Jim March--Call your office, please.

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Waitone

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Whassup wid dis.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/11/25/BAG13FTR9E1.DTL

CALIFORNIA
Hacker to try to attack state voting machines

John Wildermuth, Chronicle Political Writer

Friday, November 25, 2005

A computer hacker will be trying to break into one of California's electronic voting machines next week, with the full cooperation of the secretary of state.

Harri Hursti, a computer security expert from Finland, will be trying to demonstrate that voting machines made by Diebold Election Systems are vulnerable to attacks by computer hackers seeking to manipulate the results of an election.

"This is part of our security mission,'' said Nghia Nguyen Demovic, a spokeswoman for the secretary of state's office. "We want to make sure that every vote is counted and registered correctly.''

The stakes are high for Diebold, one of the nation's largest manufacturers of electronic voting systems. The company is trying to get its new voting system approved for use in California, the nation's biggest market, but Secretary of State Bruce McPherson refused certification after 20 percent of the new, printer-equipped voting machines malfunctioned during a July test in San Joaquin County.

"The secretary said that performance wasn't good enough,'' Demovic said.

The new security test, tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, will play a role in Diebold's future certification efforts.

Last May, Hursti and another computer security expert tested a Diebold system for the elections supervisor in Leon County, Fla. They quickly broke into the system, changed the voting results and inserted a new program that flashed the message "Are we having fun yet?" on the computer screens.

"Granted the same access as an employee of our office, it was possible to enter the computer, alter election results and exit the system without any physical record of this action,'' said Ion Sancho, the election supervisor, in a report on the county's Web site.

The California test will use a randomly selected voting machine from one of the 17 counties that use a Diebold system -- either touch screen or optical scan machines. The original plan for the test would have used a machine provided by Diebold, something opposed by the state and the critics of the company.

"We want to test a machine that's already been used in a California election,'' said Jim March, an investigator for Black Box Voting, the consumer group bringing in Hursti for the test. "We want to avoid a so-called 'lab queen,' a voting machine specially rigged for the test.''

Black Box Voting and other groups have complained that the programs loaded into the Diebold machines can be undetectably changed to provide a specific election result. Officials of the company argue their machines provide secure, accurate results.


Officials of the company did not return telephone calls Wednesday.

Diebold has been a popular target, for those worried about the security of electronic voting and for Democrats complaining about the company's links to the Republican Party.

In 2003, the head of Diebold's parent company, a major backer of President Bush, wrote a fund-raising letter to Republicans, saying he was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."

The company was trying to sell voting machines in Ohio at the time and Democrats saw the letter as more than just the usual effort to raise campaign cash. The complaints grew even louder when Bush edged Democratic Sen. John Kerry in Ohio in the 2004 election marked by widespread complaints in that state of alleged voting irregularities.

The company also has a checkered record in California. Problems with the company's electronic voting system caused disruptions at 180 Alameda County precincts during the March 2004 primary election. During the October 2003 recall election, several thousand votes for Democratic Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante in Alameda County were somehow electronically transferred to Southern California Socialist John Burton.

In May 2004, then-Secretary of State Kevin Shelley yanked certification of the Diebold machines in four counties and restricted their use in 10 other counties until their security and reliability could be improved.

The state has mandated that all electronic voting machines have a paper-ballot backup to record votes by the June 2006 primary.
 
Jim March should be National

Wait1 you are one your way to 100K.

Maybe we can extend Jims reach Nationaly. He's got commentary of his own and much more available to him through Bev and others there. Subjects incude OH, FL, and other states I am sure.

Next lawsuit maybe Jim can stop his new rig long enough to make the lawyers hold out for more money and more of the dtate machines addressed before.

Jim March a hero in his own time!
 
Standing Wolf said:
As long as people vote for representatives of the Democratic (sic) party, of course.

If you really think that this is a partisan issue, I feel sorry for you. Or perhaps you don't mind cheating, as long as it benefits Republicans?

Perhaps you are willing to trust your vote to completely closed systems, designed by private companies whose owners have shown themselves to be quite partisan, whose inner workings are kept from the public on the grounds of "trade secret." Many people aren't. When it comes to voting, "trust us" doesn't cut it.

