall include
the caption showing the name of the issuing court or
agency, the title and number of the case, and the date
of entry);
(iii) any order on rehearing, including the caption
showing the name of the issuing court, the title and
number of the case, and the date of entry;
(iv) the judgment sought to be reviewed if the date
of its entry is different from the date of the opinion
or order required in sub-subparagraph (i) of this
subparagraph;
(v) material required by subparagraphs 1(f) or
1(g)(i); and
(vi) any other material the petitioner believes essential
to understand the petition.
If the material required by this subparagraph is voluminous,
it may be presented in a separate volume or volumes with
appropriate covers.
2. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set out in the body of the petition, as provided
in subparagraph 1(h) of this Rule. No separate brief
in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed,
and the Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of certiorari
to which any supporting brief is annexed or appended.
3. A petition for a writ of certiorari should be stated
briefly and in plain terms and may not exceed the word or
page limitations specified in Rule 33.
4. The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy,
brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to ready and adequate
understanding of the points requiring consideration is
sufficient reason for the Court to deny a petition.
5. If the Clerk determines that a petition submitted timely
and in good faith is in a form that does not comply with this
Rule or with Rule 33 or Rule 34, the Clerk will return it
with a letter indicating the deficiency. A corrected petition
submitted in accordance with Rule 29.2 no more than 60 days
after the date of the Clerk’s letter will be deemed timely.
 
anyone want to bet they ask for another extension?

I'll cover that bet, given that DC originally (and quietly) asked for a 60-day extension which would have given them until after October 1 to file the appeal. They were told "No f'n way; you get 30 days tops".

Sorry I can't post a link - the info is from someone I trust inside the Beltway.
 
As I have noted in earlier pages of this thread, a 30 day extension is routine, more that that is virtually nonexistent. If the DC legal department is smart, they will hire a consulting firm to help craft a petition for cert. to make the Supremes more likely to take it up. If. On the other hand, this case has enough notoriety attached to it that it will make it past the cert. pool (group of law clerks who do the initial review and decide what the justices even see) and be read by at least most of the justices.
 
As much as i'd like to see this actually happen, we will not see, in our lifetime, a lifting of the closed registry. Unless we were to get 6 more justices with Thomas' bent, popular opinion will politically sway the USSC to use the necessary and proper clause to inhibit civilian ownership of new machine guns.

1. What is the militia
2. Who are the members of the militia
3. What are the rights and responsibilities of the individual of the militia
4. What can and cannot the militia hold as arms

this is covered in US v. Miller:
(summation from Wiki)

On May 15, 1939 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice McReynolds, reversed and remanded the District Court decision. The Supreme Court declared that no conflict between the NFA and the Second Amendment had been established, writing:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.

since the SCOTUS ruled that the Short Barrelled Shotgun wasn't the type of weapon commonly in use in the military at the time, it wasn't protected by the 2A. nowadays though, full auto and burst weapons ARE in common use in the military and should be protected by the 2A according to the Miller decision. if Heller comes out our way or the ruling stands as is, the '86 ban may be able to be overturned based on Heller and Miller. here's hoping anyway.

Bobby
 
Bobarino wrote:

since the SCOTUS ruled that the Short Barrelled Shotgun wasn't the type of weapon commonly in use in the military at the time

Actually, SCOTUS did not rule that a Short Barrelled Shotgun wasn't the type of weapon commonly in use in the military at the time. What they ruled was that there was no evidence to indicate one way or another. They remanded the case back to the trial court so that the trial court could make that evidentiary finding. That can be discerned from the following language:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154, 158.

Another issue that presents itself from the Miller ruling is whether or not this language has any bearing:

And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

Some have read these two snippets together to create what I call a "duality" requirement... It is summed up as follows:

1.) The weapon must be part of the ordinary military equipment used in civilized warfare; AND
2.) The weapon must be commonly used by the civilian population for legitimate personal purposes.

Indeed, some states recognizing an individual right use the duality requirement to restrict the nature of "arms" in the 2nd amendment. It is an interesting concept that relies upon historical traditions more than actual case law and is kinda fun to play with, if you are interested in the historical roots of the right dating back to the vikings... In short, you have to be a history nerd.
 
On May 15, 1939 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice McReynolds, reversed and remanded the District Court decision. The Supreme Court declared that no conflict between the NFA and the Second Amendment had been established, writing:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.

