Preacherman
Member
You'll recall the furore in late February over allegations that Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the U.N., was "bugged" by the British intelligence services. Well, there have been some interesting articles published about their activities, and the way they co-operate with the NSA in this country. Certainly food for thought when one considers how these activities potentially trample civil liberties.
The first article is from the Telegraph, London (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/mai...FF4AVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2004/02/27/nspy127.xml):
Eavesdropping made easy . . . they can listen through a closed window
(Filed: 27/02/2004)
Michael Smith, who worked with GCHQ during the Cold War, says that spying on allies is routine
The spying operation that led to Clare Short reading transcripts of Kofi Annan's private conversations was unlikely to have involved the use of a "bug" like those seen in spy films.
The British and American intelligence agencies have many more high-tech methods of intercepting conversations that are far more adaptable and much less likely to be detected.
It is far from clear from what Miss Short actually told the BBC which method was used, or even if the UK was actually involved in the interception of his conversations rather than simply a recipient of the intelligence.
"The UK in this time was also getting spy [sic] on Kofi Annan's office, and getting reports from him about what was going on," Miss Short said.
The first point to make is that if someone was planting bugs in Mr Annan's office, which would have been illegal under international law, the most obvious candidates are the CIA and NSA, not MI6 and GCHQ.
But the main point is that surveillance technology is now so advanced that planting bugs under desks or in telephones is not even necessary.
Powerful unidirectional microphones can pick up conversations through open windows.
Even if the window is closed, radio beams can be bounced off the glass to detect the vibrations caused by the noise inside. These can then be translated back to produce the speech.
However, the easiest way to bug a modern office is through the mobile telephones of the people working there. You don't have to actually use a mobile telephone for intelligence agencies to be able to listen to you speak.
As long as it was simply switched on, a mobile telephone on Mr Annan's desk could be used to listen in to anything he was saying to anyone else.
Mobile telephones communicate continuously with their control stations over a frequency that is quite separate from the one used to talk on. Anyone who has details of the frequencies and codes in use can listen in to what is being said in the immediate vicinity of any telephone on the network.
Intelligence services such as GCHQ and NSA do not even need to obtain the frequencies and codes from the network provider. They can bypass the main network to take complete control of any mobile telephone.
But the most likely circumstance that would have led to Miss Short seeing the transcripts of Mr Annan's conversations would be that he was talking to leaders or officials from countries that were the real target of the interception.
International telephone conversations, which travel via communications satellites, are routinely intercepted by US spy satellites.
The capabilities of these satellites and the computers used to process the millions of conversations they intercept are often wildly overstated. But they can pick out key telephone links, recognise key words and even "fingerprint" voices.
Nor is listening in to countries or organisations that are our friends an unusual occurrence. Britain's spies routinely intercept the conversations and correspondence of our allies to discover what they are really doing.
When the Government Code and Cypher School, GCHQ's predecessor, was set up at the end of the First World War, its two top targets were America and France, the two countries it had just finished fighting alongside.
During the British negotiations to enter the then European Economic Community, GCHQ intercepted French diplomatic messages to find out what stance the British negotiators should take to ensure the best deal.
Delegates to anything from trade negotiations to peace conferences are likely to find their rooms bugged by MI6 and their messages home intercepted by GCHQ in order to give British ministers detailed intelligence on what can and cannot be achieved.
The hotel rooms of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo were bugged during the 1979 Lancaster House talks on the future of Zimbabwe, as were the rooms in Lancaster House used for meetings.
As a result, Lord Carrington, the then Foreign Secretary, was briefed at the start of each day on what positions the various parties would take and what their fall-back positions in the negotiations would be.
MI6 also bugged the rooms of the delegates attending the 1992 London conference on Bosnia, with regular transcripts provided to Douglas Hurd, who was then Foreign Secretary.
The only surprise about the memo leaked by Katharine Gun, in which the Americans asked for increased surveillance on the six countries whose votes might help win a Security Council vote on Iraq, would be if it wasn't already happening.
Nor is that illegal. Under the terms of the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, GCHQ and MI6 "obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles" to safeguard our national security and economic welfare.
Miss Short's claims are controversial because interference with UN property is illegal under international law. But if the target of the intercept was the other party in the conversation rather than Mr Annan, then it is unlikely that any GCHQ officer involved could be deemed to have acted illegally.
