I got slammed by the Wall Street Journal!

Status
Not open for further replies.
. . . . and this just in from our news bureau in Florida:

<Poster's Note--I haven't seen the story in a reputable news source so I'll use what is available.>

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/28/p...partner=ALTAVISTA1&pagewanted=print&position=



July 28, 2004
Lost Record of Vote in '02 Florida Race Raises '04 Concern
By ABBY GOODNOUGH

MIAMI, July 27 - Almost all the electronic records from the first widespread use of touch-screen voting in Miami-Dade County have been lost, stoking concerns that the machines are unreliable as the presidential election draws near.

The records disappeared after two computer system crashes last year, county elections officials said, leaving no audit trail for the 2002 gubernatorial primary. A citizens group uncovered the loss this month after requesting all audit data from that election.

A county official said a new backup system would prevent electronic voting data from being lost in the future. But members of the citizens group, the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, said the malfunction underscored the vulnerability of electronic voting records and wiped out data that might have shed light on what problems, if any, still existed with touch-screen machines here. The group supplied the results of its request to The New York Times.

"This shows that unless we do something now - or it may very well be too late - Florida is headed toward being the next Florida," said Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, a lawyer who is the chairwoman of the coalition.

After the disputed 2000 presidential election eroded confidence in voting machines nationwide, and in South Florida in particular, the state moved quickly to adopt new technology, and in many places touch-screen machines. Voters in 15 Florida counties - covering more than half the state's electorate - will use the machines in November, but reports of mishaps and lost votes in smaller elections over the last two years have cast doubt on their reliability.

Like "black boxes" on airplanes, the electronic voting records on touch-screen machines list everything that happens from boot-up to shutdown, documenting in an "event log" when every ballot was cast. The records also include "vote image reports" that show for whom each ballot was cast. Elections officials have said that using this data for recounts is unnecessary because touch-screen machines do not allow human error. But several studies have suggested the machines themselves might err - for instance, by failing to record some votes.

After the 2002 primary, between Democratic candidates Janet Reno and Bill McBride, the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida conducted a study that found that 8 percent of votes, or 1,544, were lost on touch-screen machines in 31 precincts in Miami-Dade County. The group considered that rate of what it called "lost votes" unusually high.

Voting problems plagued Miami-Dade and Broward Counties on that day, when touch-screen machines took much longer than expected to boot up, dozens of polling places opened late and poorly trained poll workers turned on and shut down the machines incorrectly. A final vote tally - which narrowed the margin first reported between the two candidates by more than 3,000 votes - was delayed for a week.

Ms. Reno, who ultimately lost to Mr. McBride by just 4,794 votes statewide, considered requesting a recount at the time but decided against it.

Seth Kaplan, a spokesman for the Miami-Dade elections division, said on Tuesday that the office had put in place a daily backup procedure so that computer crashes would not wipe out audit records in the future.

The news of the lost data comes two months after Miami-Dade elections officials acknowledged a malfunction in the audit logs of touch-screen machines. The elections office first noticed the problem in spring 2003, but did not publicly discuss it until this past May.

The company that makes Miami-Dade's machines, Election Systems and Software of Omaha, Neb., has provided corrective software to all nine Florida counties that use its machines. One flaw occurred when the machines' batteries ran low and an error in the program that reported the problem caused corruption in the machine's event log, said Douglas W. Jones, a computer science professor at the University of Iowa whom Miami-Dade County hired to help solve the problem.

In a second flaw, the county's election system software was misreading the serial numbers of the voting machines whose batteries had run low, he said.

The flaws would not have affected vote counts, he said - only the backup data used for audits after an election. And because a new state rule prohibits manual recounts in counties that use touch-screen voting machines except in the event of a natural disaster, there would likely be no use for the data anyway.

State officials have said that they created the rule because under state law, the only reason for a manual recount is to determine "voter intent" in close races when, for example, a voter appears to choose two presidential candidates or none.

Touch-screen machines, officials say, are programmed not to record two votes, and if no vote is recorded, they say, it means the voter did not cast one.