Unless these systems are subjected to public, source-code level review, they simply cannot be trusted. Even paper printouts are not enough. It's trivial (like two or three lines of code) to write the software to print one vote and record another. If the margin of victory is larger than what would trigger a recount, those paper records will never see the light of day. The only thing about any election that should be secret is who voted for whom. Everything else requires absolute transparency. Companies who are unwilling to operate in a completely open fashion should be disqualified from providing election services at any level.

It's often easy to turn a blind eye to corruption when it benefits your side. That's just human nature. But consider that the shoe can always end up on the other foot.

--Shannon
 
Standing Wolf: do you REALLY think I'm in this to advance the Democratic party?

Everyone else:

This is a weird and complex situation. The easy way out for me :) is to repost the longest bit I wrote for Slashdot on this mess, and then link you to the Slashdot story with much more commentary (look for a LOT of posts I wrote):

http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/23/2345207&tid=103&tid=172

------------------

Let's make a few points clear here.

1) The Libertarian connection happened as a result of California Election Code 15004, which reads:

---
The county central committee of each qualified political party may employ, and may have present at the central counting place or places, not more than two qualified data processing specialists or engineers to check and review the preparation and operation of the tabulating devices, their programming and testing, and have the specialists or engineers in attendance at any or all phases of the election.
---

So we (Black Box Voting) approached the California Libertarian Party to team up and do up-close inspections of these voting machines, or at least explore what's possible under 15004. They hired us at a buck a day. The main result: we ended up with listings of installed software and drivers that make it obvious Diebold wasn't obeying a court order to shut down networking drivers that weren't necessary. We've complained to the California AG's office about this and Diebold's cross-connection of the San Diego central tabulator box to the Internet (also banned by both the same court order and state regulation). More details at:

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/14325.html

This upcoming "test hack" at the California Secretary of State's office is another matter entirely.

This all started when we (Black Box Voting) hired Finnish security consultant Harri Hursti to help out in a "test hack" in Leon County FL where the county elections official (Ion Sancho) was worried about all this "Diebold" controversy.

What Hursti found was pretty wild. In short: before the election, all the precinct memory cards are prepped from the central vote count box with the ballot and candidate data...normal enough. But the cards are also prepped with interpreted BASIC code loaded into all the memory cards to control the output of the summary counter printer at each precinct. Worse, if you mess around with that code loaded first at the central tabulator, you can make that end-of-day-printout read whatever you want...put in a vote-skimming routine, false numbers, whatever. Nothing in the system at the central or precinct ends checks for hashes or whatever to see if the BASIC code is legit. Said code can be date/time sensitive so that the machines will still pass Logic&Accuracy testing before or after the election. With the paper trail at the precinct dickered with, you can use the other major hack available - altering the central database of votes to match the precinct report paper. Not hard - the central database of votes is written in MS-Access so either load a commercial copy of Access and tweak by hand, or load/type a Visual Basic script to monkey with the JET database engine (the "Access back end") on autopilot.

Net result: one thoroughly "pwned" election.

The full report:

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf

Since then, *nobody* has tried to duplicate the Hursti results. If they're true, Diebold would have to do a nationwide recall and the Federally approved testing labs (Ciber Inc. in Huntsville AL and a division of Wyle also in Huntsville) would need a visit by people with badges, guns and search warrants.

After the preliminary report on the Leon County hack was released but before the final report linked above, Bev Harris and I formally asked the California Secretary of State's office to check out the issues Hursti found, under yet another obscure clause of the California elections code, 19202:

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Any person or corporation owning or being interested in any voting system or part of a voting system may apply to the Secretary of State to examine it and report on its accuracy and efficiency to fulfill its purpose. The Secretary of State shall complete his or her examination without undue delay.
---

You can see the full text of our request at:

http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/19202requestdiebold.pdf

Note that we asked the Secretary of State's office to look at these issues, and for the current version of Diebold's optical scanners (1.96.4). And this was on 6/16/05.

So out of the blue on 11/19/05 (yeah, Saturday!) we get EMail saying they're finally ready to do this...but with some interesting tweaks:

* They want US to do the hack, not them.

* They want us to hack a Diebold optical scan version 1.96.6 system which has never been used or certified in California and has probably been modified *after* the Hursti report was released.

* The test conditions were to be very limited and with a time limit (with a length they haven't decided on yet).

* The test machines would be supplied by Diebold.

* We would not be allowed to do any hacking we don't tell them about ahead of time verbally - in other words, no "tire kicking".

