legaleagle_45
Member
- Joined
- Aug 23, 2007
- Messages
- 834
NRA v VILLAGE OF OAK PARK and NRA v CHICAGO were decided today.... and the news at first blush is not good, as the court ruled against incorporation :banghead:
However, upon closer inspection, the opinion was quite sympathetic, explaining that the judge is merely a peon district court judge faced with binding precedent of Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove and despite the logic presented in favor of incorporation, he was duty bound to follow precedent.
I have tried to post the entire opinion for your review as a pdf file... I hope I successfully did so ... if not some computer nerd will tell me how to attach a file... but for now some snippets:
However, upon closer inspection, the opinion was quite sympathetic, explaining that the judge is merely a peon district court judge faced with binding precedent of Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove and despite the logic presented in favor of incorporation, he was duty bound to follow precedent.
I have tried to post the entire opinion for your review as a pdf file... I hope I successfully did so ... if not some computer nerd will tell me how to attach a file... but for now some snippets:
Al though counsel's constitutional arguments
are set out in 15 well-written pages, 2 they may be encapsulated
in a simple syllogism:
1. Under Heller, the Second Amendment's guaranty of
the right to keep and bear arms has invalidated the District
of Columbia's prohibition on the possession of handguns.
2. Almost all of the guaranties that apply against the
federal government and its agencies under the Bill of Rights
(the first ten amendments to the Constitution) have been
held to have been incorporated in the guaranties that apply
against the states and their subordinate units of government
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Ergo, the Second Amendment's guaranty of the right
of the people to keep and bear arms, as construed in Heller,
also extends to Oak Park and Chicago via the Fourteenth
Amendment. QED.
That approach, however, ignores a fundamental and critical
jurisprudential curb that confronts a district judge such as the
wri ter who is asked to confirm that third proposi tion--the
judge's duty to follow established precedent in the Court of
Appeals to which he or she is beholden, even though the logic of
more recent caselaw may point in a different direction.