But The Sun-Sentinel of Fort Lauderdale, in a recent analysis of the March presidential primary, reported that voters in counties using touch-screen machines were six times as likely to record no vote as were voters in counties using optical-scan machines, which read markings on paper ballots.

The A.C.L.U. of Florida and several other voting rights groups have sued to overturn the recount rule, saying it creates unequal treatment of voters. Counties that use optical-scan machines can conduct recounts, though only in extremely close races.

Mr. Kaplan says that the system crashes had erased data from other elections besides Ms. Reno's, the most recent being municipal elections in November 2003. Under Florida law, ballot records from elections for state and local office need be kept for only a year. For federal races, the records must be kept for 22 months after an election is certified. It was not immediately clear what the consequences might be of breaching that law.

Mr. Kaplan said the backup system was added last December.

An August 2002 report from Miami-Dade County auditors to David Leahy, then the county elections supervisor, recommended that all data from touch-screen machines be backed up on CD's or elsewhere. Professor Jones said it was an obvious practice long considered essential in the corporate world.

"Any naïve observer who knows about computer system management and who knows there is a requirement that all the records be stored for a period of months," Professor Jones said, "would say you should obviously do that with computerized voting systems."

Buddy Johnson, the elections supervisor in Hillsborough County, which is one of the state's largest counties and which also uses touch-screen machines, said his office still had its data from the 2002 elections on separate hard drives.

Mr. Kaplan of the Miami-Dade elections office could not immediately explain on Tuesday afternoon the system crashes in 2003.

Martha Mahoney, a University of Miami law professor and member of the election reform group, said she requested the 2002 audit data because she had never heard an explanation of the supposedly lost votes that the A.C.L.U. documented after the Reno-McBride election.

"People can never be sure their vote was recorded the way it was cast, but these are the best records we've got," she said. "And now they're not there."
 
Danged if I know what's going on in Palm Beach with those absentees (the "Palm Beach County runs out of absentee ballots" story). That's just weird. Unless people are hoarding them for use on election day instead of using touchscreens?

The story Waitone cites is much more important long-term. Without those records we can't sort out what happened, or do "bugtracking" over time.

:scrutiny:
 
Danged if I know what's going on in Palm Beach with those absentees
I have sinisters thought about those ballots.
When they start coming in they need to check for; the names against being the same as on Death Certificates, check them for signatures that have look alike handwriting, citizens of skid row being heavy voters, being turned in in bundles and all for Kerry, and I imagine there are numerous other illegal ways for them to be used.
 
I am not anti-open source by any means. But by saying you want to open-source the programs, I do hope that you mean to individuals hat present some sort qualifications, and not to anyone on the internet.
 
Open source means open to everyone. The point is that if I (I just happen to have a BS Computer Science from CSU Chico but that is not the issue) or you can't look at the code to verify that it is correct then the system can not be trusted. Of course, 98% of the public would not know what to look for. But the 2% that do is about 1,000,000 times as many as are currently lookng at the code. And most of those curently looking at the code have a vested interest in not finding problems.

To put this into a context that can be understood by everyone. Windows is NOT open source Linux is. If your company has mission critical systems running on servers and you go out to get "crash" insurance if those systems are running on Windows servers the crash insurance will be several times more costly than if you are running on Linux servers. The reason is that because Linux is open source there are way more "eyes" on the code and as a result it is much more stable and secure than Windows. Fact 37% of all internet servers are running Linux, only 14% are running Windows. Why would this be any different for a voting systems which will have maybe 10% of the complexity of an operating system?
 
Jefnvk: by "open source" I do NOT necessarily mean that companies can't profit off the creation and sale of the stuff - but I damned well DO mean "everybody on the Internet".

If there are security holes, they'll be found muy pronto.

What they're doing now is called "Security By Obscurity" - which doesn't work, as it only means there WILL be security holes known by a small number of (untrustworthy) people.
 
Several other points about open source as it relates to security. The NSA uses Linux exclusively and current Linux kernel versions (2.6.x) have NSA security systems build right into the kernel. By default most Linux distributions do not turn on the full set of NSA security modules because at it's highest levels these are so secure that inexperienced users/administrators can find themselves locked out of the system. And I do mean locked out as there are no back doors in a Linux kernel with full NSA security turned on. This level of security is not possible on a Windows based system.