Even if they were, as long as the Foreign Secretary deemed it necessary for the proper discharge of GCHQ's statutory functions, the Intelligence Services Act exempts them from any liability under British law.
The first article is from the Telegraph, London (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/mai...FF4AVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2004/02/27/nspy127.xml):
Eavesdropping made easy . . . they can listen through a closed window
(Filed: 27/02/2004)
Michael Smith, who worked with GCHQ during the Cold War, says that spying on allies is routine
The spying operation that led to Clare Short reading transcripts of Kofi Annan's private conversations was unlikely to have involved the use of a "bug" like those seen in spy films.
The British and American intelligence agencies have many more high-tech methods of intercepting conversations that are far more adaptable and much less likely to be detected.
It is far from clear from what Miss Short actually told the BBC which method was used, or even if the UK was actually involved in the interception of his conversations rather than simply a recipient of the intelligence.
"The UK in this time was also getting spy [sic] on Kofi Annan's office, and getting reports from him about what was going on," Miss Short said.
The first point to make is that if someone was planting bugs in Mr Annan's office, which would have been illegal under international law, the most obvious candidates are the CIA and NSA, not MI6 and GCHQ.
But the main point is that surveillance technology is now so advanced that planting bugs under desks or in telephones is not even necessary.
Powerful unidirectional microphones can pick up conversations through open windows.
Even if the window is closed, radio beams can be bounced off the glass to detect the vibrations caused by the noise inside. These can then be translated back to produce the speech.
However, the easiest way to bug a modern office is through the mobile telephones of the people working there. You don't have to actually use a mobile telephone for intelligence agencies to be able to listen to you speak.
As long as it was simply switched on, a mobile telephone on Mr Annan's desk could be used to listen in to anything he was saying to anyone else.
Mobile telephones communicate continuously with their control stations over a frequency that is quite separate from the one used to talk on. Anyone who has details of the frequencies and codes in use can listen in to what is being said in the immediate vicinity of any telephone on the network.
Intelligence services such as GCHQ and NSA do not even need to obtain the frequencies and codes from the network provider. They can bypass the main network to take complete control of any mobile telephone.
But the most likely circumstance that would have led to Miss Short seeing the transcripts of Mr Annan's conversations would be that he was talking to leaders or officials from countries that were the real target of the interception.
International telephone conversations, which travel via communications satellites, are routinely intercepted by US spy satellites.
The capabilities of these satellites and the computers used to process the millions of conversations they intercept are often wildly overstated. But they can pick out key telephone links, recognise key words and even "fingerprint" voices.
Nor is listening in to countries or organisations that are our friends an unusual occurrence. Britain's spies routinely intercept the conversations and correspondence of our allies to discover what they are really doing.
When the Government Code and Cypher School, GCHQ's predecessor, was set up at the end of the First World War, its two top targets were America and France, the two countries it had just finished fighting alongside.
During the British negotiations to enter the then European Economic Community, GCHQ intercepted French diplomatic messages to find out what stance the British negotiators should take to ensure the best deal.
Delegates to anything from trade negotiations to peace conferences are likely to find their rooms bugged by MI6 and their messages home intercepted by GCHQ in order to give British ministers detailed intelligence on what can and cannot be achieved.
The hotel rooms of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo were bugged during the 1979 Lancaster House talks on the future of Zimbabwe, as were the rooms in Lancaster House used for meetings.
As a result, Lord Carrington, the then Foreign Secretary, was briefed at the start of each day on what positions the various parties would take and what their fall-back positions in the negotiations would be.
MI6 also bugged the rooms of the delegates attending the 1992 London conference on Bosnia, with regular transcripts provided to Douglas Hurd, who was then Foreign Secretary.
The only surprise about the memo leaked by Katharine Gun, in which the Americans asked for increased surveillance on the six countries whose votes might help win a Security Council vote on Iraq, would be if it wasn't already happening.
Nor is that illegal. Under the terms of the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, GCHQ and MI6 "obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles" to safeguard our national security and economic welfare.
Miss Short's claims are controversial because interference with UN property is illegal under international law. But if the target of the intercept was the other party in the conversation rather than Mr Annan, then it is unlikely that any GCHQ officer involved could be deemed to have acted illegally.
Even if they were, as long as the Foreign Secretary deemed it necessary for the proper discharge of GCHQ's statutory functions, the Intelligence Services Act exempts them from any liability under British law.