* They get to videotape everything, we are banned from bringing cameras.

* The public isn't invited.

* Diebold has had five months to prep for this thing, we get less than two weeks.

No, I'm not kidding. You can see the actual text of their "test protocols" sent to us Saturday as an EMail attachment:

http://www.bbvdocs.org/records/proposedhurstidemo.pdf

Here's what our consultant Mr. Akbar had to say (retired from military service long ago):

http://www.bbvdocs.org/diebold/Calif-hack-consultant.jpg

And here's our reply back to the California Secretary of State's office...we have no idea how they'll respond:

---

Mr. McDannold,

We have reviewed your proposed test protocol. Thank you for your intriguing proposition, although it is nonresponsive to the 19202 request we filed on June 16, 2005.

Since you've so very kindly sought our expertise in this matter, we certainly want to oblige. Because you have requested our guidance, we feel it incumbent upon us to begin with the appropriate protocol, one which will be accepted by the scientific community and which will ensure an unbiased outcome. Let's start by looking at your agency's certification procedure 104 (c), which states:

"Certification tests shall enhance public confidence..."

Based on your own procedures, we know you'll agree that choosing test protocols that meet normal accepted practice will be imperative.

It would, of course, be a highly unusual procedure for a vendor whose existence depends on a particular outcome of the test to be involved in designing the evaluation. For this reason, Consumer Reports buys their test products off the shelf, choosing them randomly from the same inventory that customers use. (If Consumer Reports allowed manufacturers to ship them their test products, they know they would receive especially robust versions, and their constituency would not have as much confidence in their results.)

The scientific method attempts to minimize bias by removing the influence of any party who profits from one outcome or another. In testing, those who design the system are not supposed to be the same as those who test the system.

Therefore, we believe you will agree that the protocol submitted earlier should be adjusted in order to avoid procedures which introduce bias.

Let's look at what's at stake for Diebold:

If the findings by Harri Hursti and Dr. Herbert Thompson are replicated, Diebold may face a nationwide product recall, rivaled in notoriety only by the exploding gas tank fiasco that afflicted the Ford Pinto. Diebold is dependent on a particular outcome.

Failing this test might cost them their elections business altogether.

In addition, Diebold's stake in the outcome is compounded by recent financial problems in the Diebold ATM division, which produced a restatement of corporate profits and caused a significant collapse in stock prices. There are already rumblings of a stockholder lawsuit.

It is therefore not surprising that Diebold delayed this test for more than five months, and that Diebold is now "permitting" it only under conditions they control, using machines only Diebold provides.

The proposed procedure contaminates the results.

Therefore, let's resolve the current procedural defect in such a way as to "enhance public confidence" as required by your certification procedures. We can move ahead with assisting you simply by testing the voting systems used in the last election. After all, these are the machines that elected the California governor and voted for the president.

We suggest selecting machines from those county elections offices which have not shown a bias for Diebold.

We therefore suggest Alameda County for the evaluation of the TS/TSx memory card systems and for the optical scan system, we suggest Placer, Modoc, Trinity or Santa Barbara County.

These five counties are the Diebold customers who did not take part in the "we support Diebold" advertisement copied on back of the official flyer containing the agenda for the certification hearing. To refresh your memory, this relates to the letter you felt compelled to specifically disavow in your capacity as chair of the Nov. 21 certification hearing. Of course, it was inappropriate for certain county elections officials to piggyback an advertisement onto an official Secretary of State agenda, and you recognized this, disavowing the attempt to avoid the impression of impropriety.

Instead of having Diebold provide specially selected equipment from their own offices, we propose a more objective approach: The voting equipment shall be randomly selected by Black Box Voting from actual county elections offices that have shown the least bias.

We have full trust that your agency will see the wisdom of testing voting systems from an unbiased source. We are, of course, most interested in testing systems actually purchased and in use in California, rather than hypothetical or possible future systems, such as versions 1.96.6 and 4.6.4, which were initially proposed - systems that have never been certified in California. We are sure that you did not intend for Black Box Voting to take the place of the national testing labs or your consultant in testing new systems.

Therefore, consistent with our request under California Election Code 19202, let's examine the firmware most meaningful to California voters: Optical scan version 1.96.4 and the TS/TSx system as used in Alameda County.

Jim March
Bev Harris
Black Box Voting, Inc.
 
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