In addition, the NSA security modules are extensible which means that someone implementing a system that requires some specialized security can have a new NSA security extension module written to handle these new requirements. This is not possible on a system that is not open like Windows.

As an example of this extensibility, users that implement Digital Audio Workstations need to be able to run the DAW software in realtime mode. In a normal Linux installation only the root user (the system administrator) can run applications in realtime mode as this is considered a security risk. So DAW users have implemented a NSA security module that allows them to disable this security restriction so that non-root users can run realtime applications. In this case it is being used to reduce security but it is up to the administrator to run the module to do this. In Windows anyone can run realtime applications and there is no way to prevent this.

The problem I have with the current electronic voting systems is that the vendors have used the most unstable, least secure software available to build these systems. At one point MS was issuing Windows security patches daily and only stopped doing this when they realized that it was a PR disaster. Windows systems are under constant attack and systems that are not maintained with every last patch the day it is released will almost certainly be compromised and even well maintained systems are compromised at times. Properly administered Linux systems only require periodic updates (say every 1 to 3 months) and are virtually bullet proof.

In addition, Access is a database administrators nightmare. No one who knows anything about databases would consider using Access for anything that is mission critical or has ANY significant security requirements. (What does that say about the people that designed the current systems?) I consider these voting systems to be mission critical and to have very high security requirements. On the other hand there are several open source database engines (MySQL and PostSQL are examples and there are others) that are powerful, comply with industry standards, have very good security and are widely used in mission critical/high security systems.

My professional opinion is that the entire voting system should be built with open source software. That is the OS, both front end machines and on the backend, should be Linux (kernel 2.6.x with full NSA security) or BSD Unix, The database engine should be PostSQL, both front end and backend, since it has the ability to do secure data replication between distributed databases which is a key requirement for these systems. I would use Tripewire to audit all systems for changes and other activity and use all of the audit features available to log every event on every machine. The specialized voting software should be fully open source preferably written in Ada not C. I will not trust anything less than this. Therefore I can not trust the existing systems. I should add that I have yet to talk to anyone that is an IT professional that trusts the existing systems.
 
Sure. But would you stick cash in an ATM if it didn't spit out a PAPER TRAIL!?

Hell no I wouldn't ;) So, what's the big deal about a company who MAKES ATM Machines providing a paper receipt of your vote.

Jim, I'm gonna download that software and have a go at it myself.
 
....waiting for the software to download......allthou after reading your site, I'm conviced that I probably don't even NEED to do the tests myself.....

Appendix B: Physical Security And Access Issues

One of Diebold's best defenses so far has been to explain that physical security ("plant security") is a key part of the process, so that while GEMS may be open to tampering, nobody unauthorized can get into it to tamper.

This isn't a bad argument. Basically, without an "access method" to GEMS, the above steps to "hack the vote" are useless.

Problem: there IS an access method.

Sources: one major source of info, I'm pleased to report, has been SLO County's Registrar, Julie Rodewald.

Per my interviews with her, here's what we've got physically going on at the county central elections office:

The computer running GEMS is relatively high end. It's running Windows NT, and it contains a card called a "Digiboard", which is inside it and has sixteen modest-speed "serial ports". Four of the sixteen ports run across the same room to optical scan readers, to enter the absentee ballots with.

Most of the rest (ten or twelve) ports are connected to external modems. These modems are normally turned OFF.

At the time the polls close (normally 8:00pm), the modems are turned on. For the next 1.5 to 2 hours, optical scan computers at the polling places call into the central GEMS boxes through the modems and report their totals. Given the number of polling places (see also the SLO County instructions above, steps 29 through 31) each "conversation" is moderately short, although they'll perhaps vary a bit due to normal line quality differences and possibly the size of the data tranfer (popularity of a particular polling place).

The phone numbers involved are known to (or at least accessable by) everybody in the office, and the Diebold support staff (per Ms. Rodewald).

This is therefore the most likely avenue of attack.