This also says they DID NOT come to any conclusion! "...we cannot say..". They didn't say one way or the other. The Miller case decided nothing. The Court artfully dodged the issue. They needed to dodge the issue because of the murder of the only remaining defendant, but they should not have so artfully written their response(not a decision) in such a fashion to make it sound like a decision.

Woody

There is perspective and there is pretense. No amount of bombast or emotion can truthfully equate the two. One does not add validity to the other. Bombast and emotion added to pretense does not equal perspective. Reason, fact, and logic? That's a different matter. That will net you perspective every time. B.E.Wood
 
They needed to dodge the issue because of the murder of the only remaining defendant

Incorrect. Miller was murdered, but Layton was alive. He copped a plea, and got supervised probation for five years... so no evidentiary hearing on the issue was ever held. Layton succesfully completed his probation and was discharged from that probation in January 1944 by a judge who ironically had the last name of Miller.
 
legaleagle 45:
Some have read these two snippets together to create what I call a "duality" requirement... It is summed up as follows:

1.) The weapon must be part of the ordinary military equipment used in civilized warfare; AND
2.) The weapon must be commonly used by the civilian population for legitimate personal purposes.
I think you're misreading the "in common use" portion, its not about the civilians commonly using it, but the military's common use of it. For example, a civilian might have showed up to a revolutionary war encampment with a bow & quiver, but it wouldnt be appropriate as that is not what the of the day infantryman carried.

Kharn
 
Much "ink" has been spilled over the above discussed issue.

The District has now, as I understand things, appealed to the USSC, which will either accept or not, the verdict in Parker for argument. If they do not accept the case, then the Parker verdict stands and DC will perhaps "rework" it's ordinance, perhaps they won't, which I suppose will serve to render it toothless.

If The Court overturns Parker, the suit might have to be retried or the DC ordinance will remain in force, which I guess leaves gun rights no worse off than before.

If The Court upholds Parker "narrowly", then gun rights in DC get a boost, possibly without "any ripples reaching the other shore". If The Court rules in favor of Parker and they rule "broadly", then gun rights might well get a really tremendous boost. I suspect that if this ends up the way the cookie crumbles, that there will be a whole chain of law suits coming up, as a bunch of existing law will have been placed at risk. Personally, I would hope for a "broad" ruling in favor of Parker, however The Court is a POLITICAL body, which means I submit that one cannot tell. We can most certainly hope for the best.
 
NO "AND"!
The 2ndA was written by guys some of which owned CANNONS and BATTLESHIPS. There's no "personal purposes" for those.
...and don't go limiting RKBA to the point I can't own a howitzer (when I find one and have the $$$ for it).

C'mon guys, lose this nonsense about "no crew-served weapons" and such. There is NO demonstrable limit on the 2nd's reference to "arms" (make WMDs a separate thread, please).
 
Miller was murdered
Yes, but a few days AFTER the SCOTUS hearing. He just didn't show up. The short time between court date and death, being only about 3 days, has caused problems in understanding the history of the event.

There's a fairly recent THR thread going into great detail about that, clarifying the events surrounding Mr. Miller.
 
Ah, thanks, ctdonath and legaleagle. I overlooked that fact. Miller was murdered before the decision was rendered, not before the case was heard. That doesn't really change anything, though.

Woody
 
ctdonath wrote:

He just didn't show up.

True, but his presence was not important. The key is that he had no lawyer filing briefs or providing oral argument.

ctdonath wrote:

There's a fairly recent THR thread going into great detail about that

There is a real recent article concerning all of this written by one of the law clerks for one of the dissenting judges in Silveira IIRC. The bottom line of the article was that the Miller case was a set up job orchestrated by the trial court judge (who actually wanted the NFA of 1934 upheld)... If there is any interest I can try to locate it and post a link... It was fascinating.
 
legaleagle said:
]There is a real recent article concerning all of this written by one of the law clerks for one of the dissenting judges in Silveira IIRC. The bottom line of the article was that the Miller case was a set up job orchestrated by the trial court judge (who actually wanted the NFA of 1934 upheld)... If there is any interest I can try to locate it and post a link... It was fascinating.

That would be a great thread topic.

Woody
 
legaleagle_45 said:
There is a real recent article concerning all of this written by one of the law clerks for one of the dissenting judges in Silveira IIRC. The bottom line of the article was that the Miller case was a set up job orchestrated by the trial court judge (who actually wanted the NFA of 1934 upheld)... If there is any interest I can try to locate it and post a link... It was fascinating.

count 1 for interest.
 
