Kurush,
I'm also not trying to be obstinate but my point is that we don't have any evidence that, thus far anyway, they have the real capability to draw on non-Saudi/Pakistani assets effectively in the US. Nor, for that matter, that they have much capability left at ALL in the US.
The fact of the existence of variously-origined terrorist groups throughout the world does not necessarily mean that those groups have the logistic capability or intention to actually operate in conjunction with Al-Quaeda inside this country. And it is hardly like we aren't watching those on an intelligence level anyway, to see when such intentionality may become real action.
And I'm not saying dispense with truly random checks, though, given that the kind of point of access checks we're currently using are so porous I doubt we'd see much loss in effectiveness.
What I'm saying is that the Carnival model depends on the actual capability to utilize enough alternate assets to evade profiling. We just haven't seen, in practice, since 9/11 any such DOMESTIC capability from the group we are most concerned with.
Reality trumps statistical probability all the time and, as is, that's how I see this current situation. With profiling being a realistic adjunct to random searches, at the very least we may drive Al-Quaeda (in the US) outside their comfort zone of trained recruits. It isn't an "either/or" situation.
Any change of plan for a cell-based, insular, regionally focussed terrorist group, such as bringing in Chechens, ethnic Indonesians or Japanese Aum, heck, of the Bader-Meinhoff gang, is a point of vulnerability to exploit from an intelligence point of view.
I just don't feel, given what they've managed to pull off since 9/11, they have that kind of capability. they had a big splash and appear to have shot their wad on this side of the pond. Everything else has been bush league one-offs. Even in Europe, they had just one in Spain, one in London.
I've got more follow-up capability.