In February, as part of the set of downloads hackers did on the Diebold websites, the following memo between a Diebold field tech agent and the central support crew was located. We didn't understand it's full significance until we gleaned basic information on the setup from Ms. Rodewald. In it's entirety:

----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Chen" <[email protected]> To: <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:30 PM Subject: AVTS modem upload BS 4.3.11

Hi,

Found something interesting here in Alameda County, and want to see if anyone has found this in the field. Especially those of you who are doing AVTS (we don't do AVOS) modem upload from the precincts.

Running: BS 4.3.11 GEMS 1.18.14 NT 4.0 6a

I am dialing the central computer's bank of modems (connected via Digi PCI X/em) and connecting to NT's Remote Access Server. I have assigned a ip pool (166.107.248.210 to 220) and the AVTS with PCMCIA card modems dial in okay, and make a connection with the RAS server. I can see the assigned ip address to the incoming AVTS unit. However, when I try uploading, it gives and error: "no connection to host". Yes, I have confirmed the HOST name and tried the IP address.

I tried pinging the AVTS unit and only get timeouts. I then tried simulating the connection with my laptop and was able to successfully upload. I was also able to ping my laptop from the server and vice versa.

At this point, I do not think, despite the port information displayed by RAS Server, that the AVTS was taking the ip address.

I am sure I am probably doing something wrong and would appreciate some enlightenment.

rob chen

Jim again. Let me try translating:

"Digi PCI X/em" is the 16-port Digiboard - see also "products" at http://www.digi.com

"AVTS" means touchscreen terminals, while "AVOS" is optical scan. Other than the terminal type, the equipment is otherwise the same between a TS system such as Alameda and OS as bought by San Luis Obispo.

They're running GEMS 1.18.14, which is an uncertified version (ask Kevin Shelley's office if you don't believe me) on Windows NT 4.0 (bugpatch set 6A).

"RAS" is "Remote Access Server" - a set of communications software that gives external PCs VERY complete access to the central box running it. Files can be accessed and manipulated over it.

Mr. Chen was able to access the central box over one of these modems, or at least he expected to be able to do so, from an ordinary laptop.

Diebold tech staff know the RAS password to get in. They know the phone numbers.

Therefore, during that "window" of a couple hours after polls close, an ordinary PC in a Diebold basement somewhere could dial in, run a script, change votes specific to that county and get out again. In about 5 to 10 minutes tops, per county. And it would take only one conspirator among the "techies" to get the data necessary to do actual evil.

We're not done yet: Chen mentioned "I have assigned a ip pool 166.107.248.210 to 220". That means he assigned specific "internal access numbers" to the 10 modems Alameda County uses.

Problem: "IP addresses" are very specific - you can't have two on the same network. That includes the entire Internet - "IP" stands for "Internet Protocol". The numbers are somewhat similar to phone numbers - the first two sets of digits mark the system as being part of the Alameda County network system. (To test this on any Windows PC, open up a "command line" or "DOS prompt" and type "ping www.acgov.com" (their website) without quotes - you'll get 166.107.72.47 as their website host's IP addy. Those numbers can then be looked up to tell who owns them: "Alameda County Data Processing" at 1221 Oak Street, Oakland.)

So why did Diebold set up the Alameda County GEMS computer with numbers that would make it compatible to share the general Alameda County network system!? Which in turn is connected to the Internet?

Granted, hacking into GEMS this way from the Internet (outside of the Alameda County "firewall") would be difficult. Not so difficult from inside mind you, like at the County Supervisor's offices.

Still, if the danger is from Diebold itself, while this sort of security flaw is intolerable, it's not that useful. By entering in through the modem pool wired right to the GEMS box, Diebold could hack every single customer county, on an automated basis.

And you don't need a lot of "conspirators" to do this. Two or three programmers, one or two managers who are politically savvy and know which races to hack, one guy back in the "build room" setting GEMS boxes up, and one guy able to collect the data from the field regarding phone numbers, RAS passwords and the like. A crew of as little as five people could pull it off, seven or eight a bit more likely. They would also have a "dialer war-room" with between 40 and 100 PCs each with a modem and scripts, to call out to GEMS boxes and mess with them.