That would be "THE PECULIAR STORY OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER" by
Brian L. Frye, available here, among other places.
This essay suggests the conventional wisdom is only half-
right, because Miller did less than generally supposed. Part I
presents a brief historiography of Miller. Part II recounts the
history of the case. And Part III analyses Miller in light of its
history. This essay concludes Miller is coherent, but largely
irrelevant to the contemporary debate over the meaning of the
Second Amendment. Miller was a Second Amendment test case,
teed up with a nominal defendant by a district judge sympathetic
to New Deal gun control measures. But the Supreme Court
issued a surprisingly narrow decision. Essentially, it held the
Second Amendment permits Congress to tax firearms used by
criminals.
 
This is the name of it... do not be fooled by the abstract, this guy has it on the ball:

THE PECULIAR STORY OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER
Brian L. Frye Law Clerk to Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, Vol. 2, 2007

The link is somewhat convoluted. The link is to a page where you can then download the article. I found the Standford link did not work, but the Social Science Research Network worked just fine:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=986394

A snippet:

On June 2, 1938, Miller and Layton were both indicted on
one count of violating 26 U.S.C. § 1132(c) by transporting an
untaxed short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce.69 Miller
and Layton both pleaded guilty, but Ragon refused to accept their plea and appointed Paul E. Gutensohn as counsel.

The papers assumed Miller was a “test case of the national
firearms act.”101 They were probably right. The government
needed Supreme Court precedent holding federal gun control
doesn’t violate the Second Amendment. Ragon teed up the case.
He didn’t really think the NFA violates the Second Amendment,
and probably colluded with the government. His opinion is
peculiar on its face, begging for an appeal. A memorandum
disposition is appropriate when deciding a routine case, but not
when holding a law facially unconstitutional. And Ragon was
the first judge ever to hold a federal law violated the Second
Amendment, even disagreeing with another district court which
dismissed a Second Amendment challenge to the NFA.
Before he became a judge, Ragon represented the Fifth
District of Arkansas in Congress from 1923 to 1933.103 As a
congressman, he was a vocal advocate of federal gun control.104
In 1924, he introduced a unsuccessful bill prohibiting the
importation of guns in violation of state law,105 and vigorously
supported another bill prohibiting the mailing of most pistols,
which eventually passed in 1927.106 Basically, Ragon wanted to
prohibit firearms used by criminals.107 “I want to say that I am
unequivocally opposed to pistols in any connection whatever. If
you want something in the home for defense, there is the shotgun
and the rifle, but a pistol is primarily for the purpose of killing
somebody.”108 And he specifically dismissed Second
Amendment objections to federal gun control. “I cannot see that
violence to the Constitution which my friend from Texas sees in
this bill.”109 If Arkansas could prohibit pistols, so could the
United States.110
A prominent Democrat, Ragon endorsed Roosevelt in
1932 and helped push the New Deal through the Ways and
Means Committee.111 In return, Roosevelt made him a district
judge.112 The NFA was part of Roosevelt’s New Deal program,
enacted with broad support shortly after Ragon took the bench.113
But the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 was stirring up popular
opposition, based on the Second Amendment.114 The
government needed to shut it down, and Miller was the perfect
vehicle.

Film at 11:00...:)
 
Librarian wrote:

That would be "THE PECULIAR STORY OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER" by
Brian L. Frye, available here, among other places.

Dang you beat me to it... I had to search for it, do you have one of the card cataloges or sumpin?:)
 
I believe we are talking about "The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller" by Bryan L. Frye. It's a 220KB PDF file that I've attached.
 
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The requirements for a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari as detailed in the official court rules for SCOTUS:
Thank you; interesting reading about understanding more interesting reading.
 
I'm inclined to agree with Woody that Miller doesn't tell us half as much as people on both sides seem to think. As Supreme Court decisions go, it's not a very informative one. We'll just have to wait and see if they finally get around to addressing the Second head on.

There is NO demonstrable limit on the 2nd's reference to "arms"

You have to be able to keep and bear them yourself, and by implication field them and use them yourself. And the amendment, I think we all agree, addresses an INDIVIDUAL right, not the right of a MILITIA. So yes there is plenty of reason to limit "arms" to individual weapons. Unless you take the Second to confer an archaic right of states to form militias, as the group rights theorists do.
 
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