NOTE: they may have set up some or all GEMS boxes to dial OUT to the precincts versus take calls in. It doesn't matter...if anything, that would make life easier on our theoretical "black hat crew", as there'd be no need to record the local dial-in numbers. Just program an extra dial-OUT number into the GEMS box as it's being built at Diebold. Diebold supplies the entire finished computer, with Windows and all applications loaded - they could supply an altered Windows COMM driver, hacked-up Digi or modem drivers, you name it - a small "extra dialer" could be hidden almost anywhere.

Can I prove that Diebold has done this?

No.

But why else leave GEMS so "tamper friendly", including the duplicated vote tallies designed to defeat individual precinct checks, if you're not going to use it? Remember, California Elections Code 19205(c) bans even theoretical security holes; to create one as gigantic as GEMS was a risky undertaking.

Nobody sane takes risks without payout potential.

Jim, I believe your technical analysis to be 100 percent correct. I've been working on computers for well over 20 years now, and have known for a long
time that the words MS-Access and 'security' do not go hand in hand. Your hypothesis seems reasonable, given the network architecture they have chosen to use.

This is just insane. Forget right or left.....
 
Got a sick feeling in the gut yet?

20) Quit completely out of MS-Access, and fire up GEMS again (at Start-Programs-Global Election Management-GEMS). Click on the Alameda database. Hit "open". This time, for the "Admin" password, use the password you created and entered twice for the "joke" file - in my case, that would be "jokepass" without quotes.

And bingo…you're in. That is GEMS with the full datafile spread'n'ready before you. You successfully bypassed the GEMS password control system like a hot knife through butter. Note: if you were doing real dirty deeds, you'd save the old Alameda admin password off in a Notepad window or similar, and then when you're done "hacking", splice it back into the file. You would never know what the password really is, but once you were done the system's legitimate administrators would be able to use that correct password normally, without being "alerted to trouble" from their proper password not working.

from Jim's Website obviously....

and guess what: it WORKS. I chose my own password, and was able to substitue MY password for the password on the actual election data, and log into it. I was also able to remove items from the audit trail as you described. Which is not surprising since I had hacked the password.

As we say in my neck of the woods, sonofabitch! ;)

John Fund is either a 1) retard 2) intellectually dishonest 3) a big Diebold stockholder or 4) 1,2, and 3.
 
I'll scope that out tonight.

I honesty don't know how much more I can take thou :cuss:

I wonder if opinionjournal.com will post my response to Fund's article.
I thought it was reasoned and well measured. We shall see.

Thanks Jim :)
 
I didn't know that they were using RAS. Well just one more item to add to my list of GEMS software that is know to have major security problems. The last company that I worked for that used RAS phased out using it 4 years ago because of security concerns and began planning the phase out at least 3 years earlier. So the GEMS system is at least 7 years behind the curve in terms of security.
 
Okay Jim, I read the .pdf re: smartcards

:fire:

Further down the rabbit hole methinks. That's just
so pathetic I can't even begin to comment. Its
unbelievable that they have gotten away with this.
 
IT Pros Weigh In

It would seem that some semi-educated IT professionals weighed in here. That is good. Believe those that have indicated to you that DRE's are not tamper-proof. And for the gentleman/lady that referred to the language PERL as Pearl, I am embarrassed for you. Program Reporting and Extraction Language.

And for the record, I believe that what the WSJ prints is mostly gospel and that most Republicans are the ignorant disenfranchised and don't know it.

Republican = does not care about environment, does not care about corporate evil, does not care about social welfare of our society, etc.

Bring it.
 
Gee... :scrutiny:

We have a new member, who makes his first post concerning a thread that goes back to 2004 and hasn't seen any activity since. He also seems to want to start a fight with other members who are Republicans.

Do I detect a Troll??? :uhoh:
 
Old Fluff said:
Do I detect a Troll??? :uhoh:

No... you do not detect a troll. I think there is an age requirement -- that is trolls must be 13 yrs of age or older. This fella is obviously a little younger as evident by the cute and childish taunts:

Bring it.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top